


PGS

In view of the latest
news you have re-
voked for Kuwait,
I think a letter to
Palmer should be written
indicating delicately that
this is a very honor-
But practice of avoiding
embarrassing subjects
on grounds that a
P.S. ruler would
not favor them. The

Ruler of Kuwait is not
a bewildered, but a
very savvy guy

The Eastern Dept
(or Pelly) is pulling
our leg. I sign
letters



End up with leg saying good
to know we have such a competent
person in Amt to deal with these
problems, etc....



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

~~HH~~
~~RS~~

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO

Official - Informal

American Embassy,
1, Grosvenor Square,
London, W.1.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

June 18, 1952


Dear Sam:

Clive Rose of the Eastern Department brought up with Bob Houghton recently the subject of the British Aide-Memoire on the proposed VOA Station in Kuwait (our telegram 5509, June 4). He said he fully realized that the Aide-Memoire would have an adverse reaction in the Department and particularly in the Public Affairs Branch and consequently he wanted to make sure that the Department fully appreciated the anxiety with which the Foreign Office viewed the present internal situation in Kuwait. Largely reiterating the contents of Embassy despatch 5426 dated May 14, he emphasized the great difficulties the British were having in bringing administrative order out of the chaos created by the tremendous increase in oil revenue which the Sheikdom was now receiving. He said the task was further complicated by the Sheikh's inability to grasp the reason for or the details of the administrative reforms which the British were endeavoring to effect. Consequently the British were forced to move very slowly on a piece-by-piece basis keeping the number

of pieces/

Samuel K. C. Kopper, Esquire,
Acting Director,
Office of Near Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

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of pieces to a minimum. Otherwise the Sheikh would be completely overwhelmed and might throw in the sponge which would lead to even more chaos. More important, he felt, was the fact that the establishment of the station would place Kuwait directly in the line of fire in the propaganda battle against the Soviet Union. The resultant focus of world attention on Kuwait and the probable development of subversive activity there would further aggravate an already delicate situation and place the Sheikh in an even more bewildered state than he is now with consequences that would not be hard to predict. It was in this context that the Foreign Office, after considerable soul searching in view of the importance of the project, had felt compelled to reject the proposal for the establishment of the VOA station in Kuwait. Clive said at the end that he was bringing the matter up again because the Foreign Office wanted to make doubly sure that the Department was fully aware of the Foreign Office's anxiety concerning the current state of affairs in Kuwait and that it was for this reason that it had rejected the proposal.

On the general subject of Kuwait, if you are still with me, we are somewhat concerned by the implications of the Memorandum of Conversation on April 30, 1952 entitled "The Status of Kuwait". We went all over this ground ad nauseam with our British friends when we were arranging for the opening of a Consulate. In view of the pressure we are exerting on the British in Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, I would hope we could avoid getting into this quagmire again unless it is absolutely vital.

Sincerely,


Joseph Palmer 2nd
First Secretary of Embassy

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