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                   2 March 2001 - Certified
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                   Vancouver, B.C.
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      (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 10:00 A.M.)
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6 THE REGISTRAR: In the Supreme Court of British
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       Columbia at Vancouver on this the 3rd -- 2nd day
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      of March 2001, in the matter of the United Mexican
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       States versus Metalclad Corporation, My Lord.
10 THE COURT: Before you continue with your reply,
       Mr. Foy, I've received a letter making a request
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       of me which I propose to discuss at the end of the
       day when I anticipate that we'll be talking about
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       some other housekeeping matters.
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          So, Mr. Registrar, would you give a copy of
       this to Mr. Foy and Mr. Alvarez, and I've given an
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       extra copy for yourself.
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18 MR. ALVAREZ: Thank you. Oh, I'm sorry.
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    MR. FOY: My Lord, I've handed up or asked the
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       registrar to hand up three things, two binders,
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       one containing a reply, one containing reply
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       authorities and reply extracts, and then a loose
23
       document, the fifth submission of the
24
       United States of America.
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          I'd like to --
26 THE COURT: Okay.
    MR. FOY: Before I get to the reply, and I -- I'll
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       deal with the fifth submission of the United
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       States of America, first of all, I've just
       provided this to my friend and to the Court. And
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       the reason for that is that it -- this copy was
       obtained pursuant to an application under the
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       United States Freedom of Information Act, and the
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       release of this document was only obtained this
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       morning. I wasn't sure if it was late last night
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       or this morning. And that's the reason for my
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       late delivery of it to you and to my friend.
          And now I'll explain what it is. It is a
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       submission being made in -- in yet another
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       Chapter 11 arbitration by the United States of
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       America under Article 1128, the article allowing
       non-parties to the dispute. This is a dispute
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between Pope & Talbot v. Canada, allowing
non-parties to the dispute to make submissions on
the interpretation of the NAFTA, as you'll recall.
The submission speaks to the Myers case upon
which Metalclad relied, and again and that's

the reason for bringing it to your attention.
And I'll just quickly go through it. It's
very short. It notes in paragraph 2:
[All quotations herein cited as read]

"After the United States filed its fourth submission on November 1st in Pope & Talbot, the tribunal in the NAFTA Chapter 11 case of S.D. Myers rendered a partial award."

And you'll recall that is the partial award that Canada has commenced a -- an application to set aside in the federal court. Counsel for Canada referred you to that fact during their submissions.

"...a partial award..."

And -- and this is the -- the same partial award to which Metalclad referred in its submissions.

"...in which it addressed, inter alia, Articles 1105 and 1102. Though that decision does not constitute binding precedence..."

And Article 1136 is referred to, again, the -- that -- that theoretical fact is noted, but:

"...it deserves comment as one of the few final awards in a Chapter 11 arbitration."

The United States goes on, over the page, to disagree with the S.D. Myers panel majority's treatment of Article 1105(1). The panel majority incorrectly defines the scope of Article 1105(1) and in -- incorrectly links 1102 to Article 1105(1). You'll see there a variant of the alleged error that occurred here.

43	In in this case the linkage occurred
14	between two articles within Chapter 11. You'll be
1 5	aware that in in the case before Your Lordship
46	the linkage occurred between Article 1105 and
17	Chapter 18. And the United States goes on:

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"The S.D. Myers panel majority correctly finds that Article 1105 incorporates certain rules of customary international law."

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And you'll recall we relied upon that. S.D. Myers -- sorry, the reference is there to the paragraph.

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"After noting this essential point, two of the arbitrators inexplicably ignore the logical consequences of this conclusion by suggesting that a violation of standards that do not arise out of customary international law, i.e. standards of conventional law, the standards of Article 1102 may establish a breach of Article 1105."

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The United States is saying that that doesn't -- that doesn't -- cannot follow.

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"As the United States noted in its fourth submission, Article 1105 requires that parties accord investments of another party the international minimum standard of treatment which is an umbrella concept incorporating a set of rules that have crystallized over the centuries into customary international law in specific contexts. National treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment, however, are not such customary international law obligations; rather, they are treaty obligations binding on the NAFTA parties only by virtue of the parties' agreement to the NAFTA. Thus, concluding that Article 1102 has been breached..."

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Concluding a treaty obligation has been breached:

"does not establish a breach of a
customary international obligation. To the
extent the S.D. Myers panel majority
suggests otherwise, it is incorrect."

And then I said yesterday I hoped to be able to speak some more about F.A. Mann. This is what I was hoping to -- to adopt:

"The sole authority offered by the two arbitrators who formed the majority on this point is a citation to Professor Mann. They quote Mann's statement."

And Mann's submission is quoted that -- his argument is that the right to fair and equitable treatment goes much further than these other two treaty obligations.

"So general a provision that it's likely to be almost sufficient to cover all conceivable cases."

And then going on:

"Reliance on this citation by the panel majority on this point is misplaced. First, Mann's statement is that of an academic, arguing for what he thinks should be the appropriate construction of the terms fair and equitable treatment in British investment treaties. It does not purport to be a statement of accepted principles of treaty law, still less a principle so universally accepted by States that they have crystallized into rules of customary international law."

And you'll recall my emphasis on in this context, treaty context, the difference between the wording of the treaties and the need to have regard to that.

"Second, Mann provides no support for his construction of the terms in British investment treaties.

43	"Third, as demonstrated in the
44	United States fourth submission"
45	
46	An earlier submission in this case:
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"...the drafters of Chapter 11 specifically excluded Mann's thesis by selecting language in Article 1105 that fairly stated fair and equitable treatment to be a subset of customary international law, not an overarching duty that subsumes all other instances of substantive protection."

And you'll recall that I referred you to this text authority of Dolzer who -- who came to the same conclusion, saying that it's clear that in the NAFTA fair and equitable treatment is subsumed under the customary international law standard, and that the manner in which they drafted the architecture of 1105 makes that clear.

"The S.D. Myers award itself acknowledges that modern commentators might consider Professor Mann's statement on fair and equitable treatment to be an overgeneralization. The S.D. Myers arbitrators who form the majority on this point should not have relied upon authority so at variance with NAFTA's clear direction that fair and equitable treatment be construed to require compliance only with customary international law obligations.

"Determining that alleged violations of other NAFTA provisions, whether found within or without Section A of Chapter 11, are caught within the ambit of 1105, would increase the scope of that provision and of Chapter 11 far beyond that contemplated by the NAFTA parties."

Now, on the facts before Your Lordship, we don't need to go that far. I don't know whether there's a difference between a -- a provision which -- that is within or without the Chapter 11, but it is clear that provisions without Section A of Chapter 11 are in our submission outside the

43	jurisdiction of a Chapter 11 tribunal.
44	And he goes on:
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46	"In short, Myers Arbitrator Chiasson was
47	correct in concluding as recording in the

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award as follows: A finding of a violation of Article 1105 must be based on a demonstrated failure to meet the fair and equitable requirements of international law. A breach of another provision of the NAFTA is not a foundation for such a conclusion. The language of the NAFTA does not support the notion espoused by Dr. Mann insofar as it is considered to support a 10 breach of Article 1105 that is based on a 11 violation of another provision of Chapter 12 11."

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And of course I would adopt that but just modify it to say "based on a violation of another chapter of the NAFTA."

So I mentioned that this is the United States taking a position in the case in which it is not directly implicated. This is an 1128 submission.

Now, I will return to -- before I start to go directly to the -- the written reply, I would like to complete my reply to some of the oral submissions that were made.

I will be taking you in the course of that to portions of the reply. And just by way of introduction, we have not had the time to edit the -- the reply, and I would reserve that right to make any corrections to the -- to the written document.

Returning then to the oral submissions, I want to go back to something I said yesterday. I talked about annex 1120.1.

33 THE COURT: Um-hum.

MR. FOY: And one of the things I should have said was I don't think I see this tribunal relying upon annex 1120.1, and I should have brought that to your attention yesterday.

The next topic I'd like to deal with is the 1996 amendment to the option agreement. I, when making my submissions, advised Your Lordship that there was a subsequent amendment, but didn't take you to the details of it.

For the points that I was referring to the	
option agreement, the the 1993 amendment, the	
September 1993 agreement was for the purposes of	
demonstrating the knowledge of the investor at the	
time of the acquisition of the investment,	
	option agreement, the the 1993 amendment, the September 1993 agreement was for the purposes of demonstrating the knowledge of the investor at the

knowledge of the requirement to either obtain a municipal permit or to obtain a court order in order to allow operations.

Metalclad has pointed out that the option agreement was later amended at -- and -- and took you to some evidence of reasons given at a subsequent time for the amendment.

Excuse me, My Lord, I just need to get a book here.

And those references were to Mr. Kesler's evidence in -- at the respondent's book of extracts, tab 16, pages 250 to 252. And in that -- and I don't need to turn it up. I'll remind you that the -- Mr. Kesler said:

"After receiving a number of federal assurances, we decided that, since a local construction permit was simply not an issue, we had no reason to have it in the agreement and no reason to have it conditional whatsoever."

Giving the impression that this occurred as of 1995, that -- that -- that this, having received assurances with the Convenio in late 1995, the amendment was made in late 19 -- in early 1996 on account of those subsequent insur -- assurances.

That was not the explanation given in 1994 by the corporation's lawyers to the corporation's auditors with respect to this issue. And we have included in the new book of selected extracts at tab 11 a letter dated September 10, 1994, and I'd ask you to turn that up at tab 11.

This is a letter to Grant Thornton, who were the auditors of Metalclad Corporation at the time. And the issue that's on the table is whether or not is the auditors can remove the \$1.5 million contingent liability that is the subject of the conditional clauses.

You'll recall that the change that was made in September of 1993 was to take and condition

43	payment of \$1.5 million upon either receiving the
44	municipal permit or a court order. So that
45	contingent liability is on the books. They want
46	to get rid of it.
47	And this is this is this describes that

issue. And dealing with the -- the first 2 paragraph:

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"This letter is written to confirm the substance of the conversation we had with Mr. Kesler last week concerning negotiations with the majority shareholders of COTERIN to modify the agreement between the company and the shareholders regarding compensation payable to the shareholders."

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So in 1994 they're already having negotiations, not on the basis of all these subsequent assurances in 1995, but on a different basis.

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"The company..."

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And then the -- the clause is set out -- or not set out. The letter goes on:

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"The company previously acquired 94 percent of the outstanding shares of COTERIN from the shareholders in consideration of the promise by the company to pay the shareholders 2 million cash, 5 percent of the gross revenues, and to enter into employment agreements with the shareholders. \$500,000 of the consideration has been paid."

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You'll recall there was an initial \$50,000 with the very first agreement, and then 450 with the exercise of the option.

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"And 1.5 was to have been paid in 3 equal installments upon the full utilization of the landfill site owned by COTERIN. The agreement also provided the company would assume the responsibility of any site remediation. However, the costs of site remediation were to be offset against

43	payments otherwise owed to the
44	shareholders.
45	"It has been determined by the
46	company and the shareholders that full
47	utilization of the site will never occur.

Therefore, the contingent elements of the compensation previously agreed upon between the company and the shareholders will never become binding on the company. Although no formal legal opinions have been rendered, the company's counsel have informally concurred in this conclusion. The company and the shareholders have agreed to amend..."

 And there is set out the text of the -- the amendment of -- of the agreement, which amendment is recorded in January of 1996.

The letter goes on to deal with the -- one of the amendments deals with the -- well, I'll just read the paragraph:

"In connection with an agreement with the Mexican government, the company's subsidiary, ECOPSA, will conduct an environmental audit during the next 12 months to study what, if anything, needs to be done to remediate the portion of the La Pedrera site that was previously used for storage of waste prior the [sic] company's acquisition of COTERIN, and will complete the required remediation, if any, in the 36 to 48 months following the completion of the study.

"The company expects no significant remediation effort, because it currently anticipates the remediation will consist primarily of disposing drums of waste stored in the existing cells in an adjacent cell of the landfill under construction by the ECOPSA. However, until the environmental audit is completed, the company will not know what is required."

 And I'll just pause there. You'll note that they have just said there will not be full utilization of this site. And that's consistent

43	with the construction of one cell, and one cell
44	that you've seen constructed, to remediate the
45	contamination that's been there since 1991.
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47	"The company believes that substantial
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1 amounts of one of the existing cells will 2 yield waste that could be processed..." 3 4 For a service and burned and -- and have a 5 source of revenue. So there's revenue that they 6 rec -- hope to recognize from remediation alone. 7 8 "Handling the vast majority of the waste 9 on-site over a period of 36 to 48 months 10 will enable the company to complete the required..." medi "...remediation at the 11 12 lowest possible cost. Some organic 13 materials may be treated at other 14 facilities operated by the company." 15 16 So there's the description of remediation, 17 how it can occur without the introduction of any 18 new hazardous waste on-site or with a portion of 19 it treated at other facilities. 20 And then at -- it talks about the term 21 providing for the issuance of shares. 22 Now, I also have under tab 11 a portion of 23 a -- an extract from a report filed by Mexico 24 describing those events. It really just -- and 25 pages 7 and 8 takes you through the history that 26 I've just taken you through. 27 And then as well we have, under that 28 particular tab, a filing with the Securities and 29 Exchange Commission by Metalclad Corporation for 30 the fiscal year ended May 31, 1994. And I'd just 31 ask you to turn to page 2 of that. The 2's at the 32 bottom of the page. And at this stage they are telling the shareholders or the -- the public in 33 34 the middle paragraph on that page, starting 35 "ECOPSA," under "Introduction." 36 THE COURT: Um-hum. 37 MR. FOY: 38 "ECOPSA is completing construction of a 39 permitted hazardous waste landfill." 40 41 Now, you'll know -- you'll know in fact that

it's not permitted at that stage. They are

43	applying for a municipal permit in November of
44	1994.
45	And they talk about the amendment at page 5
46	of that document.
47	And in these documents, the La Pedrera

landfill is referred to it's -- as El Confine in the middle of that page. And there the amendment is described:

"The agreement with the minority shareholders requires the payment of the 1.5..."

Sorry, the negotiations are described. And -- and it says towards the middle of that paragraph:

"The agreement also provides that up to..."

Sorry. Let me -- yes.

"The agreement also provides that up to 500,000 of the minority shareholders' percentage of gross landfill revenues may be offset against any costs incurred by the company in remediation. The company now believes that the contingencies upon which the additional payments are conditioned will not occur. Consequently, the company is negotiating an agreement with the minority shareholders to issue 100,000 shares of common stock of the company to them in consideration for the remaining 6 percent of the capital stock of COTERIN, and their waiver of rights of contingent payments..."

Contingent payments based on a revenue stream that they've just -- to the auditors they've said there will not be full utilization. We -- the -- the risk that we contracted for is not going to occur, so let's amend the agreement. It goes on to say:

"The company will also perform any site remediation as required by PROFEPA."

So the explanation given by Mr. Kesler in his
testimony that these amendments were prompted by
federal assurances occurring in November of 1995
and in and around that time is not the explanation

for the amendment that was given in September of 1994.

Now, I've troubled you with that detail because it is important to correct the record.

But I come back to the foreknowledge Metalclad had at the time of the acquisition of the investment.

Metalclad admitted -- it didn't do this in the memorial. In the memorial you'll recall it -- it represented that the first it heard of municipal permit issues was in November of 1995. It admitted in -- later that it had knowledge of the assertion of municipal permitting authority, and recognized when it purchased this investment that in order to proceed it would either need to obtain a municipal permit or a court order.

That was a risk that was recognized at the time of the acquisition of the investment, and Metalclad negotiated deferment of payment of \$1.5 million on account of that risk. The risk materialized in my -- in -- in the events, and having acquired a partially permitted landfill, and having negotiated what will happen if we don't get a fully permitted landfill, that came to pass. Now, in my submission that cannot amount to a denial of unfair treatment -- de -- a denial of fair treatment or an expropriation.

Now, Metalclad attempts to marginalize the relevance of what it knew when it acquired this investment by a reference to subsequent oral assurances. And in my submission if this was not a treaty violation in 1993 when the investment was acquired but rather the materialization of a risk known to Metalclad, it cannot be transformed into a treaty violation by what -- by federal assurances made subsequently.

In the course of oral submissions Metalclad agreed that it was not the municipal permit denial alone that violated the minimum standard of treatment, but only when considered against Metalclad's subjective belief in oral representations. Now, a subjective belief, and I'll come back to whether it was reasonable, but

43	even if reasonable cannot transform what would not
14	have been a violation of the NAFTA into a
1 5	violation of the NAFTA.
46	Metalclad purchased a partially permitted
17	landfill with knowledge of the risk that it would
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not necessarily become fully permitted. That risk materialized.

Now, that completes the topic dealing with the 1996 amendment to the agreement.

I'd like to turn to the oral submissions made with respect to the application of the international commercial act as opposed to the Commercial Arbitration Act.

Again, a number of points were -- were met by Metalclad that had not been made or attempted to be made by Mexico. Mexico did not assert that a State could not enter into a commercial relationship. That can occur, and often does in the context of concession agreements.

Metal -- Mexico did not assert that a -- a direct contractual relationship was the only way a commercial relationship within the meaning of the international act could arise. And Mexico did not assert that Metalclad had not made an investment in Mexico. Mexico argued instead that the relationship between Mexico and Metalclad was not commercial within the meaning of the act.

Now, that point -- I'll come back to that point, but rather than start with that point, Metalclad argued that since Metalclad had made an investment, and since this arbitration arose out of -- in its investing, and it was international, that the arbitration fell within the jurisdiction of the international act.

The act does not apply to all international investment disputes. That's not its language. It is also required that the dispute arise out of a commercial relationship as defined.

And COTERIN, it's conceded, was an investment located in Mexico but it was not an investment with Mexico. It did not arise out of a commercial contract with Mexico.

The relationship, and this is agreed in the written materials by Metalclad, arises out of regulatory measures taken by Mexico. And the quote is from paragraph 61 of Metalclad's response where it's agreed that this arose as, quote:

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44	"part of Mexico's general regulatory
45	activity."
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47	Now, given that agreement, whether you take a

wide or narrow -- and we have no issue with taking a wide interpretation of commercial. Given agreement on that point, that this arose out of a regulatory relationship, we're content to take a -- as directed by the commentary to take a, quote, wide meaning. But a commercial relationship is not a regulatory relationship.

Now, having agreed on this point, that this arose out of regulatory activity, Metalclad then argues in -- again in the same paragraph, paragraph 61, that the nature of the specific action taken by Mexico is irrelevant to determining the nature of the underlying relationship. Now, that's -- there's the difference between us.

Is it relevant that the action taken by Mexico is -- is the action -- is the nature of the specific action taken by Mexico relevant or irrelevant? Well, in our submission the nature of the specific action is not only relevant, it's a jurisdictional requirement. Only actions that amount to a measure can give rise to a Chapter 11 arbitration. Chapter 11 is restricted in its application to governmental regulatory measures, as Mexico and Canada demonstrated by reference to the -- to the text. That point was not addressed.

And I'd ask Your Lordship just to -- I'm at a point where I can direct you to the reply, the written reply, to turn up paragraphs 13 through 18. And I've made the points in -- in -- orally that are contained in -- in 13 through 17, and I just add paragraph 18.

I'll just note there Metalclad relied upon the Carter case. And in our submission that case confirms that you must examine the relationship between the parties inter se, not simply the activities of one of the parties. You'll recall that in that case that involved a sale of the home. Neither of those parties, both of whom were individuals engaging in transaction for personal purposes, could be characterized as commercial in

- nature. I -- neither was acting in that way. But
 because they interrelated in a commercial fashion,
- 45 their relationship was determined to be
- 46 commercial.
- 47 And the case that Metalclad relies upon

demonstrates the incorrectness of their point in
paragraph 61. You must examine the relationship,
both sides. One side is not irrelevant (sic).
And when you take that together with an agreement
that Mexico was acting as part of its general
regulatory activity, you cannot construct a
commercial relationship.

Now, Metalclad -- that's the primary issue, I think, for Your Lordship with respect to the issue of the application in any event. A number of subsidiary points were made by Metalclad, and I'll deal with those quickly.

Metalclad argued that the application of the international act would lead to an unharmonious or anomalous result because there might be two different legal systems governing two situations of setting aside a -- an award under the law of the place of the arbitration and enforcing an award in the place of enforcement.

Now, Metalclad suggested that didn't make sense. Well, that makes perfect sense when the two legal regimes are different. That's common in international arbitrations. And Article 1136 of the NAFTA, which recognizes judicial review of Chapter 11 arbitrations, does not make any attempt to harmonize the law of the places of arbitration that may occur. Article 1136 recognizes that there may be a mosaic of different laws that apply. So while my friend might have rewrit -- rewritten the NAFTA to achieve a more harmonious result, that's not the way the NAFTA was constructed.

Metalclad then argued that it would defeat the object of the international act to interpret it as inapplicable to Chapter 11 arbitrations, the object and purpose. This does not follow. When the international act was enacted, Chapter 11 arbitrations didn't exist. It was enacted in 1986. So it cannot have been the specific object of the legislator's intent.

Could it have been their general intention? In my submission it was manifestly the general intention of the legislatures to make -- in
British Columbia to make the Commercial
Arbitration Act and not the international act the
statute that would apply to, quote, any other
arbitration. That's the language that's used in

the commercial act. It was open to the legislators to include language like that, like "any other international arbitration" in the international act. They didn't do so in 1986 when it was enacted, nor did they take the opportunity in 1994 to amend the statute as was done at the federal level with the federal Commercial Arbitration Act. So I suggest that the -- as reflected in the language used by the legislators, the object and purpose was clear, to make the commercial act the residuary act, not the other wav around.

> Now, Metalclad referred to Article Roman numeral 2 of the New York Convention in what appeared to be a -- an attempt to argue that only the international act could be said to comply with the New York Convention's requirement that agreements to arbitrate be respected.

Well, Canada has been a party to the New York Convention since before the passage of the international act. And the commercial act as well is re -- the commercial act also recognizes and respects the agreements to arbitrate. That didn't occur simply in the international act. Both statutes do that.

Metalclad referred to the commercial act as out of date. Now -- and I just note it was enacted at the same time as the international act.

Metalclad referred to the provisions of the commercial act that -- that envisage the assistance of the Supreme Court to -- in an attempt to argue that those references somehow made the commercial act somehow inappropriate for international arbitrations. If you look at the provisions of the international act, you'll see numerous cases in which the act calls upon the Supreme Court for assistance, Sections 2, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16 and 27 and others are provisions of the international act calling at various stages in an arbitration upon the assistance of the Supreme Court.

43	Finally, Metalclad suggested in oral
44	submissions that it if a measure of review is
45	applied by this Court, British Columbia will be
46	less attractive as a place of arbitration. And in
47	my submission that is not a basis to transform

 what Metalclad agrees to be -- to arise out of a regulatory activity into a commercial relationship.

The next topic I'd like to deal with is the -- whether Quintette is binding authority on the interpretation of the international act. In our submission Metalclad's position in this respect is -- is contradictory.

When discussing the Commercial Arbitration Act Metalclad agreed that there -- and their language was there was no, quote, binding authority on the application of that act to an arbitration like this. When discussing on the -- the international act, on the other hand, it was argued that Quintette was binding even though Quintette did not involve an arbitration like this. Mexico does not question the correctness of Quintette as applied to the type of arbitration before the Court there. Mexico argued that different considerations apply here.

Again, a point of agreement, Metalclad agreed that different considerations apply in different contexts and to different arbitrations, and one should be careful about those different contexts. We've heard -- we heard vigorous argument that anything said by the ICSID annulment committee in review of ICSID annul -- of ICSID awards should not inform the jurisdiction of this Court at all. It was different.

I -- we will come back to whether the ICSID annulment regime is closer to this type of arbitration than the Model Law regime. But at this stage I just make the point that both arbitration law, as it -- as, I think, recognized in Quintette, and the pragmatic and functional analysis dictated by the Supreme Court of Canada for, we say, review of subordinate tribunals of limited jurisdiction of any type allow the flexibility to -- for these different factors to play out in different ways in different contexts, and doesn't require the direction given by the Court of Appeal in Quintette to be a single

43	standard against which all other arbitrations that
14	happen to be reviewed under that statute are
1 5	measured.
46	Moreover, we pointed out that or we point
17	out now in reply that when interpreting provisions

that are involved in the creation of jurisdiction of a tribunal, like Section B of Chapter 11, a different standard of review would apply than decisions clearly within their jurisdiction.

Now, in discussing jurisdictional review under the international act, counsel for Metalclad focused on the word "the dispute" in that -- in a portion of the language in Section 34(2)(a)(iv) in an attempt to argue that this tribunal dealt with the dispute before it and that's the end of the analysis.

Counsel did not read, either when going through the act or when going through Quintette, the additional language of Section 34 which states that the ar -- which allows for review where the arbitral award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. And we have made extensive submissions about how this award contains decisions on transparency, on chap -- on the obligations of -- under Chapter 18, and other matters beyond the scope of submission to arbitration.

Coming back briefly to the flexibility allowed by the Court in the application of the standard of review, even if this is a -- somehow fit -- gets into the international act and is found to be commercial in some way, the distinction between the public rights that are involved here and the very private rights involved in a private commercial arbitration between commercial actors should have a bearing on the approach of the Court.

Counsel for Metalclad spent a lot of time arguing that we were asserting there should be a narrow interpretation of "commercial," and we don't assert that. We are content with a wide interpretation.

Metalclad's counsel made some comments about sovereign immunity. And I would like to record that on our understanding of the issues before Your Lordship, we haven't spoken about sovereign

- immunity, that -- that that is not an issue that is engaged, and I just want to record that. 43
- 44
- Insofar as sovereign immunity and enforcement is concerned, that is not an issue that is before 45
- 46
- 47 this Court.

Counsel for Metalclad argued that this -well, it had some aspects -- that this type of
arbitration had some aspects of confidentiality
about it, and therefore it became a private
arbitration just like private commercial
arbitration. And that does not follow,
particularly in this case where Mexico's interest
is as a regulator. And it is that that gives rise
to the public interest in the issues, which is
separate from the issue of confidentiality.

The -- that's the -- those are the submissions in response to the oral points made with respect to the application of the international act versus the commercial act.

I'll come back to the issues dealing with the questions of law and the application of -- and appropriateness of the application of the commercial act.

And I'd like a -- to continue with the -- the next topic in terms of responding to oral submissions deals just generally with the issue of the -- the -- the allegations made with respect to patently unreasonable error. And on that -- with respect to that point, Metalclad took the position that it was necessary for Mexico to argue that there was, quote, no evidence to support a particular finding of fact before this Court could review the situation before it would give rise to either a question of law or give rise to review under -- for jur -- on -- on jurisdictional grounds. Again, this is partially a response to a point not made. Mexico did not argue that point.

Mexico argued instead that the tribunal failed to have regard to documentary evidence produced by Metalclad, undisputed evidence, that when examined rendered -- rendered the findings that it did make patently unreasonable.

Now, the difference between us appears that Metalclad attempts to -- urges the Court that as a matter of law the patently unreasonable review test is only available in the administrative law context and is not available in the review of --

13	of an arbitra in the arbitration context.
14	And I think we've already referred to the
1 5	authorities in in that regard that refute that
46	argument, but I and I'll remind you of those
1 7	and and take you to a new one.

 First of all, we referred to the Shalansky case, the Supreme Court of Canada review of -- in the arb -- a consensual arbitration context where the objectively unreasonable test is referred to -- patently unreasonable -- patently unreasonable test is referred to.

In our submission that test is available for the Court's review of any tribunal with limited jurisdiction, whether those limits flow from a legislative grant of jurisdiction or whether they flow from a consensual grant of jurisdiction. The common feature is the limit on the jurisdiction.

And you'll recall I took you through at some length a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with the application of the patently unreasonable standard in the situation where the tribunal had failed to have regard to relevant evidence, the case -- the school board case in which the letter that the -- had been overlooked, where -- where that gave rise to patently unreasonable findings and fatal error.

And just to remind the Court, that was -I'll just remind the Court Shalansky was tab 61,
and the Board of Education case was 66. Sorry,
I've got the wrong -- I think I've got the wrong
one. No, that's right. It was 66.

I will now take you to another reference, and this is in the written reply at page 13. And I'll just note quickly paragraphs 49 and following. In our submission a patently unreasonable error does not fall within an arbitrator's jurisdiction, that it's a basic rule of justice in Canadian public policy -- we're making two points here -- that a tribunal with limited jurisdiction not exceed that jurisdiction. Chief Justice McLachlin has drawn clear links between the pragmatic and func -functional approach of judicial review in determining excesses of jurisdiction and the very essence of the modern rule of law. And we've included in the re -- supplementary reply authorities, an article describing the development of that pragmatic and functional test in the last

13	20 years.
14	Another earthquake, My Lord.
15	In the arbitration context, I commend the
16	next reference. Lord Justice of Appeal Kerr of
17	the Supreme Court of Judicature in England in
	and the contract of the contra

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1 in an article. I noted, that is called 2 "Arbitration and the Courts, the UNCITRAL Model 3 Law," dealing with the -- the very private 4 commercial arbitrations dealt with, in that 5 context, talking about the powers of review over 6 the decisions of tribunals outside the hierarchy 7 of the courts, noting that these are not rights of 8 appeal generally -- and that will depend of course 9 upon the statute -- but involved judicial review, 10 and is exercised when the principles of natural 11 justice have been infringed or where the -- or 12 when the ultimate conclusion was one which no 13 reasonable tribunal could have reached; noting 14 that, with the exception of certain bodies, there 15 is no one immune from judicial review in the event of improper conduct, breaches of the principles of 16 17 natural justice or decisions which clearly 18 transcend any standard of objective 19 reasonableness.

And at the bottom of that, I'll just emphasize, he -- he notes at the bottom of the -- of the paragraph:

"Speaking from experience, I believe this to be as necessary in relation to arbitrations in England and abroad as in all other contexts."

So on the law in our submission the -- the approaches available to the Court, even under the -- even in the case of the application of the international act and in the case of -- of arbitrations -- and that's the first reply to the -- the point that there has to be no evidence, in our submission other grounds are -- are available.

And having staked its ground on that point, Metalclad doesn't really meet our points. They -they go through a great number of facts on a number of issues in an attempt to show that there was evidence on issues, but what they don't do is go through the documents that we went through to

43	show how, properly considered or considered at
44	all, those documents can stand with the findings
45	that were made by the tribunal.
46	They do take some attempts to render those
47	documents irrelevant, for example, the documents

recording the -- the -- the documents recording the existence, exercise and abandonment of legal remedies in this case. They say, well -- they try and argue that that's irrelevant. But they in my submission don't demonstrate that, are not able to make that point out. And I've already -- I won't repeat those submissions.

In reply there, the -- in response then I think we have a bit of ships passing in the night because the points we made are in my submission not fully addressed.

I'm going to spend some time in reply to some of their facts, but not for the purposes of dealing with this question of whether there's any evidence or not but for the purpose of recording for the record an answer to one of my friend's questions which was, well, Metalclad -- or Mexico didn't appear to treat the Metalclad case with much credit, di -- didn't give enough credit to Metalclad's side of the story when telling the story. And I want to explain the -- the -- the perspective of Mexico with respect to that.

And I'd start by reminding the Court that, you'll recall, and I -- that in the original memorial the entire claim -- well, I -- I could -- one can even go back. In the draft statement of notice of intent to claim that was in the materials, the allegations were directed against Dr. Medellin and related to a number of factors that we haven't heard anything about since.

In the original memorial, allegations were made that Metalclad didn't know about the permit issue until November of 1995. Allegations were made that Metalclad spent 20.5 million on the labour, construction and equipment of this facility. And allegations were made of serious issues of -- of corruption against the governor and other officials in SLP and in the municipality.

Now, as it happened, we've demonstrated already to Your Lordship that the -- the first allegation about them not knowing anything about

43	the permit was false, and that was later resiled
44	from. We've also demonstrated that the statement
45	that 20.5 million was spent on this facility was
46	also false.
47	With respect to the allegations of corruption

that were contained in the original memorial, detailed witness statements were filed answering all of those allegations. And those witnesses that testified with respect to those answers were never challenged or cross-examined by the --although they were called for cross-examination by Metalclad, they were never cross-examined on those issues. And all of those allegations have, as is -- happened many times in this case, disappeared, and the case has turned into a -- a new case. The -- and this case is based upon the reasonableness of Metalclad's reliance on oral representations of federal primacy.

Now, we showed you the documents, the documents that showed that the federal authorities did not say that, that they said we don't hesitate to remind you, get a municipal permit.

Now, Metalclad's response to that -- with the exception of the evidence of Mr. Rodarte, which is always dealt with separately -- response to that was hearsay. It wasn't other documents. It was things like Mr. Kesler said, someone told me not to worry, apply anyway and you'll get the permit. de la Cruz, I think, was the person that he mentioned in there.

Now, if the witness statements of the federal officers who are alleged to have said these things, this hearsay evidence, are examined, you will see that they either don't say what was alleged, and Reyes Lujan is a good example of that, or they deny what was alleged, or they flatly contradict what is alleged with a positive statement, like Garcia Leos saying I told them whoever told you you didn't need to get a local permit was wrong. All those -- all those witness statements were filed.

None of those witnesses were called for cross-examination, nor were they contradicted by documents. And Metalclad tried to -- tried to leave the impression that this procedure was a purely continental procedure in which only witness statements were relevant, and credibility didn't

43	have to be dealt with in the by virtue of the
44	common law approach. And in my submission that's
45	not the case.
46	The system that was in play here was a
47	mixture of the continental and common law system.

And that was made clear in the letter that I took you to, and I don't need to take you back to, but at tab 3 of the -- Volume 1 of Mexico's extracts, where it was noted that if a witness was contradicted by a document and you were content to rely upon the documentary evidence, it wasn't necessary to call them for cross-examination. But if you wanted to raise doubts as to general veracity, then that would be appropriate, to call them for cross-examination.

As I mentioned, Metalclad originally -when -- when Mr. -- when Metalclad's counsel
started last week in their overview introduction,
I heard it agreed that the only representations
that were relied upon by Metalclad were oral
representations.

Now, that subsequently changed and an attempt was made to say there were some documentary representations, and I'll -- and I'll get to that. But the fact is in my submission the witness statements to which I've referred were not contradicted by the documents. The -- the federal witnesses who said go get a municipal permit were confirmed by the contemporary documents that said go get a municipal permit.

Not having been called for cross-examination, having been confirmed not contradicted by the documents, how can the tribunal completely ignore that evidence?

And I'd take you to paragraph 320 of Metalclad's response. Paragraph 320 of the response talks about the evidence filed by Metalclad with respect to the hearsay evidence saying we were told this and we were told that.

"Mexico forcefully argued that the evidence of Metalclad's witnesses should not be given weight, because other federal officials denied making any such representations. However, the tribunal in finding the federal officials had made such representations, despite their denials at

43	the hearing"
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45	Now, I just want to pause there. I this
46	may be just an inadvertence, but the witnesses
47	the federal officials who denied making the

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      representations, were never called for
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      cross-examination. So it says:
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          "...clearly made a finding of credibility,
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         a finding Metalclad respectfully submits
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         lies outside the scope of this Court's
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         review."
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         Those witnesses were available for
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       cross-examination. Some of them were called in --
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       and had to travel to Washington, and then were
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       excused. But the fact is that the federal
       officials who denied making the representations
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       where the documents supported what they said were
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       not cross-examined.
16 THE COURT: Mr. Foy, would this be a convenient time
       for the morning break?
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18 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
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       adjourned for the morning recess.
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       (MORNING RECESS)
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       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:08 A.M.)
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       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:25 A.M.)
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26 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Foy.
    MR. FOY: My Lord, I'd just recounted the contest with
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       respect to the reasonableness of this reliance,
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       and I would add these points: Testing the
       objectiveness of the reasonableness of the
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       reliance, we have to ask the question -- we have
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       federal officials, or at least the one federal
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       official, saying orally what a -- something about
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       another level of government's jurisdiction when
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       that other level of government makes it clear that
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       that's not its view. We have oral representations
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       contradicted by the documents. And we have these
       representations made on Metalclad's case after the
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       investment has already been purchased. And the
       purchase agreement contemplates going to court to
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       sort out the very issue.
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          We also have the tribunal, apparently
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implicitly, not having heard any of these
witnesses, but implicitly disbelieving all those
witness statements filed by federal officials that
said they didn't say that, implicitly disbelieving
those witness statements when they're not

contradicted by the documents. And we have it being alleged that this is a credibility finding.

But what we don't have is the tribunal making that credibility finding. We don't see in their reasons I disbelieve all of the witness statements filed by the federal officials who haven't been called to be cross-examined -- cross-examined at this hearing. This failure to deal with that aspect of it is an aspect of the complaint of Mexico with respect to this tribunal's award in its failure to do its job properly. It's another demonstration of the absence of dealing with material questions, if you're going to defend this -- this result.

Now, with respect to this question of whether oral or documentary representations were made, on Friday I -- Friday last I heard counsel for Metalclad agree that the only representations that were made were oral representations. Later in the week reference was made to an extensive chronology of documents. And it was pointed to, and they say look at this extensive chronology of documents between federal officials and Metalclad. None of those documents by Metalclad.

We did take you to two of those documents. In their chronology it was LL and MM. And in our selected extracts it was tab 47 and tab 49, federal letters from federal officials at the time my friend says construction has been approved by the federal authorities, federal letters which say:

"...in the understanding that your company shall obtain the corresponding construction permits for the described works from the municipal and State authorities in accordance to their respective jurisdiction."

Tab 47 saying -- tab 49:

43	"I do not omit to mention that your
44	represented companies shall obtain the
45	corresponding permits and authorizations
46	from the competent State and municipal
47	authorities."

So without taking you to the documents, it's alleged that there's all this documentary evidence. The documents show the federal authorities at the time construction's ongoing, making it clear to Metalclad municipal permits and State permits are -- are -- are something that it is the responsibility of Metalclad to deal with.

Now, I turn to a different reply subject. Counsel for Metalclad in a -- in what I submit was an attempt to write a different award suggested that this tribunal's conclusions were restrained, and that they could have concluded a number of other things.

It was suggested that they, the tribunal, could -- could have concluded that there had been bad faith in the classic sense of -- on the part of the municipality.

It was suggested that they, the tribunal, could have concluded that the police actions following the March 1995 demonstration could have formed the basis of the tribunal's reasoning.

It was suggested that the federal failure to go to court on behalf of Metalclad in a constitutional controversy could have been a finding the tribunal was -- made.

It was suggested that there could have been a finding that the governor of the State's evidence was -- was incredible.

None of those findings appear in the award. Some of those points were specifically dealt with. There was -- and I'll just deal with the police action -- specifically dealt with in -- in argument by both sides. The police actions are in and around March 1995.

Metalclad took another legal remedy in respect of that, alleging that State officials -- alleging in a separate Amparo that State officials had violated some aspect of the -- of the -- of the law. And that Amparo was described in Garcia Barragan's summary of all of the legal proceedings that this tribunal failed to have regard to. And

in that proceeding Metalclad was unsuccessful.
It was all it was argued for a time at
this hearing that this failure to that there
was a failure on the part of the State to provide,
quote:

"Full protection and security within the meaning of Article 1105 by failing to take an active step."

 Full protection and security is one of those international obligations which can require a State to take active steps to protect investors. That argument was made and abandoned, and does not form part of the award.

And none of these points, this -- the rewriting of what the tribunal could have done had it been less restrained form part of this award, and nor do they adequately explain what -- the award that is before us.

In oral argument Metalclad emphasized the finding by the tribunal of the absence of an established practice and procedure as to the manner of handling municipal permit applications. And I'll just point to the -- again, the documentary facts, and note again the tribunal's omission to deal with the legal remedies that were available in that respect.

Metalclad was able to get legal advice, was able in its due diligence to discover COTERIN's previous permit application and the laws upon which it was based, was able to file the application in November of 1995 in the right place with the municipality, received notice of the denial of that application, was able to file an application for reconsideration before the municipality, and was then able to file an Amparo proceeding in the Mexican domestic courts with respect to that denial. And I suggest that those facts demonstrate an established practice and procedure that was discoverable and that was exercised in this case.

The tribunal stops at the initial municipal denial, doesn't look at anything further, in fact alleges -- or allege -- doesn't really -- averts to some alleged finding of lack of due process by the failure to provide notice of the meeting

without going on to examine the facts with respect to the notice of the decision, the filing of the application for reconsideration, the filing of the Amparo after that. And their conclusion of a lack of established practice and procedure cannot stand

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without examination of the legal system as a 2 whole.

> Metalclad's counsel criticized the municipality for delay in dealing with the municipal permit application. And I'd just remind the Court that there was -- contrary to what the tribunal says, there was evidence that the matter was considered in February of 1995 by the incoming administration who determined that it had to be dealt with by the -- the session as a whole.

And you must recall as well that the construction that Metalclad was undertaking was completed by the end of February. Metalclad wasn't waiting for consideration by the municipality of this -- of its application in order to proceed.

There was also record evidence with respect to the fact that in Mexican law a proponent, an applicant for a permit, if there's delay in application, can bring that delay to the attention of the Courts and -- and have the -- have the matter dealt with. But that's the proponent's obligation. An applicant for a permit can go and get the decision made. And of course in this case the decision was made and they went off to court after that, which was not referred to by the tribunal.

Counsel for Metalclad criticized the municipality for not conducting a poll before they resolved to deny the permit. And I've already mentioned that the municipality acted in a representative capacity. What I'd like to emphasize in reply is to -- is the fact, again on the record evidence, that this was a new administration that had -- that had campaigned on a -- on a platform which included opposition to the introduction of new hazardous waste to the landfill. They'd just been elected, which -which in most democracies is a -- is a -considered a poll.

Now, I'd like to go from there to the written reply, My Lord. As with the original written

submissions, I'm not going to read you all of the reply. But I don't want you to take by having it not read that I've abandoned any of it; we reply upon all of it. I've covered some of the points already in oral submissions, and I'll highlight

some of the others. And I've covered up to page 11 at the bottom, footnote C -- or note C.

Sorry, I -- there's one point that I had to bring to your attention that I -- that I didn't cover.

At -- one of the points that was made in the re -- response is that this was analogous to a concession contract. And at paragraphs 19 and following -- the Convenio, it was alleged, was a concession contract. In paragraphs 19 and following we set out authorities defining what concession contracts are. And in fact there's been -- this subject's been reviewed by the commission of European communities recently in the con -- in their context. And this is -- you'll see, and I leave with Your Lordship those definitions, the Convenio was, as admitted in paragraph 61, the exercise of a regulatory measure, these arose out of regulatory measures, and was by no means a concession in the meaning -within the meaning that is understood, and that point's made in paragraph 25.

And I deal with the argument about this arising out of construction of works in paragraph 27 and say that's equally inapposite.

The -- the involvement of Mexico in these works was in the regulatory capacity, issuing closure orders, denying permits, not as in the Biloune case where there was a contractual relationship. The -- the construction of the resort arose out of a constract -- contractual relationship with a governmental agency.

And then I go to point D on page 8. It was suggested to you in a number of contexts that reliance upon the commercial act or even this Court engaging in review of issues of international law was somehow outside the purview of this Court's experience and expertise, and that this Court was somehow not equipped to -- to deal with those issues. And at one point in the oral argument it was suggested that this Court had no useful role.

43	Now, Canadian superior courts have experience
14	in this area. And we've referred to the Supreme
1 5	Court of Canada decision in which an argument had
16	been made that the question a question of
17	international law arising in the Quebec success

succession reference was, quote:

1 2 3

"...beyond the competence of this Court as a domestic court because it requires the Court to look at international law rather than domestic law."

Now, the Supreme Court of Canada said this:

"This concern is groundless."

Reference is made to a number of instances in which Canadian superior courts have been required in the appropriate context to take into account principles of international law and to -- and to deal with them.

This is not a basis for a finding that -- or the suggestions that have been made that somehow this is something outside the purview of this Court's experience is -- is -- is groundless. And I refer in paragraph 33 to two other cases, one we've referred to already, the Baker case; the other one, the United States and Burns and Rafay is a -- a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, again dealing with an international treaty and the Minister's obligation under that treaty.

Now, we also point out that this assertion is contradicted by Metalclad's reliance upon the international commercial act itself which, as -- as you're well aware, is based upon a Model Law which was negotiated at the -- the -- or devised by one of the U -- United Nations working groups. And this Court -- having been implemented as legislation, this Court is required to -- to deal with that.

It's also noted that in this regard, this Court has been provided with the assistance of submissions from all three parties to the NAFTA. And I've already taken you to -- we've heard from Mexico, we've heard from Canada, and I've taken you to the submissions of the United States. And there I -- at paragraph 36 I quote the passage to

13	which I read you yesterday where, with respect to
14	this particular case, the United States takes the
15	position it's wrongly reasoned.
16	I've dealt adequately with the I think,
17	already with the points that are made at page 10

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over to page 11. And I go to the bottom of page 1 2 11 at C where an -- an argument was made that the 3 fact that a tribunal has jurisdiction to consider 4 its own jurisdiction ought to be persuasive. We 5 argue here, in reply, that there's a fundamental 6 distinction between the submission to a tribunal 7 of the question of jurisdiction and the Court's review of that decision. 8

> At the outset of arbitral proceedings, it's often the case where the Courts will in enforcing a submission to arbitration say we'll leave to the tribunal to -- to deal with whether they think they have jurisdiction with the issue, always reserving the right of review of that question at the end of the proceeding. And that's the point we make in paragraph 44. With this award having been made and jurisdictional determinations been made by the tribunal, I'll come back to that, Courts now engage to -- in its -- in its reviewing function.

> Now, I think I've covered the points in --I've either covered or don't need to emphasize the points in 46 through 48, and I'll go to 49. And I think I've taken you to these already, 49 through 51.

In 52 we deal with the Food Services case, and I'll leave you with that.

I'll turn to paragraph 58, paragraph 58.

29 THE COURT: Um-hum.

30 MR. FOY: There we're replying to the -- Metalclad's reliance on primarily English authorities which concern different legislation, some of which contain leg -- as Mr. Cowper correctly noted, fairly noted, some contain legislative definitions of questions of law.

> And we note that you have to make a distinction in de -- in this question of determining whether something's a question of law or not. It arises at different stages. It can arise in proceedings where you are identifying the degree of curial deference. And it can arise in the different context of whether you're

43	identifying whether any scope of review is
14	available under particular statute. Those are
1 5	different contexts.
46	And the Supreme Court of Canada, and we refer
17	to a new case, Biniaris, has held that great care

should be taken when defining a question as being other than a question of law when the effect of that construction would be to evoke a procedural bar against the consideration of the question on its merits. Now, that's not exactly the case here, because here the -- the procedural bar is the seeking of leave, but the -- the point is made we have raised questions of law under the commercial act. And strict, watertight definitions of what's mixed law and fact in our submission don't -- needn't concern the questions of law that we've raised here. But we bring this to your attention to ensure that the different contexts of which those statements are made is appreciated.

In 61 and following we deal with our reply to the propositions or the submissions that are made as to why leave should be denied. There are three points made. The arbitration was commenced in 1997, that's referred to. This Court does not have sufficient expertise to address the issues. And the parties may have recourse to the commission.

Now, I've dealt -- the first one is -- is groundless. The Article 1136 expressly contemplates judicial review and -- and puts in place an automatic stay of enforcement. Mexico has moved promptly, as have -- as has everyone in this case, in order to bring substantive review before this Court.

I've already dealt with the expertise issue.

And I'd like to turn to paragraph 65, the role of the commission. The -- the role of the commission is fundamentally unlike the reviewing function of this Court, and -- and the one does not exclude the other. A commission was not intended to be a reviewing body for individual cases. That's the function that's recognized in Article 1136 for this Court.

If this Court -- in our submission if this Court exercises that supervisory role, it will be unnecessary for anyone to ever have recourse to

- the commission. In our submission this award does not represent a systemic problem with the NAFTA, but rather the instance of one tribunal exceeding its jurisdiction and making fundamental errors.
- 47 And the correction of that is a matter, we submit,

for this Court.

Now, a suggestion is made that the parties should simply amend the NAFTA and this Court need not deal with it, and we deal with that in paragraph 67.

Your Lordship will recall the difficulty involved by all of the three parties in concluding the NAFTA. And it's even more difficult, I'm told by those experienced in this practice, to amend the treaty once concluded. This is not a reason for failure to -- for this Court to exercise its iurisdiction.

There's a typo in page 16. Paragraph 61(c) should not read "Article 2022," but rather "2202."

The pragmatic and functional analysis referred to in 68 has been -- I've -- I've made those points, and I -- I leave that with you.

In the treatment of Article 1105 at the bottom of page 18, we reply there, as noted, that the -- Metalclad deals with most of its submissions with respect to 1105 in this part, and that's -- that's where we deal with it.

But the one introductory point we make is on the top of page 19. And that is just again to -to make the point that this was not seen as a straightforward analysis of well-understood principles. We refer to Metalclad's own counsel immediately after this award was delivered in which he said, and it's quoted:

"This is a groundbreaking decision in international law that will be cited frequently as it is the first case ever to our knowledge where a host State has been found to breach its duty of fair and equitable treatment."

Now, the -- we've -- we've -- the citation frequently has been demonstrated to be correct. We also agree that it's groundbreaking. It does -- it is not part of the substance of

- international law. And I think he's correct that
- 44 it's the first case ever. And we submit it's --
- 45 it's -- the reason for that is that it's a
- decision in excess of jurisdiction and wrongly
- 47 decided.

1 And I'll skip 74.

At 75 we to not suggest strict construction of any of the provisions of Section B of Chapter 11.

We'll go to paragraph 79. Reliance was placed upon the de Sabla case without the details of the case being brought to Your Lordship's attention.

First of all, the treaty obligation there was different. The treaty obligation was an obligation to consider claims, quote:

"...in accordance with the principles of international law, justice and equity."

Moreover, there was an express -- express provision in Article 5 which made domestic remedies with respect to the claims that were the subject of that commission irrelevant.

Article Roman numeral 5 is quoted there, it says:

"No claim shall be disallowed or rejected by the commission through the application of the general principle of international law that the legal remedies must be exhausted as a condition precedent to the validity or allowance of any claim."

So there's the complete waiver of any -- of the relevance of any local remedies. No claim should be dismissed on that regard. And of course we have no such express abrogation in the NAFTA like that. So there are no parallels either to the treaty obligation in -- in play or to the relevance of local remedies.

It's important to note though that even at -that the -- the commission in that case did
examine the Panamanian legal system as a whole and
found it wanting. There was a -- what had
happened there was that the -- the titleholders to
land were dispossessed when their lands were

transferred to third parties on application of those third parties. And the Panamanian law at issue allowed third parties to make application for anyone's land, and -- whether they held it under a title or not. And the titleholder was

required to come forward in each case in which somebody had made an application for their land.

They didn't have a title system where they could rely upon their title. They had to defend it over and over and over again. And in the course of a number of applications, the -- the -- the landholder was dispossessed, their -- more than dispossessed, their title was transferred to third -- third parties.

We deal in paragraph 82 with Tattler, and again regard was had in Tattler to domestic remedies available there. In fact, the -- the compensation was only awarded up to the point where the domestic remedy was -- was made available. This was seizure of a -- of a ship for a few days.

We distinguish Buckingham. That -- on the facts it's -- it's not worth referring to.

And we deal with some of the -- response made by Metalclad with respect to the application of the Vienna Convention in paragraphs 84 and 85.

In the next section we deal with the question of the use of preambular language. And I quoted to you yesterday the passage which is found at paragraph 87.

In paragraph 88 and following we deal with the -- the point that was made that, well, Mexico never objected to the tribunal's consideration of Chapter 18 or this transparency concept. That -- that was argued, didn't make it clear enough that you thought this was a jurisdictional problem.

And we refer to Mexico's counter-memorial here in which we -- Mexico is responding to the allegation that:

"...actions relating to the landfill were disjunctive, contradictory and lacking in transparency and predictability...the Complainant argues that...a new federal law made it clear that local construction permits..."

43	This is interesting, and I pause on this.
14	One of the arguments made by Metalclad was that
1 5	until 1997 when a another Mexican law came into
16	force that said before before we will give you
1 7	a federal permit, you need to get a local permit.

It said before that this system was totally opaque to us, but just once we were told, well, you won't give us a federal permit until we get a municipal one, it became -- everything became crystal clear. That was the argument that they were making there to try and demonstrate it was opaque before this change.

We know on the facts that they -- when they acquired the very investment, they were aware of the need to address the municipal permit issue. So on their own argument the system was transparent.

But leaving that aside, Mexico's response to this argument -- and I -- Mr. Cowper has read this, but I will give it a different emphasis, he said:

"Quite apart from the facts, there is no authority for interpreting fair and equitable treatment to extend to transparency."

Mr. Cowper emphasized "interpreting" and said this is just a question of interpretation. We emphasize "authority" and say this tribunal had no authority under a consideration of customary international law to -- to deal with treaty obligations. And we say in the footnote too that these matters are addressed in Chapter 18.

Now, the point that Chapter 18 lays outside Chapter 11 and is not referred to in Section A of Chapter 11 appeared to us to be trite and obvious. And it also, it appears, was that way to Metalclad, because as -- as was pointed out, that Metalclad didn't claim or try to import Chapter 18 into its claim. It -- this appeared in terms of the applicable law in the tribunal's award for the first time. And it having appeared and having raised a jurisdictional objection, there's no authority; you have no authority over that. This is dealt with somewhere else. We're now here maintaining the same jurisdictional objection.

43	Now, we ask we answer the question, well,
44	why did you address the issue of Metalclad's
45	knowledge of the municipal permit permitting
46	requirement if this was something outside the
47	jurisdiction? We address that because Metalclad

had falsely stated in its memorial that it wasn't until two years after it acquired COTERIN that any government authority asserted a municipal permit was necessary. That was the assertion that we were facing with the original memorial.

We were also facing an expert report that said Metalclad reasonably could have been unaware of the municipality's assertion of jurisdiction. We re -- had to and did meet each of those points, and filed evidence of domestic law with respect to that point, not to invite this Court to transform itself into a Mexican domestic court to determine that issue of Mexican domestic law, but to refute those allegations.

Now, I think I have, yesterday, adequately covered 93 through 103. Those passages include a reference to a -- the quotation from the Methanex decision that I gave you yesterday.

In paragraph 104 I add emphasis to -- we've talked about -- today we've talked about the U.S.'s position on Myers. There we just record Canada's position on Myers in its application before another Court to set aside that award, the allegation that it:

"...deals with a dispute not contemplated by or...falling within the terms of Chapter Eleven...or is in conflict with the public policy...in finding a breach of...1102 essentially establishes a breach of...1105."

And we've talked about that earlier today.
I'll go from there to paragraph 111. And
this is the section dealing with this tribunal's
failure to take account of the fact of the
existence and exercise of domestic remedies. And
I just note I think yesterday I said Article 1121
may have modified the governing rule of customary
international law. I think probably more
accurately is to state it the way I've stated it
in paragraph 111, that it is consistent with the

13	governing rule of international law.
14	In paragraph 115 I deal with the limitations
1 5	argument that was made. It was argued that, well,
16	there's a three-year limitation period in the
17	NAFTA. If you go and exercise domestic remedies,
	, -

 you will miss the limitation period. That's a -that's in fact not the case. That -- if there is
a domestic remedy, and you go and exercise it, and
you're successful, well, then you're successful.
If you go and exercise it and you're unsuccessful,
that may -- whether that gives rise to a violation
of the NAFTA will depend upon the provision of the
NAFTA that you -- that you allege was violated.

But where you go and allege denial of fair and equitable treatment, it will be because of a denial of justice that has occurred in the court system itself, and it will not occur until that denial of justice. And your time for bringing your NAFTA claim will run from that time of the denial of justice, not from the violation of some domestic law.

This point's made I think quite clearly in the Azinian case that we referred to throughout the arg -- in the early stages of the argument where the Courts said, well, you go to the courts, you can't just complain of a breach of a concession contract, there must be something wrong, there must have been denial of access in the courts, denial of justice, something else, which of course only occurs in time once you engage the courts.

In paragraph 121 we reply to the argument that the international minimum standard in Article 1105 is fact-dependant. We don't disagree that it is fact-dependent, but we don't agree that it has no standards whatsoever. And in particular, what counsel for Metalclad called the safe harbour that would -- what is particularly clear at international law is that regard must be had to the legal system as a whole. That is a standard that must be applied in the determination of whether there's been a denial of fair and equitable treatment. Article 1105 did not confer on this tribunal the jurisdiction to decide the case before it at -- ex aqueo et bono.

And I just pause to note that both the commercial act and the international act re -- if

you're going to have that kind of arbitration, it requires the express conferral of jurisdiction of that jurisdiction on a tribunal. And it does not -- and I don't think anyone's arguing that this tribunal had that jurisdiction.

I've dealt in paragraph 132 with the -- the poll point, the failure to take a poll by the municipality.

I've dealt with the point that there were no other permits in this municipality in paragraph 135, noting the terms of the permit application itself and the terms of the law requiring the permit for a project of this, quote, size and importance. That language appears both in the law and in the municipal permit application made in November of 1995 -- no, '94.

In paragraphs 136 and following we deal with the long discussion of Mexican domestic law that's contained in the response in order to support the tribunal's views.

Now, as we've noted many times, it was not necessary in our submission to address the international law issues in this case to refine and define points of domestic law. The international issues can be considered whether the municipality is correct or incorrect in its view of municipal law.

We note in paragraph 138 that the --Metalclad attributes findings to the tribunal that it did not make. For example, this one, the tribunal found that these representations superseded any written terms contained in the federal and State permits. And the passage quoted in our submission doesn't support that statement. The tribunal in our submission didn't have regard to the written terms contained in the permits, and -- and didn't have regard to the other written documents whereby the federal authorities made it clear, as I -- as I've read to you earlier, this is without prejudice to a need to apply for municipal permits, the announcement that was made at the time of the Convenio, federal permits are necessary but not sufficient authority for this project.

In some of the -- Metalclad's reliance upon the tribunal's interpretation of Mexican domestic law, it's clear that they are relying upon it not 43 as fact but as a finding of law in order to render 44 irrelevant, they say, other facts. And just to 45 take as an example, in the original permit denial 46 in 1991 to COTERIN prior to its ownership by 47 Metalclad, the municipality recorded its view that

this -- that there was an environmental risk with res -- associated with this project that was not properly dealt with.

The -- Metalclad attempts to render that irrelevant as a fact by saying, well, as a matter of Mexican law, that's outside their jurisdiction. Well, it's still a fact, it -- and doesn't become less of a fact because of their view of -- of domestic law. It shows the municipality considered its jurisdiction, included that as a matter of fact. The finding of whether or not the municipality's correct in law is something that should have been dealt with at the Mexican domestic courts.

And this -- this point's made as well in paragraph 148 where, according to Metalclad, the key question determined by the tribunal was whether the municipality was correct in its assertions. That -- in their view, the key question is a question of Mexican domestic law. We're in agreement on that. It's the wrong question, but for this tribunal it was the key.

In paragraphs 150 through 154 we deal with the -- Metalclad's response to this question of the demonstration and whether or not the tribunal when it referred to that fact was making simply a chronological observation or a finding of causation, and Metalclad wants to have it both ways. At one point in their response they say that the demonstration had a chilling effect on Metalclad, at another point they say it's simply a chronological observation.

And in paragraph 155 and 158 in particular we deal with this new assertion that the dropping of the Amparo action was because the governor appointed judges. As we've noted before in the admission, 630 is noted under paragraph 159, that was not the reason given for the tribunal.

In paragraphs 169 and following we deal with the tribunal's failure to have regard to the municipality's willingness to permit a non-hazardous waste landfill site.

One of the points I want to add, and I don't
know if it's either here or if I've said it
before, but in the Metalclad's SEC filings, you
will find reference that it was in other States in
Mexico planning on operating an industrial waste

 landfill. It was one of the proposed investments it had in Mexico. And in that representation it demonstrates the -- the point we're making here.

There was no examination by this tribunal of whether or not this facility which the municipality was prepared to consider being allowed to operate as an -- an industrial waste landfill, not a hazardous waste landfill, there's no treatment by the tribunal of that issue, and I -- and I deal with that at 169 and following.

And in particular I take you to paragraph 172. Having -- first of all, Metalclad says, well, the -- the tribunal found it was impractical. Well, there's no finding, express finding, to that -- in that regard because the tribunal didn't address the issue.

And then at paragraph 381 Metalclad argues that it was not economically feasible because they state revenues generated by the storage of hazardous waste is \$1,200 U.S. per tonne. In contrast, Metalclad says, the revenue generated by the storage of industrial wastes is \$12 U.S. per tonne.

Now, I asked counsel for Metalclad to provide me the record references for this assertion, and have been provided with none. And when -- when counsel for Metalclad dealt with this point, they said, well, I couldn't find the record, \$1,200, it doesn't matter.

Well, My Lord, it does matter. This is in -- this -- and I don't attribute this to -- to counsel. But Metalclad has instructed counsel that you can get \$1,200 U.S. per tonne for this hazardous waste. There is no evidence of that.

The evidence, and it's found at -- in the new book, tab 15, shows it -- a range for hazardous waste of value per tonne depending upon the type of the -- of the waste from -- and depending upon how much of it you have in your mix, of somewhere, if you're talking about weighted -- weighted pice -- price per tonne, from \$12 to \$54 with a total of \$150 for the different -- four types of

waste. And that's the highest. There's no \$1,200 anywhere. The -- that was -- that was Metalclad's evidence. Mexico's evidence was that the weighted average was more like \$120, depending again upon the mix of the things.

But I -- I'd note that even at \$12 a tonne, which is what Metalclad says you can get for non-hazardous waste, consider the economics, and just -- just -- of an alleged permitted capacity of 360,000 tonnes per annum at \$12 per tonne. It -- by my calculations that's over 400,000 -- or, sorry, \$4 million per annum return -- gross return on the treatment of industrial waste.

Now, for a facility that, by our calculations so far, cost them \$500,000 to acquire the land, they don't have to pay the 1.5, and we don't have any calculation of how much was actually spent because the -- because they were never provided, although false allegations were made in that regard, but we did have -- attempts were made by Mexico's experts and came up with figures in the range of 1.5 to \$3 million for construction. So you have, let's take it at the highest, 3.5. And you're getting a return in the first year of -- of everything that you've spent, gross return.

Now, that to me doesn't sound like its impractical or totally uneconomic, or it doesn't sound to me like a use that should not at least have been considered by the tribunal, because the municipality wanted remediation, and they wanted -- and they were prepared to consider it being allowed to operate in that capacity.

Now, I'd like to turn to paragraph 182, and this is the Ecological Decree. And I need to summarize the position with respect to the consideration of the Ecological Decree and make a few points here, one of which I -- has not been made.

Metalclad's submission, primary submission, is that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the Ecological Decree. And in oral argument --

38 THE COURT: Sorry, you mean the Mexican position.39 MR. FOY: Sorry, sorry. Thank you, My Lord. Thank40 you for that.

That the tribunal did not have jurisdiction to consider the Ecological Decree.

43	The in oral submissions Metalclad
14	buttressed Mexico's argument as follows:
1 5	Metalclad submitted that the Ecological Decree
16	was, quote, entirely separate and, quote, not
17	related in any way to the other claims. And in

our submission we agree and say that they -- that claim could not be, quote, ancillary within the meaning of the amendment rule. So that's -- on the jurisdictional point, we consider that our proposition has been buttressed by Metalclad's submissions.

The next point we make relates to the question of the notice this tribunal has given with respect to its jurisdictional finding in this regard which, as Your Lordship, if you're not aware, should be aware, is made for the first time in the award.

Metalclad -- sorry, Mexico objected to the tribunal's jurisdiction to deal with the issue. Having made that objection, which was not ruled upon until the award, Mexico approached the matter as if it was not within the jurisdiction, did not adduce extensive evidence with respect to it. And it then is told in the award -- there was some evidence, but then is told in the award that it's had ample time to respond, we do have jurisdiction. And, although the tribunal says it's not of controlling importance, Metalclad now says it does -- it was.

In my submission again, and this is along the lines of the submission I made earlier, we are being more generous to the tribunal's reasoning. If the tribunal was to consider the Ecological Decree of controlling importance, then it ought to have given Mexico notice of its jurisdictional ruling and afforded an opportunity for Mexico to take whatever position it had on account of that. That notice came for the first time in the award, and we are here challenging that jurisdictional finding.

Now, I say as well that -- and I'm dealing with the -- did -- did this tribunal consider it to be of controlling importance? Did they make a separate award on this basis? And I make a point I did not make the other day, which is that the -- if you look at the award itself and you look at the damages calculation, you'll see that this

tribunal fixes the date of our responsibility as
December 5, 1995 and awarded interest from that
date. That was almost two years before the
passage of the Ecological Decree.
This award on its face cannot be -- cannot

stand as a separate award based on the decree.
And in my submission the tribunal never intended it to stand on that basis, because it said it wasn't of controlling importance, and went on to say, but if -- and -- well, I shouldn't say "if."
I -- I'm adding that word. If implemented, it would be a -- an expropriation.

Moreover, I note that the tribunal didn't deal with the -- in finding -- if they did make a finding that it barred forever the operation of the landfill, although that wasn't of controlling importance, it didn't deal with the documentary evidence as to the effect of the decree. And I think I've read you this already. It's at the bottom of 191:

"The operation of a controlled dangerous residues landfill is totally consistent with Article 14 of the Decree..."

They -- they didn't -- they didn't refer to that.

Instead, the tribunal appears to have relied upon allega -- and this is from the facts and allegations portion of the award -- allegations and assertions made in 60 and 61 of the award made on the basis of newspaper reports from the Mexican media of statements allegedly made by the governor and Dr. Medellin.

Now, again we have -- so we have this hearsay evidence of a newspaper report, and Dr. Medellin and the governor are called. And -- and they do -- they are cross-examined. And they testify. They deny those reports. They deny that that's what they said.

Now, I leave aside entirely the legal significance of the subjective views of the governor and Dr. Medellin. That's another issue. But I -- I say that, unless the tribunal goes on to say, which it was agreed they did not -- unless they go on to say, well, governor, you know, I see this and I see your testimony, you deny it, and

43	it's legally significant. And I'm going to find
44	that this evidence not credible, then the
45	tribunal hasn't dealt with it.
46	And I I am not saying they did. In my
47	submission they didn't consider it of controlling

importance and didn't have to deal with it.

If, however, they were to find the decree itself a separate act, they would have to deal with these matters, they would be of controlling importance, you'd see a different damages award, and -- if that -- the -- if the tribunal, properly instructed, still found it to be an expropriation as opposed to something that allows this operation to -- to ongo (sic).

The fact of the matter is the landfill had been abandoned long before. And the testing of that -- of those facts was never tested.

And another issue that would be raised in that context was whether or not there was an obligation to find out according to Mexican domestic law whether or not there's any interference by this decree which covers such a large area with your operation.

Normally in the circumstances someone would either do one of two things: They'd operate and see whether or not it made any difference, or if they were concerned about the costs involved in a startup, they'd go and seek a declaration in -- in advance from the Mexican domestic courts. Does this decree preclude operation? I've got a letter here that says it's -- doesn't. And the issue would be resolved, as it should be, as a matter of Mexican domestic law.

Now, the tribunal didn't deal with any of -all of those issues, all of which -- that would have to be dealt with in order to properly found as a separate, entirely separate, matter a finding of entirely separate expropriation by this entirely separate decree.

Now, I think at that stage, My Lord, it would be appropriate to break. I'm going to be passing the podium to -- to my colleague Mr. Thomas, who's going to be dealing with what's starting at page 45. And I see we're close to the luncheon break. And I -- I think we're on schedule.

40 And I -- I think we're on schedule 41 THE COURT: On what schedule?

42 MR. FOY: I've spoken to my friend Mr. Cowper, and

- he's requested the opportunity to have 15 minutes at the end of the day to deal with new matters, 43
- 44
- and we're on schedule to permit him that time, if 45
- 46 not more.
- 47 MR. COWPER: Oh, I -- I should say that was asked for

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1
      and requested last evening at 4 o'clock before I
2
      received the 65-page document that I'm presently
3
      reading. I haven't accumulated a lot more points,
      but I will be asking for some time this afternoon.
4
5 MR. FOY: I would have -- would have liked to get my
6
      friend the reply much sooner, but as Your Lordship
7
      knows --
8 MR. COWPER: I'm not blaming him.
9
         I'm just saying 15 minutes was the estimate
10
       last night, and I -- my friend does have a lot.
       As I say, I haven't got a lot arising out of what
11
12
       I've heard from this morning but --
13 THE COURT: I'm -- I'm not going to cut you off at the
14
       stroke of 4 o'clock, although once we get past
15
       4 o'clock everyone seems to get a little more
       anxious it seems. But I'll give you a proper
16
       opportunity to make a sur-reply. Mr. Cowper.
17
18
          We'll reconvene at 2 o'clock.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
20
       adjourned until 2 p.m.
21
22
       (NOON RECESS)
23
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 12:28 P.M.)
24
       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 2:00 P.M.)
25
26 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Thomas.
27 MR. THOMAS: My Lord.
          My Lord, earlier in the week you had asked
28
29
       about the -- whether or not it's appropriate in
       the context of interpreting a treaty to refer to
30
31
       the title of the article. I handed up to you two
32
       excerpts from decisions of the World Trade
33
       Organization appellate body, and they answer the
34
       question in the affirmative. The first is an
35
       excerpt from a case called Argentina Safeguard
36
       Measures on Imports of Footwear. And if you look
37
       at paragraph 93, you'll see the appellate body
38
       states:
39
40
          "Our reading is supported by the context of
          these provisions as part of the context of
41
42
          paragraph 1(a) of Article Roman numeral
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43	We note that the title of Article 19	
44	is 'Emergency Action on Imports of	
45	Particular Products.'"	
46		
47	So they are in this case referring to the	

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1
       title of the article, and the same in the second
2
       case, Canada Term of Patent Protection, again
3
       another appellate body decision. And it, at
       paragraph 58, halfway through the paragraph --
4
5 THE COURT: Sorry, is it together with this article?
6 MR. THOMAS: Yes. They're just one-page excerpts from
7
       each of the reports. You wouldn't want to see the
8
       whole of the report.
9 THE COURT: Yes.
10 MR. THOMAS: The -- halfway through it you'll see
11
       again in -- in paragraph 58:
12
13
          "Indeed the title of Article 70, quote,
14
           Protection of Existing Subject Matter,
15
          quote, confirms contextually the focus of
16
          Article 70."
17
18
           So this is the practice of the World Trade
19
       Organization in respect of that issue.
20
          I'm going to begin, My Lord, by addressing
21
       Metalclad's argument which I note was entitled
22
       "The Alleged Failure to Provide Full Reasons."
23
       And in this respect Metalclad was responding to an
24
       argument that Mexico did not make.
25
          Metalclad -- Mexico's argument was not based
26
       on the insufficiency of reasons or the failure to
27
       give reasons. It was based on the failure to
28
       comply with what Mexico says is a mandatory
29
       requirement in the governing arbitral rules to
30
       deal with every question submitted to the
31
       tribunal. This is a concept which we agree is
32
       foreign to private international commercial
33
       arbitration, but it is of great significance to
34
       this type of investor-State arbitration.
35
           In Mexico's submission States have a very
36
       strong public policy interest in ensuring that
37
       international tribunals, particularly ad hoc
       tribunals that have no expert institutional
38
39
       support, fully comprehend the factual and legal
40
       defences that are raised by a sovereign State.
41
       Now, Mr. Greenberg said that this concern is
42
       inapplicable here because Canada is not a
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signatory to the ICSID Convention, and therefore this Court ought not to have regard to how this issue has been addressed in ICSID Convention cases. And he makes the subsidiary point that the domestic statutory framework under which this

Court is operating cannot accommodate this special feature of investor-State arbitration.

In our submission neither one of these arguments is persuasive, and I'll explain the reasons why. The first is that -- I should point out that Mexico did not argue that the Court was bound by a treaty that Canada has not signed. What we argued was that it makes sense in a case of first impression to have regard to the closest analogous system of arbitration that can shed light on issues of first impression for this Court.

And there's absolutely no question, and I'm going to demonstrate it empirically in a minute, that the ICSID Convention is far more similar to the ICSID additional facility arbitration rules that governed this arbitration than the UNCITRAL rules which of course are part and parcel of the UNCITRAL Model Law approach to private international commercial arbitration.

Now, I handed up to Your Lordship a -- a second-handout entitled "Reference Table." This was not photocopied with the additional facility rules that are contained in Mexico's statutes and treaty materials. It's a -- it's like a concordance table. It's at the back of the published volume of the ICSID additional facility rules. And this is actually a good empirical indication of the similarity and differences between different arbitral rules.

The columns go from -- they're in -- vertical of course. And the first column is the additional facility arbitration rules, so you see all the rules listed down the left-hand column and over the page. And then the next column is the convention. Some of the rules that are in the additional facility rules are actually in the ICSID Convention.

And then you don't need to worry about the administrative and financial regulations or the institutional rules of the centre, but go over to "AR," the title "AR" at the top of the column.

43	Those are the arbitration rules under the ICSID.
44	And then right beside the AR column is
45	UNCITRAL. And this is a reference to the UNCITRAL
46	arbitration rules of 1976.
47	Now, My Lord, you only have to look at this

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1
       table to see that the additional facility
2
       arbitration rules down the left-hand column,
3
       almost every single rule has a concordant rule in
4
       either the ICSID Convention or in the ICSID
5
       Convention arbitration rules. And I -- I say this
6
       is -- this is guite good empirical evidence of the
7
       similarity of the two systems. It doesn't -- it
8
       shouldn't surprise anyone. The additional
9
       facility is derived from the ICSID Convention.
10
           But what is also striking about this table is
11
       the posity of overlap between the UNCITRAL rules
12
       in the fourth -- in the fifth column and the
13
       additional facility rules. You'll see very few of
       the UNCITRAL rules reflected in the additional
14
15
       facility rules.
16
           So I take this as a very good indication
17
       that, no, we're -- we don't say the ICSID
18
       Convention governs. We say the ICSID Convention
19
       as interpreted by annul -- annulment committees is
20
       the best source of an indication of how this Court
21
       should approach arbitral rules which are derived
22
       from the convention and from the convention's
23
       arbitrations rules themselves. And you can see
24
       from this table that they're far more closely
25
       related -- related to that instrument than they
26
       are the UNCITRAL approach to arbitration.
27 THE COURT: And -- and in your submissions, if I
       recall correctly, you quoted the provision from
28
       the additional facility rules and then you also
29
       quoted the provision from ICSID.
30
31 MR. THOMAS: Yes.
32 THE COURT: And they're quite similar.
33 MR. THOMAS: Yes. Now, the -- the rules are not by
       the same number.
34
35 THE COURT: No.
36 MR. THOMAS: But the rule -- I believe it's Rule 49(2)
37
       of the ICSID -- of the ICSID Convention
38
       arbitration rules, or the convention rather,
39
       relates to Article 53 of the additional facility
40
       rules. It's certainly -- it's pointed out and
       discussed by the commentators that we referred to
41
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earlier in the week -- or earlier last week.

43	So in our submission, with the greatest of
44	respect, the what has happened in the ICSID
45	convention is of of great importance to the
46	this Court's approach to the interpretation of
47	these arbitration rules.

 And we say that as shown by the annulment committees and as shown by authoritative commentators such as the drafter of the rules, Dr. Broches, that the requirement to deal with every question submitted to the tribunal is a fundamental rule of procedure for investor-State arbitration. And it's intended to protect parties from arbitrary decisions. This is a point that Dr. Broches has made.

So we say that there is -- where you have a -- a -- a -- a case of first impression before this Court, and no Court anywhere has ever looked at the interpretation of the additional facility rules, this makes sense to examine. We don't say it's binding. We don't say that it's dispositive. We say that it's a good source of analyzing the importance of the rule that we say was repeatedly neglected by the tribunal below.

Our third reason for emphasizing this point is -- and I'll be very quick about this because we've made it before -- this is not one-off private arbitration. We have concerns about the informal precedential value of the awards. We have concerns about the exposure of the NAFTA parties to international responsibility for governmental acts. We have concern about the public purse and claims that are being advanced against the State. And of course there are these questions of accountability that are being raised about the operation of this particular chapter of the NAFTA.

So to suggest, as my friends have, that the policy considerations that were developed for this hands-off approach to judicial review of private international commercial arbitration should govern the judicial review of this type of arbitration, in our respect -- respectful submission makes no sense at all.

And so we stand by our observation that if you were to apply the general approach that Mustill and Boyd suggest in the excerpt that I quoted to you last week, having regard to the

43	peculiar dynamics of this particular form of
44	arbitration, it makes little sense to apply the
45	peculiar dynamics of private international
46	commercial arbitration in judicial review of
47	that.

 Now, the -- I think it was really a subsidiary point, but the second point that I -- I think is appropriate to respond to in respect of this issue is the suggestion that Section 27 of the Commercial Arbitration Act deals with this issue, and in my respectful submission it doesn't. And the reason for that is that Section 27 contemplates that the party applies to the arbitration panel requesting that it make an additional award with respect to the claims presented in the proceeding.

Well, Mexico didn't present a claim in the proceeding below. Mexico was answering claims. And it is a reversal of the statutory scheme, if I can suggest here, to suggest that the respondent who makes no claims in the proceeding below should invoke Section 27 of the act to request that some claim be addressed by the arbitrator. It makes no sense.

In addition, with respect to Section 33, which is the section of the Commercial Arbitration Act which permits a party to go back to the tribunal for additional reasons, I had addressed this before, and I just remind the Court that the -- again, at the ICSID level there is a -- the same rule, you may go back to the tribunal. But as the Amco annulment committee made clear, and this is -- I'll just remind you it's tab 4, paragraphs 35 to 37, there is no need for a party to go back to the tribunal for supplementary reasons if the request is to undo what has been done already by the tribunal.

This is not a question of supplementary reasons. This is a question of saying there are very large parts of the Mexican defence, both factual and legal, that are neither adverted to nor addressed by this award. But to do so would be of course to contradict the reasons that are addressed in what the United States itself has called fairly sparse reasons.

Now, we see that this can amount to arbitral error under Section 30 of the Commercial

Arbitration Act. And if we're governed by the
International Commercial Arbitration Act, then
Section 34(2)(a)(v) is the provision which gives
jurisdiction to the Court to address this problem,
and that is the jurisdiction to intervene where

 the arbitration was not in accordance with the parties' agreement.

As I mentioned, the international authorities are clear that this is a fundamental procedural rule. It's not something which in the private domestic commercial arbitration sense stops. It's not as if the arbitral process stops as in private international commercial arbitration and the award is something different. It's considered to be part and parcel to the arbitral process itself.

Now, I don't think there's anything that has to be said more about that line of argument from Metalclad.

I'd like to turn to public policy.

Mr. Cowper did not spend much time on the issue in his oral presentation, but Metalclad has addressed public policy issues in its outline, and I think it's appropriate for us to respond to them.

First, I have not seen in the outline an attempt to say that Metalclad did not misrepresent its expenditures. I see it as being treated as a situation where this was raised before the tribunal. It was a matter of proof, therefore this is something which ought not to concern the Court.

But I'd like you to turn, if you would, to paragraph 124 of the award where the tribunal deals with the question of damages. And you'll see that the tribunal describes Mexico's objections to the 20.4 million as challenging the correctness. They use the terms:

"Mexico challenges the correctness of this..."

Figure.

That's not an accurate statement of the Mexican position. Mexico challenged the veracity of the representation made by the expert and by the claimant in the pleadings in the expert report. And the -- the vast bulk of the cross-examination at the hearing was concerned not

only with the initial misrepresentations, but the chief financial officer's attempt to patch up and explain what had been done and clarify what had been done by using in some instances exhibits which were doctored.

This was covered in great detail by our expert's report. And this was a fundamental objection. This was not a question of -- of taking issue with the correctness of calculations there. We said they came in and misrepresented what they said they spent on this particular asset which is the subject of this arbitration.

Now, what Mr. Cowper seems to be saying is that there's no need for judicial intervention on public policy grounds if the claimant was caught in the proceeding below and the tribunal heard that evidence. And so he says that European Gas is distinguishable because European Gas deals with the situation where after the initial arbitral award this fresh evidence was discovered.

We do not read that case so narrowly. We say that this tribunal in oral proceedings and in the post-hearing submission, and in fact in the rejoinder and the counter-memorial, going all the way back to our first pleading, was put squarely on notice that this claimant had falsely misrepresented central factual predicates of its claim. The construction costs on the one hand, the filing of the expert's report that said they did not know about the -- about the municipal permit. So we said that the experts -- experts had been used to perpetrate a fraud on the tribunal, that this claimant was misleading the tribunal.

Now, in our respectful submission, Mexico was entitled to have the tribunal's views on this question. It was not a question, as Mr. Cowper suggested, that was weakly argued and abandoned later on. Ten pages of the post-hearing submission were devoted to the proposition that at public international law a State is under the duty of utmost good faith to advance a claim. This is settled law. And we said if a State is under that duty, a private party that steps into the shoes of the State to enforce international obligations is likewise subject to that duty.

Now, if the tribunal said Mexico has made

this argument, we disagree. There is no duty of good faith upon a claimant. I have no complaint for that particular part of Article 53. They've addressed the issue. They've dealt with the issue. They've rejected my argument. This award

 is silent on that issue.

Similarly, in our rejoinder, at the hearing, and in the post-hearing submission, Mexico devoted considerable time to the relationship between the former senior Mexican environmental official, Rodarte, and Metalclad. We said that he was in an improper relationship with Metalclad. And we said that there had been bribes paid to him through his wife. This was not a white poker chip. There's two payments of \$20,000 in total. And there's the issuance of 30,000 shares of Metalclad stock in February of 1993 after the issuance of a federal permit to Metalclad for a -- one of their other projects.

Now, our expert valued that at -- they were -- they're restricted shares, we agree with that. They couldn't be freely traded at that time. But had they been looked at in regard to their market price, it was a -- it was -- about \$150,000 was what those shares were worth if traded. The tribunal turned a blind eye to that.

And we say that rewarding a NAFTA claimant who engaged in these sorts of acts is contrary to the public policy of British Columbia.

In this respect, My Lord, I point out that European Gas is relevant to this consideration in one other way. When we began this proceeding we were operating on the assumption that Metalclad would take the position that it's not appropriate to look at the record at all, that the Court would be confined to the award. Of course, it has not done so itself.

But European Gas makes it clear that not only may the Court look at the record where it's alleged that there's a breach of public policy, it may substitute its own views for the views of the tribunal below.

Now, I'm going to turn to this discussion in the -- in the Metalclad outline about the Rodarte relationship. I notice that Mr. Cowper didn't spend any time on that.

But before I do that, I do want to respond to

one point that he made, which is that Mexico -- he said that Mexico took the position below that his client should not be able to trifle with the NAFTA. And -- and I say with the greatest of respect, that's not a fair characterization of

Mexico's position.

What Mexico argued below was that there is this duty of good faith. And we don't object to the idea that Metalclad could advance a Chapter 11 claim. We said that if it advances a Chapter 11 claim, then it should do so honestly and forthrightly, and we say it didn't do so.

Now, Mr. Foy has touched on this this morning, and I'll just repeat just one -- one point here. Mr. Cowper is -- is correct that the arbitral process in the additional facility rules is continental in flavour in the sense that there is a -- a substantial emphasis placed upon the written phase of the proceeding. And the idea of the written phase is that all of the contemporaneous documents which pertain to the issues in dispute, together with the written testimony of the various witnesses, is gathered and then filed along with the legal argument of the parties. So that is continental in -- in its flavour.

But the -- the proceeding, the oral proceeding is very much influenced by the common law. And I would submit that it was certainly the understanding of both sides that the confrontation of witnesses was an important element of the -- of the oral phase.

Now, at page -- at paragraph 436 of the outline, you'll -- you know that there were these allegations. Mr. -- Mr. Cowper has alleged, as indicated, there were allegations made by Metalclad about improper acts on the -- behalf of -- on the -- on the other side, on the Mexican side.

At paragraph 436 of their outline, Metalclad states that it told the tribunal at the hearing that it would be unable to prove its allegations of corruption. And I don't believe that that's an accurate statement of what happened at the tribunal. What happened at the tribunal is that it did not attempt to prove its allegations of corruption.

13	And Mr. Foy pointed out to you before,
14	My Lord, that there were at least five witnesses
1 5	that gave witness statements from the government
16	of Mexico's side that Metalclad required to attend
17	to the proceeding. And serious allegations of

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1 misconduct and illegality had been made by 2 Metalclad against all five of those witnesses. 3 When they arrived in Washington, D.C. and spent 4 some time at the hearing, three of them were 5 excused. So they were never confronted by 6 Metalclad with respect to the very serious 7 allegations that they had made.

> Mr. Rodarte, in his first witness statement, alleged that Metalclad's former legal counsel suggested bribing the governor. So Mexico's former legal counsel responded to -- or Metalclad's former legal counsel responded to that allegation and denied it hotly, to use Mr. Cowper's term. He was called to testify. He was excused.

The governor was alleged to be corrupt. He was called to testify. He did testify. He did not have any allegations of bribery put to him.

Dr. Medellin was alleged to be corrupt. It was alleged by Metalclad in the written -- written phase that bribes were funneled to him through his wife. Dr. Medellin filed a witness statement showing that his wife was terminally ill and died in the material period. He also filed his income tax statements and his statement of assets in an attempt to rebut this allegation and defend his name. He testified. He wasn't challenged. He wasn't confronted by Metalclad.

Now, Mexico did confront the Metalclad witnesses on its allegations. And we took them through these in detail in the cross-examination.

Now, what happens now? Not having confronted these witnesses at the hearing, now we come back, and we have Metalclad asserting to this Court that it has the moral certainty that there is corruption involved. It didn't take the opportunity below to confront these witnesses. It says now though that it couldn't -- it couldn't prove it and had the moral certainty. And what it does is it attempts to use the witness statement of Ambassador James Jones, former Ambassador James

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42 Jones, to in a sense validate its position.

43	Well, I'm going to suggest to you, My Lord,
44	that Ambassador James Jones as an ambassador had
45	very little personal knowledge of what happened in
46	Guadalcazar and San Luis Potosi, and I'll take you
47	to some evidence of that in a minute.

Ambassador Jones was -- his involvement in this file was at the instance of Metalclad pressing the Mexican federal government to open up this facility over the objections of the local citizens and the municipal council.

Now, if you'd turn to tab 13 of the supplementary binder here, My Lord, Metalclad filed a witness statement from a United States Department of Commerce official by the name of Kevin Brennan. And Mr. Brennan was the embassy official who was responsible for this file.

Now, he filed a witness statement. And Mexico intended to call him for cross-examination. The U.S. Commerce Department refused to allow him to be cross-examined. What it allowed Mexico to do was to interview him by telephone. And so this letter is a transcription of the interview that was held with Mr. Brennan. And in the first page you'll see a variety of people who witnessed the telephone call.

Now, if you'd just turn, My Lord, to paragraph 13, this may explain why the United States government was so supportive of Mexico. Paragraph 13 says:

"You stated that at your first meeting..."

This is reference to Mr. Brennan's interview.

"...you were informed that the previous Mexican owners had contaminated the La Pedrera site. You recall that Mr. Kesler informed you that Metalclad's intention was to first completely remediate the site before accepting new waste. You believe that this was further repeated to the ambassador in several meetings."

Now, to be fair to Metalclad, at the hearing one of Metalclad's witnesses, Mr. Neveau, testified that Mr. Brennan was wrong on this

point. He -- he said that Mr. Brennan was not correct. This is what Mr. Brennan's recollection of the remediation question was. And at number 14:

7,

1 "You stated that in 1994 it was your
2 understanding that there was no local
3 opposition to the site. You stated that
4 Metalclad did not raise this with you at
5 the outset of your dealings with it. You
6 believed the local opposition did not arise
7 until much later."

15:

11 "In response to the question were you aware 12 that this was a new business venture for 13 Metalclad, you responded that it was your 14 understanding that Metalclad had been in

understanding that Metalclad had been in the toxic waste remediation business for

some time."

Now, I can tell you, My Lord, that Mr. Kesler admitted under cross-examination, and he could not run from this one, Metalclad had never sited a hazardous waste landfill, never operated a hazardous waste landfill, it had never constructed one before. It had a small industrial insulation business and asbestos abatement business in California. The Mexican hazardous waste business was an entirely new business initiative for Metalclad.

Now, when -- and what happened -- and this is why Met -- Metalclad's previous disclosures to its shareholders in its previous announcements were adverted to by Mexico, because it went into Mexico, it announced Eco Administracion in November of 1991. It was going to build a hazardous waste incinerator in San Luis Potosi. Nothing ever happened there. They bought the land, but they abandoned the project.

They then announced they would do one in Veracruz, another incinerator. They never did anything on that.

They did one -- they then announced Tamaulipas. This was all done in the space of four months, they made these three announcements

of hazardous waste incinerators, none of	which wa
44 ever built.	
45 Then they came upon the landfill through	gh
46 Mr. Rodarte. A landfill is much, much che	aper to
47 construct than a hazardous waste inciner	ator.

 There's absolutely no comparison in the cost of building the facilities.

And we made the suggestion to the tribunal that if you looked at the history of this company's announcements and activities in Mexico, that it -- it pursued this when they were warned, and they admitted, Mr. Neveau admitted, that in January of 1994 the State said you should go to another site in the State, this has too many problems associated with it. But they've made so many announcements to the investing public that they proceeded with this investment and proceeded to construct.

And what happened is that in the summer of 1994, when Mr. Neveau had -- when they've already had objections raised by the municipality, when Mr. Neveau has been -- has been contacted by counsel and -- and recommended that they apply for the permit, Mr. Neveau is saying don't apply for the permit, they're enlisting the assistance of the United States embassy to force a top-down solution to this problem.

We laid all this evidence out. It was an important part of the Mexican case, because it explained the pressure that was being placed to resolve this politically. And we -- we also pointed out to the tribunal that what was being told to the embassy was not what was going on on the ground.

Now, in this proceeding now what they're saying is that Ambassador Jones validated their conduct because there had been information provided to Ambassador Jones about alle -- allegations of breaches of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

It's true. Governor Sanchez Unzeuta transmitted to the ambassador documents which -- which related to his view and the view of Metalclad's former legal counsel that Mr. Kesler wanted to bribe the governor by paying him \$1 million. And that information was passed on to the United States ambassador.

43	The information about Rodarte was never put
44	before the Unite United States embassy, because
45	it wasn't discovered until after two rounds of
46	pleadings in this proceeding. After Metalclad
47	filed its reply, it was discovered by Mexico.

 So the suggestion in these pleadings that the United States government validated what had happened and said there was no -- no evidence for a breach of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is misleading, because the evidence that was discovered was never put to the United States government when Ambassador Jones was there.

If you look at paragraph 21 of Mr. Brennan's interview:

"In response to the question did you ever inquire of Metalclad whether it had engaged in bribery or any other irregular activity such as making payments to federal officials in connection with the issuance of federal permits, you stated that you put the question directly to Mr. Kesler and he told me flatly they had not made any payments to federal officials and that he was fully aware of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and that Metalclad would never violate it."

Well, at the time that Mr. Brennan put this to Mr. Kesler they had signed the stock exchange agreement with Lucia Ratner. Two days later a federal permit was issued which triggered the payment of 30,000 shares to -- to Lucia Ratner, Mr. Rodarte's wife. So I guess technically Mr. -- Mr. Kesler, when he says he didn't pay the federal official, I guess that's right. They paid his wife.

He then testifies -- or doesn't testify, he confirms that they -- that Ambassador Jones at paragraph 29:

"...did forward Governor Sanchez Unzeuta materials pertaining to allegations against Metalclad to the Department of Justice, but included a commentary authorized by you..." Mr. Brennan "...and reviewed by the ambassador which stated that in your

43	opinion there was no basis for an
44	investigation."
45	
46	Then the next point, paragraph 30:
47	

"You confirmed that you were aware prior to the writing of your October 2nd, 1996 file note..."

There's a file note on the status of the Metalclad situation.

"...that Metalclad alleged that a Mexican company, RIMSA, was bribing Mexican officials in order to fulmen opposition to Metalclad's landfill project."

31:

I'll say parenthetically, My Lord, that RIMSA figured prominently in the first round of written pleadings. RIMSA was never once mentioned at the hearing in connection with alleged bribery or trying to fulmen opposition. It was only ever adverted to in the entire hearing for two weeks in relation to its landfill capacity for damages, yet that was the central part of its initial case.

 "You confirm that at some point you became aware the U.S. Corporacion Chemical Waste Management controlled RIMSA. You confirmed further that the embassy did not forward any such allegations or documents relating thereto to the Department of Justice concerning any potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by Chem Waste. You stated I guess I was waiting for more documentation. You stated that Mr. Kesler said about RIMSA Chem Waste [sic] did not constitute enough and that he was waiting for more. You stated that during the time you served at the embassy, you departed in January of 1999, you did not receive any more evidence linking RIMSA to the governor. You do not know whether anyone else at the embassy received such documents. You stated that you considered the RIMSA issue a work in progress that was

43 44	put aside when Metalclad resorted to the NAFTA arbitration process."
45 46	TWA TA dibilitation process.
47	Now, I I suggested to you before that the

1 United States embassy didn't really understand 2 what was going on on the ground. Look at 3 paragraph 40. 4 5 "You stated that you were unaware that in 6 1990/91 while under Mexican ownership 7 COTERIN had been...applied for and had been denied a municipal permit to construct a 8 9 hazardous waste landfill at La Pedrera." 10 11 Now, I note in the square brackets Mr. Pearce 12 was on this call, this is Metalclad's counsel. He 13 objected to this question saying that this fact 14 was in dispute. 15 In fact, it was an admitted fact in the reply. As Mr. Foy has pointed out, it was 16 17 admitted that as a matter of corporate record COTERIN had applied for and had been denied the 18 19 permit. 20 21 "And in response to the question did 22 Metalclad claim to have been taken by 23 surprise by the municipal permit issue, you 24 replied yes. You confirmed your 25 recollection was the way that Metalclad put 26 it was this municipality never issued 27 permits." 28 29 MR. COWPER: Never issued permits, did he say? 30 MR. THOMAS: Yes, that's correct. 31 Now, as we got closer to the hearing, My Lord, the United States sent a letter which you 32 33 should be aware of. It's at tab 12. And the 34 United States became aware that former Ambassador 35 Jones had filed a witness statement. And I'll 36 read the paragraph: 37 38 "It has come to the attention of the 39 United States government that in the course 40 of these arbitral proceedings the Metalclad Corporation has submitted to the tribunal a 41 declaration signed by James R. Jones, a 42

43	former U.S. ambassador to Mexico.
14	"On behalf of the United States
1 5	government I am writing to inform you that
46	the United States government did not review
17	the statements contained in Mr. Jones's

declaration before it was signed, nor did the United States government authorize Mr. Jones to sign the declaration.

"The statements in Mr. Jones's declaration can only represent his personal views and should not be construed as expressing a position of the United States government on the issues before the arbitral tribunal."

This is signed by the senior legal advisor of the Department of State in Washington.

As I've mentioned to you, Mr. Brennan was pre -- precluded from attending for cross-examination. We were not able to cross-examine him, but we considered that there was sufficient evidence in his statement which was put before the tribunal to show that the key case officer in the United States embassy was uninformed about the true facts of this particular investment.

And I direct you to this evidence because it was -- we did not find it necessary to cross-examine Mr. Jones. We thought that it would be inappropriate to embarrass him when -- when he was relying upon the advice of his officials who in turn had relied upon the advice of Mr. Kesler.

Now, I'm going to spend just a few minutes on the Rodarte relationship.

I note, My Lord, that when you read the section of the outline, this is paragraphs 442 to 451 of Metalclad's outline, with the exception of one reference to Mr. Kesler's cross-examination, there's not any reference to the record evidence. And I -- and I take this to be Metalclad's writing. I do not take it to be my friend's or Mr. -- or Professor Coe for that matter. I take it to be the client here.

At paragraph 315, for the first time in the entire proceeding Metalclad has linked Rodarte's wife directly to COTERIN. This is completely inconsistent with the underlying cor -- underlying

corporate documents. Tabs 32 and 33 of Volume 2
of the selected extracts that I took you through
before indicate that she was a shareholder of Eco
Administracion, which -- and then exchanged her
shares in Eco for shares of Metalclad stock in

these cash payments. That was done in February of 1993.

Mr. Kesler admitted under cross-examination that he was aware at the time that he signed the agreement with Mrs. Rat -- Mrs. Rodarte that she was the wife of a senior federal environmental official. Two days later a federal permit was issued and she became entitled to 30,000 shares of Metalclad stock.

I -- I -- although this connection between Rodarte's wife and COTERIN is repeated at paragraph 450(a) of this outline, it -- it's -- it cannot be correct, because to our knowledge this was never the case in the underlying documents on the record.

If it is true that she was a minority shareholder of COTERIN and we were unaware of that, that ties Rodarte's corruption even more closely to the investment which was the subject of this arbitration. At paragraph 443 it states:

"In 1991 Rodarte while an employee of the Mexican federal government acted as a consultant to Eco Administracion."

This, My Lord, is a revelation to Mexico. There is no record evidence in the proceeding below that -- that Rodarte acted as a consultant to Eco Administracion. No Mexican witness, no Metalclad witness testified either in writing or at the hearing that he was a consultant to Eco Administracion. And it -- moreover, it's implausible. If he was a consultant while being a full-time federal official in San Luis Potosi, why did he receive his remuneration through shares issued to his wife?

In addition to being incompatible with his duties at the time as -- being a full-time government official, this is a very uncommon form of payment in our submission.

Paragraph 443 continues to discuss this idea of the retainer of Rodarte by Eco, no record

43	evidence of that.
44	At page at paragraph 443 they say that
45	Mexico did not adduce any evidence at the hearing
46	demonstrating that any Mexican law had been
47	breached by Rodarte. Well, I suppose that's

technically correct, because we adduced evidence in our rejoinder that Rodarte was acting inconsistently with the Mexican law that dealt with federal employees. And that's -- there's no need to go to it, but it's at the rejoinder, paragraphs 150 to 178, particularly footnote 158. It's -- so paragraphs 150 to 178, particularly footnote 158 which discusses the federal law prohibiting consultancies such as the one now being described.

In paragraph 444 it's said -- it's stated that in response -- in its response to Metalclad -- Mexico's allegations against Rodarte, Metalclad adduced evidence that it had never received any type of benefit from the consultation relationship between Eco and Rodarte.

Mexico is unaware of any record evidence in the proceeding below that Metalclad had never received any type of benefit from the consultation relationship between Eco and Rodarte. If that's true, it actually underscores the impropriety of the relationship between his wife and Eco Administracion and then Metalclad. If they're not getting any benefits, why did they get 30,000 shares of stock and \$20,000 in cash?

At paragraph 446 it is stated in the -- the sentence they talk about the swap of shares, and they say:

"Under the terms of the share exchange agreement all..."

That's emphasized.

"...shareholders of Metalclad would receive cash and shares."

That's not true. All shareholders of Metalclad did not receive payments of cash and shares upon the attainment of permits. Metalclad was a publicly traded company in the United States. There's no evidence on the record

43	below that all Metalciad shareholders were getting
14	cash and shares when federal permits were being
1 5	issued in Mexico.
46	And to the extent that Ratner is linked with
17	the other shareholders of Eco, we adduced

evidence -- and if you look at tab 14 of our materials that we've just handed up to you, My Lord, where we showed that if you compare Lucia Ratner to another shareholder of Eco, Jaime de la Fuente, he had 1,700 shares in Eco, but he also had 2.150 shares of Descontaminadora and 1.550 shares of Eliminacion. Ratner had 400 shares of Eco. none in the other two companies.

Yet if you look at the terms of her agreement, which we went through before, when federal permits, environmental permits were issued to any of those companies or a company known as a Schedule 3 company, and we don't know what that is, she became entitled to payments of cash and shares.

And I put it to Mr. Kesler that, like, why were they wasting corporate resources for remunerating her for developments relating to companies that she had no shareholding interest in which she -- that was conveyed to them? And his response was she was being treated like everyone else. She wasn't. She was in a different position from everyone else.

Paragraph 447:

"Mexico has asserted that Rodarte received an improper commission arising out of the acquisition of COTERIN by Metalclad. While Metalclad was aware that Rodarte asserted that he had an agreement with Eco, it was ultimately determined by Metalclad that no such agreement existed. As a result, no commission was ever paid by Metalclad or Eco to Rodarte."

This doesn't accurately reflect the evidence in three respects. Mexico did not assert that Rodarte received an improper commission. Mexico asserted at paragraph 162 of its rejoinder that Rodarte negotiated an improper commission to arrange the sale of COTERIN to Metalclad. We had no evidence as to whether or not the commission

43	was ever paid.	
44	The second and third sentences of this	
45	paragraph I just read to you are misleading.	lt
46	was not a Mr. Kesler did not testify under	
47	cross-examination that it was ultimately	

1 determined by Metalclad that no such agreement 2 existed. What he testified at -- about was -- and 3 this is at -- I'll just read you it, it's at tab 4 10 of Volume 3 -- or, sorry, Volume 2 -- I think 5 it's -- sorry. I'll have to check that. It's --6 it's in the materials I've already provided to 7 you, but I'll read you the quote, My Lord: 8 9 "Q. And in fact Metalclad agreed to 10 protect that commission when Mr. Rodarte 11 went to work for Metalclad subsequently, 12 correct? 13 A. Yeah. He asked us will you support 14 and protect my right. And we said if you 15 have an agreement, we'll support and protect that, because we also have a 16 17 relationship with Aldrett where we can use 18 influence to protect your position. Yes, 19 we will. 20 Q. Did he disclose to you that he had a 21 commission arranged with Mr. Aldrett at the 22 time that he introduced you to the 23 investment opportunity? 24 A. Quite the contrary. Mr. Aldrett 25 claimed that he had no agreement with 26 Mr. Rodarte. So for us to then promise to 27 protect Rodarte, we kind of knew it was an 28 empty promise, because it was all dependent 29 upon whether or not there was an agreement, 30 and one said there was and one said there 31 wasn't."

Now, there's two contemp -- contemporaneous documents that are inconsistent with that. At tab 20 they clearly negotiated an agreement. This is the first version, this is August the 4th, 1994. It's a letter from Chairman of the Board Dan Neveau to Humberto Rodarte. It sets out in point form the terms of the relationship between the two parties. You'll see last line in the bullet points:

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43	"La Pedrera/COTERIN comm."
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45	THE COURT: Sorry, I'm not with you.
46	MR. THOMAS: Sorry. Tab 20 of the new of the
47	Volume 3 I gave you, My Lord.

1 THE COURT: Of the supplementary?

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2 MR. THOMAS: Supplementary tab 20.
3 THE COURT: Do I have -- what I have under tab 20 is a
4
      letter from the Department of Commerce.
5 MR. THOMAS: Oh, I'm sorry. It's in the wrong form.
      I've -- I've got a record of it. I'll pass up to
7
      you. It's -- it should be in there. Perhaps it's
      iust mv mistake.
8
9 THE COURT: It's under tab 19.
10 MR. THOMAS: Okay. So --
11 THE COURT: I think tab 19 and 20 probably got --
12 MR. THOMAS: Mixed up. Thank you.
13 THE COURT: -- transposed. Um-hum.
14 MR. THOMAS: So here we have in the -- in the bullets
15
       that go down, you see in the bottom of the
       indentated -- indented bullets:
16
17
18
          "La Pedrera/COTERIN commission.
19
          By agreement and protection of Aldrett
20
          arrangement $25,000 or equivalent stock at
21
          H.R..."
22
23
          I take that to be Humberto Rodarte's:
24
25
          "...choice in 60 days from date."
26
27
          And then in the last line -- second-to-last
28
       line of the page:
29
30
          "This summary is our agreement and
31
          understanding."
32
33
          And, My Lord, there -- this is later on
34
       included in another agreement which is at tab 40
35
       of Volume 2. And you may recall that when I took
36
       you through this evidence before, I took you to
37
       a document done in January of 1996 where there's a
       recital by Mr. Rodarte that he acted as -- he
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39
       acted on behalf of the vendors of COTERIN in
40
       arranging the sale of COTERIN to Metalclad. So he
41
       recites that in the recitals part of the
42
       agreement.
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43	The sixth clause of that agreement is
44	entitled "Payment of Commission."
45	
46	"Metalclad agrees that in the event in the
47	future it owes some amount to the sellers

of the shares of COTERIN, which debt is payable and requires to be paid to said sellers and is not subject to set-off or withholding by Metalclad due to some legal cost, Metalclad will pay out of such amount owed and pavable as mentioned above 5 percent to the consultant until..." such time "...until...until the total sum paid to the consultant pursuant to this clause amounts to U.S. \$100,000."

So he's now of course a consultant because according to his evidence he's been working for Metalclad in the open since sometime in the summer of 1993. And he -- at this time he's leaving Metalclad and he's being considered a consultant for the purposes of that.

He was not, and there is no record evidence that he was, a consultant back in 1991/92. But here is evidence, contemporary documentary evidence, which shows that whether Metalclad agreed to pay the commission or not or whether Metalclad paid the commission, it agreed to pay the commission. And there's two separate pieces of contemporaneous documents put before the tribunal on this evidence -- on this relationship.

So then when I go to paragraph 441 of the outline, we have another implicit finding of the tribunal described by Metalclad where it states:

 "The tribunal's finding of good faith, implicitly rejecting Mexico's allegations, was a finding of fact based upon a review of the whole of the evidence and the weighing of the credibility of the various witnesses who gave testimony on this issue. For example, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico James Jones testified in writing that American authorities had investigated allegations of corrupt foreign practices against Metalclad and had determined that the allegations had no merit. As a result,

43	while the evidence did not support Mexico's
44	allegations of corrupt foreign practices,
45	even if Mexico's assertion that the
46	tribunal made an incorrect finding of fact
47	on this point is correct, such an error"

Et cetera, et cetera.

Well, notice the term -- the language "as a result," the implication being that this evidence that I've just taken you through is what Ambassador Jones took and referred to the Department of Justice. He didn't have it because it wasn't discovered for two years after.

Now, Mr. Cowper said that \$10,000 to Mrs. Ratner was a white poker chip, and we don't share his view with respect to public policy. It was larger, first of all. But we don't see Rodarte's role in this proceeding as being minimal. He was the only federal official who testified as to these assurances being given.

Metalclad itself has shown in its outline that his evidence -- they consider his evidence to have been important to the tribunal's findings, because they cite his evidence as supporting the award at paragraphs 291, 299, 302 and 314 of the award -- of -- of their outline. So on four separate occasions they're saying that his evidence was supportive of these findings.

We actually directed the tribunal to other evidence relating to Mr. Rodarte in addition to all of this. And you'll recall the March 10th, 1995 demonstration. It was a very telling witness statement put in by Metalclad which we directed the tribunal to. And it was a declaration of a -- a man by the name of Anthony Talmantez, T-A-L-M-A-N-T-E-Z. And he was at the demonstration. He was a Metalclad contractor. And he says at paragraph 6:

"The demonstrators began yelling for Humberto Rodarte who had been inside one of the buses. They looked extremely unhappy and were insistent that they speak to him immediately. They were accusing him of taking kickbacks and selling out to the Americans."

43 And we refer to this at paragraphs at	
paragraph 334 of the rejoinder and following	g. And
I would say, My Lord, that the local people	may
have been poor and uneducated but they w	ere no
fools. This man was a man who was repre	senting

Metalclad, the man who was responsible in the first place for this contamination from the federal perspective, and the local people understood very well what his situation was.

Now, I'll just make one final note. I -- I have to record an objection to Mr. Cowper's characterization of -- of Leonel Ramos's testimony. Leo Ramos is the -- was the municipal president of Guadalcazar. Mr. Cowper did not have an opportunity to attend the hearing, and he didn't observe Mr. Ramos's demeanor.

I just want you to understand that this was in the -- this -- this hearing was held in the -- the executive committee boardroom of the World Bank in Washington, D.C. The table is about 50 feet long. Mr. Ramos is a -- is a -- not a well-educated man. He -- and he came into this hearing. And I think for any witness it would be an intimidating experience.

He was being cross-examined in English with Spanish translation, having the questions repeated to him in Spanish, and testifying in Spanish. The English transcript, I'm told by people who speak better -- much better Spanish than I do, does not do justice to the testimony, because this is a translation of what was said in Spanish. I think it's unfair, with the greatest of respect, to characterize Mr. Ramos's testimony in the way in which it was done yesterday.

But I will point out one other thing about witnesses, and that is: Mr. Kesler and Mr. Dabbene, the chief financial officer and the -- the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer, gave them -- were -- had negotiated employment agreements which gave themselves contingencies for the successful outcome of this case. This came out in cross-examination.

We also discovered -- we caught two of Metalclad's witnesses, Mr. Dabbene and Mr. Neveau, being coached. They were excluded. They were witnesses as to fact who were excluded from the

- proceeding. It was obvious that Mr. Dabbene had
- been coached. And he admitted it under
- 45 cross-examination. Mr. Neveau was caught out.
- And the president said to him when did you discuss
- 47 this with Mr. Kesler? By that time Mr. Neveau

said, oh, well, some months ago. Well, the issue that he was caught out on had arisen three days previously or four days previously in the hearing.

There was a conflict in their testimony relating to the way in which they had terminated the services of their local lawyers. And there had been a dispute in the proceeding as to who fired who. Mr. Kesler under oath testified that Mr. Neveau was wrong in his written witness statement. And when Mr. Neveau was -- was cross-examined it was put to him: Did you know that Mr. Kesler disavowed your testimony? And he said yes. So he had obviously been coached on this key point at the time about who -- how the whole termination of the local lawyers related.

And it was an important issue at the time because it related to whether the lawyers fired the client for wanting to bribe the governor or whether the client fired the lawyers for wanting to bribe the governor. And they contradicted each other. And then Mr. Kesler went and spoke to Mr. Neveau. And I say that is clearly evident from the cross-examination transcript.

We say, My Lord, that among the many other issues that weren't addressed in this arbitral award that this issue had -- this issue should have been addressed by the tribunal. It was put to the tribunal at the hearing. It was put to the tribunal in post-hearing submissions, and we have a right to know what the tribunal's views are. We have a right to know whether it's prepared to accept the evidence of someone who has an improper relationship with the claimant. We have a right to know its view about the propriety of -- of compensating Metalclad for bribes. And we have a right to know about the misrepresentations that were made by this claimant.

As I said to you before, if this is the standard of conduct that is acceptable for claimants in Chapter 11 cases, it's open season on the NAFTA parties. And I say that's not what the parties contemplated. It's not what tribunals

should be -- should be tolerating. And because this tribunal manifestly failed to deal with the issues, we look to this Court to exercise corrective jurisdiction under the public policy rubric of the applicable statutes.

And that concludes my submissions, My Lord. 1 2 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Thomas. I'll take the afternoon break now before we hear some reply from Mr. Cowper. 4 5 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is adjourned for the afternoon recess. 7 8 (AFTERNOON RECESS) 9 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:05 P.M.) 10 (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 3:17 P.M.) 11 12 THE COURT: Perhaps I misinterpreted Mr. Thomas's --13 MR. FOY: You did, My Lord. 14 Mr. Thomas took you to page -- to the --15 almost to the end of the outline, and I just wanted to add two points and then I'll -- or a few 16 points and I'll close. 17 18 The first point is to take you to -- or to 19 refer you to an authority with respect to the 20 proposition that where there is a good-faith 21 obligation on a party that an attempt to be 22 purposely misleading in a claim disentitles the 23 claimant to recover at all. And this is sole --24 solely by way of analogy, My Lord. The -- in the 25 insurance context you'll be aware that there are 26 situations in which a claimant owes a duty of good 27 faith. 28 And at tab 1 of the authorities we've --29 refer -- of the supplementary authorities we've referred to a decision of the British Columbia 30 31 Court of Appeal in which the proposition in that 32 context, the common law proposition, is set out. 33 And I'll just quickly read it at page 13, that --34 where Mr. Justice Macfarlane is quoting from a --35 an English decision of respectable vintage which 36 says: 37 38 "The law is that a person who has made such 39 a fraudulent claim could not be permitted 40 to recover at all. The contract of

insurance is one of perfect good faith on

both sides."

41 42

43	
44	And then it goes on to the it carries on
45	elaborating that proposition. And over on page
46	14:
47	

"If there is a willful falsehood and fraud in the claim, the insured forfeits all claim whatever upon the policy."

So Mexico argued that as a matter of law the -- that investors owe the same good faith in the advancement of this type of claim as is owed by a State. And by way of analogy to a proposition familiar to this Court, if that's correct in law, then that can have the result of forfeiting the claim.

Before I take you to the final section of our outline, the remedies available to this Court, I'd like to reply to Metalclad's final oration before closing its case.

Counsel for Metalclad argued that this was an investor taking advantage of an opportunity to call the State to account in circumstances where, absent the NAFTA, it was alleged the State was previously unaccountable. That was how this claim was characterized. And I say that that is not a fair characterization.

Metalclad's complaint, the gravamen of its complaint, was an ultra vires act against the municipality. That was an act entirely within the power of Metalclad to call the State to account in the domestic courts on an issue of Mexican domestic law.

Counsel for Metalclad asked you to imagine what the U.S. State Department would say if Metalclad asked the United States to espouse this claim. And I think that question could be asked at two levels, the first level -- or at two points in time. First, they could ask when -- right after the municipal permit denial. And I would suspect that the answer would be, well, you have a claim for an ultra vires complaint, have you gone to the Mexican courts? Go there and find out what the answer to this domestic issue is.

They could also ask that question after they had this award and say -- imagine the circumstances in which they go to the State

- 43
- Department and say I have an award -- an award in the form of an opinion from three -- three eminent 44
- international lawyers, and it's in these terms, 45
- 46 and we know -- and would you espouse a Chapter 11
- 47 NAFTA claim?

1 We know from the position of the 2 United States that their view is that opinion was 3 wrongly decided. And I would note that the U.S. 4 espouses the claims of U.S. nationals where 5 appropriate on a -- an ongoing basis in the WTO. 6 And the growing docket of the WTO dispute 7 settlement body is -- is evidence of that. 8 The last page of the submission deals with 9 the remedies available to this Court. We have not 10 there set out any logical pathway for 11 Your Lordship, but you've had -- you have our 12 points in detail. The remedy that -- what we have 13 set out are -- are the remedies that are available 14 under the different statutes. The remedy we seek 15 is an order setting aside the award. 16 Before closing, I would like to correct a 17 misstatement that I made on the first day of these hearings and apologize to my colleague 18 19 Mr. Perezcano. I said there were 26 States in 20 Mexico. There are 31 States and 1 federal 21 district. 22 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Foy. 23 MR. COWPER: Thank you, My Lord. 24 There are essentially two matters I need to 25 deal with, and that is the -- exercising the 26 privilege, and I under -- I appreciate it to be a privilege of sur-reply. And also --27 28 THE COURT: Very few lawyers do appreciate that it's a 29 privilege. 30 MR. COWPER: Well, thank you. 31 I also need to deal with the, I guess, three 32 statements of position handed up by my friends 33 this morning which you haven't heard me on at 34 all. 35 I'm going to be very concise with respect to 36 sur-reply, both because I think it's appropriate, 37 and also Your Lordship has heard a great deal from everybody on this. I'm only going to concentrate 38 39 on points in which I think my friend has made a 40 point for the first time in his reply that you 41 haven't heard me on. 42 I do want to say this though, one of the

themes of my friend's reply is that there's much agreement between us. I think I've lost count at about eight or nine. With respect to my friend, we remain in disagreement largely in this case, and I'm sorry that that is so.

It will of cos -- of course have to go to Your Lordship to determine what the correct view of the matters are. But I do not in respect of my friend's points of agreement he set out in his reply agree that he has either characterized our position or our arguments.

The next brief point I would like to make is that my friend submitted to you that with respect to the question of 1121 that there was no finding in the tribunal with respect to the interpretation of 1121 and that we had accepted that. I interpret the award as making both a -- a finding of 1121 and recording a concession.

You have heard both my friend and I on this point. I would ask you to read the transcript references I've given you. I do not believe my friend dealt with, either in his chief or reply, the transcript of the exchange between counsel and the tribunal.

My friend in his submission in reply said that you heard the words I think he said twice "local remedies" for the first time when I came to the very end of my argument. I started my submission on local remedies on Friday afternoon. I've looked at the transcript. I believe it appears as well extensively on Monday and Tuesday.

I -- I -- I simply say that Your Lordship ought to read that transcript, in fact if you disregard both of my friend's views on this and simply read the exchange between Mr. Thomas and the tribunal, I think it's manifestly clear that that was his submission as to local remedies based on an interpretation of 205.

So in reply, my friend says we were mistaken, it's an interpretation of 205. In the exchange between the tribunal and Mr. Thomas it is absolutely in my submission clear as clear could be that he was taking an interpretation of 205 to require exhaustion of local remedies as to municipalities only, which position was later withdrawn.

43	My friend in his reply stated that we had
44	argued and urged upon you a duty of insurance to
45	bring about an obligation of outcome or that that
46	was the effect of the tribunal. And I simply
47	and I and I think he suggested that there was

some kind of agreement about that. I -- with respect, we construed and we argued that the tribunal in fact found that Metalclad had a lawful right to operate the facility as it sought to do so, that it was not complaining about the failure to obtain an outcome but rather failing in the ultimate case complaining about an unlawful exercise of authority.

I would ask -- my friend took you to paragraph 105 in his reply as it relates to the tribunal's finding concerning that authority. I'd ask you to look on to paragraph 106, over to the very next page; the tribunal refers to the municipality's authority over physical construction.

With respect to my friend's construction in his reply of annex 1120.1 and his urging upon you the interpretation that, properly interpreted, it is open to a party, he said, in Mexican law to seek violation of NAFTA itself, and that was the justification for 1120.1 I believe, or 1121.1, I simply ask you to note that that was the dissenting view of the dissenter in the Waste Management case. The majority view was to the contrary.

With respect to my friend's dealing with the various reply points on "commercial," I -- Mr. Alvarez has insisted that I tell you that he does not agree that my friend has stated his argument correctly.

I think of greater help to Your Lordship, and I just ask you when you come to this point, when you refer to our arguments, to look at the arguments and the sections which concern the submission respecting the relationship created by NAFTA itself as to the creation of an investment relationship and investment dispute and rights respecting an investment, and then to turn to both of my friend's principal and reply arguments and to ascertain whether there is any effective or any answer to those submissions.

My friend at -- in his reply referred to the

counter-memorial at paragraph 860. And he indicated that contrary to our reading that sentence ought to have emphasis on the term "authority."

Do you recall it says --

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1 THE COURT: Right, interpreting --
2 MR. COWPER: -- there is no authority?
3 THE COURT: Yes.
4
   MR. COWPER: And fair enough, I -- I want to be fair
5
       to my friend, I would ask Your Lordship, and I
6
       pulled out actually the counter-memorial when he
7
       made that -- I invite you to read the entire
8
       section, which is actually only three or four
9
       pages long, but you can read it from paragraphs
10
       834 to 841 which concerns Mexico's position on
11
       this point before the tribunal. I say reading
12
       that entire section, it's very clear it was taken
13
       as a point of interpretation and not jurisdiction,
14
       and that the word "authority" was not used to mean
15
       jurisdiction but rather whether or not it was
16
       proper and whether or not there was any case
       authority or any justification for utilizing the
17
18
       objectives of the treaty or the rules relating to
19
       transparency in -- regarding what was fair or
20
       equitable.
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I would also ask you to note that in that section my friend in his reply dealt with F.A. Mann. And I think, if I heard him correctly, and I didn't hear all of his submissions on F.A. Mann, he essentially said those -- those observations of F.A. Mann are completely out of the discussion and debate if you understand international law.

My friend in -- before the tribunal relied upon and quoted the position we rely upon in F.A. Mann in their memorial at 8 -- I believe 837, and footnote the very passage relied upon by Metalclad in this case.

My friend in reply suggested that -- and he cites additional cases arising out of Canadian jurisprudence respecting international law, including the secession reference. And he characterized my submissions to you as patronizing as they relate to the Court's ability and jurisdiction over questions of international law.

I really have only two points. I was not endeavouring to be patronizing but rather seeking

43	as respectfully as I can to properly have regard
44	to what I see to be the statutory intent and
45	purpose of the international commercial act as it
46	applies to this case.
47	Secondly, in the passage my friend puts in

his reply, there is the very telling and important observation of the Court, that is the Supreme Court of Canada, that it was international law when it arises, in the words of the decision:

"...to determine the rights and obligations of some actor within the Canadian legal system."

Those are from the very point he quotes. That is, international law arises to determine the rights and obligations of some actor within the Canadian legal system.

In our submission of course this isn't a case involving the rights and obligations of an actor within the Canadian legal system. It's the exercise of your jurisdiction under the relevant act having regard to a tribunal that determined the rights and obligations under NAFTA.

Now, with respect to my friend's submission on the Convenio, he referred to the Convenio and he referred to a statement about permits in relation to the Convenio. I just ask you, when you turn to the Convenio, I believe it's accurate to say that the Convenio itself makes no reference to municipal permits.

With respect to the point of the \$1,200 a tonne, that's my error, I've made a number here, and my friend has perhaps been less telling about that. I -- I think I indicated to Your Lordship that was a number that I was given that I incorrectly understood. I believe in fact that the reference in the expert reports is \$120 a tonne as opposed to \$15 a tonne.

The point is actually made with exactly the same force, and I gave you the reference to the report. The returns from hazardous waste are 10 times per weight what they are for other waste, if not greater.

With respect to the table that my friend handed up to you comparing the ICSID Convention and the additional facility rules, the rules

respecting reasons are similar, but the annulment committee provisions are not applicable to the additional facility rules. And the failure to give reasons is not a ground for annulment. There is no parallel in our submission on that issue.

 I'm sorry, failure to consider every question is not a ground for annulment.

Now, with respect to my friend Mr. Thomas's submissions in reply, I'll try to be very brief.

This is an issue of public policy. And let me start with an error. And my friend caught me out with an error, and was not gracious enough to ask me about it.

Our submission as it relates to the share swap was directly referable to the share swap referred to in my friend's submissions, it was not a share swap with COTERIN, and I apologize to the Court for suggesting that. There is no share swap involving COTERIN. And my friend's reference to that, with respect, is more confusing than helpful.

The share swap involved the Eco company as set out in the record. The point being made in the viva voce evidence was it predated Metalclad's control. It was something committed to all of the previous shareholders, and my friend's own submission accepted this. And if you go to my friend's transcript, he said when he introduced this point that the agreement predated Metalclad's control. And my submission was that my friend cannot elevate that payment into an issue of public policy on those facts. It's not capable of being done.

Now, let me though make a second point, which is: My friend's very excited comments this afternoon were extensively gone into before the tribunal primarily for the purpose of having the tribunal determine credibility adversely to Metalclad, both as it related to specific witnesses and as to the credibility of the case as a whole.

With great respect to my friend, it is in my submission wildly inappropriate in this forum to repeat those arguments under the posture of raising a public policy ground on the basis of an authority such as the European Gas Turbine case where the party moving in that case introduced

43	fresh evidence not before the tribunal and
44	established that a fraud had been conducted on the
45	tribunal, not on the evidence before them but on
46	evidence that was unavailable to them.
47	I say with respect that my friend's treatment
	the state of the s

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of the payments is ahistorical and an unfair 2 treatment of the evidence. And if Your Lordship 3 feels that our submissions as to whether they meet 4 the threshold of requiring to be inquired into will have to have regard to the submissions and evidence as a whole, which in my submission justified the tribunal not concluding anything with respect to those matters as raising any issue 9 of public policy -- because it wasn't an issue of 10 public policy for the tribunal. It was an issue 11 of credibility of the claim as a whole and 12 Metalclad's position on factual matters. And the 13 tribunal found in at least three or four different 14 cases that Metalclad had proceeded with good faith 15 in one form or another, one use of terms or 16 another.

> Now, with respect to the positions taken, and there are many other points my friends have made, but I will not try Your Lordship's patience on a sur-reply in addressing them, I do wish to say a few words respecting the statement of pleadings advanced by the United States in the two matters handed up yesterday and today.

Now, firstly -- and of course my friend indicated that he was merely adopting them as his own submission and then proceeded to tell Your Lordship how important it was to note the position of the three States to the treaty and their position in relation to this award, which was of course the very basis of my objection to referring to them in the first place. But I want to come back to the significance of the fact that States have taken a position in relation to this award in other tribunals in a moment, just to close.

I do want to ask you to have regard firstly to the fact that in the American's submission they make it clear that their objection is only if the award is interpreted as not applying international law. And our submission is that the tribunal applied international law in this case within the meaning of Chapter 14 and 1105. And further, that

43	in order for my friend to succeed, he has to go
14	beyond that and successfully attack both findings
1 5	under 1110.
46	With respect to the interpretation of the
17	award, I leave that to Your Lordship. I won't try

42

your patience any further with that.

2 With respect to the Methanex counter-memorial 3 though, one of the things which Your Lordship 4 ought to note is that in the Methanex 5 counter-memorial, which is at page 9 and 6 following. Methanex refers to Schwartzenberger and 7 Venvelde as additional international lawyers --8 Do you have page 9? 9 THE COURT: Yes. I see 9. 10 MR. COWPER: Yes. 11 THE COURT: You're referring to at the top -- near the 12 top, yes. 13 MR. COWPER: -- as -- as having a very different view 14 of fair and equitable treatment than which has 15 been presented to you by Mexico as orthodox in 16 this case. So here are two additional 17 international lawyers saying that the fair and 18 equitable treatment standard is more than what my 19 friend would have you accept as being orthodox. 20 Secondly, Methanex quotes from the American 21 position in the ELSI case, which my friend relies 22 on heavily in this case, at page 11, in which the 23 American position -- and of course the Americans 24 were the complainants in the ELSI case, took a far 25 broader view of the content of customary 26 international law as it related to arbitrary 27 measures. 28 And you'll recall that the ELSI case applied 29 a different formulation in internat -- in -- in 30 treaties than this one. It applied a formulation 31 of arbitrary, and there was another -- arbitrary 32 or discriminatory measures, that's it, at the top 33 of page 11. It didn't have the fair and equitable 34 standard before it. But even so, the American 35 position in that case was that arbitrary or 36 discriminatory required a more broad and liberal 37 interpretation than Italy was maintaining. 38 And so I say with respect to the sovereign 39 United States of America, its position as to those 40 matters has to have regard to the fact that they have urged on tribunals far more liberal standards 41

of conduct, if you will, or liberal restrictions

43	on sovereign conduct than my friend would take
44	from the submission in the Methanex case.
45	Now, with respect to the Pope & Talbot case
46	and its note with respect to Myers, I make this
47	point very briefly, and that is: With respect to

the case before Your Lordship as presented by us, we say that the tribunal in this case did not find a breach of a provision of the treaty outside Chapter 11 and then use that breach as the mathematical and direct foundation for a breach of 1105. And therefore we would not disagree for the purposes of this case with a submission made in relation to the Pope & Talbot or other case concerning the Myers decision.

However, you'll recall that the dissent on that point, which was Mr. Chiasson, who said don't use the breach elsewhere to make 1105, but he was quite comfortable in characterizing the conduct of Canada in that case as being very close to the line under 1105 having no regard to the other provisions of the treaty.

And of course it's our submission that the facts in this case had to be determined by the tribunal as whether they fell on this side of the line or far over the line. And it's our submission on the correctness standard they were far over the line of acceptable treatment by a State under international law adhering to the obligation to extend fair and equitable treatment to investors. I do want to -- and those are essentially my points with respect to those statements.

I do want to though address my friend's urging upon you deference to the positions taken by the governments as he has now marshalled them in support of his submission. And I do say this, and that is: With respect, that both the tribunal and this Court sit in the tradition which commenced with the act of settlement 300 years ago, independent decision-makers, an independent judiciary, independent of the executive, having regard to the terms of the law and applying it to determine the rights of the citizens. And I say with respect the fact that there are three executives who urge upon you not to apply the law as it has been found by the tribunal ought not to in any way influence your application of the

- proper legal standards and the proper statutory 43
- jurisdiction in this case. 44
- THE COURT: You needn't worry yourself in that regard,because if the three of them are all concerned,
- they can amend the agreement. 47

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1 MR. COWPER: Thank you, My Lord.
2 MR. FOY: My Lord, I have no -- no further
3
       submissions, but I think it appropriate on behalf
4
       of the government of Mexico to thank counsel for
5
       Metalclad for the -- who have co-operated
6
       procedurally and who have worked very hard to
7
       allow us all to put the important substantive
8
       issues before this Court in a timely manner.
9
          I think as well on behalf of all counsel I'd
10
       like to thank our reporter, Mr. Lee; our -- our
11
       registrar, Mr. Kong; and our unobtrusive observer,
12
       Mr. Nelson, for assisting us efficiently in
13
       managing these hearings.
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Foy.
15
          If we could deal with some housekeeping
16
       issues.
17
          Mr. Cowper, I don't know if you were given a
18
       copy of the letter, had an opportunity to read it,
19
       from Ms. Vogel.
20
           Just to let counsel know, my view is that the
21
       authorities which you've provided belong to you,
22
       counsel. The tradition in the court is once we're
23
       finished that we do destroy them because counsel
24
       don't usually want to have them back. But the
25
       decision of whether I accede to the request of
26
       Ms. Vogel or not is within the control of each of
27
       you with respect to your -- your materials that
28
       vou have filed on behalf of your clients.
29 MR. COWPER: My client doesn't have any particular
       concern or objection to distributing materials
30
31
       that are before the Court.
32
           I would say that my experience has been that
       adjudicators, either arbitrators or judges, ought
33
34
       to feel free to note, amend, highlight or
35
       otherwise the authorities. And I do find that
36
       other people getting those in hand sometimes read
37
       more into those than otherwise. And I wouldn't
38
       want Your Lordship to feel somehow that those are
39
       public documents. We've given them to the -- to
40
       the Court for your use and -- and really have no
       regard to their ultimate use.
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But we don't object and certainly don't

- object to them eventually becoming public, but I 43 would certainly not want the authorities which are 44 used by Your Lordship and -- and noted or amended 45 or highlighted to -- to be distributed
- 46

47 afterwards. I think that's --

letter.

1 THE COURT: Well, I -- I have highlighted some

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2
       portions. It's not my practice to make notes,
3
       either during the course of the hearing -- I might
4
       make a one-word note sometimes -- or as I'm
5
       reading them. I don't make a practice of making
6
       notes on them. So I don't think that -- that
7
       that's a concern.
8 MR. COWPER: That's fine. I thought it might be so.
9
       That's --
10 THE COURT: Yes. The -- the most -- I hate to have my
11
       secretary do this, I don't think I will, is I go
12
       through and have my secretary photocopy everything
13
       that had yellow on it, because I did use a
14
       highlighter, and it wouldn't -- wouldn't show up
15
       on the photocopying. But I don't think the fact
       that I had marked in yellow where counsel have
16
       read a passage to me is of any significance.
17
18
           Mr. Foy, do you have any --
19 MR. FOY: Nothing to add, My Lord.
20 THE COURT: Very well then. I will, when I have
21
       concluded, provide the briefs of authority to
22
       Ms. Voael.
23
           The other voluminous number -- or amount of
24
       materials which you provided me which have been
25
       sitting over there for the entire two weeks, and
26
       I've not had the necessity to have regard to the
       record. You -- you provided me with the
27
28
       extracts. It may well be that during my
29
       deliberations in reaching my decision I will have
       to go to the record, and -- and I'll be retaining
30
31
       it for that purpose.
32
          However, once I'm finished with it, I would
33
       have no further need of it. And I -- it would
34
       seem to me that -- that there could be potential
35
       need in the future --
36
          Mr. Foy, you have provided it --
37 MR. FOY: Yes. We -- the record I -- I had -- I had
38
       thought, perhaps wrongly, that the letter related
39
       to the authorities. The record is something
40
       that --
41 THE COURT: Oh, no, no. I'm finished with the
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- 43 MR. FOY: Oh.
- 44 THE COURT: The letter did only relate to the
- 45 authorities.46 MR. FOY: Yes.
- 47 THE COURT: I'm now turning to the record.

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1 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
2 MR. COWPER: I think the practice is to simply keep
      the record in -- in the Supreme Court until such
      time as any of the parties apply to have it --
4
5 THE COURT: That's not -- that's not my practice,
      Mr. Cowper. My practice is once I've finished
7
      with it, I'm going to give it back.
8 MR. COWPER: No. I understand once Your Lordship is
9
      finished with it.
10 THE COURT: Yes.
11 MR. COWPER: But I'm saying you can give -- you give
       it back to the parties, but I think --
12
13 THE COURT: Yes.
14 MR. COWPER: -- we can -- we can then -- my friend and
       I can at that point, having received
15
16
       Your Lordship's judgment, decide what ought to be
       done with them. I have an interest in respect of
17
18
       a clean copy of the record, as does he, and we can
19
       deal with that. He provided it with my agreement
20
       to the Court, and I'm sure my friend and I can
21
       agree what to do with it.
22 THE COURT: Yes. So then I -- it is my intention to
23
       return it. And again, I'm not a marker, and I
24
       won't mark up any of the records. So if it's --
25
       if it's used or -- or needed for higher purposes,
26
       it -- it will be available in clean form.
27
          The -- the final point was just to give you
28
       some indication of what you can expect in terms of
       the timing of my decision. I'd like to be
29
       relatively prompt in -- in issuing my decisions.
30
31
       Something like this is going to take a -- a
       considerable period of time. I -- I would
32
       estimate, just roughly speaking, that it will
33
34
       probably be about two months.
35 MR. COWPER: Thank you, My Lord. I appreciate your
36
       patience.
37 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.
38 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
39
       adjourned.
40
41
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:54 P.M.)
42
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