

December 10, 1971 - I got a call from Commander Howe at the White House. He told me that Henry and Al Haig were on their way up here and that we were to have another meeting similar to the one we had on the 23rd. He gave me the address on East 74th Street. I gave Aleene Smith the phone number before going to the meeting. I left no word where I was going. Just before I left the office Commander Howe called, warning me to take a certain telegram regarding Pakistan-India. In the morning there had been a big flap because the military commander in East Pakistan had offered terms which were later in the day pulled back. The new terms offered by the Governor in East Pakistan, Mr. Malik, were covered by the telegram Howe was referring to. Kissinger and Haig had not seen the telegram and so Al wanted me to take the telegram up. I was met at the door by Winston Lord and taken into the apartment. Kissinger and Haig showed up in a few minutes and shortly after that Huang Hua and his deputy with two interpreters appeared. Henry unfolded our whole policy on India-Pakistan, saying that we were very parallel with the Chinese. Kissinger talked about the fact that we would be moving some ships into the area, talked about military

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supplies being sent from Jordan, Turkey and Iran. He said he had heard about the massing of troops along the Soviet border and that we would be glad to give information about that if we could. He talked about aid to keep the government in East Pakistan from falling. He discussed a presidential letter from Breshnev in which Breshnev discussed with President Nixon the need for a cease-fire and a political accommodation in the East (no mention of Bangla Desh). Huang replied that this was no good. This was a Russian line. Kissinger tried to point out to him that it wasn't a choice of what was right or wrong, it was the fact that the Pakistan army was going to fall in a day or two. We must find a way to keep West Pakistan stable and whole, India having indicated that they wanted to make moves into a certain part of Kashmir after they polished off East Pakistan. Huang Hua gave a long lecture on the encirclement theory, on the fact that they would have to institute guerrilla warfare if necessary. He gave no indication as to whether they were going to militarily support the operation although Kissinger hinted this would be the thing to do. He asked whether Ambassador Bush had met with the Bengla Desh which is really a dirty word as far as they are concerned. I pointed out that there had been a squib in the paper about that but Justice Chowdbury

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had come under false colors having come as a member of the Third Committee who wanted to pay his respects to me. He had come accompanied with a defector from the Pakistan Mission. It was a source of great embarrassment, and the visit had taken place two or three weeks ago, not in the last two days as the New York Times story in the December 9th or 10th paper had indicated. Henry told him that we would be willing to support whatever kind of resolution they wanted at the UN. This worried me a little for they are talking about very strong, condemnatory language. He also was willing to discuss in great detail communications and plans vis-a-vis the Soviets. Henry told him he was going to meet with Bhutto and tell him he should listen to only Henry and Haig, not anybody in the State Department.

Henry makes very clear to Huang that he has complications at the State Department. The State Department to him is an increasing obsession. He is absolutely obsessed by the idea that they are incompetent and can't get the job done. It comes out all the time. I mentioned to him that just before I came Chris Phillips had asked my judgment as to whether Rogers should land in New York on his

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return back from Europe or whether he should go right to Washington. Knowing the White House situation my judgment was that he should go down to Washington and get fully briefed. Then if he wanted to come see Bhutto and Warren Singh so much the better. I mentioned this to Kissinger and he just went through the roof. He placed a call to Alec Johnson and told Alec he had been talking to me and that I had been asked for a judgment on the matter. In his view Rogers ought to go to Washington. The situation is getting increasingly intolerable. I do not see how I can always stay out of the cross-fire but of course shall be trying.

Nixon has urged restraint on Breshnev during this crisis and had good communications with Breshnev. The White House had also corresponded the Breshnev message to Ambassador Farland without going through State Department channels, telling Farland to pass the Breshnev communique on the cease-fire and political settlements along to Yahya without urging the course of action upon Yahya.

I had to see Bhutto until 8:00 p.m. The meeting lasted over two hours.

There is something about all of this that bothers me. Kissinger told Huang Hua that he was giving the back-grounder to demonstrate what we have been telling the press, that we are for Pakistan. I leaned over and reminded Al Haig that the backgrounder included comments about our meeting with Bangla Desh, the one thing that would make the Chinese climb the walls. Al got Henry aside before the meeting, told him that and they gave Huang Hua another paper. I am not sure what it was about.

I also availed myself of the opportunity to explain to Huang Hua a newspaper article that appeared on December 10 quoting Ambassador Bush about the Secretary General. I explained to him that that was coming out of the press conference on December 8th not on the 9th. The article referred to "yesterday Ambassador Bush said" and it carried a December 10th dateline. I told him I didn't want him to think I had gone out of the meeting and openly violated the confidences that way. Huang Hua is very difficult. He doesn't say much in these secret meetings, possibly because he has no instructions. He smiles and is affable but the communication has been a one-way street. We are supplying him with a great deal of information, he is doing nothing. He asks

very few questions and his responses at this meeting were pure dogma. It was almost a repetition of what he said in the General Assembly and the Security Council meeting. He quoted a proverb about out of the darkness comes the sun, meaning don't worry. If East Pakistan gets wiped out, we can come back someplace else. In conclusion I worry about the system, about this two State Departments thing. I have no knowledge as to how thoroughly staffed out the Kissinger operation is. I understand the staff is big, but I don't know how those things work. Henry is very excitable, very emotional almost. He has a great sense of humor and sometimes is tremendously relaxed and buoyant. Often, however, he hits the ceiling and raises hell. I had a long talk with DePalma today who told me about some of their meetings in the Situation Room. Kissinger is absolutely brutal on these guys, insisting that they don't know anything and asking why they are screwing up policy etc. I went through that, and having had a little bit of a battle myself, I know what they are talking about. He is arrogant yet he can be charming. He is paranoid about the Department just as he was about the China vote, and yet he is very bright. I think he goes too far in some of these things. "We will support you in any resolution you propose." That is going very far indeed, it's going too far.

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In my view we would be well to keep a fairly low profile, let Red China do what they had to do to counteract the Russian threat. It appears to me we might be moving in close cahoots with China or even on our own into more of a public position than I would like to see or is necessary for us.

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