Between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the
commencement of military action in January 1991, then President George
H.W. Bush raised the specter of the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons
as one justification for taking decisive action against Iraq. In the
then-classified National Security Directive 54, signed on January
15, 1991, authorizing the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait,
he identified Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against
allied forces as an action that would lead the U.S. to seek the removal
of Saddam Hussein from power. (Note 1)
In the aftermath of Iraq's defeat, the U.S.-led U.N. coalition
was able to compel Iraq to agree to an inspection and monitoring
regime, intended to insure that Iraq dismantled its WMD programs
and did not take actions to reconstitute them. The means of implementing
the relevant U.N. resolutions was the Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM). That inspection regime continued until December 16, 1998
- although it involved interruptions, confrontations, and Iraqi
attempts at denial and deception - when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq
in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, and harassment.
Subsequent to George W. Bush's assumption of the presidency in
January 2001, the U.S. made it clear that it would not accept what
had become the status quo with respect to Iraq - a country ruled
by Saddam Hussein and free to attempt to reconstitute its assorted
weapons of mass destruction programs. As part of their campaign
against the status quo, which included the clear threat of the eventual
use of military force against the Iraqi regime, the U.S. and Britain
published documents and provided briefings detailing their conclusions
concerning Iraq's WMD programs and its attempts to deceive other
nations about those programs.
As a result of the U.S. and British campaign, and after prolonged
negotiations between the United States, Britain, France, Russia
and other U.N. Security Council members, the United Nations declared
that Iraq would have to accept even more intrusive inspections than
under the previous inspection regime - to be carried out by the
U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - or face "serious
consequences." Iraq agreed to accept the U.N. decision and
inspections resumed in late November 2002. On December 7, 2002,
Iraq submitted its 12,000 page declaration, which claimed that it
had no current WMD programs. Intelligence analysts from the United
States and other nations immediately began to scrutinize the document,
and senior U.S. officials quickly rejected the claims. (Note
Over the next several months, inspections continued in Iraq, and
the chief inspectors, Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) and Mohammed El Baradei
(IAEA) provided periodic updates to the U.N. Security Council concerning
the extent of Iraqi cooperation, what they had or had not discovered,
and what they believed remained to be done. During that period the
Bush administration, as well as the Tony Blair administration in
the United Kingdom, charged that Iraq was not living up to the requirement
that it fully disclose its WMD activities, and declared that if
it continued along that path, "serious consequences" -
that is, invasion - should follow.
The trigger for military action preferred by the British government,
other allies, and at least some segments of the Bush administration,
was a second U.N. resolution that would authorize an armed response.
Other key U.N. Security Council members - including France, Germany,
and Russia - argued that the inspections were working and that the
inspectors should be allowed to continue. When it became apparent
that the Council would not approve a second resolution, the United
States and Britain terminated their attempts to obtain it. Instead,
they, along with other allies, launched Operation Iraqi Freedom
on March 19, 2003 - a military campaign that quickly brought about
the end of Saddam Hussein's regime and ultimately resulted in his
capture. (Note 3)
As U.S. forces moved through Iraq, there were initial reports that
chemical or biological weapons might have been uncovered, but closer
examinations produced negative results. In May 2003, the Bush administration
decided to establish a specialized group of about 1,500 individuals,
the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), to search the country for WMD - replacing
the 75th Exploitation Task Force, which had originally been assigned
the mission. Appointed to lead the Group, whose motto is "find,
exploit, eliminate," was Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the head of
the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations. In
June, David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapons inspector after Operation
Desert Storm, was appointed special advisor and traveled to Iraq
to lead the search. (Note 4)
By the time of the creation of the ISG, and continuing to the
date of this publication, a controversy has existed over the performance
of U.S. (and British) intelligence in collecting and evaluating
information about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. The
reliability of sources has been questioned. It has been suggested
that some human intelligence may have been purposeful deception
by the Iraqi intelligence and security services, while exiles and
defectors may have provided other intelligence seeking to influence
The quality of the intelligence analysis has also come under scrutiny.
The failure to find weapons stocks or active production lines, undermining
claims by the October 2002 NIE and both President Bush and Secretary
of State Colin Powell (Document 16, Document
27), has been one particular cause for criticism. Controversy
has also centered around specific judgments - in the United States
with regard to assessments of Iraq's motives for seeking high-strength
aluminum tubes, and in the United Kingdom with respect to the government's
claim that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Africa. Post-war
evaluation of captured material, particularly two mobile facilities
that the CIA and DIA judged to be biological weapons laboratories,
has also been the subject of dispute. (Note 5)
In addition, members of Congress and Parliament, as well as potential
political opponents and outside observers have criticized the use
of intelligence by the Bush and Blair administrations. Charges have
included outright distortion, selective use of intelligence, and
exertion of political pressure to influence the content of intelligence
estimates in order to provide support to the decision to go to war
with Iraq. (Note 6)
The material presented in this electronic briefing book includes
both essential pre-war documentation and documents produced or released
subsequent to the start of military action in March 2003. Pre-war
documentation includes the major unclassified U.S. and British assessments
of Iraq's WMD programs; the IAEA and UNSCOM reports covering the
final period prior to their 1998 departure, and between November
27, 2002, and February 2003; the transcript of a key speech by President
Bush; a statement of U.S. policy toward combating WMD; the transcript
of and slides for Secretary Powell's presentation to the U.N. on
February 5, 2003; and documents from the 1980s and 1990's concerning
various aspects of Iraqi WMD activities.
Key documentation related to the controversy that has become available
in recent months makes up almost of all of the 14 additional documents
contained in this updated briefing book. These records include:
- The full Top Secret key judgments section of the October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs
for Weapons of Mass Destruction (Document
- The CIA-DIA evaluation of two specialized tractor-trailers (Document
- Reviews by the British parliamentary committees concerning the
quality and use of intelligence on Iraq by the British government
(Document 34, Document 36)
- David Kay's unclassified statement on the ISG's interim findings
- Congressional critiques of U.S. intelligence performance (Document
37, Document 41)
- Administration rebuttals of those and other critiques. (Document
35, Document 38, Document
40, Document 43).
Much that is of interest concerning intelligence and Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction has appeared in articles, monographs, and studies
published by magazines or research groups. A list of key publications
is provided immediately after the notes section. Other important
materials have been posted temporarily on government web sites.
The documentation provided in this briefing book collects many of
the most significant of these records in one place, allowing readers
to substantially augment their understanding of the issues by directly
comparing the different sources and conclusions, and ensuring that
these materials will be accessible for the long term.
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1: Interagency Intelligence
Assessment, Implications of Israeli Attack on Iraq, July 1,
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of
On June 7, 1981, in an attempt to prevent Iraqi acquisition of
a nuclear weapons capability, Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq's Osirak
nuclear reactor, before it became operational. This assessment,
produced by the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, examines
Arab reactions to the attack as well as both the immediate and short-term
repercussions of the pre-emptive strike.
Document 2: CIA, Iraq's National
Security Goals, December 1988. Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released by Mandatory Declassification
Written after the conclusion of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, this
CIA survey examined Saddam Hussein's likely regional and international
objectives and strategies - including his relations with other Arab
states and the PLO, his desire to reduce Iraqi dependence on the
USSR, and his goal of preventing closer ties between the US and
USSR and Iran. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, the
analysis briefly discusses Iraqi attitudes toward chemical and nuclear
weapons. The first are considered a "short-term fix,"
while the latter represent "the long-term deterrent."
Document 3: CIA, Iraqi Ballistic
Missile Developments, July 1990. Top Secret
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of
During the Persian Gulf War, Iraq made extensive use of its Scud
missile force to attack both Israel and Saudi Arabia - a Scud that
hit a U.S. barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 28 U.S. servicemen.
This paper completed a month prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
noted that "Iraq has the most aggressive and advanced ballistic
missile development program in the Arab world" and that it
already had two modified versions of the Scud B - the Al Husayn
and Al Abbas.
The paper examines the origins, development, and results of the
Iraqi missile program - in the form of the Scud B and its variants.
It also examines warhead options - including chemical, biological,
and nuclear. In addition, it discusses Iraq's missile production
infrastructure as well as foreign assistance to the missile program.
Document 4: Central Intelligence Agency,
Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, March
1991, Top Secret.
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This study, completed by the CIA's Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research after the conclusion of the first Persian Gulf War, examined
the status of the four components of Iraq's WMD programs -- chemical
weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles
-- as of January 15, 1991, the day President George H.W. Bush signed
National Security Directive 54, authorizing the use of force to
drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
The report asserted that Iraq apparently believed that it needed
chemical weapons both as a deterrent and to fulfill its role as
"protector" of the Arab world. There were strong indications,
according to the report, that Iraq was prepared to use chemical
weapons in any conflict with the United States. The author(s) characterized
Iraq's biological weapons program as "the most extensive in
the Arab world." With respect to nuclear weapons, the report
concluded that Iraq probably had the capability, if combined with
clandestinely acquired foreign technology, to develop nuclear weapons
in the late 1990s. Iraq's ballistic missile program was "the
most advanced in the Arab world," the report also concluded.
Document 5: CIA, Project Babylon:
The Iraqi Supergun, November 1991. Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released by Mandatory Declassification
From 1988 to 1990, Iraq was involved in an unusual weapons program,
codenamed Project Babylon. The project's objective was the development
and production of several large caliber guns, including a 1,000-millimeter-diameter
supergun. In addition, the project included development of both
conventional and rocket projectiles for the gun. The gun was intended
to deliver the explosive devices to military and economic targets
up to 620 miles away. The project was being managed for Iraq by
a foreign company, Space Research Corporation, headed by Gerald
By early 1990, a 350-mm-diameter version of the gun had been successfully
built and tested. In addition, many of the components for the 1,000-mm.
gun and two other 350-mm guns had been delivered to Iraq. In March
1990, Bull was murdered. The following month, the United Kingdom
customs service seized the final eight sections that were to be
used in the 1,000-mm. gun barrel. Other nations followed by seizing
other components of the supergun. The seizures prevented Iraq from
completing the project. In July 1991, after initial denials, Iraq
acknowledged the project. In October 1991, Project Babylon components
were destroyed under U.N. supervision.
This document discusses the rationale, origins, technical details,
and history of Project Babylon.
Document 6: CIA, Iraqi BW Mission
Planning, 1992. Secret.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of
This information report states that in the fall of 1990, Saddam
Hussein ordered that plans be drawn up for the airborne delivery
of an unspecified biological agent. The probable target was Israel.
The plan envisioned a conventional air raid employing three MiG-21s,
to be followed by another raid involving three MiGs and a SU-22
aircraft that would disperse the biological agent.The first mission
was shot down over the Persian Gulf and "no efforts were made
to find another method to deliver the BW agent."
Document 7: United Nations, Note
by the Secretary General, October 8, 1997 w/att: Letter dated
6 October 1997 from the Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency to the Secretary General.
Part of one of the report describes the work done by the IAEA,
during the period April 1, 1997 to October 1, 1997 in montoring
and verifying Iraqi compliance with the nuclear disarmament provisions
of U.N. resolution 687 (1991). It includes an extensive summary
of the technical discussions between IAEA and Iraq. The second part
of the report provides an overview of IAEA activities since 1991
related to on-site inspection of Iraqi's nuclear capabilities and
the destruction, removal, or neutralization of Iraqi nuclear weapons
or nuclear-weapons related material or facilities.
Document 8: United Nations, Note
by the Secretary General, October 6, 1998 w/att: Report of
the Executive Chairman of the activities of the Special Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9(b) (i)
of the resolution 687 (1991).
This report from the executive chairman of the UN Special Commission
on Iraq (UNSCOM) covers developments in the relationship between
Iraq and the Commission, priority issues with respect to disarmament,
and ongoing monitoring and verification activities through October
11, 1998. Two months later, on December 16, UNSCOM, in the face
of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, withdrew its staff from Iraq.
Document 9: United Nations Security
Council, Letter Dated 8 February 1999 from the Secretary-General
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, February 9, 1999
w/enc: Report of the Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency in connection with the panel on disarmament and current
and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues (S/1999/100).
This report summarizes the status of the International Atomic Energy
Agency's implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning
the dismantling of Iraq's nuclear program as of February 1999 -
two months after U.N. inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq. It includes
an examination of the remaining questions and concerns and their
impact on the IAEA's ability to develop a "technically coherent
picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons [program] and on the
IAEA's technical ability to fully implement its OMV [on-site monitoring
and verification] program."
Specific questions and concerns noted in the report include: lack
of certain technical documentation, external assistance to Iraq's
clandestine nuclear weapons program, and Iraq's inability to provide
documentation showing the timing and modalities of its alleged abandonment
of its nuclear weapons program.
Document 10a: Forged correspondence
to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Niger, concerning visit
to Niger by Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican, February 1, 1999.
Document 10b: Forged correspondence
within Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Niger, concerning
transfer of uranium to Iraq, July 30, 1999.
Document 10c: Forged letter to the
President, Republic of Niger, concerning agreement to supply 500 tons
of uranium per year to Iraq, July 27, 2000.
Document 10d: Forged letter to the
Niger Ambassador to Italy, concerning protocol of agreement to supply
uranium to Iraq, October 10, 2000.
Source: Documents provided by journalist
The only publicly acknowledged evidence for the claim that Iraq
had tried to acquire uranium from Africa, which President Bush made
in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union address, based on British
intelligence information, are these documents that were claimed
to have been official correspondence involving officials of the
Republic of Niger. The charge that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium
had been deleted from a previous speech due to the CIA's objection
that the information had not been confirmed.
Documents 10a-10d were all determined to be crude forgeries - which
included names and titles that did not match the individuals who
held office at the time the letters were purportedly written - although
the British government has insisted it has additional information
that would support the claim that Iraq was seeking to purchase uranium.
The inclusion of the claim in the State of the Union despite its
removal from an earlier speech, combined with the revelation of
the forged documents, produced further criticism of the Bush administration
and CIA Director George Tenet. Tenet, and then the president, took
responsibility for the inclusion of the unvetted information. An
FBI investigation into the apparent forgery that commenced in the
spring of 2003 is now "at a critical stage" according
the Washington Post (Mike Allen and Susan Schmidt, "Bush
Aides Testify in Leak Probe," Washington Post, Tuesday,
February 10, 2004; Page A01).
Document 11: UK Joint Intelligence
Committee, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of
the British Government, September 2002. Unclassified.
This extensive analysis of Iraqi WMD programs was produced by the
British Government's Joint Intelligence Committee, which is responsible
for overseeing the production of national and strategic intelligence.
One part of the document focuses on Iraqi chemical, biological,
nuclear, and ballistic missile programs for the years 1971-1998
and in the post-inspection era (1998-2002). Other parts of the document
concern the history of UN weapons inspections and "Iraq under
In the foreword, Prime Minister Tony Blair writes (p.3) that "In
recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence
from inside Iraq that ... Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop
WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region,
and the stability of the world."
Document 12: Defense Intelligence
Agency, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities - An Operational Support Study,
September 2002 (Extract) Unclassified.
This extract is part of a larger DIA study, produced for the United
States Central Command to assist it in planning military operations.
It notes the absence of reliable information on whether Iraq was
producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. The authors do express
their belief that "Iraq retained production equipment, expertise
and chemical precursors and can reconstitute a chemical warfare
program in the absence of an international inspection regime."
It also summarizes intelligence on possible chemical weapons activities,
such as renovation of two facilities formerly associated with the
Iraqi chemical weapons program.
Document 13: U.S. State Department,
A Decade of Deception and Defiance, September 12, 2002. Unclassified.
Three pages of this document focus on U.S. charges concerning Iraqi
failure to comply with the restrictions pertaining to weapons of
mass destruction placed upon it as a result of the Persian Gulf
War. It charges, inter alia, that "Iraq is believed to be developing
ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers - as
prohibited by UN Security Council Resolution 687" and "Iraq
has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on
a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb." With
respect to chemical weapons, it charges that "Iraq has not
accounted for hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of
thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud variant missile
Document 14: CIA, Iraq's Weapons
of Mass Destruction Programs, October 2002, Unclassified.
Issued a month after the British assessment (see Document 8), this
CIA study is the unclassified version of a Top Secret National Intelligence
Estimate completed shortly before its release. The study contains
analysis, maps, tables, and some satellite photographs of apparent
Iraqi WMD sites.
Among the study's key judgments is the statement that "Iraq
has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in
defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical
and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in execess
of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear
weapon during this decade."
Document 15: Director of Central Intelligence,
National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Top
Source: The White House
In response to the post-war controversy over U.S. intelligence
estimates of Iraqi WMD programs, the White House released the entire
key judgments section of the Top Secret October 2002 national intelligence
estimate on the subject. (An unclassified version of the NIE had
been released that same month, see Document 14).
The estimate concluded that Iraq continued its weapons of mass
destruction programs despite U.N. resolutions and sanctions and
that it was in possession of chemical and biological weapons as
well as missiles with ranges exceeding U.N. imposed limits. In addition,
it was judged that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program
and, if left unchecked, would probably have a nuclear weapon before
the end of the decade - assuming it had to produce the fissile material
indigenously. If Iraq could acquire sufficient fissile material
from abroad it could construct a nuclear weapon within several months
to a year, the estimate reported.
With regard to both chemical and biological weapons, the NIE reported
not only that Iraq had maintained stocks of the weapons but was
actively engaged in production. The released section contains the
assessment, based at least in part on human intelligence, that "Baghdad
has begun renewed production of" a variety of chemical weapons
- mustard gas, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. It also stated that all
key aspects of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program were
active - including R&D, production, and weaponization - and
that most components were larger and more advanced than they were
before the Gulf War. It also reported that Iraq possessed mobile
facilities for producing bacterial and toxin biological warfare
The estimate also examined Iraq's possible willingness to engage
in terrorist strikes against the U.S. homeland and whether Saddam
would assist al-Qaeda in conducting additional attacks on U.S. territory.
Iraq would probably attempt clandestine attacks in the United States
if it feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime
were imminent or unavoidable, probably with biological agents, according
to the NIE. In addition, in the event that Saddam concluded that
al-Qaeda was the only organization that could conduct the type of
terrorist strike against the U.S. that he wished to see take place,
he might take "the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists."
The released key judgments section is also notable for its reporting
of dissents within the Intelligence Community on two related issues
- when Iraq could acquire a nuclear weapon, and its motive in seeking
to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes. The State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence Research (INR) argued that while Saddam wished to
acquire a nuclear weapon, it did not believe that Iraq's recent
activities made a compelling case that a comprehensive attempt to
acquire nuclear weapons was being made. INR, along with the Department
of Energy, questioned whether the high-strength aluminum tubes Iraq
had been attempting to acquire were well-suited for use in gas centrifuges
used for uranium enrichment.
16: The White House, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat,"
October 7, 2002. Unclassified.
This speech, given by President Bush at the Cincinnati Museum Center,
presents his administration's view concerning the threat from Iraq.
It discusses Iraqi chemical, biological, ballistic missile, and
nuclear programs - as well as concerns about possible Iraqi connections
to international terrorist groups. With respect to how close Iraq
is to developing a nuclear weapon, Bush notes that "we don't
know exactly, and that's the problem." He went on to state
that "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal
an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single
softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year."
Document 17: Letter, George J. Tenet,
Director of Central Intelligence, to Senator Bob Graham, Chairman
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, October 7, 2002. Unclassified.
This letter from the DCI provided an unclassified CIA assessment
of Saddam Hussein's willingness to use weapons of mass destruction.
According to the letter, Iraq "for now appears to be drawing
a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or
... chemical and biological weapons against the United States,"
but if "Saddam should conclude that a U.S.-led attack could
no longer be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained
in adopting terrorist actions." The letter also discusses the
question of Iraqi links to Al-Qaeda and the basis for U.S. assessments
of the links.
Document 18: DoD, Iraqi Denial and
Deception for Weapons of Mass Destruction & Ballistic Missile
Programs, October 8, 2002. Unclassified.
The day after President Bush's Cincinnati speech (Document
12), the Defense Department provided a briefing on Iraqi denial
and deception activities with respect to their WMD programs. These
slides were used in the presentation. They include a variety of
satellite photographs (from commercial as well as a intelligence
satellites), tables, and charts that concern Iraq's assorted programs
and select facilities (for example, the Abu Ghurayb BW Facility).
In addition, the presentation focused on Iraq's denial and deception
strategy and concealment apparatus.
Document 19: George W. Bush, National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002.
This strategy document is an unclassified extract of Top Secret
National Security Presidential Directive 17.(2)
The unclassified version asserts that "We will not permit the
world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with
the world's most destructive weapons." It also notes that "because
deterrence may not succeed ... U.S. military forces and appropriate
civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed
adversaries, including in appropriate cases through pre-emptive
Document 20: Table of Contents, Currently
Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration December 7, 2002, w/covering
letter from Mohammed A. Aldouri, Permanent Representative to the U.N.
This table of contents describes the content of the report submitted
by Iraq to the United Nations with regard to its nuclear, chemical,
biological, and missile programs, as required by U.N.Security Council
Resolution 1441. It shows the varied methods Iraq used in trying
to produce nuclear material suitable for a weapon as well as the
large number of sites involved in the nuclear program.
Document 21: Kenneth Katzman, Congressional
Research Service, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and
U.S. Policy, December 10, 2002. Unclassified.
This paper, updated from an earlier version, discusses a number
of issues concerning Iraq. Outside of the WMD area, it examines
human rights/war crime issues, international terrorism, Iraq-Kuwait
issues, reparation payments, sanctions, and the oil-for- food program.
With respect to weapons of mass destruction, it focuses largely
on the U.N. resolutions placing limits on Iraqi WMD programs and
the work of U.N. inspectors in attempting to monitor Iraqi chemical,
biological, missile, and nuclear programs.
22 : Department of State, Fact Sheet: Illustrative Examples
of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security
Council, December 19, 2002.
At a December 19 press conference, Secretary of State Colin Powell
stated that U.S. experts found the Iraqi declaration "to be
anything but currently accurate, full, or complete." He also
charged that the declaration "totally fails to meet the resolution's
requirements." The same day the State Department issued a fact
sheet providing several examples of omissions from the declaration.
23 : Hans Blix, An Update on Inspection, January 27,
In Resolution 1441, adopted in November 2002, the U.N. Security
Council called for progress reports from UNMOVIC and the IAEA two
months after renewing inspections in Iraq. As head of UNMOVIC, Blix
is responsible for overseeing inspections whose objective is to
verify Iraqi chemical and biological warfare disarmament. Part of
Blix's report reviews the sequence and content of U.N. resolutions
dealing with the disarmament of Iraq.
The key part of his paper, however, deals with the extent of Iraqi
cooperation - with regard to both substance and process. With regard
to process, while he states that "Iraq has on the whole cooperated
rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field," he does note
a number of problems, including Iraq's refusal to guarantee the
safety of proposed U.N. U-2 overflights as well as it insistence
on sending helicopters into the no-fly zone to transport the Iraqis
who serve as the inspectors minders. In addition, Blix notes "some
recent disturbing incidents and harassment."
With regard to cooperation on substance, Blix's report is more
negative, noting that Iraq has failed to engage in the "active"
cooperation called for in Resolution 1441. He questions Iraqi claims
concerning the quality, quantity, and disposition of VX nerve gas
produced by Iraq as well as claims that Iraq destroyed 8, 500 liters
of anthrax. In addition, he reports that Iraq has tested two missiles
in excess of the permitted range of 150 kilometers.
The final portion of the report specifies how the inspection process
can be made more fruitful - including the turning over of more relevant
documents, lists of key personnel, and the facilitation of credible
24: Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, The Status of Nuclear Inspections
in Iraq, January 27, 2003 w/att: IAEA Update Report for the Security
Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002), January 27, 2003.
While UNMOVIC handled inspections relating to chemical and biological
weapons, the IAEA was charged with trying to verify Iraqi nuclear
disarmament. This report from the IAEA director ElBaradei's update
report provides background on previous resolutions, the IAEA's findings
before the end of inspections in 1998, and his agency's activities
since the resumption of the inspection regime on November 27.
The review of agency activities addresses the establishment of
a Baghdad field office, Iraq's declarations pertaining to the status
of its nuclear program, the request for and discovery of relevant
documents, the inventory of nuclear material, ongoing monitoring,
interviews, and specific issues raised by states - including the
U.S. charge that aluminum tubes procured by Iraq were intended for
use in centrifuges.
While in his cover letter ElBaradei observes that "we have
to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons
programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s,"
in the update report it is also noted that "little progress
has been made in resolving the questions and concerns that remained
as of 1998" and that "further verification activities
will be necessary before the IAEA will be able to provide credible
assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme."
25: Colin L. Powell, Briefing on the Iraq Weapons Inspectors'
60-Day Report: Iraqi Non-Cooperation and Defiance of the UN, January
The same day that Blix and ElBaradei addressed the UN, U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell gave a short briefing to reporters on the
U.S. view of those reports, followed by a question and answer session.
Powell noted the statement by Blix that "Iraq appears not to
have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament
that was demanded of it." The secretary went on to mention
several specific issues, including Iraqi failure to account for
the anthrax and VX it had produced, as well as the development of
missiles exceeding the allowed range. Powell also noted impediments
to the work of the inspectors, including "a swarm of Iraqi
minders," an incomplete list of Iraqi personnel involved in
WMD programs, and the inability of the inspectors to interview Iraqi
scientists in private.
Document 26: The White House, What
Does Disarmament Look Like?, January 2003.
As part of pressing its case that Iraq was not truly willing to
disarm, the Bush administration released this short paper contrasting
the nuclear disarmament process in three other countries - South
Africa, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan - with Iraqi behavior. It identified
several characteristics of importance - high level political commitment,
national initiatives to dismantle weapons of mass destruction, and
full cooperation and transparency. It then asserts that "the
behavior of the Iraqi regime contrasts sharply with successful disarmament
examples." It goes on to note the activities of several Iraqi
organizations, including the Special Security Organization, and
the National Monitoring Directorate, and the areas where Iraq's
"currently accurate, full, and complete" declaration"
falls short - including with respect to biological agents, ballistic
missiles, and attempts to procure uranium.
27: Colin L. Powell, Remarks to the United Nations Security
Council, February 5, 2003.
In the face of requests and demands that the U.S. provide further
evidence in support of its position that Iraq was failing to comply
with U.N. resolution 1441, was impeding the work of UNMOVIC and
IAEA inspectors, and that a resort to military force would be necessary
unless Iraq's behavior changed, Secretary of State Colin Powell
addressed the U.N. Security Council. The bulk of Powell's remarks,
as contained in the transcript, involved his provision of "additional
information [about] what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism
The intelligence provided came from a variety of sources - including
satellite imagery, communications intercepts, human assets in Iraq,
detainees, and defectors. It represents the largest single public
disclosure of such information made in support of U.S. diplomacy
- surpassing the scope and volume of disclosures made during the
Cuban missile crisis or the campaign in response to the Soviet Union's
shootdown of KAL 007 in 1983.
The transcript contains Powell's reading of intercepts, and his
description of the content of satellite imagery being shown to the
Security Council. It also contains his description of organizations
and activities, information about which was obtained from human
sources and/or unspecified communications intelligence - such as
the existence of a "Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspections
Teams" as well as the presence of Al-Qaida associates in Baghdad.
Document 28: Department of State, Iraq:
Failing to Disarm - U.S. Secretary of State Powell's Presentation
to the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003.
This Powerpoint presentation provided an overview of part of Secretary
Powell's remarks. It contains a selected portion of intercepts concerning
and a satellite image pertaining to Iraq's hiding of evidence, charges
that Iraq is muzzling its scientists and specifications of how that
is being done, the assertion that Iraq is still seeking nuclear
weapons (with reference to intercepted aluminum tubes), and the
charge that Iraq is harboring terrorists, including Al-Qaida representatives.
Document 29: U.S. Department of State, Iraq: Failing to
Disarm, February 5, 2003.
These images constitute the full set of slides used by Secretary
Powell in support of his presentation. They contain the full text
presented of intercepts, all nine satellite images, and other slides.
Document 30 : Dr. Hans
Blix, Briefing of the Security Council, February 14, 2003.
In accordance with UN Resolution 1441, UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix
delivered a progress on his organizations activities in Iraq, its
findings, and Iraqi compliance with the resolution.
Blix noted that "so far UNMOVIC has not found any [weapons
of mass destruction], only a small number of chemical munitions
which should have been declared and destroyed." However, he
also noted that many proscribed programs had not been accounted
for, a matter that he characterized as being of "great significance."
He specifically mentioned programs for the production of anthrax,
VX nerve gas, and long-range missiles. He also noted the status
of UNMOVIC investigations of the Al-Samoud and Al-Fatah missiles
as well as casting chambers. With regard to Iraqi actions, he reported
that Iraq had formed two commissions to search for relevant documents
and that the National Monitoring Directorate had provided a list
of 83 individuals who could allegedly verify destruction of chemical
weapons and expresses his hope that Iraq will draw up a similar
of individuals who participated in the destruction of biological
31 : Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, The Status of Nuclear Inspections
in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update, February 14, 2003.
In his update report, the director of the IAEA noted
that his agency's inspections had moved from the "reconnaissance
phase" (aimed at re-establishing knowledge of Iraqi nuclear
capabilities) into the "investigative phase" (achieving
an understanding of Iraqi capabilities over the previous four years).
He also reported on the status of the inspection
process - noting that in the preceding two weeks the IAEA had conducted
38 inspections at 19 sites, and that its methods included sampling
air, water, and sediment, as well as the use of hand-held and car-borne
gamma-ray detectors. With respect to specific issues he addressed,
among others, uranium acquisition, uranium enrichment, and the high
Similarly to Blix, he reported that "we have
to date found no evidence of nuclear or nuclear related activities
in Iraq," but that "a number of issues are still under
investigation." ElBaradei also noted that a new document provided
by Iraq contained "no new information," and expressed
the hope that the newly established Iraqi commissions "will
be able to uncover documents and other evidence that could assist
Document 32: Central Intelligence Agency/Defense
Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production
Plants, May 28, 2003. Unclassified.
In his February 5, 2003, presentation to the U.N. Security Council,
Secretary of State Colin Powell charged that Iraq had begun constructing
mobile facilities to produce biological weapons in the mid-1990s.
This program involved, he charged, the manufacture of mobile trailers
and railcars to produce biological agents, designed to evade U.N.
inspectors. Agent production reportedly took place from Thursday
night through Friday, a period during which the United Nations did
not conduct inspections due to the Muslim holiday.
This paper presents a joint CIA-DIA evaluation of two specialized
tractor-trailers and a mobile laboratory truck discovered in Iraq
after the U.S. invasion. Kurdish forces took one tractor-trailer
into custody near Mosul in late April. U.S. troops discovered the
other in early May, at the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development,
and Engineering Facility in Mosul. U.S. troops also found the mobile
laboratory, in late April. The CIA and DIA analysts concluded that
the discoveries constituted "the strongest evidence to date
that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program."
The text of this paper reviews the Intelligence Community's pre-war
sources on the Iraqi mobile program (including a chemical engineer,
a civil engineer, and a defector from the Iraqi Intelligence Service),
and the Community's pre-war assessment of the program. The paper
also asserts that the discovered plants are consistent with intelligence
reports, and that legitimate uses, including hydrogen production,
According to a subsequent New York Times report, engineers from
the Defense Intelligence Agency who examined the trailers concluded
in June that the vehicles were probably used to produce hydrogen
for artillery weather balloons, as the Iraqi had claimed.
Document 33 : CIA Statement on Recently
Acquired Iraqi Centrifuge Equipment, June 26, 2003.
After Saddam Hussein's regime was deposed in March 2003, Dr. Mahdi
Shukur Ubaydi, who headed Iraq's uranium enrichment program before
1991, turned over to U.S. officials in Baghdad a volume of centrifuge
documents and components he had hidden in his garden.
This brief CIA statement reports on some of what Dr. Ubaydi told
U.S. officials. The images, which were removed from the CIA's web
page shortly after their initial appearance, include both photographs
of centrifuge parts and blueprints.
Document 34: House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee, The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Ninth Report
of Session 2002-03, Volume I (London: The Stationary Office
Limited, July 2003). Unclassified.
The primary purpose of this document is to report the committee's
assessment of whether the British Parliament received "accurate
and complete" information from the government in the period
leading up to military action in Iraq - particularly with respect
to weapons of mass destruction.
The two key sections of the report examine the claims made in the
September and February "dossiers," including assertions
concerning Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability, its
long-range missile effort, its nuclear weapons program, Iraq's alleged
attempt to acquire uranium from Africa, and the assertion that Iraqi
forces could deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes
of being given an order to do so.
The report also contains 33 conclusions and recommendations. The
concluded that the government genuinely perceived "a real and
present danger" from Iraq, that in the absence of significant
human intelligence Britain was heavily dependent on US technical
intelligence, defectors, and exiles "with an agenda of their
own," and that the accuracy of British assessments could not
yet be determined.
Document 35: Statement by
Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on the 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of
Mass Destruction, August 11, 2003.
In the face of criticism in the press and Congress over the apparent
disparities between the claims of the October 2002 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraqi WMD and the failure to find weapons stocks or
open production lines in the aftermath of the war, DCI Tenet issued
this statement in defense of the estimate.
He characterizes much of the commentary as "misinformed, misleading,
and just plain wrong," and goes on to state that "we stand
by the judgments in the NIE," and promises that after the Iraq
Survey Group completes its work, "but not before," the
Intelligence Community, "will stand back to professionally
review where were are."
Tenet's statement goes on to defend the consistency of the community's
analysis concerning Iraqi programs as well as its collection efforts
after the departure of U.N. inspectors in 1998. He then proceeds
to examine intelligence performance with each component of Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction programs - nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, and delivery systems.
The most extensive part of his statement is a defense of the estimate's
judgment that Iraq was seeking to reconstitute its nuclear weapons
program. He states that this conclusion was based on six factors,
which did not include its reported attempt to acquire uranium from
Africa. In addition, he describes the alternative views within the
Intelligence Community as to whether Iraq was attempting to obtain
high-strength aluminum tubes for use in uranium enrichment or for
conventional military uses.
Document 36: House of Commons Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction - Intelligence
and Assessments (London: The Stationery Office Limited, September
The House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee defined
the objective of their report as determining "whether the available
intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate
and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in
[British] Government publications."
The initial portions of the report provide overviews of the committee's
investigation, of the intelligence assessment organizations (the
Joint Intelligence Committee and Assessments Staff), and of JIC
assessments from August 1990 to September 2002. The subsequent parts
of the study focus on the September 2002 dossier (including the
claims that Iraqi forces could deploy chemical or biological weapons
within 45 minutes and had sought to purchase uranium from Africa),
assessments from October 2002 to March 2003, the February 2003 document
on Iraqi denial and deception (which included substantial portions,
without attribution, from a previously published, non-governmental
analysis), and several other issues, including intelligence support
to U.N. inspectors.
The report includes twenty-six conclusions and recommendations
concerning a variety of topics - including the adequacy of the Secret
Intelligence Service's human intelligence effort in Iraq, whether
it was reasonable that British intelligence analysts drew the conclusions
they did given the available intelligence on Iraqi WMD programs,
how quickly it appeared Iraqi forces could employ chemical or biological
weapons, and decisions to include or exclude certain information
or conclusions about Iraqi capabilities and the extent of the threat
posed to Britain.
37: Letter, Porter J. Goss and Jane Harman, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, to George J. Tenet, Director of
Central Intelligence, September 25,
This letter criticizes the Intelligence Community's performance
in providing intelligence related to Iraq's chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons programs, as well as with respect to Iraqi ties
to al-Qaeda. Goss and Harman, the committee's chairman and vice
chairman, respectively, write that a "dearth of post-1998 underlying
intelligence reflects a weakness in intelligence collection"
- pointing to past committee concerns about inadequacies in human
intelligence (HUMINT) and measurement and signature intelligence
(MASINT) crucial to producing accurate assessments on weapons of
mass destruction and terrorism. The "lack of specific intelligence
on regime plans and intentions, WMD, and Iraq's support to terrorist
groups appears to have hampered the IC's ability to provide a better
assessment to policymakers from 1998 through 2003."
38: Letter, George J. Tenet to Honorable Porter J. Goss, October
1, 2003. Unclassified.
In this letter to Porter Goss, the chairman of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet disputes the contents of the September 25 letter Tenet
received from Goss and Committee Vice Chairman Jane Harman. He also
criticizes the Committee's distribution of the letter to the press
"before providing the Intelligence Community any reasonable
opportunity to respond."
Tenet argues that the HPSCI was not in a position to fully assess
the Intelligence Community's performance on Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction programs or its ties to al-Qaeda. The Committee, Tenet
charged, had reached its conclusions without having heard from David
Kay, special advisor to the Iraq Survey Group - which had been charged
with searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction.
Further, Tenet charged that the Committee's assertion that the
Intelligence Community did not challenge longstanding judgments
and assessments was "simply wrong." He also accused the
Committee of having failed to try to understand the scope of U.S.
collection activities targeted against Iraqi WMD programs.
39: Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report
of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, October
2, 2003. Unclassified.
In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces failed
to uncover production facilities for, or stocks of, weapons of mass
destruction. To improve the chances of success, an Iraq Survey Group
was established under the direction of Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the
chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations.
Dr. David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapon inspector for several
years after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, was appointed as a special
advisor to the group, and would direct the group's operations in
Kay's October 2 presentation to the Congressional committees provides
an unclassified summary of the group's interim report. Kay told
the attending members that the ISG had not yet found stocks of weapons,
but was not at a point where it could be determined definitively
that such weapons stocks did not exist or that they existed before
the war but had been relocated.
Kay also noted a number of factors that had hindered the ISG's
search - including the compartmentalization of Iraqi WMD programs,
deliberate dispersion and destruction of material and documentation
related to those programs, post-war looting, and a "far from
permissive environment" for search activities.
In addition, Kay summarized some of the Survey Group's discoveries,
which included: a clandestine network of laboratories and safe-houses
controlled by the Iraqi Intelligence Services containing equipment
suitable for CBW research; reference strains of biological organisms
concealed in a scientists home; documents and equipment hidden in
scientists' homes that could be used for resuming uranium enrichment
activities; and a continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel
propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD missiles.
40 : Stuart Cohen, Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts
from Soft Myths, November 26, 2003. Unclassified.
The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National
Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen
argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions
of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions
or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those
reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.
Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as
ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the
estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured
to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration,"
divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major
NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts
overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."
41: Congresswoman Jane Harman, "The Intelligence on Iraq's
WMD: Looking Back to Look Forward," January 16, 2004.
This speech given by the Jane Harman (D-CA), the vice chairman
of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, characterized
the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction programs as "significantly flawed."
She singled out two specific conclusions - that Iraq possessed chemical
and biological weapons, and that it was reconstituting its nuclear
weapons program, noting that "these were the centerpieces of
the NIE and of the case for war and it appears likely that both
Harman went on to call for creation of a Director of National Intelligence
who would serve as a member of the president's cabinet, increased
collaboration within the intelligence community, and "virtual
reorganization" - creating "task forces" through
altered personnel policies and providing virtual workplaces.
Document 42: Transcript of
David Kay testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, January
David Kay appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee shortly
after he resigned as special advisor to the Iraq Survey Group. Kay
states, referring to the expectation that there would be substantial
stocks of, and production lines for, chemical and biological weapons
in Iraq, that "we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include
myself here." He also notes that other foreign intelligence
agencies, including the French and the German, also had believed
that Iraq possessed such stocks and production lines. In addition,
he discusses the issue of whether political pressure had any impact
on the content of the October 2002 national intelligence estimate
(Document 15). Kay also notes that "based
on the work of the Iraq Survey Group
Iraq was in clear violation
of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441. He goes on to note the discovery
of hundreds of instances of activities prohibited by U.N. Resolution
43: George J. Tenet, Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction,
remarks prepared for delivery at Georgetown University February 5,
In the midst of the continuing post-war controversy over intelligence
estimates of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program, Director
of Central Intelligence George Tenet gave this speech in which he
addressed "how the United States intelligence community evaluated
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs over the past decade,
leading to a National Intelligence Estimate in October of 2002."
In his talk, Tenet reviewed the "three streams of information"
available concerning Iraqi WMD programs - Iraq's history, the inability
of Iraq to account for weapons that it possessed at the time of
the 1991 Gulf War, and information obtained after U.N. inspectors
left Iraq in 1998. He also compared the estimate's descriptions
of Iraqi WMD activities with what has been discovered by the Iraq
Survey Group. He argued that "it would have been difficult
for analysts to come to any different conclusions than the ones
reached in October of 2002," but went on to say that "in
our business that is not good enough."
Tenet also spoke about the role of U.S. and British intelligence
in monitoring Libyan WMD, the activities of Pakistani nuclear scientist
A.Q. Khan, and related topics.
1. George W. Bush, National Security Directive 54, Responding to
Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, January 15, 1991. Top Secret. See National
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book Number 39, Operation Desert
Storm: Ten Years After, January 17, 2001, Document 4.
2. See Sharon A. Squassoni, Congressional Research Service, Iraq:
U.N. Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 7, 2003,
3. Accounts of the war and the diplomatic battles prior to it, include
Todd S. Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq (New
York: Times Books, 2003); William Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain,
Europe, and the War in Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
4. James Risen, "U.S. Asks Ex-U.N. Inspector To Advise on Arms
Search," New York Times, June 12, 2003, p. A14; Central Intelligence
Agency, "DCI Tenet Announces Appointment of David Kay as Special
Advisor," June 11, 2003, (available at www.cia.gov); Kenneth
Gerhart, "The Changing Face of ISG's Home Base," Communique,
July-August 2003, pp.5-7.
5. On the various element of the controversy, see Kenneth M. Pollack,
"Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," The Atlantic,
January 2004, pp. 78-92; Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews, and
George Perkovich, WMD in Iraq: evidence and implications (Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004); Thomas Powers,
"The Vanishing Case for War," New York Review of Books,
December 4, 2003, pp. 12-17. With regard to the possibility that human
sources knowingly provided false information on weapons of mass destruction
as well as Saddam's whereabouts on the opening night of the war, see
Bob Drogin, "U.S. Suspects It Received False Iraq Arms Tips,"
Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2003; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough,
"Inside the Ring," Washington Times, January 2, 2004, p.
6. See note 5, the citations for Pollack; Cirincione, Matthews and
Perkovich; and Powers.
7. Joby Warrick, "Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake," Washington
Post, March 8, 2003, pp. A1, A18.
8. Mike Allen and Barton Gellman, "Preemptive Strikes Part of
U.S. Strategic Doctrine," Washington Post, December 11, 2002,
pp. A1, A26.
9. Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen Not Biological
Arms," New York Times, August 9, 2003, pp. A1,
David Albright, Iraq's Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction,
December 5, 2003, (available at http://www.isis-online.org)
Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews, and George Perkovich, WMD
in Iraq: evidence and implications (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2004) (available at http://www.ceip.org)
Anthony Cordesman, Intelligence and Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction:
The Lessons from the Iraq War, July 1, 2003 (available at http://www.csis.org)
Barton Gellman, "Iraq's Arsenal Was Only on Paper," Washington
Post, January 7, 2004, pp. A1, A14-A15.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iraq's Weapons
of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, September
Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong,"
The Atlantic, January 2004, pp. 78-92 (also available at http://www.theatlantic.com)
Thomas Powers, "The Vanishing Case for War," New York
Review of Books, December 4, 2003, pp. 12-17.