Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1977-1980
Table of Contents
I.
BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
II.
AFRICA: SHABA AND THE HORN
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- Letter from Carter to Brezhnev, December 21, 1977
Carter expresses "hope that the United States and the Soviet Union could collaborate in making certain that regional African disputes do not escalate into major international conflicts." Brzezinski, according to his memoir, inserted into the letter "some reasonably straightforward language" regarding Soviet conduct in regional conflicts, notably in the Horn.
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- "Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Paul Markowski and Comrade Boris N. Ponomarev, Candidate of the Politburo and Secretary of the CC CPSU, on February 10, 1978, in the House of the CC CPSU" [Excerpt], February 13, 1978
Ponomarev touches on his conversation with Carter on January 25, 1978. Brzezinski later recalled that he "was very gratified that the President" at this meeting "spoke up forcefully on this subject, warning the Soviets that we did not wish a confrontation but that the Soviets were running the risk of creating one in a region which was very sensitive to us." Ponomarev, it seems, did not get the message.
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- "Middle East, Horn, Belgrade CSCE, SALT," Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (Vance, Shulman, Dobrynin) [Excerpt], February 14, 1978 (enclosed in Department of State Memorandum, Leo Reddy to Mr. Anderson, February 21, 1978)
Vance calls for the prompt withdrawal of "all foreign troops, including Soviet and Cuban, from Ethiopia and Somalia." He emphasizes the importance of "a firm commitment that the Ethiopians and the Cubans would not cross into Somali territory" and warns of "the serious consequences."
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- "The Horn of Africa," Minutes of the Special Coordination Committee, February 22, 1978
In this wide-ranging discussion, members of the SCC debate, among other things, policy options in the event Ethiopian or Cuban troops cross the frontier with Somalia. Brzezinski argues for deployment of a U.S. carrier task force off the Horn; Vance and Brown argue against. Brzezinski raises the China card as a way to "raise the cost of involvement for the Soviets and Cubans." Brown responds: "that would certainly get their attention."
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- "Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation of [SED] Comrade Lamberz with the Cuban Ambassador to Ethiopia, Comrade Pepe, on March 3, 1978; based on the Notes of Comrade General Major Jänicke" [Excerpt], March 4, 1978
The East German and Cuban representatives discuss the recent visit of David Aaron, Brzezinski's deputy, to the region. (For Aaron's own version, see the SCC meeting of February 22, above.) According to the Cuban ambassador, Aaron "withdrew the demand for the immediate removal of Soviet and Cuban advisers" after Mengistu promised Ethiopian neutrality.
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- "Middle East, Horn of Africa, SALT, Other Multilateral Matters," Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (Vance, Shulman, G. Smith, Dobrynin) [Excerpt], March 16, 1978
Vance expresses satisfaction that the Ethiopians did not cross the border with Somalia. Dobrynin informs him that the Somalis had tried to revive the idea of a federation in the Horn, but they received no encouragement from Moscow.
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III.
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
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- Letter from Carter to Sadat, October 21, 1977
Carter makes "a personal appeal" to President Sadat to help break the stalemate in the Middle East. Some observers later question whether this may have given Sadat additional impetus to go to Jerusalem.
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IV. MID-1978: A CRITICAL MOMENT?
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- "Confrontation Or Cooperation with the Soviet Union," Address by President Carter at the U.S. Naval Academy, June 7, 1978
Carter addresses the increasingly ambiguous character of U.S.-Soviet relations: a mix of cooperation and confrontation. The speech, which comes at a time when Soviet leaders are complaining internally about "the growing aggression of U.S. foreign policy," later becomes the object of scrutiny itself. Vance, for one, writes in his memoir that "instead of combating the growing perception of an administration rent of internal divisions, the image of an inconsistent and uncertain government was underlined" by the speech.
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- "Several Issues of the International Situation," Protocol No. 107 of the June 8, 1978, session of the CC CPSU Politburo [Excerpt], (with attached text of Brezhnev's speech to the Politburo), June 8, 1978
Brezhnev, primed by Gromyko, tells the Politburo that Carter seems to be "intent upon struggling for his election to a new term as President of the USA under the banner of anti-Soviet policy and a return to the 'Cold War'." He proposes to "fight" for détente and, in particular, "to categorically refute and expose the imperialist intentions with regard to the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Africa, among them the region of the Horn of Africa, in Zaire, etc."
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V. CHINA
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- "Carrying Out Additional Measures to Counter American-Chinese Military Cooperation," Draft Memorandum for Soviet ambassadors (with cover sheet attached from CPSU Politburo session), October 2, 1980
This note to all Soviet ambassadors and representatives warns that "as American-Chinese military cooperation develops further, destructive elements will grow in international relations." "In an effort to create favorable conditions for the realization of its hegemonic aims, the Peking leadership counts on aggravating relations between countries, setting some states against others, and provoking military conflicts. Peking does not hide the fact that it aims to cause a nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the USA, and, from its ashes, assume world domination."
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VI. THE CENTRAL FRONT
VII. THE POLISH CRISIS
VIII. JUNE-DECEMBER 1978
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- "First Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev," Memorandum of Conversation at the Vienna Summit, June 16, 1979, 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.
Brezhnev, in an obvious reference to the March 1977 meeting in Moscow and Carter's "zigzagging," asks the U.S. President what would happen to SALT "if subsequently one of the sides, for reasons of its own, were to start revising [its] decisions or begin acting as if they did not exist at all?" He also contrasts the successful completion of the talks on strategic armaments with the "ever increasing outlays and the persistent buildup of military forces" in the West. He then says, "off the record," that he and Carter have "the duty of getting their nations used to the idea of limiting strategic arms, and this warranted their moving forward to further steps in SALT III."
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- "Possible Conclusions of a Soviet Policy Review," Memorandum from Shulman to Vance, December 4, 1979
Shulman concludes that "the Soviets are concerned that U.S.-Soviet relations are moving inexorably toward a continuing downslide, in which the whole range of our cooperative activities, including arms control, would come into question." The report says that "the Soviets appear to have concluded that the advantages of more direct intervention in Afghanistan now outweigh the inevitable price the Soviets will pay in terms of regional and US reactions. The confusion in Tehran and the prospect of US military action there have been factors in arriving at this conclusion."
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