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the tribunal?

1 1 March 2001 - Certified 2 Vancouver, B.C. 3 4 (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 10:00 A.M.) 5 6 THE REGISTRAR: Recalling the matter of the United 7 Mexican States versus Metalclad Corporation, 8 Mv Lord. 9 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Cowper. 10 MR. COWPER: Thank you, My Lord. If I may start with the -- just identifying 11 12 what we have left to do, by my review of my notes, 13 I have to take you to the last chapter. I have to 14 take you to the proper interpretation of Article 15 1110 in response to my friend. I also have to take you to the final section as it relates to my 16 17 submissions respecting the logical order of the 18 questions which arise. 19 And there are in the course of that a number 20 of miscellaneous matters which have accumulated, 21 particularly relating to some of the authorities 22 my friend relies upon which fall within the 23 remaining chapter, so I think I should be able to 24 deal with those cases. 25 I do have -- on a review of my notes, failed 26 to respond to one aspect of my friend's 27 submissions with respect to the June '94 28 incident. I'll give you a specific reference on that. And then I have to deal with the issue of 29 30 the question of leave to appeal and the existence 31 or absence of questions of law. 32 So -- and my friend has been kind enough to 33 give me an authority, and the supplemental 34 argument. 35 Now -- so that's what remains to be done. 36 What I'd like to do if I can is to start with 37 the question Your Lordship left me last evening, which was, if I can paraphrase it, what was the 38

federal government's responsibility for the lack

of transparency on the basis of the findings of

Now, in my submission the award properly read

attributes liability to the federal government for a lack of transparency in two respects: It founds liability for lack of transparency with respect to the original acts or failure to act of the federal government, and those are two different things.

And it also finds liability on the federal government as the national government because of the principle of attribution and the findings of the lack of transparency as it relates to State conduct and municipal conduct are attributed to Mexico in the finding of the tribunal.

Now, I think Your Lordship's question to me yesterday focused on the first part of that, and we then went as I read the transcript last night and covered a number of different areas. But just trying to proceed logically, if I may, let me start with the first proposition, which is: What did the tribunal find was the original liability of the federal government for its contribution to what the tribunal found was a lack of transparency?

If I may, I'd like to by way of preface say that I read the conclusion of the tribunal at 99 and 100 on this topic at the very end of its section on 1105 to refer to the totality of the acts of the Mexican organs of government which have been dealt with in the previous sections as they pertain to transparency. So that paragraph 99 which says:

[All quotations herein cited as read]

 "Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for Metalclad's business planning and investment. The totality of these circumstances demonstrates a lack of orderly process and timely disposition in relation to an investor of a Party acting in the expectation that it would be treated fairly and justly in accordance with the NAFTA."

I say on a fair reading that's a reference to the acts and the failure to act of all three levels of government. That's a conclusion at the very end respecting the Mexican State, if you can put it -- the international State's liability for a breach of 1105 which is then found in paragraph

| 43 | 100. It says: |
|----|--|
| 44 | |
| 45 | "Moreover, the acts of the State and the |
| 46 | Municipality - and therefore the acts of |
| 47 | Mexico" |
| | |

And you'll find in the very beginning of this section the word -- Section A is the principle of attribution. And it says under Section A found earlier in the award, the acts of the State and municipality are properly attributable to Mexico under international law. So that's the reference back to that section of the award.

"...fail to comply with or adhere to...Article 1105...that each Party accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment. This is so particularly in light of the governing principle that internal law...does not justify failure to perform a treaty."

So just starting with the end of the story, what I say is fairly read -- and of course 101 is the conclusion of failure to treat under 1105. But 99 through 101 fairly read say -- the first part is that Mexico failed to ensure transparency collectively, that the failure to -- to perform -- to ensure transparency and predictability is a factor in paragraph 100 which resulted in unfair treatment, unfair and inequitable treatment, and that Mexico is responsible not only for its own federal officials' acts but the acts of the State municipality.

So starting with that, let me then go to what I say is the finding of liability in response to Your Lordship's direct question of the federal officials for a lack of transparency.

And Your Lordship said last evening that -how can there be -- and excuse me for -- I'm not
quoting you, but just so that we're on the same
page, how can the federal government be
responsible for a lack of transparency when it was
Metalclad's position that the federal government

| 43 | was correct in its assertion through its officials |
|----|--|
| 44 | that the municipality had no authority with |
| 45 | respect to municipal permits and could not refuse |
| 46 | a permit? |
| 47 | Now, with respect to the tribunal's finding, |
| | • |

the finding they make with respect to the federal government's original liability in my submission is found most clearly in paragraph 88 at page 29. And this is consequential to a number of other findings, but if I can focus on this for a moment.

The other findings are the representations, the reliance and otherwise that I referred Your Lordship to yesterday, and I won't -- I won't repeat that. But at 88 it says:

"In addition, Metalclad asserted that federal officials told it that if it submitted an application for a municipal construction permit, the Municipality would have no legal basis for denying the permit and that it would be issued as a matter of course. The absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal construction permit, as well as the absence of any established practice or procedure as to the manner of handling applications for a municipal construction permit, amounts to a failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by NAFTA."

 Now, with respect to the findings of the tribunal there are two aspects to that, but there is a clear liability in my respectful submission for the federal government's contribution to it on the findings of the tribunal.

And the central point that I think has to be made here in relation to Your Lordship's question is the tribunal's finding did not agree with Metalclad that the municipality had no authority.

And you'll recall as I went through the award that the position of the parties was Mexico submitted to the tribunal that the municipality was an autonomous constitutional entity that had the right to refuse the construction permit and could not be interfered with and had the authority to interfere with the construction -- to refuse

| 43 | the construction permit, and that nothing wrong |
|----|--|
| 44 | had happened. |
| 45 | Metalclad's position was not only on the |
| 46 | facts; that is, we've been told they didn't have |
| 47 | authority, we didn't have to apply to them. On |
| | |

the law, Metalclad's position was the municipality has no jurisdiction, no right to call for a permit, no right to receive a permit, no right to consider granting a permit.

What the tribunal said was on their view of the law in response to those two positions, the municipality's authority -- and I think they use the word "at its best," but for the purposes of the finding -- extended to physical and engineering considerations. And I'm -- I'm paraphrasing it, they use of "physical" and "physical design."

But clearly what they're talking about is the construction of the buildings, the pouring of the cement, and those physical engineering considerations as distinct from any considerations which would pertain to environmental matters, the design of the hazardous waste facility as it related to treatment of the waste, receipt of the waste, all of those construction and operation matters.

Now, on the facts found by the tribunal, what the tribunal has said is having regard to the permits issued, and they've -- they've placed great emphasis on that, the federal government in its permits nowhere said with clarity or in fact at all that you have to obtain a municipal construction permit because they have authority over physical and engineering considerations.

Now, you'll recall yesterday, I believe, I took you to the permits. And you'll recall that the permits include substantial reference to and authority to construct buildings, receiving facilities, process facilities, treatment facilities, everything that was built is encompassed within the construction elements of the federal permits.

What's not contained in the federal permits is any acknowledgment or reference to a municipal jurisdiction over the physical construction of the buildings or the fences or that suchlike.

And what the municip -- and what the tribunal

has said is you the federal government under the goal of transparency have an original obligation to tell an investor this is our responsibility, but you need to go to the municipal government because they have authority over the physical

engineering component of your project; they can't interfere with our authority which is exclusive with respect to environmental matters, but they can go and you have to go to them to get a physical engineering -- and I'm just paraphrasing -- a permit as it relates to the physical engineering of your buildings and the

And on the findings of the tribunal, not only did the permits not state that, but the federal officials made representations which went even beyond silence to endorse and recommend and indeed, as is said in one of the documents, instruct the company to undertake and conduct its construction without seeking a permit, that the construction went on. And it was only after the Convenio -- I'm sorry, it was only after the stop work order is issued federal officials then say, oops, well, for the matter of respect you ought to apply. And then, as I said yesterday, the application lies like a dead letter until a Convenio is concluded, and then the municipality asserts itself.

So I say, just to sum up that point, that in -- the direct answer to Your Lordship is on the finding of the tribunal, they did not accept Metalclad's submission that there was no authority. And as a consequence of that there was a lack of transparency in their view as to the distinction between the federal government's exclusive environmental authority over the site, the project, the construction and everything else, and the municipal authority over physical engineering questions.

And so they attributed to the federal government a breach of transparency in relation to the federal government's treatment of the matter in their permits and in their documents and in their conduct of the matter.

So that's the first original finding, I say, of liability as it relates to the federal government for a lack of transparency.

| 43 | Now, I use the word "liability" loosely |
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| 44 | because I've said, I think consistently, that the |
| 45 | tribunal used it as a factor in finding a breach |
| 46 | of 1105. They did not anywhere say this is a |
| 47 | breach giving rise to a right to damages. |

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1 With respect to the second ground of original 2 liability in relation to, if you will, a 3 transparency-related concern, in paragraph 104 of 4 the award the tribunal found: 5 6 "By permitting ..." 7 I'm sorry if -- it's at page 33. 8 9 THE COURT: Got it. 10 MR. COWPER: 11 "By permitting or tolerating the conduct 12 of Guadalcazar in relation to Metalclad 13 which the Tribunal has already held amounts 14 to unfair and inequitable treatment 15 breaching Article 1105 and by thus participating or acquiescing in the denial 16 to Metalclad of the right to operate the 17 landfill, notwithstanding the fact that the 18 19 project was fully approved and endorsed by 20 the federal government, Mexico..." 21 22 And in that connection of course they're 23 talking about collective liability in international law. 24 25 26 "...must be held to have taken a measure 27 tantamount to expropriation in violation of 28 NAFTA Article 1110..." 29 30

So the second ground of original liability on the finding in relation to transparency concerns, I'm at -- or a breach of duties in relation to transparency concerns was the participation or acquiescence, using their phrase, in the misconduct, if I may say it that way, of Guadalcazar and inferentially the State of San Luis Potosi.

Now, as to that matter, the natural question arises and deserves a straight response as to what the tribunal had before it concerning the scope of steps available to the federal government other than acquiescence and participation.

| 43 | And there are in my submission four matters |
|----|---|
| 44 | that were before the tribunal, some of which I've |
| 45 | already identified for you, but I'll summarize |
| 46 | them this morning, which relate to the federal |
| 47 | government's failure to fulfill the goals of |

transparency by failing to take steps in relation to the assertion of authority, the unlawful assertion of authority by the municipality and inferentially the State government.

The -- can I have tab -- I'll give you -- I'll go to the next point and -- while my friend is finding my reference. The -- so maybe put a 1 and then I'll come back to it, or you can number it.

The -- the -- the first point I'd like to make in this connection is that in contrast to what the municipality and the governor did, in the evidence before the tribunal, it's very clear that when the municipality and the State asserted themselves, that the political forces within the federal government had two reactions, first of all, was to convert it to a political problem.

And you'll see in my reference -- and one point in which my friend and I dissent is that my friend goes into discussions and negotiations which are self-evidently attempts to solve a political problem, not a legal problem, but attempts by Metalclad and the federal officials to say if we give you this, will you just change your position?

And if you go -- there's -- there's substantial evidence here of negotiations which are absolutely expressly on the basis that -- let's put aside for the fact -- for the moment whether the municipality and the State have any lawful authority in this matter at all. If we offer you a citizens committee, if we offer you water, if we offer you medicine, if we offer you these things, will you abandon your position and allow us to proceed? And Metalclad conducted those negotiations extensively, and the federal officials from time to time turned up.

The point is though one of the federal responses was to blend the question of rights, the question of lawful process, with the question of political appearament.

What the federal government did not do was to

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- assert itself in the municipality in any way comparable to the fashion which the governor did. 44
- And I -- I -- this isn't a big point, but if you 45
- 46 look at what the governor did, he sends a lawyer
- to the municipality to provide them with, if I may 47

put in quotes, advice respecting the -- the permit application.

The lawyer advises them as to how to refuse the application. The governor drives down to this tiny municipality, and it's -- it's more evocative of any other description, in which a mayor shares his telephone with the -- the phone booth, as my friend put it on the first day of this hearing. And he presides at the meeting concerning the application.

And I simply asked the question, and I think the tribunal fairly did too: Where were federal officials? Where were federal officials and federal political representatives in the municipality saying hold it a second, under the laws of this country you can't do this? You need to allow this facility to operate because we the federal government with the lawful authority have given them the authority to do it. More than that, we told them to build the facility without applying to you for a permit. We told them to apply for a permit to you because you would be required to give it. Where is the evidence of federal officials asserting their lawful authority in the same way that the governor and the State had?

So when the -- when the tribunal says that the federal government participated and acquiesced in that, that's one element of what they failed to do.

Now, if you go to -- if you go to the -- the next point, which is the assertion of police authority -- if you go to tab 21 -- I'm sorry, tab 22. I'm trying to look for something. I'm not sure. And it's -- this is the -- one of the declarations of Mr. Miranda. And if you go to the page -- the fifth page, it's unfortunately not numbered.

And I'd ask -- I'm going to read you the second and third full paragraph. And this is -- chronologically putting you in the history, this is following the demonstration. Okay.

| 43 | |
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| 44 | "For the following four weeks paid |
| 45 | demonstrators stood by the landfill |
| 46 | exercising psychological pressure, |
| 47 | intimidating, threatening and challenging |

the workers of the landfill. State police were present during the whole time. And their attitude was also intimidating and threatening. The personnel began fearing for their families. I decided with the consequent economic implications to deviate the trucks and for them to enter the landfill through an alternate entrance.

"In January '96..."

Okay. So we're now in January '96.

"...once again the State police came back to the landfill for a three-month period. Many trucks entering and exiting the landfill were stopped and under strict surveillance when they had no attributions to do so. Because Metalclad and its subsidiaries never entered of one ounce of waste to the landfill the police were infuriated.

"Later a group of inhabitants of Los Almoles, backed by the municipality and with the State police protecting them, blocked the roads. And for some weeks no trucks could get into the landfill."

Now, there was a lot of fighting back and forth in the evidence as to the involvement of the State police and what they were doing, but I simply say this: In relation to the federal government's involvement, there's no evidence of the federal police showing up and saying this is a federal facility authorized by federal permits, it -- they have lawful authority of the federal government to operate it, and allowing and ensuring that other forces of the Mexican subsidiary governments did not interfere with the operation.

And I think yesterday you said -- said to me why didn't the company just go ahead and operate, or something to that effect. This is part of that

43 answer, which is that there were subsidiary
44 government forces which Metalclad reasonably took
45 the view would not let this facility operate. And
46 more to the point for my present submissions, the
47 federal government would not interfere with the

actions of the State police or municipal people. That's the second point, I think.

The third point relates to my -- my friend's reliance on the Amparo. And I simply say this, that the Amparo -- and -- and I don't want to give you the detail unless you need it. But the JURICI report stated that the Amparo obtained in relation to the Convenio was flawed because the process -- well, firstly, there was no jurisdiction in the municipality to seek the relief, so the injunction ought not to have been granted.

Secondly, the order ought not to have extended to COTERIN which was not a party and did not have notice of the proceedings, had no opportunity to appear. In other words, it -- it shouldn't have been involved in any way.

And forgetting for the moment that -- the rightness or wrongness of the JURICI report, my point in relation to the federal inaction is that I believe it's undisputed that that Amparos dissolve several years later for lack of jurisdiction. And I say simply that the failure of the federal government to move with dispatch to remove that injunction also played an element and a role in the tribunal's finding of participation and acquiescence.

Now, finally, the fourth thing which the federal government could have done and did not do on the facts before the tribunal relates to this, and that is the transition, once the negotiations came acropper (sic), and have really infiltrated the negotiations, which is the negotiations, as I've already said, were political. And during the course of those, quite clearly the federal government was -- the federal government of Mexico was beginning to tell the company a message that was starkly in contrast to that which had -- it had told them during the construction and preparation of the site, which was we have to get the State municipality onside, that is politically necessary.

And in -- in that connection I'd ask you to

- turn to tab 45, because one of the remedies that
 was lawfully available to the federal authorities
 that was considered by them and not acted on by
 them was the commencement of a legal process which
- 47 I don't know the details of but which is

effectively a -- a challenge to the constitutionality of the actions of another organ of government.

And at the proceeding there was under tab 45 this -- this memorandum of May 24th, 1996 produced. It concerned other matters as well, and so only parts of the letter were filed. And it deals with other legal proceedings. But the passage I wish to emphasize today is at the second page of that memorandum. And this is a report by one of the counsel acting for COTERIN respecting his discussions with federal officials. And you'll see the second full paragraph:

"We met with attorney Martin Diaz...Diaz, head of the legal department of SEMARNAP..."

And you know that's the federal -- the new name for the federal agency.

"...on May 21..."

And just to put you in the chronology, that's May 21, '96.

"...to discuss the advisability of SEMARNAP filing a lawsuit called 'Constitutional Controversy,' which is an action that the law grants to the authorities when another authority invades its jurisdiction. And in our case the Municipality of Guadalcazar invades the area of authority of SEMARNAP.

 "Prior to the meeting we delivered to Mr. Diaz a memorandum giving him our arguments to sustain the validity and the advisability of filing the constitutional controversy. At the meeting Mr. Martin Diaz mentioned that although in his opinion the constitutional controversy is an action in which SEMARNAP could succeed, Mrs. Carabias, the secretary of SEMARNAP,

| 43 | mentioned to him that she considered it |
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| 44 | unadvisable to file a constitutional |
| 45 | controversy because the president of the |
| 46 | republic" |
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         And that's of course of Mexico.
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3
          "...has been mentioning in his speeches
4
         that there is a new federalism in Mexico.
5
         And a lawsuit filed by SEMARNAP against the
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         municipality would be contrary to what the
7
         president has been stating."
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9
          Now, the point I'm making here is that the
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       federal government had at its hand and -- and in
11
       its powers the ability to take the lawful question
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       that -- the question of the lawful authority of
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       the municipality to the courts of Mexico and to
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       obtain a determination of the lawfulness of the
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       conduct of the subsidiary government.
16 THE COURT: Is this proceeding, the con --
       constitutional controversy, the proceeding which
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18
       the Mexican courts ultimately held that the
19
       municipality should have commenced rather than the
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       Amparo proceedings?
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          Mr. Foy is shaking his head in the negative.
22 MR. COWPER: I don't know the answer to that. I'll
23
       try to look.
24 THE COURT: Okay.
25 MR. COWPER: As I understand it, it's another form of
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       proceeding that's only open to governments in the
       courts to obtain declarations, so it would be --
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28 THE COURT: Right. What I -- I understand of Amparo
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       was that that's -- it's a private citizen --
30 MR. COWPER: Yes.
31 THE COURT: -- complaining of a --
32 MR. COWPER: Yes.
33 THE COURT: -- government action.
34 MR. COWPER: Yes. And this may have been the -- the
       way that it ought to have been commenced. I -- I
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36
       don't know if the municipality has access to the
       same process. That's my question. It may have
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       been. I'll come back to you. I'll try to find
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39
       the answer to that question.
40 THE COURT: I think Mr. Foy and Mr. Thomas have
       consulted and may be able to give their view of
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       it.
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- 43 MR. FOY: My Lord, I think you're correct. As I
- 44 mentioned when I described the -- the dismissal of
- 45 the municipality's Amparo against the Convenio,
- one of the reasons, as I understood it, was that
- 47 Amparo was only a remedy available to private

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      interests, not to an organ of government, that the
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      appropriate remedy for organs of government with
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      respect to issues like this was the constitutional
4
      challenge.
5 THE COURT: Yes. I think you used --
6 MR. FOY: And I --
7 THE COURT: -- constitutional challenge or
8
      constitutional controversy.
9 MR. FOY: Controversy, yes. And I took you to this
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       very memo during the course of our submissions.
11 THE COURT: Okay. That -- that satisfies my query,
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       Mr. Cowper --
13 MR. COWPER: Thank you --
14 THE COURT: -- unless --
15 MR. COWPER: -- My Lord.
16 THE COURT: -- you feel the need to investigate it
17
       further.
18 MR. COWPER: No.
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          So finally on this topic, I just want to
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       refer you to two aspects of the evidence that was
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       in -- in -- in the form of evidence under oath as
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       opposed to a letter, because I want to refer you
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       back and just ask you to make a note that
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       Ambassador Jones got the same message, and I read
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       it to you yesterday in page 2 of his memorandum,
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       where during the course of the negotiations when
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       it appeared as if the municipality and the State
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       would not agree to anything, and -- and you'll
29
       recall there's a number of declarations about how
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       agreement appeared to be at hand, and then
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       agreement failed, and then agreement appeared to
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       be at had, the government appeared -- the governor
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       appeared to be on-board and then changed his
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       position repeatedly, that Ambassador Jones was
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       told -- and it's page 2, and you don't have to
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       come back to it, I read it yesterday. But he was
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       told by high levels of the Mexican federal
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       government that they were powerless to force State
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       and local officials to support the Metalclad
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       project. So that's evidence under oath that is to
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       the same effect.
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And I'd also refer you -- and I won't -- I

| 43 | won't read it to you, but if you go to Secretary |
|----------------|--|
| 14 | Carabias's evidence, and at tab 45 it's not tab |
| 1 5 | 45, sorry. Her evidence at page 70. |
| 16 | She effectively in her evidence, and |
| 17 | and it's I've read the whole of her evidence, |

and it's -- it's a -- a bit of an internally difficult piece of evidence to read. But one of the themes of her evidence, and it's a very strong theme, is that the State and the municipalities are autonomous actors. We can't interfere with, we can't take steps to correct them because they are autonomous within our system of government.

And effectively that's, in a -- in a different way, reflecting the political judgment which she's reflecting to be one of the elements of the new federalism referred to in the letter, and that -- that tab reference is tab 12 at page 70.

So just summing up that, what I say then in answer to your question, and I'm sure it's a longer answer than perhaps you wanted, is that there were on the terms of the award findings of liability for failure to obtain transparency which were proper factors to take into account in determining whether there's a breach of fair and equitable conduct under 1105, both as to original acts of the federal officials and inaction and failure to act which was characterized and found to be participation and acquiescence in unlawful conduct by the State and municipal governments.

As to the first, I've really given you two, which is that the finding of the tribunal was, at the end of the day, that there was in fact a jurisdiction in the municipality in relation to construction permits, that the federal officials had not identified for the investor in an appropriate way so that the investment was predictable and transparent, the necessity to obtain a permit that was restricted to physical and engineering purposes.

And it, by attribution, was held liable for the municipal government's breach of a whole host of transparency-related values which was the complete absence of a system at all, the complete absence of any kind of record of municipal conduct in accordance with their law, the failure to adhere to their jurisdiction, their excess of

| 43 | jurisdiction and and, frankly, the chaos of the |
|----|---|
| 44 | situation within the municipal office. |
| 45 | And you can, if you wish to it's the |
| 46 | declaration of Carvajal who says not only is it a |
| 47 | bad thing at the municipality, but I went to the |
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State office that's supposed to have the registry
2
       of building permits within the State. There
3
       wasn't a single permit, not a single permit iss --
4
       on record that's supposed to be held by the State
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       officials.
6
          So -- and then I say for the four reasons
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       that I've just given that the finding under 105 of
8
       participation and acquiescence was also the other
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       basis of liability for saying the lot -- the
10
       federal officials failed to receive transparency.
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           Now, turning -- sorry.
12 THE COURT: Can I just ask you one --
13 MR. COWPER: Yes, of course.
14 THE COURT: -- question on the -- the latter part?
           I took your submissions yesterday to say
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       that -- that the municip -- or the tribunal's
       reliance on transparency only -- or was -- was
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18
       only related or was restricted to 1105 and did not
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       "infect," I think is the word used, the findings
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       vis-a-vis expropriation under 1110. Now, Mr. Foy
21
       has been taking a contrary opinion.
22 MR. COWPER: Yes, of course. Yeah.
23 THE COURT: But in giving me the answer you've just
24
       given me, you've referred me to paragraph 104.
25 MR. COWPER: Yes.
26 THE COURT: And you've made reference to the
       acquiescence of the State. And you've -- you've
27
28
       talked to me about the lack of transparency in
29
       that regard.
30
           But paragraph 104 comes under the section of
31
       the tribunal's decision dealing with
32
       expropriation, not a breach of 1105.
33 MR. COWPER: Yes. And if you -- if you go to 104 --
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       and I don't disagree with that. I -- I -- if you
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       turn to 104 which is in the expropriation section,
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       I accept that. What -- and I -- I thought I had
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       said this earlier, but I -- I say it here.
       There's no doubt that the first finding under 1110
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39
       carries with it a conclusion of unfair and
40
       inequitable treatment arising out of 1105.
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           What I've said is, though, that the -- at 104
42
       you'll see:
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| 43 | |
|----|--|
| 44 | "By permitting or tolerating the conduct |
| 45 | of Guadalcazar" |
| 46 | |
| 47 | Do you see that? |
| | |

"...in relation to Metalclad which the Tribunal has already held amounts to unfair and inequitable treatment breaching Article 1105 and by thus participating or acquiescing in the denial to Metalclad of the right to operate the landfill..."

What I was saying was in relation to the expropriation analysis, the tribunal does something additional to what it does under 1105, because it has additional findings in relation to what constituted an expropriation.

And in relation to that paragraph what they're focusing on is the federal government's attributed liability as it relates to expropriation for the -- what they held was essentially the permanent cessation of the operation of the facility by Guadalcazar.

Now, I say that's not infected. My friend says it's infected. Your Lordship will have to deal with whether under 1110 that finding, if there's any error in 1105, can remain. I say that it's quite a distinctive and additional finding than that under 1105.

If I led you to think that there was no connection, I certainly didn't mean to say that. There's clearly a connection as to the first finding between 1105 and the findings of -- in relation to that as it goes to 1110.

What I am -- putting it in another way, what I'm saying in particular is that if you look at my friend's argument, he says, well, the one infects the other. And I say that does not naturally flow at all, because expropriation is a separate conclusion flowing from particular findings which they make, including the finding in -- in 104.

And then of course I have the additional submission as it relates to the decree.

And let me say what I think the tribunal did with the same facts as it relates to expropriation, and they've done a number of

- things. But as it relates to the federal acts that they found, what they've said is the 43
- 44
- representations which are made which the company 45
- 46 relied upon in good faith, and those are the
- findings, that you didn't have to apply for a 47

permit, and that the local authority had no jurisdiction to either consider one or -- or refuse one, coupled with, as they find in 104, the participation and acquiescence in the subsequent shutdown or, if you will, frustration of operation by the local governments, constituted a measure by the federal government taken collectively which constitute -- which amounted to expropriation, both I think originally and by attribution under the finding of sub (a) of attribution of liability for the State government.

Now -- and of course when you turn to -- and I'll get this to you in a moment. But the decree stands entirely separate from the transparency analysis, because the decree is a finding that's separate and apart from everything else that happened. The State governor pronounced a decree which had the effect of barring forever the operation of the landfill. That's not a -- that's not a -- and I don't even hear my friend saying that's related in any way to a transparency concern. His answer to that is it's not a finding or they didn't have jurisdiction to make it because it was an amendment.

So that's my answer anyway. If we go to the next chapter then, if I've dealt with your short question, that was my long answer to your short question from last evening.

Now, with respect to -- I dealt with the Myers case. If you could turn to 173. Now, I've already dealt, and I did particularly last Friday, with the argument my friend deals with here, which is this was merely an inter -- an impairment or a -- a slight interference with the value of the property because they could have operated a dump. I just remind you of what I said to you last Friday. I say that's an argument which does not succeed on the findings, that the tribunal properly within its jurisdiction, and indeed properly on the facts, found that the State and municipal government were absolutely prepared to ensure that this facility which was authorized and

| 43 | built and and ready to be operated would never |
|----------------|--|
| 14 | be operated. |
| 1 5 | If I could go to and and when I get to |
| 46 | Biloune, what I I was interested in my friend's |
| 17 | comment about the before and after picture which |
| | |

was, well, Metalclad started with a partially permitted site and ended with a partially permitted site. And I said on Friday the difference was that they actually built a landfill in between those time periods, and there was a finding that they had a fully permitted site.

But aside from that, the central point to be made is when he goes to Biloune, Biloune is a case where there was a partially built -- or a project which started. They had a building on it. They started to build the -- the resort on the site. And then as a result of the absence of a building permit, it was partially demolished.

So you could say on those facts, well, at the beginning and the end Mr. Biloune, who was deported, had the same thing. He had a site in downtown Accra, or however that city is pronounced, in which he had a right to apply for a permit. He'd never obtained a permit. He had a legal right to try to build something, and he was deprived of nothing. And of course the very learned tribunal in that case found that there was an expropriation, and I'm going to come to that case before I complete my submissions.

The next point I make at page 173, the bottom and following, is the conception of expropriation. I -- I say that the tribunal in this case did not apply any extraordinary meaning given to expropriation. And the key issue is their findings of fact in relation to what occurred here, which is a -- a collective view of the totality of the circumstances as they viewed them.

It isn't the case that there was any compelling argument or indeed today any compelling argument that this was a minor interference with property rights. And indeed let me say this, and that is: The troubling issues which arises in international law, which is a legitimate one, is the -- is the threshold between the exercise of lawful authority which interferes with the value of property and the obligation to compensate when

| 43 | you've determined not to allow someone to make use |
|----|--|
| 44 | of their property. |
| 45 | Now, in this case I say we're very clearly |
| 46 | far on this side of the line. And I do not say |
| 47 | that the tribunal said that this is improper or |
| | |

gives rise to any compensation.

And on the facts of this case, it wasn't a difficult choice. There are lots of cases where it might be difficult, because if you take this as an example, assume that the hazardous waste facility was built, and that all the membranes are in place, and there's a regulatory change requiring a totally different membrane to be built -- to be put in place in such facilities and all the old membranes have to be taken out and put back in, and the company says that destroys our economics and we just can't operate profitably on that basis, that's the classic case where the regulatory initiative which affects an investor is an interference with the value of the property, but it's not a taking.

Now, in the situation in this case where the case had everything to do with whether or not this facility which was properly built and ready to go could ever be operated, you don't need to trouble yourself in my submission with whether or not there was a basis on which to find expropriation under the proper test in international law.

Now -- and -- and put another way, there is no basis to say that on a fair reading of the award they found an expropriation simply because an interference with the economic benefit of the project.

At page 174 I note that Amco and Indonesia, I am told, was an award which was quoted at 548 but it subsequently annulled. And if you read that quote, I -- I say it says nothing more in its context than referring to the fact that a taking has to be attributable to the State under rules of State responsibility. And if you make a note of that, even my friend's quote, I think, is really directed to that issue and not directed to the issue that it's cited for.

Now, secondly, with respect to, if you will, incidental effects, this isn't an incidental effect case. It's a case in which an organ of the Mexican government determined to stop the

- operation of this facility. And there was lots of not only evidence of acts to that fact, but 43
- 44
- there's evidence of political determination. 45
- There's a whole -- a number (sic) of evidence 46
- which justify that conclusion. 47

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At the bottom, with respect to the reference to Myers, I say indeed that the Myers analysis, which my friend relies upon, is in -- is indeed fully consistent with the analysis of the tribunal here, because in Myers there was a more difficult issue with respect to expropriation which was the permanence of the measure.

And you'll recall that Myers was the export ban case. And if Your Lordship will recall, that export ban was temporary. So undertaking analysis, it has to essentially be a permanent or a severe taking. In other words, the -- the State has to say we're not going to let you do that. They can't say we're not going to let you do it for a month or for a year. It has to have an element of permanence to it.

In Myers the ban was fixed in time, and lifted. And so in terms of the expropriation analysis, that doesn't affect the 1105 analysis, which doesn't require permanence. It does affect the expropriation analysis. And I say there's nothing inconsistent with the tribunal's analysis of expropriation in this case and in the Myers

Now, with respect to the question of direct and indirect taking, there is in my submission no doubt in international law, even on the authorities my friend cites, that it need not be an express expropriation to constitute a taking under international law. And it need not be a transfer of title. In other words, the State doesn't have to affect a transfer of title from the investor to itself, and it doesn't have to say I'm expropriating your property in order to attract liability under Article 1110. And I make that point at 524, going over to page 176. 37 THE COURT: Do -- do you say that the phrase "tantamount to expropriation" is what brings in the tribunal's ability to deal with indirect expropriation?

41 MR, COWPER: I haven't read all of the authorities. I 42 think on some of the authorities, even without

- using "tantamount," the international lawyers have said expropriation includes acts which are in 43
- 44
- effect expropriations. But tantamount removes any doubt. Anything that is equivalent to 45
- 46
- expropriation --47

1 THE COURT: Um-hum.

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2 MR. COWPER: -- allows expropriation.
          But I think the word "expropriation" as
4
      properly understood includes with it acts which
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      are in effect expropriations whether or not
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      they're admitted expropriations.
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          Some of the authorities refer to them as
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      constructive. I think it's quite clear on the
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      authorities that there are many cases in which the
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       word "tantamount" is not used, and this analysis
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       is conducted; that is, just the word
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       "expropriation" itself carries with it the
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       concept that it's ought not -- it doesn't have to
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       be an admitted expropriation.
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          And of course the -- the obvious virtue of
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       that principle is that we're talking about
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       States. And the State can effect an
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       expropriation, intend to carry out an
19
       expropriation, without admitting it. It can do it
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       in a variety of ways.
21 THE COURT: The reason I ask that question is --
22 MR. COWPER: Um-hum.
23 THE COURT: -- because quite apart from the
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       explanation you just gave --
25 MR. COWPER: Yes.
26 THE COURT: -- if you look at 1110, it actually uses
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       the word "indirectly." It says may directly --
       any party may directly --
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29 MR. COWPER: Yes.
30 THE COURT: -- or indirectly --
31 MR. COWPER: Right.
32 THE COURT: -- actually. Okay. So I've -- the
       question that enters my mind then is: What is the
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34
       phrase "tantamount to nationalization,
35
       expropriation" attempting to accomplish?
36 MR. COWPER: Well, I -- I don't know if it's belts and
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       suspenders here.
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          The -- the argument below was that people
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       said equivalence was the -- "tantamount" meant
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       equivalence. And that may be another way of -- of
       dealing with something which is in effect an
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42
       expropriation but not an admitted expropriation.
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| 43 | Directly or indirectly is another way of getting |
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| 44 | at the potential risk that a State effects an |
| 45 | expropriation which it doesn't admit and it |
| 46 | doesn't do so directly. |
| 47 | So I think that they they may come at |
| | |

1 both -- at the same situation from different 2 normative directions, if you will. 3 THE COURT: Um-hum. 4 MR. COWPER: What -- what I say in relation to that is 5 that my friend cannot sustain the proposition that 6 there has to be a transfer of title, that there 7 has to be a direct and admitted expropriation. 8 And that's what I say, with respect, on these 9 facts you would have to find in order to erect any 10 error in relation to the tribunal's treatment of 11 the concept of expropriation. 12 If you're at 176 at 527, I've quoted an ICSID 13 award at the bottom, and it says:

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"A deprivation or taking...may occur under international law through interference by a State in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of its benefits, even where title to the property is not affected... [Compensation is] warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral."

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And in relation to investing, I -- I just make a narrow point which is of course that any project will involve starting with a purchase in the host country of a right in relation to a site. So if we take ourselves completely out of this and say that you would like to operate a -- a rain forest resort in the middle of a rain forest somewhere in Suriname as an example, and you go to the country, and you purchase even just a lease or some right to occupy a portion of the rain forest and to build a resort, if you apply my friend's analysis, if the -- if the local State said you can't operate the resort anymore, but you can still keep the -- the licence, you can still be there, you just can't operate the resort, has there been a taking?

Well, for the purpose of investors, what

| 43 | they're interested in and what the guarantee is, |
|----|--|
| 44 | is it's the guarantee that your investment will be |
| 45 | protected. And that's why in all of these cases |
| 46 | they're looking at it as a project analysis. |
| 47 | And in this case, coming back to our case, |

that's precisely what the tribunal said. The sole basis for the investment was the construction and operation of a hazardous waste facility, not a place for rare cactus, not a dump, not a municipal dump, but a hazardous waste facility.

I go to 177 and I quote Professor Higgins, where she talks in similar terms. And she makes it clear that it's -- it's intensely a factual determination.

"...interferences which significantly deprive the owner of the use of his property amount to a taking of that property."

And then I go in the middle of page 177 to my next point, which is that the cumulative effect principle, which is can you take into account as a tribunal not only an isolated act, but can you take into account the totality of circumstances? And I say that's clearly permissible. It's -- it's permitted by Chapter 11. And it's a well-acknowledged principle of international law that constructive takings are very often the product of combinations of acts by government, and sometimes combinations of acts by different levels of government within the same State, but they end up with the net effect of a taking.

And on that point, Your Lordship's reference to directly or indirectly might be opposite, that there might be a -- a useful application of that language to a circumstance where there is by way of cumulative effect an indirect taking. And I've given you a number of references at the bottom of 177.

If you go to 178, I'd like to quote from our own Yves Fortier who, in an unanimous award, pronounced on this issue in the following terms:

"It's clear, however, that a measure or series of measures can still eventually amount to a taking, though the individual

| 43 | steps in the process do not formally |
|----------------|---|
| 14 | purport to amount to a taking or to a |
| 1 5 | transfer of title. What has to be |
| 46 | identified is the extent to which the |
| 17 | measures taken have deprived the owner of |
| | |

the normal control of his property... There
is ample authority for the proposition that
a property has been expropriated when the
effect of measures taken by the state has
been to deprive the owner of title,
possession or access to the benefit and
economic use of his property."

And -- and I'm going to go to tantamount in a moment, but I do say this, and that is in relation to the general consideration Your Lordship has; I'm dealing with error here. But I do remind you that I stand on the proposition that the tribunal's clearly within its jurisdiction in relation to this type of consideration, because it's an intensely factual question.

Even in international law, these standards aren't pure standards of law. It's not a pure question of law. It's a question of mixed fact and law within the international law standard, because one has to determine -- if you've just read this, you have to identify the extent to which the measures taken have deprived the owner of the right to property. It involves both legal and factual elements.

Now, turning to the next point with respect to tantamount, I say at 532 that it was common ground below that "tantamount to" denoted equivalence. And the tribunal I say properly referred to and saw as appropriately relevant the Biloune case.

And I'd like to go to Biloune. And I can do that before or after the break.

34 THE COURT: You may as well do it now.

35 MR. COWPER: Okay. If you go to the Biloune case, 36 which is in our -- I'm sorry, the petitioner's 37 authorities, tab 12.

> And my friend I think quite fairly noted that Biloune was an authority relied upon by the tribunal. It's an authority in relation to expropriation. And he quite fairly tried -- or sought to distinguish it, and in my submission the

| 13 | petitioner cannot successfully do so. |
|----------------|---|
| 14 | For the for my purposes I simply say the |
| 1 5 | tribunal used it as persuasive, and it is |
| 16 | persuasive. The tribunal referred to it as having |
| 17 | a number of common features. And I say beyond |

doubt it has a large number of common features.

The only, if I will say, signal call of my friends is that this case involves a deportation. If you take that into account, and you look at all the other facts, virtually every other fact in this case sounds in Biloune.

You have assurances that a municipal permit is not required, reliance on those assurances. You have construction. You have arbitrary acts by a municipal authority. You have a -- a stop work order which is enforced by a partial demolition. You have a denial by the government that it knew it was going on.

In this case, as I say, in not dissimilar terms in a situation where the building was in the city right next to a facility of the government, as in adjoining the facility of the government, the government maintained it didn't know construction was going on in -- before the tribunal. And the tribunal found that to be unsustainable. I say similarly the tribunal in this case made a similar finding. So you had that position.

You had, similarly with respect to the issue of customary international law, the liability in this case, although it arose from an agreement, was determined in accordance with customary international law. Judge Schwebel clearly applied customary international law and the concept of expropriation to the facts of an investment which was made which was frustrated by the circumstances arising from a dispute between the investor and the permitting authority and a change in politics.

There was clearly a change in the country which altered the political will to allow the investment to go forward and was backed up by the denial of the -- of the -- of the permit, which was never granted in this case, the stop worker -- order and partial demolition and then the deportation.

So with respect to common features within the

| 43 | facts of the award itself, those are a large |
|----|---|
| 44 | number of common features. |
| 45 | And I I commend you to deal with the issue |
| 46 | and the authority at 207. And I'd just ask you to |
| 47 | flag, if you would, that Part 6 under |
| | |

"applicable law" makes it clear at the bottom that although it was an agreement, neither of the parties led evidence with respect to the law of Ghana, and they applied customary principles of international law to the -- to the consideration.

And then Part 7, which is the tribunal's decisions, you'll see that they find that there was a -- a de facto partnership, that there was substantial work on the premises when work was interrupted.

If you go to 208, at the top of that paragraph, the -- the -- the investor's company began work before a building permit was applied for. And you'll see in the second sentence on the top paragraph it appears that:

"GDTC considered the granting of a building permit to be a formality which would eventually be discharged but which was not necessary prior to starting work. Indeed, the fact that the original pond court structure was constructed without a permit ever having been applied for or issued tends to indicate that a permit was not indispensable."

Of course, in our case we have a municipality that had never granted a building permit in its history.

And you'll see, following down, the stop work order in the next paragraph is issued one day before the deadline. The local -- the authority of ACC ordered demolition to begin and part of the new structure was destroyed.

Then in the middle you'll see Mr. Biloune brought all these events to GIC's attention, was told, he maintains, that his problems did not arise out of a lack of a building permit, but rather were political.

And let me say at the end of the story that the tribunal had before it that was precisely the case here, and there's evidence of that. There is evidence that in the negotiations with the State and the municipality, they made it clear the building permit was not the problem. The building permit was not the problem. The political question of benefits to the State and the

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municipality being provided Metalclad was the issue. That was the problem.

And I think it's Mr. Carvajal's dec -declaration that says that's per -- that's what we were told in the negotiations. There was no doubt about it, if we can solve these other problems. the building permit will be issued without any difficulty.

At the bottom, the permit was never granted. Going over to 209 at the top, you'll see at 209 the change in government. It appears that by mid-November 1987 --

Do you have 209? 14 THE COURT: Um-hum. 15 MR. COWPER: Thank you.

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"...Mr. Biloune concluded that the government was not willing to permit the project to proceed. He accordingly placed the project in the hands of administrators and the workforce was discharged."

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Well, you know, Mr. Biloune is in the same position. He's in a -- a politically difficult position. He has to decide am I going to try to press things, try to get the permit, try to move forward, or are my political problems insuperable.

He's deported. He still owns the property. But the international lawyers on this tribunal found that the aggregate combination of acts by the governments constituted a taking of the property giving rise to a -- a right to compensation.

If you go to the next paragraph, it's interesting that this tribunal as well did not make findings about the motivations for the actions. The -- the facts gave rise, as I say in this case, to numerous speculations about the underlying political motivations of the political actors. The tribunal says in the second sentence:

41 42

| 43 | "The motivations for the actions and |
|----|---|
| 44 | omissions" |
| 45 | |
| 46 | And you may want to circle "omissions." |
| 47 | |
| | |

"...of Ghanaian governmental authorities are not clear. But the tribunal need not establish those motivations to come to a conclusion in this case."

So they, just as in the present case, were able to conclude international liability in relation to expropriation without a finding of motivation or intent on the part of the governmental authorities.

Now -- and I don't want to trouble you much longer with this, but with respect to the defences in the case, the defences in this case were quite similar. The respondent, that is the governmental authority, said we didn't know the building was going on and -- otherwise we would have acted to require a building permit, that his problems in relation to the deportation had nothing at all to do with the project. They're completely unrelated.

The fact that the building permit was refused, the partial demolition happened. And then shortly thereafter he's asked to turn up and file his statement. And then shortly thereafter he's arrested. And shortly thereafter he's shown the way out of the country. Those are totally unrelated. They're coincidental. We ask you to find that the -- the latter are not related to the former. And the tribunal said that strains credibility, as the tribunal in this case held in relation to the decree, in my submission.

And they do so over at 210 in the finding with respect to the ignorance in this case. The authorities in Accra alleged to be -- and if you're -- the second paragraph up from the -- Part 8, it says:

 "In particular, the tribunal does not find credible that the authorities in Accra were ignorant of the existence for well over a year of construction activity in one of the most prominent sites in the city and one

| which adjoins the seat of the government of |
|--|
| Ghana." |
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| And I say a similar finding was made in this |
| case. |
| |

1 So I say purely and simply in a case which 2 was pronounced by a highly distinguished arbitral 3 tribunal, including Judge Schwebel from the 4 International Court of Justice, they had no 5 trouble finding an expropriation on similar 6 circumstances, an expropriation applying to the 7 principles of customary international law on facts 8 which I think the tribunal properly characterized 9 as remarkably alike. 10 There's two other points before I leave it 11 though, which are of some interest. The same 12 questions procedurally arose in relation to 13 damages and the quantification of damages that my 14 friend Mr. Thomas put before you in this case, 15 because the respondents argued that the quantification of damages were impaired by what 16 17 they characterized as inaccurate and improper 18 accounting and the relationship of some of the 19 expenses claimed to the project. And you may wish 20 just to make a note of 214, the second full 21 paragraph. 22 THE COURT: I don't have a 214. 23 MR. COWPER: I'm sorry? 24 THE COURT: I don't have a 214. Mine ends at 211. 25 MR. COWPER: I -- did my friend not put the full judgment in? There's -- there's two awards in the 26 27 report. One is on liability and the other is on 28 damages. 29 THE COURT: Yes. Mine stops just after the award on 30 damages begins. 31 MR. COWPER: Oh, my friend says he only put liability 32 in. I'm sorry, I didn't know that. We'll get you 33 a full copy, but maybe for that reason, if you 34 could just make a note to -- to read 214. 35 The only point I'm making is that remarkably 36 the similarity in this case not only extends to 37 what happened and the facts which were confronted 38 by the tribunal, but also some of the procedural 39 elements of the case, because when the investor 40 in -- in this case came forward, part of the 41 response was hold it a sec, a whole bunch of those

expenses weren't attributable to the project. You

took money out. You took inventory out. They're inaccurate or false. And that issue was faced and confronted by the tribunal. And they concluded an award of damages based on value, based on investment, just as this tribunal did, the -- the

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      monies invested in the project on the whole of the
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      evidence. And they found some -- some support in
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      auditors' and accountants' work in this case, as
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      in the present appeal.
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          And finally, there was also in this case, and
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      it's not totally clear the basis of it, an
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      application to the tribunal to set aside its own
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      award on the basis of false representations by the
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      claimant made to the tribunal in the first
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       occasion, which was dismissed by the tribunal
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       itself.
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          So the parallels between this case and
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       Biloune far from being that obvious go in my
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       respectful submission from the beginning to the
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       end of the alphabet.
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          If that's an appropriate time to take the
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       morning break.
18 THE COURT: Yes. We'll take the morning break.
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    THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
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       adjourned for the morning recess.
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       (MORNING RECESS)
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       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:10 A.M.)
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       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:29 A.M.)
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26 THE COURT: You're in the home stretch of your
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       submission, Mr. Cowper.
28 MR. COWPER: Thank you, My Lord. The -- I'll -- I'll
       endeavour not to stumble and fall before the end.
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          I'd like to return, if I may, because
       Mr. Greenberg pointed out that I didn't read my
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       note carefully enough when I responded to your
       question on infection, and there is a point that I
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       failed to make, and that is -- if you -- or if I
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       made it, I made it, in his words, "ineptly."
36 THE COURT: That was brave of him.
37 MR. COWPER: The section which starts at 104 as it
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       relates to the tribunal's determination of whether
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       there was an expropriation in relation to those
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       facts needs to be and must be read in coordination
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       with the following paragraphs which are 105, 106
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       and 107.
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| 13 | And what I was endeavouring to say was that |
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| 14 | the fundamental foundation for the finding of |
| 1 5 | expropriation in relation to municipal conduct as |
| 46 | it relates to expropriation was the absence of |
| 17 | lawful authority, not a confusion about who had |

what authority.

42 MR. COWPER: I apologize.

2 What they found was the denial of the permit 3 was without authority. And you'll see in those 4 sections they place emphasis that it's founded on 5 the absence that is the unlawful conduct, not the 6 confusing conduct, but the unlawful conduct of the 7 municipality. 8 And so in relation to my friend's assertion 9 that the observations respecting transparency 10 infected 1110, what I say is that those 11 observations which he criticizes relate to 12 confusion, lack of clarity, et cetera. And as I 13 endeavoured to say earlier in the week, when you 14 come to their finding in respect of the 15 municipality, clarity's not an issue, because they have, as held by the tribunal, exceeded their 16 17 lawful authority. 18 With respect to the references in those 19 paragraphs respecting process, because there are 20 references of process, those sound in the due 21 process required by 1110. In other words, 22 you'll -- there are references to the finding that 23 the municipality did not carry out due process in 24 relation to its conduct. And you'll recall that 25 in 1110 it's not only liability for -- for 26 expropriation. The way 1110 is framed indeed is 27 that a State must follow due process in relation 28 to any State conduct which will amount to and 29 result in the taking. 30 So turning back to what's left of my 31 remaining Chapter, I have dealt with the concept 32 of measure from 179 and following. 33 THE COURT: Would you mind just giving me the -- the 34 tab reference in paragraph 533? 35 MR. COWPER: I'm sorry. I didn't -- I was --36 THE COURT: Paragraph 533, there's a tab reference 37 that's left blank. Do you know what that is in 38 reference to? 39 MR. COWPER: Oh, I don't. I noticed that last night. 40 Tab 74. 41 THE COURT: 74.

| 43 | The coming back to Part 7, which is at |
|----|--|
| 44 | paragraph 534, there are really two different |
| 45 | questions here. And let me just say this, and |
| 46 | that is: It's important to recognize that in |
| 47 | relation to this case and other similar cases that |

the question of what's a measure in respect of a federal State requires a very careful understanding of the principle of attribution in international law.

And so any fair determination of what's a measure has to take into account that measures may be taken by any or a combination of the organs of government in the federal State which may be taken either alone or together to constitute an act by the sovereign country for which the sovereign country is responsible in international law.

And I give you the -- the quote in Loewen at the bottom and the top of page 180. Loewen was on any account, I think, an extreme case in the sense that, as I indicated earlier in the week, the -the threshold question there was to what extent can judicial conduct be reviewed under Chapter 11. if at all? And so they have to go not to deal with the normal things we would think about, which is a municipality's authority to shut down a State, or a State's authority to issue an official decree preserving rare cactus, or the federal government's authority to permit a hazardous waste site. Those things are frankly within the very narrowest concept of State measures, either the action in relation to such matters or the denial in relation of those measures, are at the heart of what we think of as State measures within the concept of international law.

The second point my friend raises is really in relation to how it is that inaction can be a basis for liability, and he makes that point at 586.

And I simply say that international responsibility, as I say at 538, is frequently, if not very frequently, found on the acts of omission by a State rather than the acts of commission. And there's no principle of international law that a State must take positive action before it can have attracted to it international liability. And I quote from Smith at 538 to that effect. And in fact, as you'll see at the bottom:

| 43 | |
|----|---|
| 44 | "it has been noted that 'the cases in |
| 45 | which the international responsibility |
| 46 | has been invoked on the basis of an |
| 47 | omission are perhaps more numerous than |

those based on an action taken by a State."

Now, I -- I simply say that on any fair reading of Chapter 11 measures intended by NAFTA to embrace a broad variety of State conduct or -- or measures, and that what was at stake in this case falls within the narrowest possible meaning of "State measures."

The point I make in paragraph 8 is -- is really related to my reply I made concerning the submission my friend made concerning interference with economic benefit, and I won't repeat that here, although I give you another international authority at 543.

And I then turn to the ninth point which deals with the municipal conduct. And if you go over to page 183, I deal with the ELSI case.

And the -- there are really two observations to be made on ELSI. The governmental act in that case complained of was in fact an order of requisition. The outcome, and you'll recall that this was a case involving an act which was held to be unlawful by the local authorities but held not to be a breach of international law.

And there are two or three observations about that. The first one, as I said on Tuesday, there is no precise equation between the lawfulness of domestic action and unlawfulness under international standards. Something can be unlawful in domestic law and lawful internationally, or lawful by domestic law and unlawful by international standards, and the other two mathematical possibilities also exist.

And the reason for that is because -- not only because they're different measures, but because by the very nature of international law it imposes on States liabilities which are differently expressed and differently stated but which are relevant to the lawfulness of the State's conduct by domestic law.

So taking it in its logical order, if the

domestic law constitutes a violation of international law when the State takes measures pursuant to it, the most obvious one being expropriation without compensation in this context, the fact that it's a lawful expropriation

by the law of British Columbia or the law of Mexico or otherwise is totally beside the point in determining whether it constitutes a compensable expropriation under international law.

Equally, however, in determining, I say, expropriation, if for example there was an unlawful act of an -- of a -- of an organ of government which constitutes essentially the denial of the uses of property by an investor, that is a factor, and it is a proper foundation for a finding that supports a finding of ex -- expropriation at international law. It's not a necessary finding, but it's a supportive.

In ELSI they found, if I read the case properly, that on the facts of that case the cause of the requisition, and you can go -- just make a note at page 71, was not the improper motives of the State in issuing the requisition, but the fault of the company in being, as I think they said, inevitably bankrupt or hurdling into inevitable bankruptcy. So although the authority said there's no breach of international law, a very important point was that the company was on the facts found to be hurdling into bankruptcy in any event, and not as a result of the fault of the State or any State measure.

Now, that's my first ground of distinction, and I think it's a fairly solid one.

I should also say that, if you will, the theology expressed in ELSI that the fact that it was unlawful in international law ought not to be taken heavily into account has been seriously criticized notwithstanding the unusual facts of the bankruptcy at the door, and at 547 I quote the late F.A. Mann saying:

"[T]here is no doubt as a matter of Italian law, the requisition was unlawful. As a matter of pure logic, it is plain that illegality under a municipal system of law does not necessarily entail illegality in international law. Yet, as a matter of

| practical justice, it does cause discomfort |
|---|
| to realize thattreaties designedto |
| protect foreign investment should fail to |
| condemn acts whichthe legal systems of |
| civilized nations consider illegal [T]he |
| |

standards of international law and in,
particular [sic], of treaties designed to
protect foreign investors are not usually
lower than those of municipal legal
systems."

And then Thirlway commented on that case as unusual. And in the quote at 548, he says:

"The unusual aspect of this finding is that it operates in favour of the State whose national law is in question. The principle of the supremacy of international law has developed in the form of findings that a State cannot rely on its own national law as a defence on the international level. In the ELSI case, on the other hand, the fact that the domestic courts censured an action affecting foreign nationals was not regarded as sufficient to support a claim of breach of treaty."

 And I think logically both of those commentators might have arrived at precisely the same outcome for the investor in the ELSI case but by a different route. They would have found there was a breach of international law but no damages, because the company had no value to be compensated for on the international level, and the tribunal did not go there. They said there isn't even a breach of international law.

So I say it's an unusual case. It's not a case that had any clear or obvious application to the present case, and most clearly does not support a finding that the tribunal erred in law in finding an expropriation on the facts before them.

Now, that's -- those are my submissions in relation to the -- where are my notes -- in relation to Chapter 8.

I have to deal with a number of other matters though.

| 43 | Could you make a note in relation to the |
|----|--|
| 44 | my friend in in oral argument, I don't think |
| 45 | we've dealt with this at all in our in our |
| 46 | written submissions, at least I couldn't find them |
| 47 | last night suggested in oral argument to you |

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1
       and it may be in his -- in his materials -- that
2
       there was a June 1994 stop work order. And I
3
       don't know precisely how he characterized it, but
4
       that's how I understood his submission to be.
5
          In my submission there was no such beast, and
6
       the evidence made that clear. And I'll just give
7
      you two references. There are more, but the --
8
       the document which I don't think my friend took
      you to is Exhibit 16-1. And we've put it in the
9
10
       back of tab 21 of our extracts. The two
11
       references I give you, the witnesses are
12
       Mr. Tuckett at tab 25 of our extracts pages 3 to
13
       5, and again Mr. Miranda at pages 2 to 3.
14
           And if I may say all that -- what -- what
15
       happens is that in June of '94 there's some people
16
       on the highway. They go out and talk to them.
17
       The people on the highway threaten them. They go
18
       back into the facility. And then subsequently
19
       these people create this handwritten document
20
       which is nicely typed and -- and translated, but
21
       effectively purports to be minutes of a meeting
22
       including a resolution by the people on the
23
       highway that they were going to stop the
24
       operations of the facility. And the officials of
25
       Metalclad did not understand, interpret or
26
       otherwise consider that to be a stop work order in
27
       any fashion. It was part of the general political
28
       controversy relating to the facility.
29
           Now, with respect to the next -- if I can go
30
       to the next point, which is my friend's -- well,
31
       perhaps I could deal with it this way: Let me --
32
       let me go to tab 9. And then I can deal with it
33
       another way. I have to deal with the issue of
34
       questions of law, and I -- would Your Lordship
35
       like me to deal with that before I come to the --
36
       my Part 9 or --
37 THE COURT: Makes no difference to me.
38 MR. COWPER: Makes no difference to you? Okay. With
       res -- let me deal with the questions of law that
39
40
       my friend handed up.
41
           And do you have that? It was a supplemental
42
       submissions.
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- 43 THE COURT: Yes.
- 44 MR. COWPER: That makes one of us. Sorry. Thank
- 45 you.
- The -- in my friend's supplemental argument,
- and you do need to have it in front of you, my

32

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41 42

1 friend identifies, in response to my concerns on 2 page 1, questions of law under Section 31 of the 3 Commercial Arbitration Act under paragraph 2. 4 Under sub (a) he characterizes it as: 5 6 "The tribunal erred in law by failing to 7 deal with all questions addressed to it, in 8 particular questions relating to 9 Metalclad's bona fides and improper acts 10 contrary to Article 53 of the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules 11 12 which the tribunal was bound to apply." 13 14 And sub (b) under the heading "Unreasonable 15 Findings" --16 MR. FOY: What page are you on? Sorry. 17 MR. COWPER: The first page. 18 MR. FOY: Thank you. 19 MR. COWPER: 20 "The tribunal erred in law by making 21 findings upon a view of the facts that 22 could not reasonably be entertained in 23 particular by failing to have regard to relevant evidence." 24 25 26 Now, that embraces in the two propositions a 27 substantial number of subsidiary arguments which 28 were made and purported to be in relation to 29 either issues of fact or issues of jurisdiction or

with why I say that in a moment.

My friend has asserted -- in support of that he's handed to me the decision of Your Lordship in Marathon Realty which refers to a decision by Madam Justice Southin in Crown Forest Products, and I'll deal with that in a moment.

issues of law. And I simply say this, and that

is: In relation to -- and I'm going to take them in reverse order -- unreasonable findings, that

that is not a statement of an error in law, that a

I've submitted earlier, that the tribunal made

statement of an error in law would have to sav. as

findings in the absence of evidence, and I'll deal

| 43 | But as I indicated in my argument and as I |
|----|--|
| 44 | submitted to you, in this context it's my |
| 45 | submission that the question of law as it arises |
| 46 | out of a finding of fact must be and fall |
| 47 | within the conventional test which is a finding of |

 fact in the absence of evidence as opposed to a weighing of evidence.

And there are different statutory contexts in which judges have found that it may be capable of being intervened in a judicial administrative context where no reasonable person could find such facts or could not reasonably enter -- be entertained. I say that's not the right formulation for this context.

Secondly, I say that with respect to what represents a -- a constellation of attacks on the findings of fact of the tribunal, that when we're dealing with an application, on the assumption that there's no jurisdiction except as it relates to questions of law, that the petitioner has to go to the level of detail of saying these elements of evidence or these findings were made without evidence and constituted material errors which justify setting aside the award.

And the -- the -- I -- I frankly am not that much further ahead than I was on the delivery of my friend's argument in that he has comprehensively identified all of his attacks on unreasonable findings as justifying this collective error of law. And I say properly speaking my friend ought to have identified, and I -- I -- I thought I had said this, clear questions of law, and that when it relates to a question of fact, he ought to state it in clear terms so that the Court can, in assessing whether it's a question of law, firstly know what the petitioner proposes the question of law to be and what it relates to, so that it can not only assess whether it's a question of law, but its materiality and relevance to the other issues in the case.

Mr. Greenberg's addressed Article 53, and I won't supplement his submissions with respect to that.

Now, with respect to -- I've already conceded, without having my friend's point, that in relation to some of the threshold questions

under the commercial act, these are clearly
matters of moment, if you will. They're matters
of substance, that there are questions of law
which I've conceded exist on which you could say
that the threshold test that is of importance to

 the parties, questions of law that are of importance to the parties and of significance.

In my submission none of the questions which relate to the findings of fact fit within that rubric. None of them properly can be elevated into questions of law which justify the Court entertaining leave to appeal on them. None of the questions relating to the reasons can be so elevated.

With respect to the issues of law which I've accepted could arise, in my submission they are questions of law relating to the interpretation of the treaty and international law, and that it's important how my friend characterizes them because, depending on that characterization, the Court has to consider the questions of discretion and propriety, if you will -- not propriety in any proper sense, but the -- the suitability -- that's the word I'm reaching for -- the suitability of granting leave to appeal to a domestic court for their consideration. And so, for example, if the question of law is did the tribunal properly interpret the principles of customary international law as they relate to expropriation, I say the Court has to consider as a threshold whether that's an appropriate question of law, assuming, as I've said, it's clearly a question of law on which a domestic court should grant leave to appeal.

And that's a factor not only in granting leave to appeal, but in considering whether to remit in the event that that is a measure which the Court wishes to consider, because remission is a remedy available in the event that intervention is warranted under either act.

If on the other hand the question of law is stated as is the decree, capable of being and constituting a taking in international law, that's a different question of law with a different character and one which in my submission deserves far less attention and far less of a case for granting leave to appeal, because it's a far

| 13 | narrower and fact-dependent question which only | |
|----|--|--|
| 14 | arises between these parties to this dispute. | |
| 15 | It's not of relevance to the parties | |
| 16 | generally in Chapter 11. It's not of interest to | |
| 17 | the international law community. And so to | |

consider granting leave to that question of law constitutes -- considering of granting of a -- a leave to a very narrow issue of international law which is not only fact-dependent, but only arises between these parties.

There's no quest -- nobody else is complaining about the decree. And indeed, on my reading of the review, there's only one -- only one person who is intended to be affected by the decree.

But what I say is my friend hasn't, with respect -- and I -- and I have tried to say it's important to identify the questions of law on which the Court needs to identify leave, not only for the purposes of fairness to Metalclad which is responding to a proceeding which has been conflated for the benefit of both parties, but for the -- in fairness to Metalclad. As I indicated at the very beginning, I was concerned about the definition of questions of law. And I say with respect to my friend, I am not further along on that process substantially than I was at the beginning.

Being that as it may, and I appreciate the Court -- and my client, I can tell, you appreciates the Court making itself available in the conflated hearing and making all of this time available. I simply leave this point to say this. and that is: When Your Lordship comes to this point, if Your Lordship does, and that is if you find that the commercial act has application and you come to consider whether or not there are questions of law, then I would ask you to go through the process I've just identified and to say -- and ask yourself the question: What is the question of law which arises? And does that question of law deserve being granted leave to appeal having regard to the nature of the question and the Court's ability to comfortably address and answer the question and the significance to the public generally? Because not all these questions concern everybody. And my friend's submission was

| 13 | everybody's waiting for this, but that's not true |
|----|---|
| 14 | of all of these questions. |
| 15 | And then finally you have to consider whether |
| 16 | the questions of law which are identified are |
| 17 | taken collectively, because there's a there's a |
| | |

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1
      significant number of them at least, would, if
2
      leave to appeal has been granted and if found to
3
      be in error, justify setting aside the award.
4
          With respect to -- that's my submission with
5
      respect to the questions of law except as it
6
      relates to the test. And on that I will simply
7
      rely to my -- to my friend's cases, so I don't
8
      need to seek leave to serve reply.
9
          Did -- did you give His Lordship the Marathon
10
       case?
11 MR. FOY: It's in the materials.
12 MR. COWPER: Oh, I'm sorry.
          If you could turn -- I -- I understand my
13
14
       friend's relying for his statement of the test as
15
       it relates to evidence on Your Lordship's judgment
16
       in Marathon, which is at tab --
17 MR. ALVAREZ: 36.
18 MR. COWPER: -- 36 --
19 MR. ALVAREZ: In the petitioner's authorities.
20 MR. COWPER: -- of the petitioner's authorities.
21
          And do we have --
22
          And -- and effectively it's -- it's
23
       Your Lordship's statement at page 5, paragraph
24
       14. And I've had occasion to read not only
25
       Your Lordship's judgment but also the referred
26
       judgment in Crown Forest Industries.
27 THE COURT: Um-hum.
28 MR. COWPER: And this is a judgment Your Lordship
29
       composed some time ago, I think it was six or
       seven years ago. But you'll see that in paragraph
30
31
       14 you say:
32
33
          "The appeal of an arbitration award is
34
          limited to questions of law. Counsel for
35
          the tenant relied upon the following scope
36
          of questions of law established for
37
          assessment appeal cases. See Crown Forest
          Industries v. Assessor of Area 6, Courtenay
38
          Southin..."
39
40
          As she then -- Southin J. as she then was:
41
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"1. The arbitrator misinterpreted or misapplied legislation.
2. The arbitrator misapplied principles of general law.
4. The arbitrator acted without any

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1
          evidence or upon a view of the facts which
2
          could not reasonably be entertained."
3
4
          And Your Lordship then said:
5
6
          "Counsel for the landlord did not take
7
          exception with this characterization of a
8
          question of law."
9
10
           And I don't know Your Lordship's purpose for
11
       saying that, but I do say counsel for Metalclad in
12
       this case does take exception to that
13
       characterization of a question of law for the
       purposes of this proceeding.
14
15
          In my submission if you go to the Crown
       Forest Case -- and I've just been told we haven't
16
17
       copied it.
18 THE COURT: Um-hum.
    MR. COWPER: So I've --
20 THE COURT: I just viewed -- I just viewed para 14.
21
       I'm just repeating what counsel for one of the
22
       parties told me.
23 MR. COWPER: That's -- that's what I thought. And --
24
       and if you go to the Crown Forest Case -- and I'll
25
       have to get a copy for you, and I apologize
26
       because I thought we had pretty much everything
27
       here -- but Madam Justice Southin, as she then
28
       was -- and it's a very colourful judgment and --
29
       and great fun to read, but she -- she, I think,
30
       very clearly for her purposes of the case is
31
       dealing with it not on the basis that that is the
32
       conventional test, but is a test that she's just
33
       stating for the purposes of the case. And it's --
34
       it is so for a number of reasons.
35
           In the assessment area, you have what I
36
       think -- and Your Lordship knows more than I do.
37
       In the assessment area you have this incredibly
       complex and difficult appeal process or -- or
38
39
       jurisprudence relating to what do you do with
40
       hypotheses of valuation which are used or not used
       in the absence of evidence having regard to a
41
42
       statute which has various terms relating to the
```

| 43 | hypotheses and standards of valuation? |
|----------------|--|
| 14 | In the very cases Madam Madam Justice |
| 1 5 | (sic) in her judgment disagrees with a judgment by |
| 46 | Mr. Justice MacDonald in the assessment context |
| 17 | and refuses to follow him on the basis that he is |

 interfering with findings of fact and not questions of law.

And in the course of her judgment, she effectively says that in the unusual -- and I think she actually uses the word "bizarre" at some point -- the bizarre context of assessment appeals, that the -- you have to deal with questions which relate to matters which are decided in the complete absence of evidence but nevertheless have to be reviewed as to whether they were available to the assessors because they represent valuation methods which may or may not be properly before them.

And so I say that that test ought not to be extended generally either from Your Lordship's judgment or her judgment into this case, and indeed in the -- some of the other cases cited by Madam Justice Southin in her own cases. The two at page 15 of her judgment are both cases which say they are findings of fact unless there is an absence of evidence or no evidence.

And if you want to know, that's the Provincial Assessors of Comox case which says:

"Absence...we must accept those findings as the case does not raise any question of absence of evidence."

And in the Swan Valley Foods case, which is another assessment case, it says:

"In the present case there...I have reached the conclusion they've reached that in the present case there was no evidence that the owner would be willing to pay the replacement cost."

So even within the assessment field, I think there's some state of confusion. And some judges have applied the no-evidence test. And other judges have said that because of the unusual features of the statute and the statutory tests

| 13 | which have to be applied, there may be, if you |
|----------------|--|
| 14 | will, reviewable errors which would in another |
| 45 | context not be errors of law. |
| 46 | Now, that deals with the those two cases. |
| 1 7 | And if I could then turn to Chapter 9, what |
| | |

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1
      I've tried to do here -- and I don't know if -- if
2
      Your Lordship's read it, but I thought it was
3
      perhaps useful at the end of my submissions to
4
      deal with what I submit to you is -- is an attempt
5
      at least to -- to deal with the logical complexity
6
      of the case before you.
7
          And I -- I say firstly of course that the
8
      first question is which statute applies to the
9
      proceeding. And we've submitted to you that the
10
       international act applies. And if the
11
       international act applies and the commercial act
12
       does not apply, then a number of the issues which
13
       have been raised and which we've spent a great
14
       deal of time on in the last few days do not arise
15
       for decision.
16 THE COURT: I actually --
17 MR. COWPER: If --
18 THE COURT: -- see it as being that threshold question
19
       and then it branching --
20 MR. COWPER: Yes.
21 THE COURT: -- into two sections.
22 MR. COWPER: The --
23 THE COURT: Which -- you haven't quite put it that
24
25 MR. COWPER: No. I mean, Your Lordship could consider
26
       the grounds under both statutes in the event that
27
       Your Lordship was in error as to the first issue
28
       or, in other words, if Your Lordship was to -- to
29
       approach the matter and say I accept that it's
       only international act, then it's clearly within
30
31
       your jurisdiction to proceed to consider what you
32
       would do under the second ground. I mean, I
       accept that. Is that -- that's the two branches
33
34
       Your Lordship is referring.
35 THE COURT: Yes.
36 MR. COWPER: Yeah, okay.
37
          The -- the second logical step, and I think
       this would apply to either of Your Lordship's
38
39
       potential avenues of inquiry and decision, is
40
       what's the proper legal characterization of the
41
       errors alleged? And -- and I do say that that's a
42
       necessary and important question, because my
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| 43 | friend and I have disagreed as to the proper |
|----|---|
| 44 | characterization of the errors which have been |
| 45 | asserted by the petitioner. And just two of those |
| 46 | questions are whether there are any questions of |
| 47 | jurisdiction; that is, whether any of the errors |
| | |

alleged in the jurisdictional part of my friend's submissions are truly questions of jurisdiction. And secondly, whether there are within those any questions of law and, if so, are they reviewable?

Under (c) do the questions of fact raise grounds of reviewable error under the relevant statute? That's logically available to you on the basis of my friend's submission.

Second, the next stage I say to submit -would be to assess any of those errors, either jurisdictional, legal or factual against the proper standard of review having regard to the proper characterization of the error.

Assessing whether any of the errors identified would have made any difference to the outcome of the arbitration. And of course, my client is not engaged in this for academic purposes. It's engaged in it because it's received what it hoped to be a final adjudication of its rights. So unless there are errors identified that justify setting aside the award, I say that the inquiry by the Court does not justify inter -- any intervention, because it has to justify setting it aside in the aggregate in order for there to be a justified conclusion of setting aside the award.

The next one is -- and I've put it the wrong way having regard to Mr. Greenberg's submissions, but assessing whether the tribunal failed to answer the questions before it or in the terms of the act whether it dealt with the disputes before it. And you have Mr. Greenberg's submission as to the proper characterization of that jurisdiction.

Then the next one would be to consider your discretion after you've identified and dealt with those preliminary matters, your discretion under the statute whether to intervene at all. And I -- I remind you that in our submission there is an overriding jurisdiction that is mandated to you under the act not to intervene, that you have the right not to intervene even in the face of error, in the face of material and -- and proven error.

| 43 | And then, secondly, whether the errors are |
|----|---|
| 44 | severable from the remainder of the award. |
| 45 | And over the top, if any intervention is |
| 46 | merited, whether there should be remission to the |
| 47 | arbitrators required in the circumstances either |

to address claims or other matters not addressed or, you may wish to -- to note, not addressed adequately in the award. In other words, if you conclude that they're addressed, but not adequately.

And then alternatively whether to remit any matters to be determined in accordance with your directions as to either jurisdiction or law.

Now, with respect to the -- the overall exercise of your discretion at the last stage of this analysis, in my submission in terms of the relationship between this Court and the tribunal that none of my friend's submissions justify any conclusion other than that the tribunal honestly came to grips with the problem, and I've supported them throughout and I continue to do so.

If Your Lordship finds that there are mistakes or, if you will, Your Lordship's not satisfied that they've reached the right conclusion in a way that's reviewable under either statute, I say that with respect to issues of international and treaty law, because of the structure which -- that NAFTA has set, the proper body to have another go at those issues is the tribunal and not the Court. And that's because in -- as I submitted earlier, the jurisprudential context here in my submission is that these disputes are determined by the tribunals which determine the rights between the parties subject to obviously Your Lordship's oversight and review and correction for error.

And that role continues and ought to continue and is intended by the act to continue having regard to Your Lordship's authority to remit. And that's particularly so given the role of the commission and the governmental actors which are after all ultimately in control of the content and interpretation of NAFTA.

Now, that concludes my submission with respect to that.

I -- I want -- there's one issue of dispute between my friend and I which we can deal with

before we close for -- for noon hour, which is that my friend has given me the submissions of the American government in another proceeding under Chapter 11 which has not yet been determined by anybody. And I object to those being given to

Your Lordship. And we need -- perhaps need to deal with that. He fairly gave them to me yesterday or the -- earlier in the week. And in my submission Your Lordship ought not to have reference to the submissions of other parties, either claimants or respondents, in ongoing Chapter 11 disputes. I -- I think in principle those ought not to be entertained by the Court.

I do wish to say that overall, with respect to the submissions of Quebec and Canada, that I have I think with sufficient force addressed the issues which are spoken to by Canada and Quebec, so I have no supplemental submissions. I think we've essentially embraced in our submissions and answered the concerns raised by both of those parties.

I do wish to say though that in relation to the matters that occur here, it's -- I do recognize that the States which are parties to the treaty are excited and concerned about the interpretation given to the treaty.

And I've submitted to you that the process they've put in place to which we all ought to be servants rather than masters puts the tribunals in fundamental control of the interpretation of the NAFTA unless and until they've erred within a material sense under the international act and subject to binding determinations as to future tribunals coming from the commission.

But I do say this as well in closing, because this is a case where a company, a -- an enterprise, took advantage of the offer that is guaranteed in Chapter 11 to have its investment -- investment in one of the party States protected by the protections of Chapter 11. And it is the first or one of the very first cases in which an investor has called a State party to account for the promises under Chapter 11 and has undertaken as a private party the not inconsiderable burden of establishing to an international tribunal that a State party has violated international law and has violated its treaty obligations in relation to

| 43 | its its conduct respecting a private party. |
|----|---|
| 44 | And my friend made a fairly stirring |
| 45 | submission to you that this was a privilege which |
| 46 | we have to watch jealously, that we ought not to |
| 47 | allow, if you will, the people on the street to |
| | |

 to lightly interfere with sovereign relations between party States.

And in relation to the facts of this case, I just -- I'm just going to close with this observation, and that is: What we're seeing occur is precisely what happens when you give private parties rights, and you give them a process which allows them to call to account a government that was previously unaccountable to private parties.

And the process of international law, which has undergone evolution for centuries, is one which had one significant and overwhelming filter for the adjudication of private rights, and that was no matter what was done to you by another State party, you had to persuade what Harry Truman called the men in pinstripes in the State Department, or our equivalent of pinstripes in our departments, that your problem deserved not only the attention of your country, but the determination by your country to take your claim to another State and to prosecute it with all the diplomatic risks which are attendant on calling another State to account for a potential breach of its international obligations.

And in my respectful submission what's outrageous conduct when you own a business like this and you invest in a country like this for a businessman is outrageous having regard to what's occurred to that businessman, and that's always been the case. But what's happened in the past was the assessment at the very beginning of what was outrageous was made by the men in pinstripes; that is, the diplomats, the trade officials and otherwise, to decide whether what was conducted. whether it was outrageous or not, truly deserved the attention and, if you will, the championing by a sovereign State against another sovereign State. And you can imagine the governmental process involved in assessing whether to allow private claims to go through that filter.

And so what we've seen happen here, not only in this case but in the other awards we've

reviewed, is that private parties have said hold it a second, we take those promises seriously. And now that you've given us the right to bring them directly, we're going to. And of course, not surprisingly, Canada and Mexico and the

United States are saying, well, you know, actually there are a lot more people taking advantage of us, a lot more people calling us to account for the rights we've given them than we anticipated.

And I say with respect that is absolutely precisely what the governments announced they were doing, what they intended to do, and the consequences flow naturally from investing people with rights that allow them to have access directly to tribunals to acquit their rights.

In respect of this case I have no doubt that in the previous era in which a small company that tries to establish a facility in a rural part of Mexico would have had no luck whatsoever in getting something like the sovereign United States of America to bring a claim internationally to call Mexico to account, given the complexity of that international relationship.

What I say with respect to the overall case here is that this tribunal did precisely what the drafters of NAFTA asked them to do. They've discharged their duty as international lawyers in assessing the facts, in making the facts, and in finding that what happened to Metalclad was unfair and inequitable and was an expropriation of its facility.

Those are my submissions, My Lord.

28 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cowper.

Just to address the point you raised earlier, I see nothing inappropriate for Mr. Foy to rely on the arguments of the United States in another arbitration. They have no precedential effect on me. He's simply going to be adopting as his own, as is usually the case. So I -- I don't see anything inappropriate, so he may refer to those when he replies tomorrow.

37 MR. COWPER: Okay. I have Your Lordship's ruling.

Then I'd like to, if I may, have the privilege of putting into the evidence the reply to that argument by Methanex. I only was given that this morning.

I should tell you I didn't have either of

these arguments until this morn -- I -- my friend gave me the United States's yesterday. I asked him for the reply, and he gave that to me this morning.

I would like to --

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1 MR. FOY: I'll put both in.
2 MR. COWPER: -- look at the latter.
          No, I understand that.
4 MR. FOY: Okay.
5 MR. COWPER: We'll put both in, I appreciate that.
          But I -- I would like to make submissions
6
7
      with respect to them now they're to be the record
      so that I'm not interrupting my friend or seeking
8
9
      to have a sur-reply. I'll only be five or ten
10
       minutes at the most.
11 THE COURT: Mr. Foy, do you have anything to --
12 MR. FOY: Two things, My Lord. I'd like to start my
       reply this afternoon, if that's convenient for
13
       Your Lordship. The -- we've -- there's a lot of
14
15
       ground that we have to cover, and I think it would
       be a -- a useful use of the time, if -- if that's
16
       convenient to the Court.
17
18
          And I have no difficulty with my friend
19
       making some submissions with respect to the
       materials to -- which I've provided to him.
20
21 THE COURT: Um-hum.
22 MR. COWPER: When am I going to do that? Will I do
23
       that at 2? When do you want me to do it? Sorry,
24
       I'm iust --
25 MR. FOY: You can -- when would it be convenient?
26
          He can do it tomorrow morning if he'd like to
27
       do it. Maybe he wants to hear what I have to say
28
       about the -- the --
29 MR. COWPER: I don't like -- I don't like interrupting
30
       my -- my opponents, so what I'll try to do is --
31
       is read them at lunch hour and give you my
32
       observations on them before my friend starts his
33
       reply. I -- I don't know how long my friend is
34
       planning on being in reply obviously. If he wants
35
       to start at 2, I'm in Your Lordship's hands. I
36
       know that we indicated we'd take this afternoon
       off. I --
37
38 THE COURT: Yes. And I communicated that to Trial
39
       Division. Ms. Smolen was quite happy to hear that
40
       actually, because she had other matters for me to
41
       do.
42
          Madam -- or, Mr. Registrar, do you know from
```

- your conversations with Ms. Smolen today whether there's another judge who has become available to 43
- 44
- 45 hear the other matters?
- 46 THE REGISTRAR: I'm -- from my sense of the
- conversation, I don't believe there is, but I can 47

Submissions by Mr. Cowper Submissions by Mr. Foy

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2 THE COURT: Um-hum. Would you mind checking and phone
      down now?
4 MR. COWPER: I should say just while we're on this, I
5
      have to appear before the benchers tomorrow
6
      morning on a matter which might take me a little
7
      bit later in the morning, so I -- I may not be
8
      here at the bell of 8 -- of 10, but other counsel
9
      will be, and I'll just join when I can, if that's
10
       okay. I apologize. I'm not intending any
11
       discourtesy to my friend. It's not a disciplinary
12
       matter, My Lord, I may say.
13 THE REGISTRAR: The registry has indicated that would
14
       be fine.
15 THE COURT: So there is another judge available to
16
       deal with it?
17 THE REGISTRAR: I believe so.
18 THE COURT: Then we will continue at 2 o'clock.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
20
       adjourned until 2 p.m.
21
22
       (NOON RECESS)
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 12:18 P.M.)
23
24
       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 2:00 P.M.)
25
26 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
27
          Today I want to start our reply. I will
28
       focus this afternoon on replying to the arguments
29
       made orally. I will tomorrow reply to the written
30
       materials.
31
          I want to note at the outset that many of the
32
       arguments we have heard orally were made to refute
       points that Mexico did not make, and that many of
33
34
       the points that we did make were not addressed.
35
          And in the course of the reply, we hope to
36
       identify where the parties are now in agreement,
37
       and we are in -- given changes in Metalclad's
       position throughout the course of the oral
38
39
       argument, we are in more agreement today than we
40
       were when we -- when Metalclad started last week,
41
       to identify where there are issues that remain
       between us and to identify what those issues
42
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check again, My Lord. I checked at 11 o'clock.

| 43 properly are from our perspective, and | io answei |
|--|-----------|
| some of the questions that that have | arisen. |
| But before I do that, I'd like to go to | the |
| 46 decision that I have handed up. This is | the |
| decision sorry, not decision. These a | are the |

submissions that Mr. Cowper referred to earlier this morning in the Methanex matter.

You have before you the submissions of the United States on jurisdiction and the submissions of Methanex on jurisdiction -- on -- on the United States's challenge to jurisdiction.

The -- we contacted the United States and asked them if they had a position on Metalclad, and we were directed to this document. We do not speak for the United States, and I make that perfectly clear. And I am adopting these submissions as Mexico's.

As I understand how these proceedings came about, and how Metalclad came to be an issue in these proceedings, in the Methanex proceedings, is that in the course of -- or subsequent to an initial challenge that was filed by the United States with respect to whether or not the pleadings disclosed a cause of action that was known to the NAFTA, amendments were sought after the Metalclad and Myers decision had been handed down. And that's why you'll see in these submissions reference to the Metalclad decision and the position taken by both the -- the United States and Methanex in that regard.

I'd note at the outset that these positions are being taken in the jurisdictional context. So they are considered to be -- to bear upon jurisdiction. And so you have before you, with respect to these points, you have Canada, you have the United States and you have Mexico characterizing the issues that we'll get to as jurisdictional issues.

So I'd ask you to turn to the United States submission. And I'll take you just to the passage that deals with the Metal -- or the -- take you to the passages that deal with the Metalclad decision, and it starts at page 37 of the U.S.'s memorial.

Under the heading "B, Methanex's Article 1105(1) claim is inadmissible on its face," and I'd like to take you through this in some detail,

it notes:
44
"Methanex...Methanex's Article 1105(1)
claim similarly fails to identify any right
on which that claim could be based. There

is no international law standard incorporated into that article that is implicated by the measures in question. In the discussion that follows, the United States first demonstrates that the standards of treatment contemplated by Article 1105 are those established by customary international law."

And you will recall that both Mexico and Canada have submitted in these proceedings that the standards contemplated by Article 1105 are those established by customary international law.

"Second, the United States shows that no standard of customary international law incorporated into Article 1105, whether substantive or procedural, is implicated by the acts alleged to be wrongful here."

And I won't -- I won't detain you with the -- the particulars. And I'm referring to these submissions for their principles.

Turning the page to page 38 under the heading "Article 1105 standards are those of customary international law," first reference is made to the text of the article, and it is noted that:

"By its plain terms, treatment is to be accorded in accordance with international law. Fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security are provided as examples of the customary international law standards. The plain language and structure of Article 1105 requires these concepts to be applied as and to the extent that they are recognized in customary international law and not as obligations to be applied without reference to international custom."

And I'll come back to that. I'll just note

that, because Methanex as well agrees that the Metalclad tribunal in our case made its findings 43 44 without reference to international custom, its 45 46 1105 findings. 47

"Methanex's suggestion that Article 1105 and, in particular, its reference to fair and equitable treatment can be applied without reference to customary international law is rebutted not only by the plain language of the article, but also by the historical context of the words 'fair and equitable' in the article. The most direct antecedent to the usage of fair and equitable treatment in international investment agreements is the OECD draft convention on the protection of foreign property first proposed in 1963 and revised in 1967."

And I would just pause there, My Lord, to recall that Metalclad argued before Your Lordship that one should simply read the language as if you're reading the English language. And with respect, one should read the language of Article 1105 as treaty language in the context in -- and the history in which it has arisen, not simply as -- without context, not simply without reference to that context.

And it goes on:

"The commentary to Article 1 of the OECD draft convention which incorporated the standard of fair and equitable treatment noted that the standard reflected the well-established general principle of international law that a State is bound to respect and protect the property of nationals of other States."

And then it quotes from that draft convention.

It goes on:

"In addition in 1984, the OECD's committee on international investment and multinational enterprises surveyed the OECD

| 43 | member States on the meaning of the phrase |
|----|--|
| 44 | 'fair and equitable treatment.' The |
| 45 | committee confirmed that the OECD members, |
| 46 | the world's principal developed countries, |
| 47 | continued to view phrase as referring to |
| | |

1 p

principles of customary international law."

 Now, this would be well-known to the negotiators of the NAFTA.

"Thus, from its first use in investment agreements, fair and equitable treatment was no more than a shorthand reference to elements of the developed body of customary international law governing the responsibility of a State for its treatment of the nationals of another State. It is in this sense, moreover, that the United States incorporated fair and equitable treatment into its various bilateral investment treaties."

Now, this is the United States speaking with respect to its own BITs.

"In the ensuing years as international investment treaties incorporating variance of the OECD draft became more common, an academic debate emerged concerning the meaning of the phrase as it appears in those agreements without reference to customary international law."

And you'll recall, Your Lordship, in -- in our argument we took you to the text writer who noted that in the NAFTA it did not appear without express reference to customary international law, but appeared subsumed under international law.

And so these other agreements that didn't make any express reference to international law are different than 1105. But this -- but we also referred to the debate that had arisen. And we referred to that reference in -- where it was said that in the NAFTA of course it's clear fair and equitable treatment is subsumed under international law, and you'll recall those extracts.

| 43 | Even in the in this debate though, the |
|----|---|
| 44 | United States notes: |
| 45 | |
| 46 | "The prevalent view was that in such |
| 47 | circumstances the phrase should be viewed |
| | - |

as having its traditional meaning as a reference to the international minimum standard of treatment. A few scholars contended that the requirement of fair and equitable treatment standing alone announced a new and undefined conventional standard distinct from customary international standards, a..." subje "...a subjective standard that left it to the arbitrators to determine in each case whether in all the circumstances the conduct in issue is fair and equitable or unfair and inequitable."

And there's the reference to the footnote to F.A. Mann upon which Metalclad has placed significant reliance.

So in this context of these other treaties that -- where fair and equitable treatment was disjointed from the language or not subsumed under international law, the debate arose, and it was argued a sub -- subjective standard should apply.

"Against this backdrop..."

The U.S. says:

 "...the drafters of Chapter 11 excluded any possible conclusion that the parties were diverging from the customary international law concept of fair and equitable treatment. Accordingly, they chose a formulation that expressly tied fair and equitable treatment to the customary international minimum standard rather than some subjective, undefined standard.

"Article 1105's provision for treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment, states the primacy of customary international law. If this were not enough, the heading of the article 'Minimum

| 43 | Standard of Treatment' confirms the |
|----|---|
| 44 | applicability of the customary |
| 45 | international minimum standard. |
| 46 | "Finally, Canada's statement on |
| 47 | implementation of the NAFTA clearly notes |
| | |

that the article provides for a minimum absolute standard of treatment based..."

And this was read to you earlier:

 "...based on long-standing principles of customary international law. For these reasons the United States disagrees with the discussion of fair and equitable treatment in the award by the Chapter 11 arbitral tribunal in Metalclad. Although the award's sparse statement of reasons leaves...leaves some doubt..."

And you'll recall there was no reference other than the -- to any authorities, principles or otherwise in the 1105 discussion in the award, there was simply the reference and -- and we say misreference to the -- a combination of the preamble and Article 102. And so we agree the -- with the characterization of the reasons as sparse, and leaving the reader in some doubt. It goes on:

"It appears to apply a fair and equitable standard without an evaluation of customary international law on the subject. To the extent that Metalclad can be read to suggest that fair and equitable in Article 1105 articulates a standard other than the international minimum standard, it is wrongly reasoned and should not be followed here."

Now, the -- not -- not surprisingly Methanex on this jurisdictional challenge differs with that as to whether or not their pleadings should survive, and whether or not the United States is right with respect to this issue.

But interestingly, they -- the Methanex submission, and I'll take you to it next at page 10, at page 10, when they rely upon the Metalclad

decision, at the bottom of that page they -- they note Metalclad at the top, and they say that the tribunal emphasized a -- a broad protection and found a breach, and quoted some of the portions of the award. But then they say this at the -- at

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1
       the bottom, they -- they agree with the
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       United States in this regard, and with -- with --
3
       saying:
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5
          "The Metalclad tribunal thus made no
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          reference to customary international law in
7
          finding a violation of Article 1105.
8
          Rather, following Dr. Mann's approach, it
9
          simply considered whether the measures at
10
          issue were fair and equitable or unfair and
11
           inequitable."
12
13
           So I think that confirms our reading of the
14
       award in -- and we -- I'll come back to that. But
15
       it confirms that insofar as both Methanex and the
16
       United States are concerned, the Metalclad
17
       tribunal did not apply customary international
18
       law. It did something else. And an issue for
19
       this Court will be whether or not it had the
20
       jurisdiction to do that something else.
21 THE COURT: Mr. Foy, I'm not sure if you discussed
       with Mr. Cowper -- this is the first point you're
22
23
       making.
24
           Mr. Cowper, would -- would you --
25 MR. COWPER: I haven't -- I'm afraid that I had booked
       the afternoon, so I spent my lunch hour actually
26
27
       getting rid of my afternoon, and I haven't had a
       chance to read either document. I'll do that
28
29
       overnight, because my friend said I can deal with
       it in the morning, and I will.
30
31 THE COURT: Very well. We can leave it on that
32
       basis. I anticipate after the length that
33
       Mr. Foy's indicated during his reply that you
34
       probably will be asking for an opportunity to
35
       provide some sur-reply, whether I give you that
36
       privilege or not, it remains to be seen. So you
37
       can govern yourself as to whether you wish to wait
       until Mr. Foy's finished or not or do it in the
38
39
       morning. It is totally up to you.
40 MR. COWPER: Well, I think it's best to interrupt him
       as few times as possible, so I'll leave it to the
41
42
       end. Thank you, My Lord.
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- 43 MR. FOY: Now, I hope to be saying more about 44 F.A. Mann tomorrow, but just -- it -- it noted
- there that -- by the United States that his theory 45
- 46 is a theory that starts from a premise that does
- not exist here, the premise that your treaty 47

language only includes the language "fair and equitable treatment," and does not subsume that standard under customary international law and the minimum standard of treatment afforded by customary international law. So I say Mann's theory is -- is inapplicable in the circumstances of this case, even on his own formulation of it.

But I also note that Metalclad took you to a portion of the Myers award in which arbitrator Schwartz referred to Mann's theory. And I just note that at paragraph 258, I won't turn it up, Schwartz also recogni -- himself recognized that Mann's theory is not part of customary international law.

So the other -- the other thing I take from the submissions of the United States in the Methanex case is that you have before you the submissions of the three parties to the NAFTA, you have Mexico's submissions, you have Canada's submissions and to -- and you have these submissions, all agreeing that the Metalclad decision was wrongly decided. And I'll talk -- and I'll come back to that when I talk about the assistance that -- that this Court either needs or has been provided in dealing with issues of international law and the interpretation of the NAFTA.

Another point I take from the Methanex decision is it's -- it's clear rebuttal of -- of any proposition that these tribunal's decisions don't have some precedential impact. What you have here is the Metalclad decision coming down. You have immediately amendments being made to pleadings in reliance upon the reasoning advanced by the Metalclad tribunal, and then you have another dispute as to the correctness of Metalclad not simply occurring in this -- in these proceedings, but occurring in the Methanex proceedings as well.

So notwithstanding the technical, non-binding effect as provided for in Chapter 11, the practical impact of these decisions, which is to

be well-expected given the breadth of the -- of the offer to arbitration that is contained there, have been cited, immediately cited, and are the subject of discussion in -- in front of other tribunals. So any reliance upon any proposition,

as Metalclad did, that these -- that these decisions have no precedential effect I think is -- is also rebutted by the -- the events in Methanex.

Now, having said that you have before you the submissions of three of the parties to the NAFTA that the decision of Metalclad is not correct, I note that most of the time spent in oral argument by Metalclad was not spent attempting to defend the correctness of the decision. Most of the time in oral argument was instead spent in attempting to argue that the tribunal did its job by resolving the dispute before it, and whether the tribunal did so or -- correctly or not, this Court cannot interfere because a jurisdictional error has not been demonstrated. Most of the time was spent not defending the correctness but in an attempt to demonstrate that the tribunal had done its job.

Now, of course, if we're under the Commercial Arbitration Act, Your Lordship can correct the tribunal on the questions of law. And the very -- that -- that is a question of law, for example, that has just been discussed in Methanex. It's a clear question of law as to whether or not the -- whether or not Article 1105 expresses the customary international law standard or something different.

Now -- but I want to in this part of my submissions emphasize and respond to -- reply to the jurisdictional arguments.

In my submission this tribunal did not do the job that the parties conferred upon it by their consent to arbitration in this case. I'm going to emphasize that in this part of my submissions I will not go into the record to disputed facts. I will take what the tribunal says at face value, and I will go from that -- and not just some of what they say, and I won't -- and I will ask you not to ignore what they say, and I will examine the questions that they asked themselves.

Now, in my reply the tribunal's job was

limited, as it -- as any arbitrator's is, by the terms of the consent to arbitration contained in the particular arbitration. As Your Lordship is aware, the terms of that consent to arbitration are contained in Section B of Chapter 11.

And one part of Section B is to -- is to require the tribunal to apply the -- to focus upon the -- sorry. One part of the consent to arbitration concerns the question of what is the applicable law. That is a jurisdictional issue. In our submission this tribunal identified and relied upon the wrong applicable law. This is not a question of misapplication of the correct law, but rather identification and reliance upon the wrong applicable law.

And I take you back in the award to -- to emphasize Part Roman numeral 6 termed "The Applicable Law." And you'll recall just this morning Metalclad's counsel took you to the arbitration in the Biloune case where it too -- in the course of the arbitration, the arbitrator set out the, quote, applicable law. It is a necessary part of the identification of their jurisdiction.

And it's paragraph 70 and 71. And I take you to 71, and emphasize the reference to Chapter 18 in the second sentence of that paragraph. And I say this tribunal, taking them at face value and not ignoring what they've said, not putting behind what they said, they have identified Chapter 18 as part of the applicable law governing this dispute.

Now, I think -- and -- and you have been taken to -- and as you recall, Chapter 18 prescribes transparency requirements for the publication of laws and for the provision of administrative and judicial remedies.

You have been taken to paragraphs 76 and 88 and 104 of the award just today in which Metalclad's counsel showed how transparency formed not just part of the award under 1105, but also the award under 1110. As my friend said in -- fairly, he agreed this morning that there is clearly a connection between the tribunal's finding and 1105 and 1110. That connection is transparency.

And I'll just -- again, I -- I know you've been taken many times to these, but just so that I

| 43 | have the point, at paragraph 76 again, there's |
|----|--|
| 44 | the: |
| 45 | |
| 46 | "Prominent in the statement of principles |
| 47 | and rules" |
| | |

And -- and I'll come back to the confusion between objectives and principles and rules, but the tribunal has it correct, I think.

"Prominent in the statement of principles and rules that introduces the Agreement is the reference to 'transparency."

They see transparency as a rule. It is part of the applicable law. They are applying that rule in determining the dispute before them.

They then set out their understanding of that rule.

And we have -- and I'll just pause there to note that one of the things you haven't heard is an argument that -- from -- from Metalclad, is that the members of this tribunal, as arbitrators, are entitled to legislate new rules not otherwise agreed to by the parties. That was one of the jurisdictional defects in this tribunal -- tribunal's reasoning, and I submit it has not been addressed. But that's what they do in the remainder of paragraph 76.

In paragraph 88 they make it clear that it is their -- it is the violation of this rule of transparency, they -- they say -- they talk about the absence of a clear rule with respect to municipal construction -- and then they say it is this that:

"...amounts to a failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by NAFTA."

Again, in my submission making it clear that the applicable law that they are applying is a transparency rule.

Now, I think I heard counsel for Metalclad agree in oral argument that this formed part of the content, that was the language used, part of -- that this transparency formed part of the

content of their ruling on Article 1105. And I
agree with that. It did. Both Chapter 18 and
clearly transparency formed part of the content of
the applicable rules applied by this tribunal to
resolve this dispute.

Now, counsel for Metalclad agreed that the tribunal did that and then defended the tribunal by arguing that this tribunal has jurisdiction to apply the, quote, agreement as a whole. As I understand the response of Metalclad, it -- it's not disputing what -- what they did, but -- but arguing that they are entitled to do that, to consider the agreement as a whole.

Mexico's reply is that only Chapter 20 tribunals can apply the rules that are contained throughout NAFTA.

Articles 1116 and 1117 of Chapter 11 restrict Chapter 11 tribunals to the rules contained in Section A of Chapter 11. Transparency is not a rule contained in Section A of Chapter 11.

I did not hear Metalclad respond to Articles 1116 and 1117 and the restrictive effect that they have on this tribunal's jurisdiction in respect of the applicable law.

You have been advised that transparency is a qualitatively different rule than customary international law, that it is a treaty rule that only exists by virtue of treaty and is only expressed in the specific terms of the specific treaty in which it's found.

You have also been advised that as a treaty rule it does not exist in Chapter 11, Section A. And this comes back to the debate that was ongoing in -- in Methanex. The -- in Methanex it was pointed out that what 1105 covers are not treaty rules, but customary international rules, a different set of rules.

And those treaty rules in my submission are not implicit somehow in Chapter 11. Section B is clear, they have to be expressed there. The architecture is clear. When other rules like those contained in Chapter 15 are set out, they are set out expressly.

Now, the next point I'd like to reply to relates to Article 102 and the preamble.

Now, we heard a lot of argument that Mexico is submitting you cannot -- the tribunal was wrong

to look at Article 102. That is not Mexico's submission. Mexico submitted that this tribunal misstated Article 102. And I'd like to turn it up, and -- and to recall the misstatement and bring it back to the applicable law, because it

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arises from this tribunal's conflation of a statement in the preamble, one of the words of the preamble, and words that don't exist in 102.

Now, as I said, Mexico does not take the position that it was jurisdictional error for this tribunal to refer to 102, but when you go there, you have to read it.

102, as Your Lordship is familiar, contains both a reference to objectives and a reference to rules. My -- counsel for Metalclad, now we appear to be in agreement that the objectives are set out in A through F. Any principles or rules that are referred to are national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency.

Now --

16 THE COURT: You say you're in agreement. MR. FOY: Well, we almost got there, but then my friend said -- and I'm going to elaborate on this. And then my friend said but transparency is also an objective.

> So he -- grammatically he appeared to -- he started with one position, he then resiled from that position, and then I thought we were close to an agreement, and then said but transparency is also an objective. So I -- with that caveat I think we're in -- we're in agreement.

Our position is clear, if I can state it. Our position is the objectives are those set out in A through F. The rules and principles are those elaborated throughout the agreement, as Mr. Thomas advised, including national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency.

Now, one of the things that we pointed out was that you do not see in Article 102 the objective identified by this tribunal in paragraph 75 of its award. Paragraph 75 of the award, the tribunal says:

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"An underlying objective of NAFTA is to promote and increase cross-border investment opportunities and..."

41 42

| 43 | And I emphasize this language: |
|----|--|
| 44 | |
| 45 | "and ensure the successful |
| 46 | implementation of investment initiatives." |
| 47 | |

Reference Article 102.

The language "ensure the successful implementation of investment initiatives" appears nowhere in Article 102. The word "ensure" does appear in the preamble that -- one page back. The word "ensure a predictable commercial framework for business planning and investment" is one of the preambular statements. But nowhere -- and it appears the tribunal appears to have conflated or taken that word out of the preamble, and then attach it to words that don't appear in the objectives by transforming "increase substantially investment opportunities" into "ensure the successful implementation of investment initiatives."

Now, Your Lordship would be familiar with the rest of the award, that what the tribunal takes -- later takes this -- how they -- having mis -- misidentified an objective, they then take this obligation of result and apply a duty of insurance on the federal government in this case to ensure the successful implementation of Metalclad's business plan.

In fact, my friend earlier this morning went so far as to suggest that this tribunal has imposed a duty on the federal government to go to court to obtain permits for this business plan to ensure its successful implementation, and I'll come back to that.

Now, again, this is one of those arguments that -- jurisdictional arguments that I didn't hear responded to directly. What we heard instead was -- with respect to Article 102, we heard instead some -- a number of different positions as to whether or not transparency is a rule or an objective.

And Your Lordship has -- recollection is probably more accurate than mine in that we are not in agreement, but I heard originally Metalclad saying transparency is an objective of the -- of 102, but then I thought I heard him come back and say, no, transparency is a rule as -- as

| 43 | grammatically is suggested. But then in the |
|----|--|
| 44 | course of answers to questions, it was also said |
| 45 | that, well, it's also rule and an objective. And |
| 46 | so to that extent we remain apart. |
| 47 | I would like to make our position clear. |
| | • |

Objectives and rules are different.
Objectives are hortatory. They, like preambular statements, can be looked at, but they are not rules, and they do not override the textual rules.

And tomorrow I will bring to your attention a passage from another Chapter 20 tribunal in which -- in -- in a dispute between the States with respect to transportation issues in which a tribunal said:

"There is no suggestion in NAFTA that the preambular language was intended to override the textual obligations. Rather, the language used in the preamble, resolve rather than agree to, shall or must, indicate the preamble is aspirational and hortatory. The panel also notes..."

Sorry -- so the -- both the preamble -- and that deals with the preambular statement where they have taken the word "ensure," it appears, from the preamble, made it into an objective. They have then taken in my submission in this -- this tribunal has taken a misstated objective and had regard to that misstated objective in the application of what are already the wrong rules, the Chapter 18 transparency rules. And with respect to that, and -- and the difference between objectives and rules, our position is that the tribunal may have regard to objectives, but must have regard to them properly stated.

What a tribunal may not do without exceeding its jurisdiction is have regard to a different -- have regard to different treaty rules, like transparency, to provide content for the customary international law rule of minimum standard of treatment contained in Chapter 1105 -- Article 1105. In our submission the tribunal in doing so identifies the wrong applicable law and goes beyond the parties' consent to this arbitration.

Now, I mentioned this briefly, but the -- the

next point I reply to is the alternative point that this tribunal, if it was -- and I say it was not -- if it was entitled to go to treaty notions of transparency to inform Chapter 18 -- Chapter 11, then this tribunal legislated a treaty

standard not found anywhere else in the NAFTA in its paragraph 76.

Now, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, I did not hear a response to -- to this allegation of jurisdictional error. It appears to Mexico that the tribunal applied a wholly new notion, as the Methanex investor agrees was a wholly new notion not grounded in customary international law.

Now, Your Lordship has pointed out in questions to Metalclad that even on this standard as legislated, and accepting the findings of the tribunal with respect to Mexican domestic law, and I'll be getting to those, the federal government met the standard, recent -- rendering in my submission the result on its face to be unreasonable and contradictory.

Now, in response to Your Lordship's questions, the counsel for Metalclad constructed a new set of reasons for the tribunal that don't appear on the face of the award, referring to a number of findings not made by the tribunal in an attempt to defend the result, ultimately getting to the -- to state the proposition that the federal authorities were obliged to seek legal remedies on Metalclad's behalf.

Now, that doesn't appear anywhere in the tribunal's award. And in this portion of the submissions, I'm restricting my submissions to the face of the award and not going -- and not writing in findings that were -- that do not appear on the face of them.

But I want to note this point, because it's ironic that the first we hear of legal remedies available in the Mexican domestic courts from Metalclad, the first we hear was an argument that the federal authorities, not Metalclad, but the federal authorities have a NAFTA obligation to go to court on behalf of investors to ensure the successful implementation of their business plans. And if they don't, they will violate Article 1105.

This submission is made in response to one of

| 43 | our primary submissions which is that Metalclad | |
|----|---|--|
| 44 | itself had domestic remedies available to it, | |
| 45 | exercised by it, and later abandoned with respect | |
| 46 | to the domestic legal issue that it faced. | |
| 47 | Nothing was said by Metalclad's counsel about | |
| | | |

Metalclad's exercise of those legal remedies. Nothing was said by the tribunal about Metalclad's exercise of those remedies. Instead, for the first time we hear -- nothing was said in response. Instead, for the first time we hear that the NAFTA obliges the federal government to take the municipality to court to resolve the constitutional difference between the two levels of government, all of which in response to -- to a question, well, isn't this -- on its face, this award, self-contradictory?

Now, that brings me to the tribunal's application of the wrong law in another respect, and that is in the respect of its approach to the Mexican domestic legal issue. And as we mentioned, and as I've just reiterated, when the tribunal in its award -- you will not find any reference to the Mexican domestic remedies, the -- the specific facts now I'm talking about, about the exercise -- the existence of the remedies, the exercise of the remedies, and the abandonment by Metalclad of those remedies in favour of negotiations with the municipality.

And I will -- I want to reply to my friend's response to -- to that.

My -- my friends don't disagree with me. They agree there is no reference, and they defend that. They defend that failure to refer by a reference to a portion of the award in paragraph 97 and footnote 4, but -- and I'll get to that.

But at this stage I'd like to just go back to the reasons, take them at face value, and ask the question whether or not this tribunal's doing its job, doing the job assigned to it, or doing something else. And I'd like you to turn to paragraph 79 of the award. At paragraph 79 of the award, the tribunal says:

"A central point in this case..."

And I emphasize for this tribunal a central point was an issue of Mexican domestic law.

| 43 | Now, the tribunal's award goes on to identify |
|----|--|
| 44 | two aspects of this issue, whether or not a |
| 45 | municipal permit was required at all or whether or |
| 46 | not a municipal permit was required, but this |
| 47 | tribunal could this this municipality in |
| | • • |

these circumstances could not refuse this permit application.

The -- the reasons are difficult to follow

with respect to those two aspects of the question. At one stage in the reasons, paragraph 105, the tribunal appears to hold -- says, taking them at face value, that the:

"...exclusive authority for siting and permitting a hazardous waste landfill resides with the Mexican federal government."

And that, if you took it as what was -- that there would be no requirement for any municipal permit if -- if that was a -- a correct finding. I'm going to come back to the question of correctness or incorrectness.

But at another stage in the award the tribunal, in paragraph 86, says:

"Even if Mexico is correct that a municipal construction permit was required..."

So I'm not clear where they land on the -- on the question, but I'm -- I just want to emphasize at this point it's central to their -- it's a central point as far as they're concerned.

At no stage in these -- in this award does the tribunal ask itself the question, are there domestic remedies available to Metalclad, to foreign investors, to address this issue of domestic law?

The correctness or incorrectness of the municipality's view of its jurisdiction was not an issue before this tribunal. And I say that it wasn't necessarily an issue either as a matter of Mexican domestic law or as a matter of fact. It was not a central point that needed to be resolved as if by a Mexican domestic court, which is the way the tribunal approached it.

| And I'm going to develop the point that in my |
|---|
| submission the tribunal's asked itself the wrong |
| question. The question should have been, in my |
| or the questions could have been in my submission |
| more along the lines of of the following: Was |
| |

the uncertainty arising from an unresolved
constitutional issue agreed by Metalclad's counsel
to be -- to involve a federal-municipal
confrontation, was the existence of that
uncertainty over a new law involve -- involving
environmental issues a violation of the mini -minimum standard of treatment in Article 1105?

Investors face uncertainty in the application of new laws, especially in federations, every day. This investor when it acquired this investment was aware of that uncertainty, and I'll be coming back to the option agreement to identify how this investor arranged its affairs, planned its affairs on account of that uncertainty. And if the existence of uncertainty arising from unresolved constitutional issues and environmental law is a violation of the NAFTA, then in the Beazer case, in the Hudson case, in the Rascal case, Canada is frequently violating Article 1105 of the NAFTA.

And I submit that that demonstrates both the -- the unreasonableness of -- of -- of that, if the proper question were asked, but also I -- I want to emphasize that what I -- the submission I'm making at this stage is that for an international tribunal charged with the responsibility to determine whether there's a violation of international law, that the fine points of -- of interpretation of domestic law are not matters that have been afforded to it.

It should look at the question, not with resolving correctness or incorrectness, but dealing with both. If the municipality's right or if they're wrong, does the existence of that uncertainty itself violate the NAFTA?

Now, another way to frame the question in this case, again being true to the findings of the -- of the tribunal, would be to say, well, in the face of a representation from a federal official with respect to the extent of municipal authority, and in the face of conflicting representations from municipal authorities with

| 13 | respect to their understanding of their |
|----------------|--|
| 14 | jurisdiction, does that amount to a violation of |
| 1 5 | the NAFTA? |
| 46 | Now, international law is clear, and and |
| 1 7 | I I I I will come back to to the way |

 my friend characterized international law as being somehow vague on this point. It's not.

At international law, rather that attempting to resolve fine disputes of domestic law, inter -- international law, especially under Article 1105, requires the tribunal to have regard to the entire legal system.

The ELSI case makes it clear that in testing questions like this, the question requires regard to the entire legal system, both to determine whether foreign investors are permitted access to that legal system to resolve these questions of Mexican domestic law, to ask the question whether there are remedies open to an investor to curb ultra vires acts. Without that examination, without the examination of the legal system as a whole, and as ELSI points out, where the legal system has been engaged without an examination of the specific findings of -- of the -- of the domestic courts, the international tribunal has not done its job.

Now, in this respect this tribunal made no mention of the legal system as a whole generally. They didn't examine the question of whether it was open to foreign investors generally. But more specifically, they did not examine the facts involving the specific exercise by Metalclad of the remedies open to it against this permit denial.

There is no reference in the award to the initiation by Metalclad of a writ of Amparo against the municipal permit denial of the finding of the Mexican domestic courts that that initiation had been done without exhaustion of the domestic remedy at the administrative level, and without reference to the abandonment of those domestic legal proceedings by Metalclad voluntarily as they stated before the tribunal -- and I'll come back to their change in position here, as they stated to the tribunal as a demonstration of good faith for -- in -- in respect of the negotiations with the State and the

| 43 | municipality. |
|----|--|
| 44 | Examination of those facts rather than the |
| 45 | substitution of the tribunal's view for domestic |
| 46 | law, examination of those facts would demonstrate |
| 47 | there was a legal system available to Metalclad to |

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1
      resolve these issues. It would reveal that it was
2
      Metalclad's voluntary abandonment of those
3
      remedies that took place in this case. It would
4
      allow -- it would permit -- recourse to those
5
      remedies would permit the domestic courts to
6
      resolve the central point. And who better suited
7
      to resolve an issue of Mexican domestic law than
8
      the Mexican courts? Certainly who better suited
      than a tribunal charged with applying
9
10
       international law?
11
          Now, on this point, and there's another point
12
       of agreement, Metalclad's counsel agreed that a
13
       violation of domestic law and a violation of
14
       international law are not co-equivalent. They
15
       exist at different levels. They are two separate
16
       issues.
17
          And I'm about to turn to replying to
18
       Metalclad's defence of the tribunal's failure to
19
       consider these facts, and it may be an appropriate
20
       point to take a break.
21 THE COURT: Yes. We'll take the afternoon break.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
23
       adjourned for the afternoon recess.
24
25
       (AFTERNOON RECESS)
26
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:02 P.M.)
27
       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 3:16 P.M.)
28
29 THE COURT: Yes. Continue, Mr. Foy.
30 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
31
          When I was going through the Chapter 18 point
       I had a note to -- that I would give you tomorrow
32
       the references that Mexico gave to the tribunal
33
34
       that it -- it saw this as a juridical issue, so
35
       I'll give you those tomorrow. But I forgot to
36
       tell you that when I was going through that --
37
       that portion.
38
          Where I was was making the point that on
39
       the -- again, identifying the point of agreement
40
       between us, that Metalclad agreed that the
41
       tribunal did not consider the existence or
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exercise of the local domestic remedies but

| 43 | defends that by reference to paragraph 97 and |
|----|---|
| 44 | footnote 4 of the award. |
| 45 | And in paragraph 97 the tribunal is |
| 46 | concluding its view of Mexican domestic law and |
| 47 | in and and stating its conclusion that the |

municipality's insistence upon the deny -- and denial of the construction permit in this instance was improper in its view of Mexican domestic law.

And then it footnotes this, it says:

"The question of turning to NAFTA before exhausting local remedies was examined by the parties. However, Mexico does not insist that local remedies must be exhausted. Mexico's position is correct in light of NAFTA Article 1121 which provides that a disputing investor may submit a claim under NAFTA Article 1117 if both the investor and the enterprise waive their rights to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any party any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing party that is alleged to be a breach referred to in NAFTA Article 1117."

And my friend took you to an exchange between President Lauterpacht and Mr. Thomas in the -- in the -- in the award and argued that it had been agreed by Mexico that local remedies did not need to be exhausted.

And -- and I'll point out that there may be a difference between the question of exhaustion and the question of whether or not those -- the remedies are completely irrelevant, the exercise of those remedies and the facts arising by reason of those exercising -- but -- but I'll come back to that.

First, dealing with the exchange between -sorry. So -- so he took you to that exchange
between President Lauterpacht and Mr. Thomas. And
then he argued that nothing in Article 1121
requires Metalclad to exhaust local remedies. So
those were his defence of the agreed-upon
proposition that this tribunal ignored those
facts.

Now, dealing first with the exchange between

Mr. Thomas and -- and President Lauterpacht, this exchange related not to this point at all. This exchange related to the meaning of Article 105 of the NAFTA. Article 105 is the -- was the subject of extensive debate and relates to the issue of

State responsibility for the acts of some nationals.

The debate, and I won't go into the details of it, but the debate centred on the fact that under the Free Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, there was express reference in the agreement when imposing obligations on local governments to the phrase -- to the use of the phrase local governments.

And the debate noted that in Article 105 that reference does not appear. The reference in Article 105 is to State and provincial governments.

That debate was dealt with by the tribunal in paragraph 73 of its award. And I took you to that in the opening and noted that, although Mexico's position was not set out fully in -- in paragraph 73, that Mexico did not base this application before Your Lordship upon any issue arising out of paragraph 73.

I'm merely pointing to the -- to the -- I'm at this point in the argument to point out that the -- this exchange that took place between the tribunal and counsel that my friend referred to had to do with Article 105, not with the point that I'm dealing with.

Now, the next defence by Metalclad of the ignoring by this tribunal of local remedies is the proposition that nothing in Article 1121 requires Metalclad to exhaust local remedies. Now again, this is a point that was not made by Mexico.

Mexico's point was that at international law, before a State will be found to have violated the minimum standard of treatment, of fair and equitable treatment, the entire legal system as a whole has to be considered.

A claim of this -- of this type, denial of fair and equitable treatment, is not ripe until those local remedies are exhausted, unless there is in these -- the system of laws of that country a denial of access to the laws, or denial of access to the courts to foreign investors, or some

| 43 | other denial of justice is made out in the in |
|----|--|
| 44 | the court proceedings themselves. |
| 45 | Article 1121 doesn't require the investor |
| 46 | to seek local remedies for local problems; |
| 47 | international law requires that before a violation |
| | |

 of this standard can be made out.

And again, counsel for Metalclad agreed with the proposition that when an investor comes to a Chapter 11 arbitration they carry the burden. The language that was used was that they carry the burden of demonstrating a violation of in this case Article 1105.

That burden cannot be discharged without an examination of the local remedies and a finding that they are wanting or in some way have specifically denied justice to this investor.

You'll recall that in the ELSI case the tribunal, after having examined in detail the remedies actually exercised, the tribunal then asked the question, well -- and having examined the -- the Court's treatment of those -- of those issues, then asked the question: Has the legal system as a whole failed the investor in this case?

And I point to this as an -- as an example, as a reply to my friend's submission that this tribunal did its job, did the job before it. In -- in my submission it did not.

Now, I want to treat separately the question of the relevance of local remedies and questions of expropriation in -- in dealing with Article 1121. But before I get to that, what Article 1121 does in the face of this principle of international law so far as 1105 is concerned is to say that if you're going to come to the NAFTA, you must file a waiver. That waiver relates to actions involving the measure but then says but not including injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief not involving a claim for damages.

That last phrase, and I -- I should get the precise phrase, and it's Article 11 -- in this particular case Article 1121(2)(b) that we're talking about, which the tribunal has noted in footnote 4, contains some of the language that the tribunal ascribes to it.

But the tribunal does not note the

| 43 | exception. If you go back to the award and |
|----|--|
| 44 | footnote 4, you'll see they set out the |
| 45 | introductory language with respect to that |
| 46 | waiver. And they stop at: |
| 47 | , , |

1 ' 2 '

"...alleged to be a breach referred to in NAFTA Article 1117..."

Without noting the language,

"...except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief not involving the payment of damages before an administrative tribunal or a Court under the law of the disputing party..."

No waiver is required with respect to those type of proceedings. International law requires those type of proceedings, or at least the examination of those type of proceedings before identifying any substantive breach of Article 1105.

You don't have a denial of the minimum standard of treatment where there exists domestic remedies available to the -- and -- to the foreign investor without an examination of the legal system as a whole.

If you -- if you -- and I -- if you take this again at the face of the award, this tribunal's view of Mexican domestic law, which as I've already indicated was an inquiry beyond its jurisdiction and unnecessary for its -- its jurisdiction, if you take their finding, then had -- and -- and credit it, then had Metalclad proceeded with -- and -- its domestic remedies and chosen the appropriate forum, it would have succeeded. It would have succeeded in obtaining a declaration, as the municipality -- or as this tribunal said, that the municipality's insistence upon and denial of this -- of this permit was improper.

Absent a finding that there's no legal remedy available to you, or you've been denied access to this remedy, again on -- on this tribunal's finding, if they had noted the existence of those remedies and the significance of that fact, they would have said you've got a domestic problem

here; you have a domestic legal problem. The gravamen of your complaint is an ultra vires act, not a violation of the NAFTA. Have you gone and exercised your remedies? We need to know that before we can pass upon whether there's any

international responsibility for Mexico.

Now, this tribunal did not engage in that inquiry. And they didn't because they say -- they -- they referred to -- my friend has taken you to a passage where he says Mexico didn't insist, and they've taken you to a passage that dealt with an entirely separate issue, Article 105

And then they take you to Article 1121 and say -- and -- and they say it doesn't require me to exhaust the remedies. Mexico didn't argue that. Mexico argued that international law requires that, that Article 1121 has a partial modification of that international rule, a partial modification which does not have any impact on proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief not involving the payment of damages.

The very proceedings that -- that Metalclad engaged in in this case, the writ of Amparo, is a constitutional remedy available to a private citizen to challenge the vires of the municipality's insistence upon and denial of the construction permit; that was the very case brought by Metalclad too as it turned -- initially they brought it without exhausting a -- a remedy that was available to correct that.

The -- and -- and as I noted, they later -- they later abandoned that proceedings (sic). And they said when they abandoned the -- that proceeding that they did so as a show of good faith towards the municipality in support of their negotiations. Now, what do they -- that's what they said to the tribunal.

What do they say now? They say now what they say in paragraph 375. They make here an allegation which is quite contrary to the -- what they admitted, and I took you to the admission, and it was paragraph 630 of the -- of the -- of -- of the record, but it was at -- I put it in my extracts at tab 69, where the fact that on October 31, 1996 COTERIN filed a motion before the Supreme

| 43 | Court withdrawing from the appeal regarding the |
|----------------|---|
| 14 | district judge decision to reject the Amparo that |
| 1 5 | it filed challenging the municipality's denial of |
| 46 | a construction permit. |
| 1 7 | And Metalclad's position on that allegation |
| | |

of fact was it was admitted. Metalclad notes that it withdrew its Amparo actions as a demonstration of good faith in the negotiations undertaken with the State and municipality, 6 -- 69 of the extract.

Now, they say it must be considered that the judge likely to hear any proceedings brought by Metalclad would be directly appointed by the governor. Well, first of all, that's a misstatement of fact. The proceedings would get to the federal level, to justices appointed at -- at the federal level.

Then they say Metalclad understandably had no confidence whatsoever in the integrity of the legal process, in its ability to provide a fair and impartial hearing of those issues affecting Metalclad. That -- that's quite a different statement than the one they made to the tribunal.

Then they say consequently Metalclad determined that it -- it had been treated unfairly and inequitably and properly sought relief pursuant to the NAFTA instead of proceeding under Mexican law.

That's their excuse now, a new excuse. And I'd -- if this had been the gravamen of their complaint, and if the tribunal had made such a finding, one thing is for sure: They would have to examine the existence, exercise and abandonment of the legal remedies; it would have to be part of their job to look at it. And if they found that there was no integrity in the legal process in Mexico, we'd have a different award. We don't have that award.

And the -- what we have instead is a complete failure by the tribunal to address the significance of these facts. And in my submission a -- an admitted omission, it's common ground that they didn't deal with it, and no defence to that in my submission to -- to that omission.

Now, I'd like to deal with -- excuse me. The -- my friend reminds me that I should emphasize, and I should, that -- that when the tribunal states article -- the content of Article
1121 in this footnote they -- this is the second
misstatement or failure to record the accurate
content of an article of -- of the NAFTA by this
tribunal. It was done in respect of Article 102.

And here's another example of, in this case, an incomplete -- the other case it's -- it's not of whole cloth, here is an incomplete statement of what Article 1121 in fact states.

Now, I'd like to stay with this issue and -- and deal with it -- deal slightly separately with the question of local remedies and expropriation, because the -- there are slightly different but ultimately no -- no difference in result.

If there were no Article 1121 and you were simply dealing with international law, then in my submission, if there was an act of expropriation by a State, the -- and -- and if there was a treaty like the NAFTA but without Article 1121, the investor would have to look around initially and see is there a local compensation board to whom I can seek compensation for this expropriation, and have to go there, or at least attempt to go there to determine whether or not there had been a taking without compensation.

Now, again the investor would have to do that because they bear the burden when they go to NAFTA of demonstrating under this -- under Article 1110 of a taking without compensation. And if there's a mechanism freely available to them at the domestic level to go to the local compensation board, they would not -- and they went there and obtained compensation, they would not be able to establish that there had been a taking without compensation.

So if they were successful, they would have no -- no claim at the international level. Now, Article 1121 appears to modify that in respect of claims for damages. Or, sorry, I'll put it another way. I'll put it in the language of the -- I'm -- I'm making a -- okay. In respect of claims other than claims for -- claims for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief not involving the payment of damages.

Now, the claim I've just described, if you'd go to the lo -- the local compensation board,

there's been an expropriation and you're -- you're
going there for compensation, it would not fall
within that -- within that language. It would be
a claim for compensation. And Article 1121
appears to allow an investor an option to go to

arbitration before or instead of -- or going to make the claim before the local compensation board. Now -- so long as that claim is waived.

That -- come back to our case. That's not our case. In our case what we have is a claim. The gravamen of the complaint was an ultra vires act by the municipality. The claim at the domestic level, the claim that this tribunal elevated to the international level was not a claim at the local compensation board for compensation for an expropriation.

The Amparo that was initiated was for, as I understand it, a -- a -- a declaration the municipality had either the obligation to -- to extend the permit or was wrong in denying the permit. That type of claim is completely unaffected by Article 1121.

And again, in respect of this -- in -- in respect of this case we have no ripened expropriation. If they go off to the domestic court, if they convince the domestic court that, yes, we're right, that this tribunal's view of domestic law is correct, then of course the municipal denial would be dealt with and nothing would stand in the way of -- you know, that would be resolved. The -- this -- the domestic legal issue would have been resolved.

Now, Article 1121 does not on whatever reading its given make irrelevant these facts of -- that Metalclad both contracted to do this when they bought this investment and did it in respect of these very -- this -- these very events.

And as I -- as I mentioned, not -- not hearing -- other than this defence about the tribunal was entitled to ignore that, the first you heard of the legal remedies available in Mexico from Metalclad's counsel was this -- this morning when you heard that it was the federal authorities that ought to have initiated a constitutional challenge.

And it -- and again, in dealing with this

overall question has this tribunal done its job, in my submission its failure to examine those facts, to consider them as totally irrelevant and to -- failure to deal with the significance in international law of the existence, exercise and

 abandonment of remedies has not done its job.

Now, another point was made by my friends with respect to this issue of local remedies. And -- and it was -- annex 1120.1 was pointed to. And annex 1120.1, on the basis of this it was suggested -- it was suggested that an investor should be very careful before they exercise local remedies in Mexico because of the terms of -- of this provision.

My friends in making those submissions failed to understand a fundamental principle of Mexican law that is entirely different from Canadian and United States law, and it's as follows: Under Mexican law a treaty like the NAFTA becomes domestic law. It does not need legislation to be implemented. And I'll come back to the situation in Canada and the United States. It becomes Mexican domestic law.

So in Mexico, and in Mexico alone of the three countries, it is open to anyone, because it's domestic law, to seek to allege a violation of the NAFTA itself in the domestic courts in Mexico. It's part -- this is part of Mexican domestic law.

And what annex 1120 deals with is a situation where an investor attempts to do that, rely upon the NAFTA in a Mexican domestic court, or an alleged violation of the NAFTA, and also go to a Chapter 11 arbitration panel and rely on the violation of the NAFTA, and it speaks to that situation.

Now, of course, again it has no application to the facts of this case. This investor did not allege a violation of the NAFTA in the Mexican domestic courts. This investor alleged a violation of the Mexican constitution in a writ of Amparo, a different law than this.

This annex is only necessary in the case of Mexico because under Canadian law treaties are not self-executing. They are not implemented as domestic law unless Parliament passes legislation, in some cases the legislative assembly passes

| 13 | legislation making them part of domestic law. |
|----------------|--|
| 14 | And you'll recall, Mr. Thomas took you |
| 1 5 | through it, that that happened with respect to |
| 46 | those changes required to Canadian law to |
| 17 | implement Chapter 19 of this agreement. |
| | |

 There were consequential amendments that are now part of domestic law to implement those changes. But Article 1105, Article 1110 are not Canadian domestic law.

In the United States it's slightly more complicated. The NAFTA is what's called a congressionally approved executive agreement under U.S. law and, with that status, is not self-executing in the United States. It -- it too, as in Canada, has to be implemented by legislation.

Things that are treaties which are ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, treaties under U.S. law are self-executing. This is not one of them. And -- and for that reason in both Canada and the United States the NAFTA's not part of Mexican (sic) domestic law, but in Mexico it is and that's the reason for annex 1120.1.

And again, it's -- although my -- counsel for Metalclad relied upon it as a defence for the proposition that it was appropriate to ignore Mexican legal remedies, it -- it has no application. There were no Mexican legal remedies attempted to be initiated in the domestic courts of Mexico alleging a -- a direct violation of the provisions of the -- of the NAFTA.

Now, in its response to one of your questions, My Lord, the -- well, I'll come back to that.

I'll deal with the point that was made that these are not jurisdictional errors as they only involve the interpretation of Article 1121, that the tribunal -- that my friend's saying -- okay. Well, all right. Let's assume that the tribunal's got it wrong, again with respect to Article 1121; this is not jurisdictional. And in my submission it is jurisdictional for this reason:

Article 1121 is part of Section B of Chapter 11 and is one of the -- what I would call the constating provisions of the jurisdiction of Chapter 11 tribunals. It is one of the provisions like Article 1116 and 1117 that gives these

| tribunals their jurisdiction. |
|--|
| And Your Lordship knows that in the analogous |
| context of the powers and and I say |
| analogous. I don't say it's exactly the same. |
| But in the analogous context of a for example, |
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1 another subordinate body that has a limited 2 jurisdiction which is constrained by its 3 constating provisions, like a municipality in 4 Canadian law, Your Lordship is aware, and I took 5 you to the Rascal case in which the Supreme Court 6 of Canada has recently confirmed that the 7 correctness standard is applied to review of a 8 tribunal's interpretation of a provision that 9 gives it jurisdiction.

> Once it has jurisdiction, and it's within the scope of its powers, then the exercise of those powers may be subject to a different standard of review. But on the question of its jurisdiction, a correctness standard is applied to review.

> And in my submission the misinterpretation of Article 1121 and its effect somehow to make irrelevant all of these -- the existence, exercise and abandonment of local remedies was a iurisdictional error.

Excuse me.

This -- this particular jurisdictional error was compounded in this case by not only ignoring the local remedies, the domestic remedies, but by this tribunal seeing itself as a Mexican domestic court and seeing itself as required, a central issue, to resolve fine issues of Mexican domestic law.

So the -- the two errors of jurisdiction are interrelated. And as interrelated, they both -both involve what I started out with, which is the proposition that the tribunal has identified the incorrect applicable law and basically has done a job not assigned to it by the consent of the party -- of the parties to the -- to this arbitration.

Now, My Lord, I'm about to move on to a new topic and I think it would be, from my perspective, if it's convenient for Your Lordship, to take a slightly early break and -- and resume tomorrow morning.

41 THE COURT: Particularly in view of the fact that we weren't even planning on sitting this afternoon

- 43 I --
- 44 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord, yes. And I apologize for the miscommunication in that regard, it
- 46 appears to have been mine.
- 47 THE COURT: It mattered not. It didn't cause any

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      significant problems.
      So we will adjourn for the day and reconvene at 10 tomorrow morning.
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4 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
      adjourned until the 2nd of March at 10 a.m.
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      (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:55 P.M.)
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