On Thursday, August 28, 2003, the Peruvian
Truth and Reconciliation Commission released its final
report, investigating 20 years of internal conflict and human
rights abuses in Peru from 1980 to 2000. From the initial
burning of ballot boxes by the Shining Path in Chusqui, Ayacucho,
on May 17, 1980, to the eventual flight of former President
Alberto Fujimori to Japan in November 2000, Peru has been
witness to many forms of political violence and human rights
violations, committed by both government forces and insurgent
groups. This briefing book offers a selection of historical
materials from U.S. government sources that sheds light on
this brutal period. They are taken from a recent special release
of records to the Peruvian people by the Bush administration
and from collections of declassified documents obtained by
the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information
Act. Both were important sources for the Truth Commission's
report.
Truth
and Reconciliation
In June 2001, interim President Valentin Paniagua established
the groundwork for a Truth Commission, later reaffirmed by
President Alejandro Toledo in September of the same year.
This Truth and Reconciliation Commission was charged with
determining the causes of internal violence in Peru between
May 1980 and November 2000; contributing to the clarification
of the crimes and human rights violations perpetrated during
this period; identifying those responsible for these violent
acts; evaluating proposals for reparation to the victims and
their families; recommending reforms as preventive measures;
and establishing follow-up mechanisms for its recommendations.
Over the course of the past two years, the Commission accomplished
these tasks by establishing five different regional offices,
which collected a total of 16,885 testimonies. Staff input
these testimonies into a complex database system, which they
used to analyze the findings. In addition to individual testimonies,
the Commission hosted a number of public hearings, where victims
could openly relate their experiences. Other dialogues and
meetings with key actors and sectors of society were conducted
to allow these groups an opportunity to put forth their views
on what had happened during the 20-year period. The Commission
produced seven Regional Histories and 19 In-Depth Studies,
with the aim of researching particularly relevant cases. It
also began an initiative to help clarify the fate of the disappeared,
in concert with the International Red Cross, the Peruvian
Ombudsman's Office, and the National Coordinator for Human
Rights. The Commission created a judicial team to analyze
the pattern of violence, crimes and human rights abuses, and
an ad-hoc working group to evaluate cases in which individual
responsibilities might be established and pursued in the criminal
justice system. The working group performed a number of exhumations
as part of its investigations.
As the culmination of the Commission's work, the 12-volume
final report (along with seven annexes) will be presented
before the Peruvian people in an official ceremony in Huamanga,
Ayacucho on August 29, 2003. A copy of the final report will
be posted on-line at the International
Center for Transitional Justice's website.
Special
Declassification of U.S. Documents
Among the various sources of information the Commission used
to compile its report were declassified U.S. government documents.
On November 27, 2001, the Commission, with the assistance
of the National Security Archive, officially requested the
Bush administration's assistance in obtaining an expedited
declassification of U.S. documents relating to human rights
in Peru. The Commission originally requested an expedited
inter-agency review on a list of key cases and subjects. Although
the Bush administration briefly considered the possibility,
in the end the Commission received an expedited State Department-only
review process, omitting any materials from other relevant
agencies. On January 6, 2003, the US Embassy delivered 326
declassified State Department documents to the Commission's
main office in Lima.
The Bush administration's response, while falling considerably
short of the Commission's request, was nonetheless important.
Declassified U.S. documents can provide insight into the broader
political process and context, the structure and activities
of different institutions and geographical regions, and the
private perspectives and positions of government and military
officials, as well as provide illuminating details on specific
events and human rights cases. For all these reasons, the
newly released materials will contribute to a broader understanding
of the abuses that took place in Peru during the period under
review.
However, it is important to treat declassified documents
as a source with care, as the Peruvian case demonstrates.
First, a release of this size accounts for only a tiny fraction
of the entire record, most of which remains classified and
out of public reach. Not only is the full picture of events
from the U.S. point of view unavailable, but researchers must
keep in mind the question of why only these materials and
not others were released. One should also not expect to receive
new information on every human rights case of interest. Much
of the information will be more corroborative in nature than
new and revealing. Some cases may not be mentioned at all
in the documents, or only very superficially. In part, this
depends on the level of interest the U.S. government had in
the subject at the time, and on the willingness of relevant
sources to confide pertinent details to American officials
on specific cases. Finally, in reading these documents, one
also has to take into account that their content can be influenced
by the personal bias of both the writer and the sources from
which s/he gets his/her information.
Technical
Analysis of the New Release
An analysis of the 1,985 pages
of documentation released directly to the Commission
- most of which were U.S. Embassy cables - shows that 230
of the 326 documents had been previously released to the National
Security Archive in some form, while 96 had not. Of those
230 previously released documents: 34 contained more
security deletions than the Archive's version; 32 were released
to the Commission in more complete form, and 161 had the same
level of excisions, while three had different portions excised
with no clear "better" copy. Of the 326 documents
released to the Commission, six were exact duplicates released
twice. One hundred and thirty-one of the 326 documents were
released to the Commission with excisions, and the majority
of the excised material was withheld under the B1 (1.5D) exemption
of the FOIA, which refers to information that cannot be released
because it would threaten U.S. foreign relations. For
a full analysis of the special release of declassified documents
in Excel format and links to the actual documents themselves,
please click here.
Sources
on Peru from the National Security Archive
Separate from and in addition to the 326 documents released
directly to the Commission from the State Department, the
National Security Archive has submitted a large group of Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) requests relating to Peru over the
years. This resulted in the declassification of thousands
of documents from multiple agencies. This includes documentation
from other important U.S. agencies that did not respond to
the Commission's request. These documents are drawn from four
different collections and projects at the National Security
Archive: 1) Lynda Davis Human Rights Collection, started by
a former Archive analyst in the early 1990 and including human
rights documentation from 1980 to the early 1990s; 2) Drug
Policy Collection, started in the early 1990s by Kate Doyle
and including policy and military strategy documents from
the 1980s and early 1990s; 3) Bigwood Donation, donated by
free-lance journalist Jeremy Bigwood; and 4) Peru Documentation
Project Collection, started in the late 1990s and including
documents on key human rights cases from 1980 to 2000. The
Archive shared these documents with the Truth Commission.
This briefing book is a selection of some of the most representative
documents from the period studied by the Truth Commission.
The documents in this publication are drawn from all four
collections of the National Security Archive, as well as the
special declassification made to the Commission itself. The
documents span the period 1981 to 2000, and include information
on key human rights cases, as well as profiles of the actors
involved in the violence. The materials not only reveal details
of specific actions but also lend insight into the way the
U.S. government viewed the events taking place in Peru, as
well as how policy was shaped to deal with escalating human
rights violations.
What
the Documents Reveal
The documents begin with a grave underestimation by the CIA
of the nascent Shining Path in 1981. They follow the growing
conflict with the - at times - contradictory positions of
clamoring for more effective counterinsurgency tactics by
the Peruvian government, and demonstrating a mounting concern
regarding human rights abuses. It is clear that the rival
policy objectives of counterdrug policy, respect for human
rights, and concerns about the insurgent threat to U.S. interests
abroad were not always easily reconciled or given equal weight.
Information from the Peruvian government versus information
from the human rights community and Peruvian press were often
widely divergent. The U.S. government did not always have
access to inside information that could allow it to evaluate
better which of the widely opposing views were most accurate.
Atrocities were clearly committed on both sides of the conflict,
but Washington's dilemma was how to assist the Peruvian regime
in curbing a brutal insurgency which was committing massacres,
assassinations and other violence, while at the same time
pressuring the Lima government not to commit its own abuses.
Perhaps the most chilling documents in this briefing book
are revelations made by a Peruvian officer within the military's
apparatus of terror, whose testimony caused U.S. Embassy officers
to question the United States' own inadvertent contribution
to the violence through military assistance programs. The
officer revealed that U.S. government training for the deactivation
of terrorist bomb threats provided to the Peruvian military
was used by the Peruvian officer and others like him to perfect
their ability to build better bombs to be used against assassination
targets.
By the time the revelations emerged from this former army
officer, the U.S. government had already begun to act on its
own grave concerns over Peruvian government abuses. On April
28, 1994, the National Security Council ordered an interagency
review to be conducted by NSC Senior Director for Democracy
Morton Halperin. This study into human rights abuses in Peru
was inspired in part by pressure from the Congress at the
time, but the conclusions of the report have never been disclosed
to the public. While the U.S. has released a great deal of
declassified material on Peru (especially from the State Department)
the record on this vital aspect of U.S. foreign relations
is still far from complete. Hopefully, the government will
continue to make sincere efforts to fill the gap.
[Note: This briefing book should be read as a contribution
and elaboration to the information revealed in the earlier
2002 "Eye of the Storm"
briefing book.]
About
the Peru Documentation Project
The Peru Documentation Project is directed by Tamara Feinstein.
The Project began to focus on human rights in Peru prior to
the downfall of Vladimiro Montesinos at the request of human
rights investigators in Peru. The Project is grateful for
the support of the John D & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,
the Arca Foundation, the John Merck Fund, the Ford Foundation,
and the Open Society Institute.
Documents
Click here for a full analysis
of the 326 declassified documents released directly to the
Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Excel format,
including links to the documents themselves.
Note: The following documents are in
PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free
Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1: Central Intelligence
Agency Review, Latin American Review: Peru Keeping Terrorism
in Check, July 3, 1981, 6pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
This very early CIA analysis of the Shining Path and the
growing violence in the Andean Highlands demonstrates the
flawed ability of U.S. intelligence to accurately predict
the growing threat of the Shining Path. The CIA discounts
the rise in "terrorist activities" as of lesser
impact, or concern, in comparison with the insurgency of the
1960s. The CIA notes that "the present incidents not
only differ in scope and intensity, but President Belaunde
is unlikely to overreact and set off a chain of events similar
to those that led to his ouster in 1968."
Document 2: Central Intelligence
Agency Review, Latin American Review: Peru Terrorism May
Threaten Civilian Government, March 15, 1982, 5pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
After less than a year from producing the previous document,
the CIA dramatically changes its assessment of the threat
posed by terrorism in Peru. It notes that there has been some
success in discrediting the government security forces and
provoking a military intervention, as occurred in the 1960's.
It also recounts details of the March 3, 1982 prison attack
by the Shining Path, killing 10 and freeing 247 inmates, characterizing
the incident as the most serious terrorist act since President
Belaunde took office.
Document 3: U.S. Embassy (Lima)
Cable, Peruvian Terrorism: The Nature of the Threat,
April 20, 1982, Secret, 9pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Kate Doyle - Drug Policy)
The U.S. Embassy in Lima offers an extensive analysis of
the developing crisis with the Shining Path in Peru. The cable
details the Shining Path's structure, philosophy, activities,
and evaluates claims of foreign support and drug trafficking
links. The document notes that the Shining Path's initial
"sabotage campaign," starting with election box
bombings in 1980 through the March 1982 bombing of the Palace
of Government, has been an effective method of creating great
public unease at low-overhead costs, while the new tactic
of bombing electric tower shows an "increased sophistication."
Document 4: U.S. Embassy (Lima)
Cable, Peruvian Terrorism Turns Bloodier, but not Necessarily
According to Plan, April 8, 1983, Confidential, 3pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
This cable describes recent massacres in Lucanamarca and
Huancasancos committed by the Shining Path and alludes to
the government retaliation. It speculates on the changing
attitudes towards the Shining Path, and how these fit into
both Shining Path and government strategies.
Document 5: U.S. Embassy (Lima)
Cable, Peru: Sendero Terrorist Counterattack, April
20, 1983, Confidential, 5pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
This update on the situation in Peru, including more details
on Lucanamarca and Huancasancos, notes the failure of the
Peruvian government to contain the growing violence in the
highlands, and warns of the potential for "an upping
of the ante by the security forces," if the situation
continues.
Document 6: U.S. Embassy (Lima)
Cable, Peru: Assessment of Short Term Prospects, September
2, 1983, Secret, 11pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Kate Doyle - Drug Policy)
This document describes the current status of political affairs
in Peru, and evaluates the status of the conflict with Sendero.
It speculates that the change in tactics by Sendero, to focus
more attacks in the Lima where all the wealth and power is
concentrated in Peru, has "fundamentally altered the
terrorism equation." It notes mounting pressure on the
government from both elite and average citizens to deal with
the problem.
Document 7: U.S. Embassy (Lima)
Cable, Incidents in Emergency Zone Lead to Human Rights
Concerns, August 13, 1984, Confidential, 1pg.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
The U.S. Embassy debates the ramifications of the disappearance
of prominent campesino organizer Jesus Oropeza Chonta and
La Republica correspondent Jaime Ayala. The embassy is not
thoroughly convinced that these two incidents are linked,
or are part of a larger policy shift in counterinsurgency
tactics. However, the embassy warns that these incidents,
along with other reports of an emerging pattern of "tough
measures" by the military, may develop into a "source
of serious concern" to the United States. The US Ambassador
has raised these concerns with Prime Minister Mariategui and
has plans to discuss the issue with Army Commanding General
Julia later in the week.
Document 8: U.S. Embassy (Lima)
Cable, Profile of Politically Motivated Terrorism in Peru,
March 26, 1985, Secret, 14pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
This document provides an overview of activities and strategies
of the Shining Path and the newly emergent Revolutionary Tupac
Amaru Movement (MRTA). It describes the cyclical nature of
Shining Path violence, and its waxing and waning influence
in various provinces.
Document 9: U.S. Embassy (Lima)
Cable, Garcia Administration and the Peruvian Military,
January 14, 1986, Confidential, 10pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
This cable profiles the relationship between newly elected
President Alan Garcia and the Peruvian military. It highlights
a number of points of contention between Garcia and the military;
and demonstrates Garcia's reliance on high public approval
rating to restrain actions against him by the military. It
characterizes human rights as the most explosive issue of
contention, noting general fear within the army caused by
Garcia's firing of Generals Enrico, Jamara and Mori after
the Accomarca and Pucayacu massacres.
Document 10: Central Intelligence
Agency Review, The Insurgency Review: Peru Insurgents Hold
the Initiative, June 1987, 6pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
This CIA analysis focuses mainly on the Shining Path; its
structure, history, and growing base. It also describes the
rise of Lima-based activities of the MRTA. It concludes that
the insurgents currently have the momentum of the war on their
side, and shows little faith in President Garcia's ability
to develop an effective and comprehensive counterinsurgency
strategy in the short-term.
Document 11: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, Lawyer for SL Leader Morote Assassinated,
July 30, 1988, Confidential, 3pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
This cable describes the assassination of Peruvian lawyer
Manuel Febres Flores by the paramilitary group, "Democratic
Commando Rodrigo Franco." Despite police speculation
that the Shining Path or MRTA may have been responsible; the
Embassy notes it is more likely that a government or APRA
paramilitary was responsible. The embassy admits that they
know such paramilitary groups exists and that they have acted
before; but that because Febres's murder is of such a sensational
nature compared to previous acts, it "marks a new stage
in Peru's terrorist conflict."
Document 12: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, First Arrest of Rodrigo Franco Command Suspects,
May 24, 1989, Confidential, 5pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
This document describes the arrest of three Rodrigo Franco
Command (CRF) suspects, occurring just after the first official
government acknowledgement that the paramilitary group exists.
The cable cites the rumors of Peruvian Minister of Interior
Mantilla playing an important role in directing the CRF, and
debates the likelihood of a probe into the CRF actually succeeding.
The embassy comments that, "the CRF is known to sow its
own brand of terror, following behind the SL in an attempt
to convince inhabitants that they should be more fearful of
the CRF than of the SL."
Document 13: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, Rodrigo Franco Command Nears First Anniversary
Mark, July 18, 1989, Confidential, 21pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
This cable describes the history, activities and political
context of the Rodrigo Franco Command (CRF). It also evaluates
rumors of the CRF's ties to the APRA government, DIRCOTE and
Minister of the Interior Mantilla.
Document 14: Defense Intelligence
Agency Cable, Ashaninka Indians in North Satipo also under
SL Attack, April 9, 1990, 5pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
This document describes the ongoing conflict between the
Ashaninka Indians and the Shining Path. It attributes the
conflict to the Ashininkas refusal to cooperate and for resisting
encroachment on their land. It describes the Shining Path
murder of resistant Ashaninkas as turning to "genocide"
after January 1990.
Document 15: Central Intelligence
Agency Analysis, Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement: Growing
Threat to US Interests in Peru, March 28, 1991, Secret,
10pp.
Source: Jeremy Bigwood Request (Donation to
Archive)
This CIA analysis profiles the MRTA, its structure, strategy,
foreign ties, activities and the threat it poses to U.S. interests.
Document 16: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, SL Kills Two Polish Priests; Other Instances,
August 12, 1991, Confidential, 8pp.
Source: State Department Release to Truth
and Reconciliation Commission
This cable describes the murder of two Polish priests by
the Shining Path in Ancash, as well as other Shining Path
and MRTA attack and government counter attacks. The cable
describes the military's distrust of ICRC in the conflicted
areas.
Document 17: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, Rondas Urbanas Against Sendero, March
2, 1992, Confidential, 9pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Lynda Davis - Human Rights)
This document describes the impact of the Shining Path murder
of local leader Maria Elena Moyano on the debate over "rondas
urbanas" (urban self-defense committees). It notes Moyano's
murder has lead to a clamor for "autonomous" rondas
to provide security from the Shining Path, but a reluctance
and distrust of rondas sponsored by the government's security
forces.
Document 18: Defense Intelligence
Agency Cable, Military and Police Reaction to Increased
Bombings, July 24, 1992, Confidential, 4pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
The Defense Intelligence Agency reports on an escalating
and less discriminating bombing campaign by the Shining Path,
and the government reaction.
Document 19: U.S. Southern
Command Cable, Rondas and Counterinsurgency in Peru,
September 8, 1992, Secret, 6pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
Southern Command provides a detailed analysis of the phenomenon
of "Rondas Campesinos," Peru's version of civil
defense patrols. The analysis outlines the history of the
development of rondas and their role in counterinsurgency
efforts, noting Fujimori's recent efforts to incorporate rondas
into his current counterinsurgency strategy.
Document 20: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, Ayacucho Mayor on Huayallao Massacre,
October 20, 1992, Confidential, 5pp.
Source: State Department Release to Truth
and Reconciliation Commission
In this cable, the mayor of a neighboring town describes
the Shining Path massacre at Huayallao, Ayacucho. The mayor
describes broader problems in the region resulting from the
conflict.
Document 21: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, Cantuta/Cieneguilla Investigations, September
22, 1993, Confidential, 7pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
This cable describes the problems surrounding the investigations
into the La Cantuta massacre, including the closing of the
civilian investigation into the case. It reports the request
of the victims' families to have U.S. assistance in testing
the remains found at the mass grave in Cieneguilla against
DNA of the La Cantuta victims, since the Peruvian government
claims it does not have the funds to perform the test. The
embassy notes that they had already offered forensic help
when the mass grave was first discovered, but had received
no reply from the Peruvian government. The embassy also critiques
the lack of independent civilian investigation into the case.
Document 22: Defense Intelligence
Agency, Officer not in Jail, December 21, 1993, Secret,
4pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
This Defense Intelligence Agency cable provides more information
on the whereabouts of convicted officer Telmo Hurtado who
participated in the Accomarca Massacre in Peru. Despite the
fact that Hurtado was sentenced to six years in prison earlier
that year for his participation in the massacre, he is now
out of prison, on active duty, and has been promoted to captain.
Document 23: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, Claimed Member of "Colina" Describes
Barrios Altos Executions, March 15, 1994, Secret, 11pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
The US Embassy relates the contents of a document describing
the origin and activities of the La Colina death squad. The
author was allegedly a member of this group, and the embassy
provides speculation as to why this document was leaked and
the veracity of its claims.
Document 24: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, [Excised] Views the Fujimori Government,
March 24, 1994, Secret, 10pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
In this cable, a former ally of National Security advisor
Vladimiro Montesinos describes his take on the Fujimori administration.
The Embassy cautions that the source is somewhat embittered,
and his information should be "taken with a large grain
of salt" but that he was also in an excellent position
to form judgments on the issues he discussed. The source is
convinced that Montesinos fully controlled the groups that
committed the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres; and
that because of this the Fujimori government would be forced
to continue to hide the truth of what happened.
Document 25: National Security
Council, Human Rights Abuses in Peru, April 28, 1994,
1pp.
Source: Jeremy Bigwood Request (Donation to
Archive)
The National Security Council orders an interagency review
on human rights abuses in Peru, to be directed by Morton Halperin.
The review is in response to U.S. congressional concern over
the role of Vladimiro Montesinos, the National Intelligence
Service (SIN) and Army Intelligence (SIE) in these abuses.
Document 26: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, Ex-Army Officer Alleges Army Intelligence
Role in 1991 Letter Bombings of Opposition, June 1, 1994,
Secret, 7pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
Two journalists describe their meeting with an ex-Army Officer
who claims to have carried out five letter bombings originally
targeted by SIN Chief Vladimiro Montesinos. The Embassy plans
to set up a meeting with the officer, and asks for guidance
from the State Department to corroborate the claims made by
the journalists.
Document 27: US Embassy (Lima)
Cable, Systematic Human Rights Violations Under Fujimori:
Ex-Army Officer Describes his Role in Assassinations, Letter
Bombs, Rape and Torture, June 30, 1994, Secret, 29pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
The ex-Army officer mentioned in the previous cable sits
down with embassy officers to recount in detail his participation
in various human rights abuses from the mid 1980s to the mid
1990s. He describes the structure of the army and intelligence
units who participated in these acts, and his personal involvement
in human rights abuses. This includes detailed descriptions
of the types of torture used by the military; human rights
and opposition candidates named as assassination targets;
and the use of anti-bomb training assistance from the U.S.
to create better bombs for assassination attempts. The Embassy
concludes that "None of the source's statements on methods
are new. What was striking, not to say chilling, about his
allegations - apart from his total lack of remorse - was his
insistence that such violations were the norm, rather than
excesses."
Document 28: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, Ex-Montesinos Collaborator Pins Bombing of
Opposition Politician on Vladimiro Montesinos, August
22, 1994, Secret, 6pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
A former Montesinos ally, who now is openly opposed to him,
alleges that Montesinos was directly linked to a May 1990
bombing of opposition congressman Fernando Olivera. The source
claimed that Montesinos openly alluded to his involvement
in the bombing during a campaign strategy session with Fujimori.
The cable notes that it cannot judge the veracity of the allegations.
Document 29: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, Peru: Update on Barrios Altos Case, June 9,
1995, Secret, 6pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
Tensions mount between the civilian judge in the November
1991 Barrios Altos massacre case and military justice authorities
that want the case transferred to them. National Security
Advisor Vladimiro Montesinos and Army Chief Hermoza both have
refused to testify before the civilian judge. The embassy
speculates that the case is unlikely to remain in civilian
court, but that the publicity may make it harder for Fujimori
to pardon those convicted of the La Cantuta massacre.
Document 30: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, General Robles Detention Update, December
2, 1996, Confidential, 7pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
This cable recounts the details of the detention of General
Robles by the military after his public accusations that a
military death squad had been involved in a recent bombing
of a television station. Robles had been previously forced
to flee the country in 1993 after he revealed links between
the government-sponsored La Colina death squad, and the La
Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres. General Robles' wife
opines that if there had not been an immediate public outcry
this time to his disappearance from the human rights community
and others, he may have joined the ranks of the "disappeared."
Document 31: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, General Robles Amnestied and Released,
December 10, 1996, 8pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
The Fujimori administration's approval drops as a result
of the detention of General Robles, and the amnesty proposed
by Fujimori and enacted by Congress by point to a trend of
greater tension between Fujimori and the military intelligence
hierarchy.
Document 32: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, All but One Tortured Oxapampa Detainee Released,
April 24, 1997, Confidential, 5pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
This document describes the military detention, torture and
release of 48 Oxapampa residents in February and March 1997,
who were falsely accused of being MRTA members. Even seven
soldiers were accused in the hysteria, and possible 2 suspects
were killed. President Fujimori's public acknowledgement and
criticism of the incident was initially overlooked, due to
the furor over another sensational torture case involving
the murder of intelligence agent Mariela Barreto and the torture
of agent Leonor La Rosa by the government. However, both of
these cases of government abuse were eclipsed by the euphoria
following the successful end of the MRTA hostage crisis.
Document 33: U.S. Embassy
(Lima) Cable, Journalist Fabian Salazar Alleges Torture
by Intelligence Agents, May 31, 2000, Confidential, 7pp.
Source: National Security Archive Request
(Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)
This cable describes allegations by journalist Fabian Salazar
that SIN officials broke into his office, confiscated incriminating
videos and brutally tortured him.