



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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GRADE: ... (01 OF 02) ... 132026Z

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISG-00 CIAE-00 OODE-00 JPM-05
H-01 IMR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NBC-05 SPA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 OMB-01 TRSE-00 IO-13 EB-08 AID-05
AGRE-00 HA-05 MCT-01 CTME-00 INT-05 DOE-15 SOE-02
MRC-05 /147 W

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R 131141Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6552
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY ISLAHABAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CINCEUR
CINCPAC

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CINCEUR AND CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, PINS, PINT, AF, IR, PK, US
SUBJECT: SIX WEEKS AFTER AFGHANISTAN'S REVOLUTION: A SUMMING-UP

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF MY ANALYSIS OF THE
SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
POLICY SIX WEEKS AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF APRIL 27-28
AND ON THE EVE OF MY FINAL DEPARTURE FROM KABUL.
2. THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
AFGHANISTAN (DRA) IS OVERWHELMINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE
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SOVIET UNION. IT CANNOT STAY IN POWER WITHOUT SOVIET

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HELP. IT RELIES ON HUNDRED PERCENT ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND INCREASINGLY ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, BOTH TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL, AND FOR TRADE.

3. THE LEADERS OF THE DRA HAVE BEEN IDEOLOGICALLY INSPIRED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THEIR ADHERENCE TO MARXISM-LENINISM IS REVEALED IN THEIR RHETORIC, IN THEIR STATED INTENTION TO FOLLOW THE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT MODEL BY EMPHASIZING HEAVY INDUSTRY AND COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE, IN THE WAY IN WHICH THEY HAVE ORGANIZED THEIR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT, AND IN THEIR CLOSE AFFINITY TO THE SOVIET SATELLITES.

4. THE NEW LEADERS OF THE DRA ARE ELATED BY THE SUCCESS OF THEIR REVOLUTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY CLEARLY FEAR THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION AGAINST THEM FROM BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FORCES, AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE HIGHLY VISIBLE AND STRICT. A NATIONWIDE NIGHTTIME CURFEW IS STILL IN EFFECT.

5. I AM NOT AWARE THAT ANY OPPOSITION TO THE DRA IS BEING ORGANIZED BY ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. IT IS, HOWEVER, CLEAR THAT THE DRA REPRESENTS A MINORITY OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION AND THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION AND OUTRIGHT OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME INSIDE AFGHANISTAN IN THE MIDDLE CLASSES, THE CLERGY, AND THE TRIBES. AT THE MOMENT, THIS OPPOSITION IS

FRAGMENTED AND LEADERLESS AND, HENCE, POSES NO IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE REGIME. WHETHER IT CAN COALESCE AROUND A LEADER IN THE MONTHS AHEAD REMAINS TO BE SEEN; BUT,
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EVEN IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD HAVE TO OVERCOME THE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY POWER OF THE DRA BACKED BY THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE USSR, IN ORDER TO OVERTHROW IT. A POSSIBLY MORE LIKELY SCENARIO INVOLVES ASSASSINATIONS, TERRORIST ACTS, AND GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE MOUNTAINOUS TRIBAL AREAS ADJOINING PAKISTAN, OTHER POSSIBILITIES WHICH ARE HARD TO EVALUATE AT THE MOMENT INCLUDE SPLITS WITHIN THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP, OR BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS.

6. THE NEW LEADERSHIP IS INEXPERIENCED IN GOVERNMENT.
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AND ADMINISTRATION AND WILL HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME WITHOUT EXTENSIVE EXTERNAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS, THE ECONOMY MAY MOVE AHEAD ON ITS OWN STEAM FOR A WHILE, AIDED BY A FAVORABLE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION THIS YEAR, BUT DIFFICULTIES COULD BECOME EVIDENT WITHIN SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR. THE PRIVATE SECTOR, FOR EXAMPLE, IS BLOWING DOWN RAPIDLY, AND THE PRINCIPAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE, CUSTOMS RECEIPTS, HAVE FALLEN SHARPLY.

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