THE CARTER-BREZHNEV PROJECT

Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1977-1980



Table of Contents

I. BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

II. AFRICA: SHABA AND THE HORN

  • Letter from Carter to Brezhnev, December 21, 1977

    Carter expresses "hope that the United States and the Soviet Union could collaborate in making certain that regional African disputes do not escalate into major international conflicts." Brzezinski, according to his memoir, inserted into the letter "some reasonably straightforward language" regarding Soviet conduct in regional conflicts, notably in the Horn.
  • "The Horn of Africa," Minutes of the Special Coordination Committee, February 22, 1978

    In this wide-ranging discussion, members of the SCC debate, among other things, policy options in the event Ethiopian or Cuban troops cross the frontier with Somalia. Brzezinski argues for deployment of a U.S. carrier task force off the Horn; Vance and Brown argue against. Brzezinski raises the China card as a way to "raise the cost of involvement for the Soviets and Cubans." Brown responds: "that would certainly get their attention."
  • "Middle East, Horn of Africa, SALT, Other Multilateral Matters," Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (Vance, Shulman, G. Smith, Dobrynin) [Excerpt], March 16, 1978

    Vance expresses satisfaction that the Ethiopians did not cross the border with Somalia. Dobrynin informs him that the Somalis had tried to revive the idea of a federation in the Horn, but they received no encouragement from Moscow.

III. THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

  • Letter from Carter to Sadat, October 21, 1977

    Carter makes "a personal appeal" to President Sadat to help break the stalemate in the Middle East. Some observers later question whether this may have given Sadat additional impetus to go to Jerusalem.

IV. MID-1978: A CRITICAL MOMENT?

  • "Confrontation Or Cooperation with the Soviet Union," Address by President Carter at the U.S. Naval Academy, June 7, 1978

    Carter addresses the increasingly ambiguous character of U.S.-Soviet relations: a mix of cooperation and confrontation. The speech, which comes at a time when Soviet leaders are complaining internally about "the growing aggression of U.S. foreign policy," later becomes the object of scrutiny itself. Vance, for one, writes in his memoir that "instead of combating the growing perception of an administration rent of internal divisions, the image of an inconsistent and uncertain government was underlined" by the speech.

V. CHINA

VI. THE CENTRAL FRONT

VII. THE POLISH CRISIS

VIII. JUNE-DECEMBER 1978

  • "First Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev," Memorandum of Conversation at the Vienna Summit, June 16, 1979, 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

    Brezhnev, in an obvious reference to the March 1977 meeting in Moscow and Carter's "zigzagging," asks the U.S. President what would happen to SALT "if subsequently one of the sides, for reasons of its own, were to start revising [its] decisions or begin acting as if they did not exist at all?" He also contrasts the successful completion of the talks on strategic armaments with the "ever increasing outlays and the persistent buildup of military forces" in the West. He then says, "off the record," that he and Carter have "the duty of getting their nations used to the idea of limiting strategic arms, and this warranted their moving forward to further steps in SALT III."
  • "Possible Conclusions of a Soviet Policy Review," Memorandum from Shulman to Vance, December 4, 1979

    Shulman concludes that "the Soviets are concerned that U.S.-Soviet relations are moving inexorably toward a continuing downslide, in which the whole range of our cooperative activities, including arms control, would come into question." The report says that "the Soviets appear to have concluded that the advantages of more direct intervention in Afghanistan now outweigh the inevitable price the Soviets will pay in terms of regional and US reactions. The confusion in Tehran and the prospect of US military action there have been factors in arriving at this conclusion."