- the failure of U.S. intelligence to perceive the imminent
threat of war; according to the State Department's intelligence
chief, Ray Cline: "Our difficulty was partly that we
were brainwashed by the Israelis, who brainwashed themselves."
(document 63)
- the advance warnings of a possible Egyptian-Syrian attack
received by the Israelis and Kissinger's advice to Prime
Minister Gold Meir to avoid preemptive action (documents
7, 9, 10,
and 18)
- the initial state of confusion in the U.S. intelligence
community about the possibility of war (document
13)
- Kissinger's early decisions to provide military aid to
Israel (documents 18 and 21) and stay in touch with Arab
leaders, to maximize U.S. diplomatic influence (documents
20, 44, and 63)
- Kissinger's initial downplaying of Arab threats of an
oil embargo and production cuts (document
36A)
- Kissinger's "shock" at, and refusal to follow,
Nixon's instruction to establish a U.S.-Soviet condominium
to enforce a peace settlement (documents 47
and 48)
- the complete record of Kissinger's 20-22 October talks
with the Soviets and the Israelis on a United Nations Security
Council cease-fire resolution (documents 46,
49-50, 53-56)
- Kissinger's virtual green light for Israeli violations
of the UN cease-fire (documents 51
and 54)
- Brezhnev's use of the U.S.-Soviet hotline to protest Israeli
cease-fire violations and the entrapment of Egypt's Third
Army (documents 61A and B)
- Brezhnev's 24 October letter that prompted the U.S. Defcon
III nuclear alert (document 71)
- Kissinger's rage at West European governments, whom he
saw as acting like "jackals" and "hostile
powers," for not supporting U.S. policy (documents
63 and 75)
- tense meetings of NATO's North Atlantic Council where
U.S. Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld heard complaints about the
lack of advance notice of the U.S. alert (documents
79A and B)
- Kissinger's conviction that war had put the United States
in a "central position" in the Middle East while
the Soviets had been "defeated" (document
63)
- U.S.-Palestinian Liberation Organization contacts during
the war (document 78)
- the record of emotional conversations between Kissinger
and Meir over cease-fire arrangements (documents 91A
and B, 93A and B)
As significant as the new material is, highly important U.S.
documentation on the October War remains classified, especially
among the National Security Files in the Nixon Presidential
Materials Project. The withheld material includes intelligence
reports, back channel messages sent through CIA offices, and
a variety of other documents. Perhaps most important, almost
all of the transcripts of meetings of the Washington Special
Action Group (WSAG)--a special NSC sub-committee responsible
for handling crisis situations--remain classified even though
thirty years have passed. In addition, declassification work
at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project is short-staffed
and mandatory review requests take considerable time to process.
Thus, it may be some years before new archival information
on the October War becomes available. (Note 2)
The transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations
("telcons") are an especially important classified
primary source on the October War. For years under Kissinger's
personal control, all of the telcons are now under review
at the National Archives and the Department of State. A new
book by Kissinger, Crisis, consists of transcripts
of his telephone calls during October 1973. (Note
3) This is a significant collection which elucidates key
developments during the war. Unfortunately, the documents
themselves are not available, only Kissinger's edited rendition
of them. Crisis is by no means a stand-alone account
of U.S. policy during the October War in part because it overlooks
events, such as Kissinger's meetings with the Israelis on
22 October that had critically important consequences for
the course of the fighting.
As useful as Kissinger's compilation is, the documents have
been edited by him as well as excised by the National Security
Council. A fuller picture of the October War may not be available
until the universe of Kissinger telcons is open for research.
Moreover, Kissinger's own record may be incomplete. Other
U.S. senior officials who participated in these events kept
their own records of telephone conversations which may be
as illuminating as Kissinger's. Walter Isaacson's 1992 biography
of Kissinger cites some of this material. For example, on
6 October, Kissinger urged Nixon assistant, General Alexander
Haig to keep Nixon in Florida in order to avoid "any
hysterical moves" and to "keep any Walter Mitty
tendencies under control." This language does not appear
in Crisis. On 12 October, when the airlift decisions
were being made, Kissinger told Schlesinger that the situation
in Israel was "near disaster" and that it was due
to "massive sabotage" by the Pentagon. "Massive
sabotage" does not appear in Crisis either. (Note
4)
The story of the October War and its background is a complex
one that is necessarily simplified in the commentary on the
documents selected for this briefing book. Unlike today's
Mideast crisis, which focuses on Palestinian grievances against
Israeli occupation, the issue that sparked war in 1973 was
the outcome of the last Arab-Israeli conflict, the "Six
Day War" of June 1967. During the months before the 1967
war, neighboring states, who denied Israel diplomatic recognition,
threatened Israel's very existence. Worried that an Arab attack
was imminent, the Israelis launched a preemptive strike against
Egyptian and Syrian forces on 5 June 1967. Within a few days,
the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had seized the Sinai Peninsula
to the Suez Canal from Egypt, Jerusalem and the West Bank
from Jordan, and the Golan Heights--or the Jawlan--from Syria.
The conflict and its outcome came before the United Nations
Security Council, which after protracted discussion passed
Resolution 242 calling for a full settlement. The resolution,
however, was ambiguous enough to fit U.S. President Lyndon
Johnson's basic objective: the United States would support
Israeli territorial acquisitions until the Arab states were
willing to declare peace with Tel Aviv. (Note
5)
The extraordinary Israeli victory laid the basis for greater
instability, on the one hand, creating what one analyst calls
an "impertinent sense of invulnerability" in Tel
Aviv, and, on the other hand, kindling irredentist sentiments
in Egypt and Syria. (Note 6) While creating
buffer zones eased short-term security concerns for Israel,
a new threat loomed as Arab military defeats encouraged Palestinians
to take the route of armed struggle. During the next six years,
the Egyptians would engage in low-level conflict in the Sinai
("War of Attrition") while members of Black September
would kill Israeli Olympians in Munich and U.S. diplomats
in the Sudan, among other incidents. In September 1970, aircraft
highjackings triggered a rebellion against King Hussein by
Palestinian militants. With Syrian tanks entering Jordan,
the possibility of wider conflict loomed but tensions lessened
after Syrian forces withdrew under attack and the PLO was
expelled from Jordan. Linking Damascus with Moscow, the Nixon
administration defined the crisis in Cold War terms and treated
Israel, which had been ready to strike Syrian forces, as a
Cold War ally that had to be armed. The Nixon administration
provided Israel with over a billion dollars in military credits
to support sales of F-4 Phantom jets and other equipment.
Peace efforts on the Middle East made little progress prior
to 1973. During the early 1970s, UN envoy Gunnar Jarring and
U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers floated plans to settle
disputed issues, but their initiatives failed. The Israelis,
who were internally divided over the basis for a settlement,
were unresponsive to Egyptian overtures and the Nixon White
House, preoccupied with Vietnam and seeing no immediate threat
to the peace, had low motivation to pull its weight. Egyptian
president Anwar Sadat was interested in developing closer
ties with Washington and displayed Egyptian independence by
expelling thousands of Soviet advisers in mid-1972, but Washington
responded slowly to this initiative. While Cairo-Moscow ties
were fraying, the Soviets sought a role in the region. Egypt
remained dependent on Soviet military aid and Moscow continued
to supply Syria.
With diplomacy stalemated, during 1972 and 1973, Sadat believed
that the military option was necessary to secure U.S. political
intervention and to facilitate negotiations. To bring U.S.
influence on Egypt's side, he was willing to make a separate
arrangement with Israel over the Sinai, although he would
keep his flexibility secret from leaders of other Arab states.
To make the military option workable, that is to disperse
Israeli forces during war, Sadat realized that he needed partners.
A non-military ally was King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who promised
to use the oil weapon against the United States. For military
action, Sadat turned to Syrian President Hafez el-Assad although
the basis for cooperation was narrow because of differences
in objectives. Determined to recover the Golan Heights, Assad
had little interest in a relationship with Washington and
rejected the possibility of negotiations. He saw Israel's
very existence as abhorrent. Moreover, while Sadat secretly
envisioned a limited war with Israel, Assad incorrectly assumed
the possibility of a greater conflict that would force Israel
to surrender the West Bank. Differences over strategy would
undermine the Assad-Sadat partnership soon after the fighting
began. (Note 7)
Once begun, the October War would yield military triumphs
and reverses for all sides. Egyptian and Syrian surprise attacks
would stun the Israelis as Arab forces poured over the Suez
Canal and into the Golan Heights. While the Israelis expected
quickly to reverse the situation, they suffered 
significant
losses during the first few days. The Egyptians successfully
kept forces on the Canal's east bank, but success turned into
near disaster as Israeli troops, led by General Ariel Sharon,
among others, launched counter-offensives, seized positions
on the Canal's west bank and trapped Egypt's Third Army. U.S.
diplomatic intervention saved Egyptian forces from destruction.
Syria fared worse, with Israeli forces winning back control
of the Golan Heights and moving troops within striking range
of Damascus. Yet, as IDF generals would ruefully acknowledge,
Egyptian and Syrian forces fought valiantly. The human toll
was substantial. By the end of the war, 2,200 Israelis soldiers
had been killed, which in percentage terms was equivalent
to 200,000 Americans. This was four times as many as in the
Six Day War. Another 5,600 were wounded. 8,500 Arabs were
killed--many of them Syrian--but far fewer than the 61,000
lost during the Six Day War. (Note 8)
Soon after the fighting started, the war developed into an
international crisis, not least because Washington and Moscow
had significant interests in the region. For both superpowers,
credibility was a central consideration. And as Nixon put
it, several weeks into the war, "No one is more keenly
aware of the stakes: Oil and our strategic position."
(Note 9) Both states had already armed their
respective Arab and Israeli clients and both launched massive
airlifts to sustain the battlefield strength of their allies.
Although the Egyptians and Syrians suffered battlefield reverses,
their resolve and a determined Israeli counter-attack kept
the fighting going. Angered by the U.S. airlift, the Arab
petroleum exporting states embargoed oil deliveries to the
United States, thus producing a significant energy crisis.
While both Moscow and Washington recognized the danger of
confrontation and intermittently supported cease-fires, their
political commitments made that support equivocal with destabilizing
consequences. Superpower tensions over Israeli violations
of the 22 October cease-fire escalated to the point where
the Nixon administration staged a Defcon III nuclear alert,
yet with all of the strains, détente prevented a serious
clash.
The need to avoid U.S.-Soviet confrontation made it all the
more essential for Kissinger to press Israel to let non-military
supplies reach the beleaguered Third Army. The U.S. intervention
on behalf of Sadat and his troops foreshadowed Washington's
new diplomatic role, the development for which Sadat had waged
war. In late October, Israeli and Egyptian senior officers
began meeting to work out the details of the cease-fire which
culminated, after Kissinger became involved, in the "Sinai
I" disengagement agreement of January 1974. Consistent
with Sadat's nationalist orientation, Israeli withdrawal from
Egyptian territory was his principal objective and it was
largely attained before his assassination in 1981. Nevertheless,
other issues from the 1967 war--Israeli control of the Golan
Heights and the West Bank--remain contested and a source of
dangerous tension to this day.
The ongoing Watergate crisis and the financial scandal that
brought down Vice President Spiro Agnew intersected with the
October War. Agnew's resignation and the need to appoint a
new vice president distracted Nixon. So did the constitutional
battle with Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, Attorney General
Elliot Richardson, and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus,
whose firings--"the Saturday Night Massacre"--coincided
with Kissinger's trip to Moscow. While Nixon's political prestige
was collapsing, Kissinger's was growing even more. With Nixon
embattled, Henry Kissinger emerged as the key U.S. decisionmaker
during the October War. (Note 10)
Documents
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Table
of Contents
I.
The Looming Conflict
II.
On the Brink of War
III.
Coordinated Offensives
IV.
Airlifts, Battlefield Stalemates, and Oil Threats
V.
Turn of the Tide?
VI.
"The Smell of Victory" and Search for a Cease-Fire
VII.
Collapse of the Cease-Fire
VIII.
Crisis
IX.
Crisis Resolved
I. The Looming Conflict
Document 1:
Memorandum from National Security Council [NSC] Staff, "Indications
of Arab Intentions to Initiate Hostilities," n.d. [early
May 1973]
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential
Materials Project (hereinafter NPMP), Henry Kissinger Office
Files (hereinafter HAKOF), box 135, Rabin/Kissinger (Dinitz)
1973 Jan-July (2 of 3)
In the early spring of 1973, Sadat told Newsweek journalist
Arnaud de Borchgrave that the "time has come for a shock"
but no one at the time believe he had a plan for war. That
in October 1972 he had already made a basic decision for war,
if not its exact timing, was a well-kept secret. (Note
11) Certainly, the spring of 1973 augured the possibility
of great instability in the Middle East: a looming energy
crisis, Saudi intimations that the kingdom might use the oil
weapon in the absence of a Middle East settlement, and Israeli
raids on PLO offices in Beirut. Moreover, Egypt and other
Arab states were making quiet military moves that portended
possible action. The NSC analysts who may have prepared this
report believed that various moves that U.S. intelligence
had picked up--movement of surface-to-air missiles and bombers,
higher alert for air forces, reports on war planning, and
the like--indicated that those states were "preparing
for war." Nevertheless, they could not be sure whether
these developments indicated intentions to attack or a ploy
to put "psychological pressures" on Tel Aviv and
Washington. A safe conclusion was that "whatever the
Egyptian and Arab leaders intend at this state, the pattern
of their action thus far does not provide the Arabs with a
rational basis for an attack at an early date." Sadat
would not take military action "within the next six weeks,"
probably not before the "next UN debate." At the
close of May, however, a few weeks after the preparation of
this report, Roger Merick, an analyst at State Department's
Intelligence and Research prepared a report forecasting a
"better than 50 percent chance of major" Egyptian-Israel
hostilities within six months. (Note 12)
The INR estimate, which has not yet been found and declassified,
generated greater interest in the State Department in steps
to facilitate Arab-Israeli negotiations.
Document 2A: Memorandum
of Conversation [Memcon] between Muhammad Hafez Ismail and
Henry A. Kissinger, 20 May 1973, 10:15 a.m.
Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, box 25, Cat C
Arab-Israeli War
Document 2B: Memorandum
from Kissinger to the President, "Meeting with Hafiz
Ismail on May 20," 2 June 1973
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 132, Egypt/Ismail Vol VII May 20-September
23, 1972
During the late winter and spring of 1973, Henry Kissinger
held several secret meetings on Middle East issues in New
York and France with Muhammad Hafez Ismail, Sadat's national
security adviser. When they first met in February, Hafez and
Kissinger had a wide ranging, although inconclusive, discussion
of Egyptian-Israeli relations and the relationship of an Egypt-Israel
settlement to the Palestinian problem, among other issues.
This meeting did not start off well because press leaks had
disclosed U.S. plans to provide Israel with F-4 Phantom Jets,
a development that naturally discomfited the Egyptians. Kissinger
tried to persuade Hafez that the administration's step-by-step
approach balancing security and sovereignty concerns was more
likely to win Israeli cooperation than the Egyptian approach
emphasizing a comprehensive settlement of the 1967 borders.
But Hafez was skeptical, worrying, for example, that once
a step had been taken, e.g. a preliminary agreement over the
Sinai, that Washington would lose interest. Kissinger and
Ismail had further communications but they did not meet again
before war broke out. Whatever the actual diplomatic possibilities
were, Sadat had already decided that military action was essential
to break the diplomatic stalemate and get Washington's attention.
According to one of Ismail's staffers, Ahmad Maher El-Sayed,
who was present at the meetings, "What we heard from
Kissinger was `don't expect to win on the negotiating table
what you lost on the battlefield.'" In other words, Washington
could do little to help as long as Egypt was the defeated
power. Thus, Egypt had to "do something." If Kissinger
said anything to that effect privately, the present document
does not include it. Instead, it shows Ismail treating "war"
as the alternative to accepting the "status quo,"
with Kissinger plainly seeing war as a bad choice: "military
action will make [the] situation worse." In any event,
nothing that Kissinger said would encourage Sadat to reverse
the decision for war. Interestingly, however, Ismail himself
may have opposed the final decision to launch hostilities
[see Document 8]. (Note
13)
Document 3: Henry Kissinger,
Memorandum for the President's Files, "President's Meeting
with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on Saturday, June 23,
1973 at 10:30 p.m. at the Western White House, San Clemente,
California
Source: HAKO, box 75, Brezhnev Visit June 18-25 1973 Memcons
During 1973, the U.S.-Soviet Union détente process
continued to unfold with Nixon and Brezhnev holding a summit
meeting at Camp David and the "Western White House"
in June. With the second phase of the Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks going slowly, the summit made no progress in that area,
although it did unveil the controversial Agreement on the
Prevention of Nuclear War. During the meetings in California,
Brezhnev kept Nixon and Kissinger up late on the night of
23 June so that he could put across his concerns about the
Middle East and China. While the Soviets knew nothing of Sadat's
decisions until October, Brezhnev presciently emphasized the
danger of the Middle East situation. Sharing his apprehension
that war might break out unless the superpowers encouraged
negotiations he said: "we must put this warlike situation
to an end." Brezhnev further argued for the importance
of agreement on "principles," such as guarantees
for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories but Nixon, while
agreeing that the Middle East was a "matter of highest
urgency," was not interested in making any decisions
that evening. Brezhnev's principles, however, were inconsistent
with the step-by-step approach that Kissinger had been pushing.
Apparently Kissinger (and probably Nixon as well) was resentful
that Brezhnev had raised this subject with no notice, as Kissinger
privately noted: "Typical of Soviets to spring on us
at last moment without any preparation."
Document 4: Theodore Eliot,
Jr., Executive Secretary State Department, Memorandum for
the Record, "Next Steps on the Middle East," 29
June 1973, enclosing, Secretary of State Rogers to Nixon,
"Next Steps on the Middle East," 28 June 1973
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of
State Records (hereinafter RG 59), Subject-Numeric Files 1970-1973
(hereinafter cited as SN 70-73, with file citation), Pol 27-14
Arab-Isr
During the summer of 1973 Secretary of State William Rogers
supported a major diplomatic initiative on the Middle East.
After Nixon's re-election in November 1972, Henry Kissinger
expected to become secretary of state but Rogers refused to
leave his post for at least six months because he did not
want to hand Kissinger a "victory." The previous
four years had marked one of the lowest points in State Department
history because Nixon and Kissinger had marginalized Rogers
and the State Department in such key policy areas such as
China, Vietnam, and U.S.-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, Nixon
had given Rogers considerable scope in Middle East policy
and Rogers had a continuous interest in finding ways to ameliorate
the Arab-Israeli conflict (although Kissinger had thwarted
many of his initiatives). After the Brezhnev-Nixon summit,
Rogers made his last stab on Middle East policy by suggesting
secret Egyptian-Israeli peace talks. Concerned about the risk
of Middle East war, superpower confrontation, and oil embargoes
if the problems continued to fester, Rogers believed that
it was essential to get the Egyptians and Israelis to stop
talking past each other on their respective interpretations
of UN Security Council Resolution 242, passed in the wake
of the Six Day War. Rogers' effort was stillborn; as the Eliot
memo shows, Nixon "did not want the Secretary to proceed,"
ostensibly because the White House was waiting to hear from
Brezhnev. Plainly, however, Kissinger was beginning to usurp
Roger's role on the Middle East issue and, no doubt, neither
Nixon nor Kissinger wanted him to get the credit for any progress
in that area. Rogers finally resigned in August 1973. It is
interesting to speculate whether a determined effort along
the lines that he proposed could have derailed the war. (Note
14)
Document 5: Memcon between
Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, 10 September
1973, 6:03 p.m.
Source: NPMP, HAKO, Box 135, Rabin/Dinitz Sensitive Memcons
Kissinger and the Nixon White House were under growing pressure
to move on Middle East diplomacy but while they would make
appropriate public signals, they saw no need to move quickly.
On 5 September 1973, during a press conference, Nixon declared
that the administration had important plans for Middle East
negotiations: "we have put at the highest priority ...
making some progress toward the settlement of that dispute."
(Note 15) During a conversation a few days
later with the late Ambassador Simcha Dinitz (Note
16), with whom he established a close relationship, Kissinger
explained that "the trend here to do something is getting
overwhelming. It can be delayed but it can't be arrested."
While Kissinger believed that it was important to get negotiations
going and was looking for ideas on initial steps--perhaps
a proposal on Jerusalem or a settlement with Jordan--he had
no problem with delay: he felt "no immediate pressure."
But to reduce whatever pressure there was and to maximize
U.S. leverage, Kissinger told Dinitz that he wanted to find
ways to "split" the Arabs, to keep the Saudis out
of the dispute, and to otherwise "exhaust the Arabs."
Kissinger may have used such language to ease Israeli concerns
about negotiations, but that rhetoric could also have encouraged
inflexibility. (Note 17)
Document 6: Harold Saunders,
NSC Staff, to Kissinger, "Memorandum on Your Talk with
Zahedi," 19 September 1973, enclosing memorandum of Kissinger-Zahedi
conversation, 15 September 1973, and untitled paper handed
to Zahedi on 13 August 1974
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 132, Egypt-Ismail Vol. VI May 20-Sept
30, 1973
Kissinger's backchannel communications with the Egyptians
on a Middle East settlement continued into the weeks before
the war. This time, the intermediary was Iranian Ambassador
Ardeshir Zahedi (the son of the U.S.-backed general who had
ousted Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh twenty years earlier),
who had met with Ashraf Ghorbal, Ismail's deputy in Switzerland.
There Zahedi how shown him a memorandum, prepared at the White
House, which outlined the U.S. approach to negotiating a settlement,
"a step at a time" so that "propositions"
could be presented to Israel that "cannot be easily rejected."
Perhaps suspecting that Kissinger was trying to entrap Egypt
in a negotiating process with no clear end in sight, Ghorbal
was not excited by the White House paper: "it contained
some good words but not action." What he wanted was "a
tangible and concrete suggestion."
II.
On the Brink of War
Document 7:
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Brent
Scowcroft to Kissinger, 5 October 1973, enclosing message
from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir (passed through Israeli
chargé Shalev)
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 136, Dinitz June 4, 1974 [sic]-Oct.
31, 1973
Neither Israeli nor U.S. intelligence recognized the imminence
of war in early October 1973. AMAN, the Israeli military intelligence
organization, and the leadership generally assumed that national
military power would deter war and downplayed the possibility
of conflict until 1975 when Egypt and Syria had better air
capabilities. Moreover, Israeli military and political leaders
had a condescending view of Arab fighting abilities. Rumors
of war had begun to crop up beginning in the spring of 1973
and during September 1973 AMAN began collecting specific warnings
of Egyptian-Syrian intentions to wage war in the near future.
Moreover, in late September Jordan's King Hussein warned Prime
Minister Meir that Syrian forces were taking an "attack
position." These developments concerned the Israelis
but AMAN ruled out major war. On 4 October, however, the Israelis
picked up a number of signals suggesting the imminence of
war: the Soviets were starting to evacuate the families of
advisers in Egypt and Syria; a high-level clandestine source
warned Mossad of the possibility of a coordinated attack;
and aerial reconnaissance detected an increase in gun deployments
along the Suez Canal. The next day, 5 October, with AMAN now
seeing a "low probability" of war, Meir shared Israeli
concerns with Washington. (Note 18) With
Kissinger in New York at the annual meeting of the United
Nations General Assembly, his deputy Brent Scowcroft received
this urgent message from Meir late in the day. Egyptian and
Syrian war preparations were becoming more and more noticeable
making Meir and her colleagues wonder whether 1) those countries
anticipated an Israeli attack, or 2) intended to "initiate
an offensive military operation." She asked Kissinger
to convey to the Arabs and the Soviets that Tel Aviv had no
belligerent intentions, but that if Egypt or Syria began an
offensive, "Israel will react militarily, with firmness
and great strength."
Document 8:
U.S. Interests Section Egypt, Cable 3243 to State Department,
"Soviet View on Causes and Timing of Egyptian Decision
to Resume Hostilities," 26 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1175, 1973 War (Middle East) 26 October
1973-File No. 21
During the weeks before the war, the Soviets believed that
the situation was growing more dangerous, but like the Americans
and the Israelis they did not see the "resumption of
fighting [as] at all likely." Yet, they had begun to
evacuate dependents because they had learned of the decision
for war, but not its exact timing, a few days ahead of the
event. As the war unfolded, U.S. diplomats in Cairo picked
up interesting gossip about Soviet foreknowledge and Egyptian
debate over war from a suspected Russian Intelligence Services
(RIS, or KGB) official, Leo Yerdrashnikov (whose official
cover was deputy director of the local Tass office). His account
is fascinating although some details are unconfirmable, at
least with sources known to this writer. Interestingly, in
the discussion of Sadat and his advisers, Yerdrashnikov claims
that Hafez Ismail was among those who argued against war because
a "policy of rapprochement … was working in Egypt's
favor." The Soviet also claimed that Sadat had told Saudi
Arabia's King Faisal of his decision in August and that the
King had "encouraged" Sadat. Yerdrashnikov also
sheds light on when the Soviets learned of Sadat's decision.
On 3 October, Sadat told Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov
that war was imminent. Moscow did not, however, learn when
the war would start until the morning of 6 October. (Note
19)
Document 9:
U.S. Embassy Israel, Cable 7766 to Department of State, 6
October 9988, "GOI Concern About Possible Syrian and
Egyptian Attack Today"
Source: NPMP, National Security Council Files (hereinafter
NSCF), box 1173, 1973 War (Middle East) 6 Oct. 1973 File No.
1 [1 of 2]
Apparently, Kissinger did not receive Meir's message [Document
7] until the next morning, when he passed a copy to Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin to corroborate Israeli concern. (Note
20) In any event, Kenneth Keating, the U.S. Ambassador
to Israel, provided more specific news in a message that arrived
sometime before 6 a.m.: the Israelis believed that Egypt and
Syria would launch a coordinated attack within six hours.
The Israeli's "Top Source," an Egyptian (who may
have been a double agent) had provided warning that war would
begin that day. Shocked and surprised by the possibility of
war, Golda Meir put it this way: "we may be in trouble."
Some of Meir's advisers urged a preemptive strike, but the
prime minister assured Keating that Israel would not launch
a pre-emptive attack; she wanted to "avoid bloodshed"
and, no doubt, the opprobrium associated with striking first.
Instead, the Israelis ordered the mobilization of 100,000
troops, a disorganized process that took several days. At
2:00 p.m., the Egyptians and Syrians, aided by a successful
deception plan, launched their attack. As Egyptian Major General
Talaat Ahmed Mosallam later put it, the surprise was so complete
"because of both the Arab plan and the failure of the
Israelis to understand or even believe what they saw with
their own eyes." (Note 21)
Document 10:
Message from Secretary Kissinger, New York, to White House
Situation Room, for delivery to President Nixon at 9:00 a.m.,
6 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 664, Middle East War Memos &
Misc October 1-October 17, 1973
At 6:00 a.m., Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco woke
his boss with Keating's message. As this document shows, Kissinger
immediately took the reins of power and began making phone
calls and sending messages urging restraint by all concerned
parties. That morning, Kissinger got in touch with Nixon (who
was in Florida) only after he had made a series of calls,
first to Dobrynin, asking that the Soviets hold back Cairo
and Damascus. He also called Israeli chargé Shalev,
advising him to inform his government "that there must
be no preemptive strike." Later, having received Israeli
assurances about preemption, he told Dobrynin and Egyptian
Foreign Minister Zayyat that there would be no such strikes.
Interestingly, Kissinger has never acknowledged that he recommended
against preemption, although his recent collection provides
more confirming information on this point. (Note
22)
Document 11: U.S. Mission
to United Nations cable 4208 to U.S. Embassy Israel, 6 October
1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1173, 1973 War (Middle East) 6 Oct.
1973 File No. 1 [1 of 2]
Hoping that he could avert war, Kissinger wired Ambassador
Keating, informing him of his other efforts to secure Arab
and Israeli restraint and of his "appreciation"
for Meir's assurance that there would be no preemptive moves.
Document 12: U.S. Department
of State cable 199583 to U.S. Embassies Jordan and Saudi Arabia,
"Message from Secretary to King Faisal and King Hussein,"
6 October 1973
Source: NPMP, National Security Council Files (hereinafter
NSCF), box 1173, 1973 War (Middle East) 6 Oct. 1973 File No.
1 [1 of 2]
During the course of the October War, Kissinger tried to
demonstrate impartiality by communicating with the leaders
of Arab governments he considered "moderate," such
as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, among others. In this message,
prepared for Kings Faisal and Hussein, Kissinger related his
efforts to avert war and vainly asked their help in securing
"restraint" on Assad's and Sadat's part. Within
a few days, Kissinger would soon begin back channel communications
with Ismail and Sadat.
Document 13:
Memorandum from William B. Quandt to Brent Scowcroft, "Arab-Israeli
Tensions," 6 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1173, 1973 War (Middle East) 6 Oct.
1973 File No. 1 [1 of 2]
Saturday morning, before the U.S. learned that war had broken
out, the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) met in the
White House Situation room in Kissinger's absence. (Unfortunately,
all but one of the WSAG meeting minutes remain classified).
According to one account, during the meeting, Director of
Central Intelligence Colby opined that neither side was initiating
war but that the conflict was the result of an "action-reaction
cycle." (Note 23) This document, prepared
by NSC staffer William Quandt, reflects the uncertainty of
that morning. In light of Meir's warning, Quandt tried to
interpret the various signs of impending conflict: evacuation
of Soviet advisers, Egyptian forces on a high state of alert,
and the positioning of Syrian forces at the Golan Heights.
One possibility was that the evacuation of Soviet advisers
meant that Moscow "had gotten wind" that war was
imminent. Another possibility was a "major crisis in
Arab-Soviet relations." Indeed, "downplay[ing] the
likelihood of an Arab attack on Israel," U.S. intelligence
saw an Arab-Soviet crisis as a more plausible explanation.
This was consistent with the received wisdom in the intelligence
establishment that the Arabs would not initiate war as long
as the military balance favored Israel. In other words, Tel
Aviv's preponderant military power deterred war. This was
the prevailing view of Israeli intelligence and U.S. intelligence
bought into it. A few weeks later, Assistant Secretary of
State Intelligence and Research Ray Cline observed, "Our
difficulty was partly that we were brainwashed by the Israelis,
who brainwashed themselves." (Note 24)
Brainwashed or not, Quandt suggested a number of actions "if
hostilities are imminent."
III.
Coordinated Offensives
Document 14: Message from
Soviet Government to Nixon and Kissinger, 6 October 1973,
called in at 2:10 p.m.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 27-Arab-Isr
This message conveys Brezhnev's and the Politburo's concern
about the Middle East "conflagration." Although
far from straightforward about when they first learned of
Sadat's war plans, the Soviets were no less shocked than the
Americans by the Egyptian and Syrian decisions for war. For
Brezhnev and his colleagues, war was a "gross miscalculation,"
a "major political error," because they believed
that the Arabs were sure to lose. Recognizing the danger of
the situation for superpower relations, during the first days
of the war the Soviets pressed their Egyptian and Syrian clients
for a cease-fire. At the same time, however, Brezhnev wanted
to maintain Soviet influence in the region, thus, Soviet policy
had to avoid a military and political disaster for Egypt and
Syria. The tension between détente and credibility
concerns would shape Soviet policy throughout the conflict.
(Note 25)
Document 15: Memorandum
from William Quandt and Donald Stukel, NSC Staff, "WSAG
Meeting -- Middle East, Saturday, October 6, 1973, 3:00 p.m."
Source: NPMP, National Security Council Institutional Files,
box H-94, WSAG Meeting, Middle East 10/6/73 7:30 pm., folder
1
As Israelis were observing Yom Kippur, the Egyptians and
Syrians launched their attacks. Just after 2:00 p.m. (Cairo
time) 100,000 Egyptian troops and 1,000 tanks engulfed Israeli
forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal while 35,000 Syrian
troops and 800 tanks broke through Israeli positions on the
Golan Heights. (Note 26) Providing Kissinger
with some background information for another WSAG meeting,
held early that evening, NSC staffers believed that senior
officials had to start considering a number of issues, such
as steps to minimize threats to U.S. interests, e.g., an Arab
oil embargo, possible Soviet moves, and the "consequences
of a major Arab defeat." With respect to the Soviet position,
Kissinger's advisers believed that the key question was how
Washington could "best take advantage of this crisis
to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East." But if
Moscow's influence was to be reduced, it could not be the
result of a "major Arab defeat" because that could
endanger U.S. interests in the region, destroy the possibility
of a settlement, and weaken "moderate" Arab regimes.
The advantages of finding ways to "minimize" Arab
"loss of face" required serious consideration.
Document 16: Memorandum
to Kissinger, initialed "LSE" [Lawrence S. Eagleburger],
6 October 1973
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, Pol 27-14 Arab-Isr
At the outset, the Israelis did not want UN Security Council
action on a cease-fire because it could prevent them from
reversing initial Arab gains. During a conversation with Foreign
Minister Abba Eban at 9:07 a.m, Kissinger indirectly assured
him that Washington would not immediately go to the Security
Council; this satisfied Eban because it would let the Israelis
decide whether to "[do] it quickly." While Kissinger
would soon consider Security Council action to stop the fighting,
the Israeli position on a cease-fire influenced his thinking.
Sometime during the day, Eban spoke with Kissinger's executive
assistant, Lawrence Eagleburger, (Kissinger must have been
temporally occupied) and registered his appreciation that
Kissinger would defer UN action so that Israel had "time
to recoup its position." In other words, the Israelis
sought a cease-fire based on the status quo ante. To
give the Israelis time to do that, Eban asked for a delay
on any Security Council action until Monday. By the time Eban
spoke with Kissinger later in the day, the latter had seen
Eagleburger's memo and Eban had nothing to worry about. Having
decided that Washington had to "lean" toward Tel
Aviv in order to restrain the Arabs and the Soviets but also
to get more leverage over the Israelis during the negotiating
phase, Kissinger tacitly assured the foreign minister that
Washington would not be "precipitate" in seeking
Security Council Action. In any event, the Soviets were interested
in a cease-fire and so was Assad--if the fighting stopped
he would have control of the Golan Heights. Sadat, however,
was not ready to halt until he had a stronger position on
the Sinai. (Note 27)
Document 17: Memcon between
Kissinger and Ambassador Huang Zhen, PRC Liaison Office, 6
October 1973, 9:10- 9:30 p.m.
Source: RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's
Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977. Box 328. China Exchanges
July 10-October 31, 1973
Back in Washington, at the close of the day Kissinger had
one of his confidential talks with Huang Zhen, Beijing's representative
in Washington. Rather frankly, Kissinger disclosed elements
of his grand strategy; he assured the Chinese that "our
strategic objective is to prevent the Soviets from getting
a dominant position in the Middle East." Believing that
the Israelis would achieve a quick victory over the Arabs
in a few days, Kissinger wanted to demonstrate to the Arab
states that "whoever gets help from the Soviet Union
cannot achieve his objective." Moreover, to the extent
that the Arabs believed that they could win some territory
before agreeing to halt the fighting, Kissinger wanted to
slap down that belief by supporting a cease-fire based on
a "return to the status quo ante." The Chinese were
sympathetic to the Arab cause so Kissinger had to be able
to assure progress on Arab grievances. Once negotiations begin,
"we will have to separate ourselves from the Israeli
point of view to some extent." That would be possible,
however, if Washington could offer security guarantees for
"new borders after the settlement."
Document 18:
Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 7 October 1973, 8:20
p.m.
Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973-1977. Box
25. Cat C 1974 Arab-Israeli War
The first page of this document is mostly illegible--except
for a few scraps on U.S. supply of Sidewinder (air-to-air)
missiles and bomb racks--but it provides interesting detail
on the early moments of the war, such as Israeli cabinet debates
on the question of whether to preempt or not. Apparently advice
that Kissinger had given in the past--"whatever happens,
don't be the one that strikes first"--played no small
part in Meir's thinking. With war underway, Kissinger assumed
that Israeli forces would soon reverse Egyptian advances;
therefore, he wanted to delay action at the UN Security Council
to enable the IDF to "move as fast as possible."
The Israelis were seeking military aid---Sidewinder missiles,
planes, ordnance, ammunition, and aircraft parts--but aircraft
was the priority of the moment. Kissinger, however, was not
so sure that aircraft could be provided "while the fighting
is going on," although he thought it possible to make
Sidewinders and bomb racks available. As for the Soviets,
Kissinger did not show much concern: "in all their communications
with us, they were very mild."
Document 19: Department
of State, Operations Center, Middle East Task Force, Situation
Report # 8, "Situation in the Middle East, as of 2300
Hours (EDT, Oct. 7, 1973"
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1173, 1973 War (Middle East) 7 Oct.
1973 File No. 2
During the first day of the fighting, Arab forces made significant
gains--the Syrians had penetrated the Golan Heights while
the Egyptians had moved into the Sinai past the east bank
of the Suez Canal. Given the great strategic value of the
Golan Heights, so close to Israeli population centers, the
Israelis started to throw in forces there first. (Note
28) To keep officials abreast of developments, the State
Department's Middle East Task Force, lodged at the Department's
basement Operations Center, regularly issued "sitreps"
on military and political developments. This one, produced
at the end of the second day of the fighting, showed a grim
situation: "major losses on both sides," a "miserably
tough day" for the Israelis.
Document 20:
Kissinger to Egyptian Foreign Minister Al-Zayyat, 8 October
1973, enclosing "Message for Mr. Hafiz Ismail from Dr.
Kissinger," 8 October 1973
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 132, Egypt/Ismail Vol. VII October
1-21, 1973
Within a day after the war broke out, Sadat's security adviser,
Haifez Ismail, sent Kissinger a secret message, through the
Cairo CIA station, outlining his government's war aims. The
message remains classified and Kissinger found its basic terms---restoration
of 1967 borders--unacceptable, but he saw it as extraordinarily
significant: it treated Washington as the key player in the
peace process but also showed Sadat's moderation; he did not
seek to "widen the confrontation." (Note
29) Kissinger quickly responded, asking Sadat and Ismail
to clarify points about territorial withdrawal. He also asked
about the substance of a backchannel message from Sadat to
the Shah of Iran that the Iranians showed to U.S. Ambassador
to Iran Richard Helms. Given Kissinger's expectation that
the Israelis would soon be overtaking the Egyptians, he may
have anticipated that Ismail and Sadat would be interested
in his offer to "bring the fighting to a halt" and
"personally participate in assisting the parties to reach
a just resolution" of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Document
21A: Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 9 October
1973, 8:20-8:40 a.m.
Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, box 25, CAT C
Arab-Israeli War
Document 21B: Memcon
between Dinitz and Kissinger, 9 October 1973, 6:10-6:35 p.m.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, Pol Isr-US
Early in the morning of 9 October, Kissinger received a call
from Dinitz that Israeli forces were in a more "difficult"
position. A counter-offensive launched the previous day had
failed with major losses. At 8:20, the two met for a more
detailed conversation, with a chagrined Dinitz acknowledging
that the Israelis had lost over 400 tanks to the Egyptians
and 100 to the Syrians. Egyptian armor and surface-to-air
missiles were taking their toll in the air and ground battle
and the Israeli cabinet had decided that it had to "get
all equipment and planes by air that we can." Kissinger,
who had assumed that Tel Aviv could recapture territory without
major infusions of aid, was perplexed by the bad news--"Explain
to me, how could 400 tanks be lost to the Egyptians?"--and
the diplomatic implications of substantial U.S. wartime military
aid was troublesome. As indicated on the record of the 8:20
a.m. meeting, Dinitz and Kissinger met privately, without
a notetaker, to discuss Golda Meir's request for a secret
meeting with Nixon to plea for military aid, a proposal that
Kissinger quickly dismissed because it would strengthen Moscow's
influence in the Arab world. To underline the urgency of the
situation, Dinitz may have introduced an element of nuclear
blackmail into the private discussion. While Golda Meir had
rejected military advice for nuclear weapons use, she had
ordered the arming and alerting of Jericho missiles--their
principal nuclear delivery system--at least to influence Washington.
(Note 30) Kissinger has never gone on record
on this issue and no U.S. documentation on the U.S. Israeli
nuclear posture during the war has been declassified. Whatever
Dinitz said, Kissinger was responsive to the pleas for more
assistance. Later, when the WSAG considered the Israeli position,
it recommended the supply of arms as long as Washington kept
a low profile. Meeting Dinitz later in the day, Kissinger
told him that Nixon had approved the entire list of "consumable"
items sought by the Israelis (except for laser bombs) would
be shipped. Moreover, aircraft and tanks would be replaced
if the need became "acute." To ensure that the U.S.
role had low visibility, Israeli cargo plans would have the
El Al markings painted out. Moreover, discussion of arrangements
to charter U.S. commercial aircraft for shipping war material
began on the U.S. side. During that meeting, Dinitz had better
news to report: progress on the Golan Heights and the massive
destruction of Syrian tanks.
Document 22: William Quandt
to Kissinger, "Middle Eastern Issues," 9 October
1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 664, Middle East War Memos &
Misc. Oct. 6-Oct 17, 1973
Pointing to risky developments--Israel's losses and request
for supplies, the probability that fighting would "drag
on" for more days, threats to U.S. citizens in Lebanon,
calls from Kuwait for use of the oil weapon, and reports of
Soviet casualties from Israeli bombing in Syria--Quandt advised
Kissinger that he would have to consider decisions on a number
of problems. Meeting Israel's arms requests "too visibly"
could endanger U.S. citizens but holding back would undermine
Tel Aviv's confidence in U.S. policy. For Quandt, the "key
problem" was a cease-fire. The earlier position favoring
a cease-fire based on the status quo ante had become
less and less tenable because of the "prospects for increasingly
serious threats to US interests if the fighting is prolonged."
Pushing for a "ceasefire in place," however, was
likely to "irritate" the Israelis, who were trying
to recover lost territory. Tel Aviv might charge a high price,
such as "strong" diplomatic and military support
after the war, but Quandt thought it might be "worth
the cost." Whatever impact this suggestion may have had
on Kissinger's thinking, he brought up the possibility of
a cease-fire in place during a phone conversation with Dinitz
later in the day. (Note 31)
IV.
Airlifts, Battlefield Stalemates, and Oil Threats
Document 23: Department
of State, Operations Center, Middle East Task Force, Situation
Report #18, "Situation in the Middle East, as of 1800
EDT, Oct. 10, 1973"
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174, 1973 Middle East War - 10 October
1973 File No. 5
While Arab and Israeli ground forces were "sparring
and regrouping," Syrian and Israeli air forces were engaged
in battle and the Israeli Air Force bombed the international
airport at Damascus. Meanwhile, Greek, Israeli, and U.S. intelligence
picked up signs that the Soviets were airlifting supplies
to their Arab clients. "The Israelis speculate the main
cargo is missiles." As for the U.S. effort to supply
Israel, the U.S. press had already observed an Israeli Boeing
707 picking up missiles and bombs in Norfolk, VA. Moreover,
comments by Sheik Yamani, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Petroleum,
suggested that the U.S. military supply of Israel would have
a cost--cutbacks in oil production. The Soviets had made their
airlift decision early in the war, believing that extensive
support could enhance Moscow's prestige in the Arab world.
This decision had significant implications for the course
of the war; not only did the airlift encourage the Egyptians
and Syrians to continue fighting it came to be seen in Washington
as a "challenge" to American power. (Note
32)
Document 24: U.S. Interests
Section in Egypt, cable 3942 to State Department, "Current
Egyptian Military Position," 10 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 638, Arab Republic of Egypt IX (Jan-Oct
73)
A secret source within the Egyptian government provided the
U.S. Interests Section with current information on battlefield
and political developments. Some of this intelligence reached
the Associated Press, which reported conflicting information
on Egyptian war aims: either to take "all of Sinai"
or to hold ground deep enough into the peninsula to force
a cease-fire in place. While the plan that Sadat has shown
Assad aimed at forty kilometer incursions into the Sinai,
the actual Egyptian war plan posited a far more limited attack,
enough to get Washington's attention and force Tel Aviv to
negotiate. The information provided by the source suggested
a more restricted incursion than Sadat had originally anticipated
(20 kilometers instead of 60), but the intimation of limited
purposes was correct. Given that had concealed from Assad
his limited goals, a press leak of this sort was undoubtedly
highly disturbing to the Egyptian leadership. Apparently,
the AP report upset the informant so much that the Interests
Section observed that "If this continues, source cannot
continue to produce."
Document 25: Yuli Vorontsov,
Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy, to Scowcroft, 10 October
1973, enclosing untitled paper, delivered 11:15 a.m.
Source: NPMP, HAKO, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 19 (July 13,
1973-Oct 11, 1973)
Skeptical that the Arabs would make lasting military gains
and worried about the war's impact on U.S.-Soviet détente,
Moscow was interested in a cease-fire throughout the conflict.
But Sadat wanted to keep fighting in order to get political
concessions from Israel while the latter rejected a cease-fire
that left Arab territorial gains in place. By 10 October,
Soviet interest in a cease-fire was more serious; the fighting
was stalemated and the Politburo estimated that the Arabs
would not make further military gains. That morning, Dobrynin
called Kissinger informing him that Moscow was interested
in a Security Council resolution for a cease-fire in place
as long as a third party introduced it and Moscow would not
have to vote for it. As the memo suggests, it had been difficult
for the Soviets to persuade the Egyptians to accept a resolution
(by contrast, Assad wanted a cease-fire to stop Israeli advances).
To give their clients some cover, the Soviets would have to
maintain some distance from any resolution. Kissinger stalled
on the Soviet proposal ostensibly because of Vice President
Agnew's resignation (owing to a financial scandal). Kissinger,
however, wanted to give Tel Aviv time for military advances.
In between conversations with Dobrynin, he advised Dinitz
to the effect that "Everything depended on the Israelis
pushing back to the prewar lines as quickly as possible …
We could not stall a cease-fire proposal forever." By
the time the Israelis were supporting a cease-fire resolution,
they had begun making military gains, but those gains turned
Sadat against the proposal. That, the Soviets regarded as
a "gross political and strategic blunder." While
Kissinger's dilatory tactics irritated Moscow, the Soviets
continued their airlift. As Soviet Middle East expert Victor
Israelian later suggested, "the motivations of the two
superpowers were the same," with both were trying to
"assist their clients in their deteriorating military
situation. (Note 33)
Document 26: Memcon between
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush and Petroleum Company
Executives, "The Middle East Conflict and U.S. Oil Interests,"
10 October 1973
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 27Arab-Isr
While Kissinger was trying to put off the Soviet cease-fire
proposal, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush heard out
top executives from Exxon and Gulf Oil on the possible use
of the oil weapon during the war. The executives had asked
for the meeting because they had learned that Kuwaiti Oil
and Finance Minister Abdel Rahman Atiqi, who had already called
for an emergency meeting of Arab oil ministers to discuss
the role of petroleum in the war, was warning Washington to
avoid action that could lead to precipitate moves against
"U.S. oil interests." Believing that the Arabs had
the companies "at their mercies," the oil executives
worried that if Washington started to replace Israeli aircraft
losses, radicals like Qadhafi would get the upper hand and
the companies would be nationalized. Also in prospect were
price increases of 100 percent and the curtailment of oil
production. Rush was also concerned about the impact of prolonged
fighting but he could not promise the executives what they
wanted: a U.S. statement against arms shipments to the Middle
East. As State Department official Roger Davies noted, the
Soviet airlift, then just beginning, would increase pressure
to "resupply Israel."
Document 27: Department
of State, Operations Center, Middle East Task Force, Situation
Report #22, "Situation Report in the Middle East, as
of 0600 EDT, 10/12/73"
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174, 1973 Middle East War - 12 October
1973 File No. 7
On 11 October the IDF continued their offensive against Syrian
forces, the next day breaching the "main Syrian defensive
line" and recapturing the Golan Heights. The situation
on the Suez front remained "static," with an artillery
battle under way. The Soviet airlift unfolded causing apprehension
among the Israelis about the restoration of Syrian SAM capabilities.
Meanwhile, Nixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger were beginning to make major decisions on the
U.S. supply operation. While Kissinger and Schlesinger had
sought to contract private U.S. aircraft to move supplies,
this proved impractical because U.S. companies wanted to stay
away from the conflict. Moreover, on 12 and 13 October, Kissinger
was getting reports that the Israelis were running low on
ammunition. Although he was not sure if Dinitz was telling
him the truth about ammunition supplies----"How the hell
would I know," he told Schlesinger--he did not want to
risk any Israeli failure in "going as a fierce force."
When it became evident that civilian charter aircraft could
not be mobilized, on 13 October Nixon ordered a major U.S.
military airlift to supply Israel. To his staff, Kissinger
justified this move as part of his diplomatic strategy: having
failed to win Egyptian support for a cease-fire resolution
at the United Nations, it was necessary to prolong the fighting
to create a "situation in which [the Arabs] would have
to ask for a cease-fire rather than we." [See Document
63]. (Note 34)
Document 28: Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Joseph Sisco to Kissinger,
"Proposed Presidential Message to King Faisal,"
12 October 1973, with State Department cable routing message
attached
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 15-1 US/Nixon
Given the Nixon administration's continued concern over the
position taken by "moderate" Arab regimes, policymakers
were pleased to receive what they saw as a restrained communication
from King Faisal. In the continued effort to woo Faisal, the
State Department prepared a reply for Nixon's signature. Stressing
Washington's balanced, "pro-peace" stance, the message
delicately encouraged Faisal to keep out of the conflict and
avoid taking actions that could hurt Israel or Washington:
it was important to conduct "ourselves in such a way
that it will not be impossible for the US to play a helpful
role once the fighting is over."
Document 29A: State
Department Cable 203672 to U.S. Embassy, Saudi Arabia, "Message
to the King from the Secretary, 14 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174. 1973 Middle East War 15 - 15
October 1973 File No. 9
Document 29B: U.S. Embassy
Saudi Arabia, Cable 45491 to State Department, "US Arms
to Israeli: Saudis Sorrowful: King May Send Another Message,"
16 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174. 1973 Middle East War 15 - 16
October 1973 - File No. 11
A U.S. military airlift to Israel could not occur in secret
and Kissinger's State Department initiated a coordinated diplomatic
campaign to minimize the adverse political impact on the Arab
countries. Before the State Department started briefing other
governments in the region about the airlift, Kissinger wanted
to explain his decision through a private message to Faisal.
Recognizing that the only way he could make the airlift palatable
to the Saudis was on anti-Communist grounds (the kingdom had
never established diplomatic relations with Moscow), Kissinger
played up the anti-Soviet angle, suggesting that what had
made the U.S. decision "inevitable" was insufficient
Soviet cooperation in the latest cease-fire talks and the
Soviet "massive airlift." Moreover, the administration
had to make this decision "if we are to remain in a position
to use our influence to work for a just and lasting peace."
In other words, by helping Israel Washington would be in a
position to press Tel Aviv for concessions during peace talks.
That Kissinger hardly mollified Faisal is indicated in the
marginal notation: "Faisal angry at this." Although
Faisal's response to Nixon remains classified, apparently
he wrote that the U.S. decision had "pained" him.
Yet, the Saudis were careful to conceal any antagonism; as
the cable from Ambassador James Akins suggests, the embassy
in Riyadh discerned "no visible anger … but rather
genuine expression of sorrow." (Note 35)
Document 30: Department
of State, Operations Center, Middle East Task Force, Situation
Report #32, "Situation Report in the Middle East as of
1200 EDT, Oct. 15, 1973"
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174, 1973 Middle East War - 15 October
1973 File No. 10 (2 of 2)
After what amounted to a week-long, "operational pause,"
on 4 October the Egyptians began a major tank offensive on
the Sinai, the "largest armored battle since World War
II." Asad had been pressing Sadat for action to relieve
pressure on the Syrian front, but the Israelis quickly reversed
the offensive. (Note 36) The Egyptians suffered
significant losses--76 tanks according to Egyptian sources,
280 according to the Israelis--a defeat that opened the way
to IDF advances across the Suez Canal. The Israeli air force
was heavily engaged in combat operations, attacking airfields,
fuel depots, tanks, and missile batteries in Egypt and Syria.
On the oil front, oil company and embassy officials believed
that King Faisal would take "'some' retaliatory"
action if the United States announced that it was airlifting
military supplies to Israel.
Document 31: Seymour Weiss,
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department
of State, to Kissinger, "Armed Shipments to Israel,"
15 October 1973
Source: RG 59, Top Secret Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-1973,
box 23, DEF G
The Pentagon organized the airlift to Israel out of the Joint
Staff's Logistics Readiness Center (LRC). Given the high stakes
involved, State Department officials believed it essential
to monitor the airlift's progress, not least so that they
could resolve any political problems that emerged. At the
outset this proved difficult; an Air Force Colonel Wieland,
who was working for the State Department at the LRC, found
himself "prematurely invited out" by the Defense
Department. While Wieland's supervisor, Seymour Weiss, would
have to turn the bureaucratic wheels to reinsert the State
Department into the LRC, he was nevertheless able to provide
an initial report on the airlift's status. Seventeen flights
a day were already scheduled with 25,000 tons of supplies
approved for shipment. Among the items that had already been
delivered were F-4s (Phantom jets), Sidewinder air-to-air
missiles, anti-tank weapons, and artillery projectiles, among
other items. Weiss mentioned a diplomatic problem: Egypt had
lodged a protest with the West German government against the
movement of military supplies from U.S. bases to Israel. Despite
that protest, the United States continued to supply the Israelis
from U.S. bases in Germany for the time being. Weiss's reference
to the "over-taxed" airbase at Lajes (the Azores)
signaled another diplomatic problem: none of the other bases
mentioned--Torrejon in Spain or Mildenhall in the United Kingdom--would
be available for refueling empty aircraft returning from Israel.
While it took severe diplomatic pressure--a "harsh note"
from Nixon (Note 37)--to secure Portuguese
cooperation, Kissinger would be highly pleased with the Portuguese
during the airlift while his anger with other Europeans steady
grew.
Document 32A: U.S. Mission
to NATO Cable 4936 to Department of State, "NATO Implications
of the Middle East Conflict: NAC Meeting of October 16, 1973,"
16 October 1973
Document 32B: U.S. Mission
to NATO Cable 4937 to Department of State, "NATO Implications
of the Middle East Conflict: NAC Meeting of October 16, 1973,"
16 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174, 1973 Middle East War, 16 Oct.
1973-File No. 11 [1 of 2
During the first week or so of the crisis, Kissinger learned
that NATO Secretary General Josesph Luns had said something
to the effect that Washington "had been taken in by the
Soviets on détente and we are now paying the price
for détente" (see Document 75).
Taking advantage of a restricted North Atlantic Council (NAC)
meeting on the war, Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. permanent representative
(with Ambassadorial rank) to the North Atlantic Council, reviewed
U.S. policy with his Canadian and European counterparts and
expressed displeasure at such criticisms. Describing U.S.
policy early in the war, the decisions for an airlift to resupply
Israel, and the ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the fighting,
Rumsfeld saw the "present crisis [as] a test of the evolving
spirit of détente." He tartly observed that "we
do not take kindly to suggestions that the U.S. was foolishly
drawn into détente relationships with the USSR."
In light of the danger that the Soviets might tip the military
balance, Rumsfeld asked alliance partners to cooperate in
finding ways to "make clear to the Soviets that détente
is a two-way street." Later in the discussion, he suggested
a number of measures that the Allies could take to "damage"
Soviet interests "if the choose to damage ours,"
including slowdown Western participation in the Conference
on European Security and Cooperation or "economic measures,"
presumably denial of credits or exports. As Rumsfeld noted,
the Council emphasized "Alliance solidarity" but
his summary overlooked some tough questions raised during
the discussion. For example, the Belgian representative, André
De Staercke, implicitly criticized Washington for not consulting
with NATO before the meeting: "consultation was an essential
part of solidarity." While Rumsfeld contended that the
present meeting was a form of consultation, de Staercke was
more interested that Washington consult with its allies on
basic decisions during the crisis.
V.
Turn of the Tide?
Document 33: Department
of State, Operations Center, Middle East Task Force, Situation
Report #36, "Situation Report in the Middle East as of
1800 Hours EDT Oct. 16, 1973"
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1174, 1973 War (Middle East) 16 Oct.
1973 File No. 11 [2of 2]
This sitrep pointed out the first signs of what would turn
out to be a major reversal of fortunes for Egypt: a small
Israeli armored force led by General Ariel Sharon had arrived
on the west bank of the Suez Canal to begin striking Egyptian
artillery and air defense units. Another item pointed to the
possibility of a petroleum crisis. Angered by the U.S. airlift
and then by the U.S. announcement of large-scale financial
aid to Israel, the Arab oil producers were making plans to
wield the oil weapon. This document shows the Saudis pressing
the European Community (EC) to "use their influence to
change America's policy in the Middle East." Oil would
be used as a weapon against the U.S. airlift but the production
"decrease … will hurt the EC countries first."
(Note 38)
Document 34A: William
B. Quandt to Kissinger, "Memoranda of Conversations with
Arab Foreign Ministers," 17 October 1973, with memcon
attached
Source: SN 70-73, POL 27Arab-Isr
Document 34B: Memcon
between Nixon and Arab Foreign Ministers, Wednesday, October
17, 1973, 11:10 a.m., in the President's Oval Office
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 664, Middle East War Memos &
Misc. Oct. 6-Oct 17, 1973
Earlier in the conflict diplomats of key Arab states with
close political and/or economic ties with the United States
had sought a meeting with Kissinger and Nixon to register
their concerns about the U.S. position on a cease-fire based
on the status quo ante and the possibility of U.S.
resupply for Israel. By the time the meeting occurred, the
cease-fire issue had shifted and the U.S. airlift was in progress.
Kissinger wanted to persuade the diplomats that the U.S. position
was balanced, neither pro-Israeli nor pro-Arab, and that any
action on the part of the Arab oil producers to use the oil
weapon would "only hamper our efforts to play an effective
peacemaking role." During the discussions, Foreign Ministers
Saqqaf (Saudi Arabia), Benhima (Morocco), Bouteflika (Algeria),
and Al-Sabah (Kuwait) argued that the fighting could not end
until territory occupied in 1967 had been returned and the
Palestinian problem solved. Nixon and Kissinger, however,
refused to "make commitments we can't deliver on"
and emphasized that the broader issues of a settlement had
to be separated from a cease-fire, because if the fighting
was prolonged it could lead to a "great power confrontation."
The U.S. hoped to "improve the situation" but the
fighting had to stop first. In the meantime, the airlift would
continue to "keep the balance" in the region. Kissinger's
line of reasoning did not wholly convince his audience; as
Benhima observed, "It is difficult for [the ministers]
to convey assurances on the US position to their chiefs of
state at a time when the US is aiding Israel."
Document 35: Thomas R.
Pickering, Executive Secretary State Department, to George
Springsteen, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs,
17 October 1973, enclosing memorandum by Lawrence Eagleburger,
17 October 1973
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL Fr-US
As suggested earlier, U.S.-European tensions increased during
the October War. Henry Kissinger's "Year of Europe"
initiative had already produced trans-Atlantic disagreements
over the newly-enlarged EC's decisionmaking processes, and
Western Europe's close dependence on Middle Eastern oil supplies
provided the basis for disagreements during the crisis. One
of Kissinger's chief European critics, French Foreign Minister
Michel Jobert, had been suspicious of the "Year of Europe"
and dubious of Kissinger's détente strategy, which
he believed was producing a superpower condominium at Europe's
expense. On 17 October, during a speech at the National Assembly,
Jobert assailed Israel for checking the peace process and
the superpowers for fanning the flames of war with military
supplies: "We see Mr. Brezhnev, the apostle of détente,
and Dr. Kissinger, now a Nobel Peace Prize winner, shaking
hands while sending thousands of tons of arms by air."
(Note 39) The statement infuriated Kissinger
who ordered a demarché to the French ambassador. Not
only did the State Department find the references to Kissinger
"offensive and unnecessary," it rejected any equivalence
between the U.S. and Soviet positions, and found Jobert's
statement "inconsistent with good relations between the
two countries." Things would get worse.
Document
36A: Minutes, "Washington Special Action Group
Meeting," 17 October 1973, 3:05 p.m. - 4:04 p.m.
Source: NPMP, NSC Institutional Files, box H-117, WSAG Minutes
(originals) 10-2-73 to 7-23-74 (2 of 3)
Document 36B: Memcon,
"WSAG Principles: Middle East War," 17 October 1973,
4:00 p.m.
Source: NPMP, NSC Institutional Files, box H--92, WSAG Meeting
Middle East 10/17/73, folder 6
Except for this transcript, all the minutes for WSAG meetings
during the October War remain classified. At this meeting,
the participants discussed key issues: planning for an energy
crisis, the Arab-Israeli military situation and problems related
to the airlift. During the review of plans for energy conservation
in the event of an oil crisis, Kissinger showed some optimism
that, during the present war, his diplomatic strategy would
avoid Arab oil embargo, as he patronizingly observed: "Did
you see the Saudi Foreign Minister come out like a good little
boy and say they had very fruitful talks with us?" An
hour into the meeting, Nixon called in the WSAG principles
for a "pep talk." Mentioning what he saw at stake--"oil
and our strategic position"--Nixon focused on the airlift
and sealift of supplies to Israel, which he believed were
essential for preserving U.S. "credibility everywhere"
as well as for bringing Tel Aviv to a settlement. In a self-congratulatory
statement, Kissinger declared this was the "best-run
crisis" of the Nixon administration, noting that despite
the "massive airlift" TASS had issued only mild
complaints while Arab foreign ministers were making "compliments
in the Rose Garden." The congratulatory mood was premature
because the Arab oil producers had not announced the oil boycott
and production cuts that were a direct response to the airlift.
Document 37: U.S. Interests
Section in Egypt Cable 3167 to State Department, "Egyptian
Military Situation," 18 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1175, 1973 Middle East War 18 Oct.
1973 File No. 13
U.S. diplomats in Egypt reported on a battle "of major
proportions" on the banks of the Suez Canal, a confrontation
that may be showing that the "offensive has begun to
move into Israeli hands if only temporarily." Signs that
"things did not go well for the Egyptians" were
the lack of military announcements and delays on the request
of a NBC News correspondent who wanted to go to the Suez front.
Those who prepared this report did not know that the IDF was
launching a plan to encircle Egypt's Third Army, a development
that would quickly spark a major crisis. (Note
40) An NSC staffer who read this cable perceptively wrote
"turn of tide?" on the document.
Document 38: U.S. Embassy
Kuwait cable 3801 Cable to State Department, "Atiqi Comment
on OAPEC Meeting," 18 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1175, 1973 Middle East War 18 Oct.
1973 File No. 13
Arab oil producers had met in Kuwait to discuss wartime oil
supply policy where they decided, as this cable reported,
to begin a "complete embargo on oil to the United States."
The oil producers had decided, contrary to Kissinger, that
action on energy policy would be conducive to negotiations,
not an obstacle to them. They sought to warn the "United
States and other consumers" that the producers were "as
serious as front line fighters that Israel must give up occupied
lands." Nevertheless, apparently the Saudis insisted
that the OAPEC announcement not specifically mention the United
States but countries that were "unfriendly" to the
Arab cause.
Document 39: U.S. Embassy
United Kingdom Cable 12113 to State Department, "European
Attitudes in Middle East Conflict," 18 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1175, 1973 Middle East War 18 Oct.
1973 File No. 13
For the Nixon administration, one of the most disturbing
elements in the October War was the attitude of West European
governments. As former U.S. Ambassador to West Germany Martin
Hillenbrand explained, Washington "complained vociferously
about what it regarded as European lack of support."
While key allies such as the United Kingdom discouraged the
use of their bases for U.S. aircraft supplying Israel, the
Nixon administration conducted virtually no "prior consultation"
with NATO Europe about its decisions during the war. (Note
41) This cable, signed by the media magnate Walter Annenberg,
the U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom, sheds some light
on the divergences. While Annenberg was clearly displeased
that the Europeans were "staying on the sidelines"
and that European attitudes had the "effect of isolating"
the United States from NATO, Conservative Member of Parliament
and confidant of Prime Minister Edward Heath James Prior believed
that cooperation was difficult because interests were divergent.
He explained that the "Middle East war posed very difficult
and serious problems for Britain" because of the importance
of Arab oil and the UK's "economic and commercial interests
in Arab states." Taking this stand plainly posed some
risks for the Heath government because a "large majority
of British public were sympathetic to Israel."
VI.
"The Smell of Victory" and Search for a Cease-Fire
Document 40: Department
of State, Operations Center, Middle East Task Force, Situation
Report # 43, "Situation Report in the Middle East as
of 0600 Hours EDT, Oct. 19, 1973"
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1173, 1973 Middle East War, 19 Oct.
1973-File No. 14
While the tank battle on the Sinai raged inconclusively,
Israeli forces enlarged "their bridgehead" on the
Canal's west bank with the presence of over 200 tanks. This,
the Israelis believed, gave them the option of heading toward
Cairo, thus increasing their ability to destroy the Egyptian
army. "The Israelis feel they now have turned the corner
in the war and that the initiative on both fronts is now in
Israel's hands." That the "smell of victory"
might make Tel Aviv unwilling to accept a cease-fire pointed
to a dangerous problem: the impact on U.S.-Soviet relations
if the Israelis devastated the army of one of Moscow's major
clients.
Document 41: Brezhnev
to Nixon, 19 October 1973, handed to Kissinger 11:45 a.m.
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 20 (October
12-November 27, 1973)
With the reversals on the Sinai, Sadat wanted a cease-fire
and the Soviets treated this as an urgent matter. On the evening
of 18 October, Dobrynin read to Kissinger the text of a proposed
cease-fire resolution for the UN Security Council; the next
morning, Brezhnev wrote Nixon about the crisis. (Note
42) The Soviets saw a "more and more dangerous situation"
and a responsibility by "our two powers" to "keep
the events from going beyond the limits." Anxious to
avoid a humiliating defeat for Moscow's Arab clients, worried
about damage to relations with Washington, and determined
to play a role in any post-war settlement, Brezhnev urged
Nixon to send Kissinger to Moscow for talks on expediting
the "prompt and effective political decisions" needed
to stop the fighting. (Note 43)
Document 42: Memcon between
Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, and Moorer, 19 October 1873,
7:17 - 7:28 p.m.
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1027, Memoranda of Conversations
- Apr-Nov 1973, HAK and President (2 of 5)
Hours before flying to Moscow, Kissinger gave a briefing
on Brezhnev's request and his planned trip to top defense
and intelligence officials. As Kissinger explained, going
to Moscow would delay a cease-fire resolution for a "few
days," save face for the Soviets, and avoid a worse situation:
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko "coming here with tough
instructions." Kissinger emphasized what he saw as the
centrality of the U.S. role: "Everyone knows in the Middle
east that if they want peace they have to come through us."
Yet while he saw the Soviets failing politically in the region,
""we can't humiliate [them] too much." A-4s
refer to Skyhawk attack aircraft.
Document 43: Nixon to
Brezhnev, 20 October 1973
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 20 (October
12-November 27, 1973)
No less than Brezhnev, Nixon saw much at risk if the fighting
continued; he quickly instructed Kissinger to travel to Moscow
to negotiate a cease-fire resolution. Given his assumption
that a trip to Moscow was a way to buy time for further Israeli
military advances, he was dismayed by Nixon's decision to
grant him "full authority" to negotiate: "the
commitments that [Kissinger] may make in the course of your
discussions have my complete support." For Kissinger,
too much freedom of action was not helpful; if he needed to
delay, for example, to help the Israelis improve their position,
he would not be able to use consultations with the President
as an excuse. (Note 44)
Document 44:
Excerpts from Backchannel U.S.-Egyptian messages, 20-26 October
1973
Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 130, Saunders-Memorandum-Sensitive
Ismail also weighed in on behalf of a cease-fire in this
message to Kissinger late in the evening of 20 October. Aware
of Kissinger's plans to meet with Brezhnev in Moscow, he hoped
that the discussions would reach agreement on a resolution
to end the fighting at "present lines." In keeping
with a speech that Sadat had given on 16 October, Ismail called
for agreement on a peace conference that would reach a "fundamental
settlement."
Document 45A: State Department
Cable 208776 to all Diplomatic and Consular Posts, "Middle
East Situation," 21 October 1973, and
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1175, 1973 Middle East War, 20 October
1973-File No. 15
Document 45B: Embassy
in Saudi Arabia Cable 4663 to State Department, "Saudi
Ban on Oil Shipments to U.S.," 23 October 1973
Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1175, 1973 Middle East War, 23 October
1973-File No. 18
