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                   28 February 2001 - Certified
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                   Vancouver, B.C.
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      (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 10:05 A.M.)
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6 THE REGISTRAR: In the Supreme Court of British
7
      Columbia in chambers at Vancouver on this the 28th
8
      day of February 2001, in the matter of the United
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      Mexican States versus Metalclad Corporation,
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       My Lord.
11 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Cowper.
12 MR. COWPER: Thank you, My Lord.
          Last evening I had just concluded Chapter 4.
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       And I looked at my notes overnight, and there are
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       two or three things that I should say before
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       moving to Chapter 5.
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          Yesterday I dealt with what in our view
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       constitutes the only possible -- or if I can say
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       it this way, potential issue of jurisdiction, and
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       that is relating to my friend's argument
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       concerning transparency.
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          My friend in his written submission
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       essentially asserts that that error as he alleges
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       it, jurisdictional in nature as he says it to be,
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       infected both the finding under 1105 and 1110.
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          With respect to that, let me say generally
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       that with respect to the interpretation of 1110
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       and the authorities under 1110, you'll find our
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       submissions in the chapter I'll come to later,
       which is -- and it's in response to my friend's
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       chapter concerning alleged errors of law. That's
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       at Chapter 8 and following.
33 THE COURT: Um-hum.
    MR. COWPER: So I haven't dealt with 1110 in the
       chapter I've just covered. I deal with the proper
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36
       interpretation in Chapter 8.
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          Let me say this, and that is: On a fair
       reading of the award in my submission, the finding
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       under 1110, that is the first finding, is not
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       infected by my friend's allegation respecting
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       transparency. And for that reason, as I've dealt
       with it, it is an issue of interpretation, I say
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43	it's not capable of being a jurisdictional point.
44	That's my position with respect to the first
45	finding on 1110.
46	And I say that because, with respect to the
47	finding of expropriation, the issue is not whether

the processes were fair, but fundamentally what was the net effect of the aggregate conduct?

And the difference between 1105 and 1110 on the tribune -- tribunal's own wording essentially is whether in addition to being unfair it essentially constitutes a permanent deprivation of property under 1110. And so I say -- although my friend very briefly says the one infects the other, I equally briefly say they don't. There's no natural transition from a finding of 1105 with references to transparency to saying the finding in 1110 is necessarily infirmed if the transpare -- transparency goals of the treaty are unavailable to the arbitrators.

I say further that with respect to the issue of jurisdiction that the tribunal's finding, if I'm correct that they made an additional finding with respect to the effect of the Ecological Decree, has nothing to do with transparency. That's a finding based upon a separate governmental act construed by the tribunal as affecting separately the permanent deprivation of property by quite a separate governmental decision, which is the Ecological Decree issued by the State.

And so I say that with respect to the second finding, that on my friend's argument there is no evident jurisdictional complaint. And indeed, unless my friend establishes in my submission that that is not an independent ground, that there is no jurisdictional ground that has -- attacks or is capable of attacking the second finding of 1110.

I do agree that if my friend's submissions with respect to the amendment of the claim are correct, in other words, if he successfully attacks the tribunal's finding of jurisdiction on amendment, that that would then constitute a means by which the second finding on 1110 could be done away with. But I say, in effect, he has to succeed on that as it relates to the second finding on 1110.

I hope that's helpful.

43	With respect to a number of interpretive
44	issues, I would ask you as well to note in this
45	chapter I'm going to come, when I come to the
46	errors of law, to three important cases. And I
47	haven't dealt with them yesterday, and I've chosen

to deal with them on interpretation.

My friend has a different view of their impact but I will deal with the Biloune case, the ELSI case that my friend put some emphasis on in his submission to you, as well as the Myers case as it relates to the -- to the matter largely, when I come to it, to the error.

I should say, and I'll -- I'll take you to this when I -- when I take you back to Myers, that the separate opinion of Schwartz in Myers comments on the transparency argument, and says that in his view it makes sense or it is sensible but he's not going to find it because in his view there was inadequate argument, and he -- it's unnecessary for his purposes.

But that passage in Myers is helpful in my submission because it shows that another international lawyer looking at this does not see the conclusion reached by this tribunal as lying outside the debate between international lawyers concerning the proper interpretation of these provisions.

So what I'd like to do today then is I'll -- I'll turn to the facts, which is really Chapter 5, and deal with those. And we will then -- I'll deal with Chapter 6, which is the separate submissions made with respect to the allegations of improper conduct.

We'll be dealing -- and I think we'll have more than sufficient time today to deal with Chapter 7. And we may get to the errors in law by the end of the day, it really depends on how quickly I go through the facts.

Turning to Chapter 5, I'd like to make a couple of general observations which I haven't made in the document and which really arise from the manner in which my friend has approached the facts. And let me start with what I have attempted to do in Chapter 5 and what I haven't attempted to do.

We have not attempted in Chapter 5 to lay out before you all of the evidence on any of the

.3	points raised by my friends. We've selected
4	evidence, and it is decidedly selected.
-5	I do that because the burden which I see I
-6	have here is only to per persuade Your Lordship
7	that there was contrary evidence or a body of

 evidence on which the tribunal could find the conclusions it had made which are under attack under this section by my friend.

In -- in my respectful submission, one of the difficulties the Court's faced with in this proceeding is that the parties are not joined with respect to the nature of the factual issues below. And to some extent I say with respect to my friend that he did not endeavour to do that for the benefit of the Court in his factual submission. He did not endeavour to say what in his view as counsel were the two views of the facts. He, rather, selected out facts which in his view on the evidence made the conclusion in his submission patently unreasonable.

One of the difficulties in a case where Your Lordship is faced with that type of record is that the Court has -- and I -- and I say with respect ought to have some unease about the total body of fact that underlie the conclusions of the tribunal. And I'll try to indicate to you in my submission what I see, the nature of the issues joined.

But there's no doubt that under Chapter 5 you will find by and large a counterpart to my friend's Chapter 5, which is selections of Metalclad's view of the facts and Metalclad's witnesses.

By way of general overview, let me say though in complete answer to this chapter that in not one case in my submission has my friend argued that there is no contrary evidence. On no fact found by the tribunal explicitly or implicitly has my friend asserted that there was no contrary evidence.

And so as a preliminary issue, it's important for me to say this, and that is: In my submission the -- what my friend characterizes as patently unreasonable test ought not to be applied to questions of fact. The question of fact in my submission only elevates itself in this context to a question of law if it can be said that there was

no contrary evidence or no evidence available to the tri -- tribunal. And as in a more judicial setting, the tribunal must be taken to have listened to the evidence and the submissions of the parties, and to have taken into account the

 body of evidence that was laid before them.

And I want in that connection to say this: You have one unusual access to the process in that there's not only a transcript of the evidence but a transcript of the submissions.

And -- and I simply say this: It's not necessary for Your Lordship, but if you have any concerns, because an aspect of my friend's argument is, well, here's a fact, and I'm going to say there's lots of contrary facts. But even there, part of my friend's message to you is, well, why wasn't that dealt with either more expressly, more comprehensively or more inclusively if they didn't accept it?

If you dip into this record and you dip into any part of the transcript you will see a tribunal that is engaged, a tribunal that asks intelligent questions, a tribunal that tells counsel what its reaction is to the relevance of what's being presented in a reasoned way and which repeatedly offers counsel and the parties opportunities to persuade them to the contrary and to present their -- their point of view.

And I say -- and -- and it's perhaps notable that my friend has not seriously challenged or sought to use the record of the submissions before the Court to support any finding that the tribunal was doing anything other than honestly and industriously trying to come to grips with the facts and the law, legal issues that were before them.

Now, the final comment I want to make, because I've dealt with the facts as my friend has put before them, is I do want to say this, and that is: My friend's submission and my chapter will not give you anything other than a -- a -- a slight introduction to the true colours of the battle on the facts before the tribunal.

And you have from the award what I've said yesterday was a restrained set of conclusions. You should and ought to know that there were vigorous positions taken by Metalclad and equally

43	vigorous positions taken by Mexico which the
14	tribunal did not decide were necessary to resolve
1 5	to conclude whether the claims were made out or
16	not. And let me just give you two quick examples.
1 7	But it's important because, for example,

Mexico's fundamental factual premise, as I read the record, certainly one of their fundamental factual premises was that this entire claim from stem to stern was a part of an overall securities fraud by Metalclad.

And the proof -- perhaps the easiest way to introduce that is if you read the cross-examination of the president of Metalclad, Mr. Kesler, and I don't have a time knot on it, but you can go for about two hours of transcript in his cross-examination before you get to anything that deals with the issues we've spoken of to this point in the hearing.

They deal with securities filings, securities disclosure, the state of the company and otherwise, all in aid of a proposition that the claim was brought in bad faith, that Metalclad had acted in bad faith throughout, and that its Chapter 11 filing was an attempt to rescue itself from the consequences of its own securities misdealing and the misconduct of its officers in managing the business.

On the other hand there is a substantial body of evidence which was present in declarations and other forms in which Metalclad said that the picture of the facts and conduct by the federal government, the State government and the municipality could be indicted as being motivated by improper motives. And I won't in this context, because I don't need to, and the tribunal didn't make any findings, tell you about those.

But there was a substantial body of evidence which Metalclad put into the record in support of the view that if you had to explain what happened here, a full explanation would require you to make findings of credibility against the governor of the State, against the municipal president and against other Mexican witnesses.

Now, it's obvious from the tribunal's award that they did not find it necessary to come to grips with those issues of fact.

And in its closing Metalclad conceded that it

43	could not make out on persuasive evidence some of
14	its allegations of impropriety, or and it chose
1 5	to render and to submit its case on the more
46	modest basis which is reflected in the award.
17	The reason I'm saying it though is is that
	, , ,

if you want to know what happened below, you have to understand that the award reflects a restrained conclusion and that there were many issues of credibility between the parties, many issues in which people -- one witness said another was lving, that there were many issues of just downright this person is lying about that meeting, that didn't take place, that did take place, I didn't say it, I did say it, there were improper motives here, the company is acting as a --essentially a fraudulent actor there, none of which in my respectful submission are required for determination by Your Lordship on a review of this award.

Now, if I can then turn to Chapter 5 with that introduction, and I've tried, and I may be unduly simpleminded here, but I see the various letters, and I think we go A to T in my friend's chapter, and I've -- I think they really fall into three headings. And these are inexact, but they may be useful for the organization of my presentation.

By and large let -- as I see it, letters D to L deal with permits and federal approval, it may be C to L in fact. And then M, N, O and P deal with essentially municipal process and the facts relating to the municipality. And then there's a miscellaneous grab bag, if I may say, from Q onwards dealing with some matters such as the relative expertise of the witnesses, terms of the Mexican constitution and municipal law, and the effect of the Ecological Decree. So I think it's useful to think in those three terms. And I'm going it try as I go through to refer in my references to which of those headings it fits into.

By way of the broadest possible overview on the first heading, if it's useful too for Your Lordship to know where I'm going, I say that virtually all of my friend's submissions respecting permits, legal advice, the terms of the permits, the option agreement, federal

13	representations and the like fail to account for
14	the findings of the tribunal respecting subsequent
15	events, the terms of subsequent permits and the
16	evidence respecting subsequent facts.
17	And I'm going to come back to this with

detail, but it may be useful for you to hear just sort of a one-sentence summary of where I'm going with respect to some of these matters.

So, for example, with respect to the terms of the original refusal, I'm going to take you to it and say that on its face the '91 refusal was based on the absence of federal permits and State permits which were later obtained by the company, and that the fact that there was an earlier refusal on its face is unpersuasive with respect to the refusal in 1995 by the municipality.

With respect to the legal advice, I'll say that, with respect to my friend, he takes legal advice, the total colour of which is this is a risk, and converts it into the company acknowledged and surrendered to authority of the municipality.

On the whole of the evidence it's very clear that the tribunal found as a fact that Metalclad believed and acted on the basis of representations by federal authorities that the municipality did not have lawful authority. And it equally found that Metalclad sought to solve the political situation by addressing the municipality and satisfying them, even though they did not regard them as having lawful authority.

And with respect to that general area, I'm going to take you to the permits and the subsequent correspondence. And the central point is a historical point, which is forgetting what's happening early in the piece, the -- the central dates of importance are from the spring of '94 through to the fall of '95, because that's when construction of one form or another starts. That's when you have the stop work order in the fall. You have the continuing construction. You have the completion of the construction and the demonstration. You have the long period of time when the permit application is outstanding. You have the conclusion of the Convenio. And you have the application and the successful obtaining of an injunction by the municipality as it relates to

13	their challenge to the Convenio and their refusal
14	of the permit.
15	Now, that's the time period which is most
16	exhaustively and and comprehensively discussed
17	by the tribunal, and I'm going to say correctly

so, because in each respect those facts answer my friend's concerns.

Heading to the next one-sentence answer, my friend put to you the option agreement as a fact early in the -- in the piece, and he said with some care that he did not argue that this represented the final form of agreement between the parties. And I thank him for that.

But the significance of this was that the contrary case in the evidence was that Mr. Kesler said subsequent to that option they waived that provision because they received reassurances that the municipal permit was not necessary, and that if they applied for it, it would be issued as a matter of course, and I'll take you to those specific passages.

With respect to my friend's reliance on the fact that Mexico's witnesses were consistent in denying the existence of federal representations, that of course requires the complete renunciation of Rodarte's evidence, which my friend, I think, more or less conceded. But, however criticized, it was evidence that was available to the tribunal under their reasons. But also more directly -- and if you actually go to the reply filed by Metalclad, they rely upon the evidence of witnesses other than Rodarte extensively with respect to the proof of federal representations, and I'll take you to it.

But there is a substantial body of evidence about federal representations. And as the tribunal in my submission properly found, the most important period is what happens when the stop work order is issued? What happens when the company which has been constructing for some period of time, maybe halfway through, I don't know, you know, what construction timeline you're talking about, but substantial construction has been on at least through the fall of '94 -- they get this, and what happens?

And as you know, the tribunal found effectively that Metalclad believed that if they

43 applied they would get the answer. And I say
44 there was a substantial body of evidence to
45 substantiate not only the -- the good faith of
46 that conclusion, but also the rationality of it,
47 which was they had federal and State permits by

that time, they had federal representations at that time to that effect, and I'll take you to the evidence. And not only that, as the tribunal notes, shortly thereafter they got further federal authority in relation to the very project, and I'll take you to that.

With respect to the -- the point on remedial construction, it's difficult to encompass it in one sentence, because in my submission my friend takes that as an ahistorical event when of course it's in my submission a very historical event, which was: In Metalclad's evidence, it said in the summer of '94 when we had started construction we had various permits and authorities, but we were asked by federal authorities to go slow on construction because of the assassination and the pendency of the presidential election which was in August of that year.

However, Metalclad said after the election in the fall of '94 and going through to the spring of '95, the -- the construction continued to pace, increased its pace and was open and obvious to evidence. And there's a tonne of evidence with respect, and I've selected some. But there's a tonne of evidence and reason to accept that the construction in the fall of '94 through to the winter of '95 was obvious to everybody and was not possibly capable of being characterized as limited to remediation or maintenance.

There was evidence about remediation and maintenance work, and Metalclad included that, that there was no doubt that there was such work going on, but that the construction of the facility later in '94 and '95 was not understood by anybody to be limited to that, including the municipality.

With respect to my friend's assertion concerning the federal closure order, I'll take you to that order. And there was a contrary case with respect to the federal closure order, and it was a very simple one, which was the federal closure order was the closure of COTERIN's site

43	which was a transfer site. And it expressly
44	contemplated continuing federal oversight and
45	additional authorities being granted.
46	In other words, it was a closure order
47	subject to further and other authorities, and I'll

take you to the chain of permits which flow between then and '95 and '96 which are -- which are continuously coming out of the federal government and which authorized works. They authorized construction. They authorize other works. They authorize, for example, the partial reme -- I don't know if remediation is the right word, but the proper storage, if you will, of the existing facility as well as the construction of what was built.

And -- and I say with respect, having looked at the record, I don't think there was a contrary case. The federal closure order was clearly subject to subsequent orders and subsequent orders flowed.

My friend took the view that one of the points of the earlier permit was that it had a paragraph referring to local permits. I'll take you to that. With respect, on a fair reading of that document, I don't think anybody would have thought that was a warning sign, that you had to go out and get a municipal permit in relation to the facility. And there's a substantial body of evidence about oral representations and documents which indicate the contrary.

Within the document itself, it indicates the kinds of authority you have to get from a -- another corresponding authority that fall outside the scope of hazardous waste, such as dumping or removal of land elsewhere in the municipality, and those are indicated with precision. And there was a substantial body of evidence that they weren't necessary for the operation of this facility, and therefore those permits, which are not even suggested by my friend to be necessary here, had to be obtained. And those are expressly referred to in the body of the permit.

And my friend takes, I think, the penultimate paragraph, which is essentially boilerplate, and says how can Metalclad today say that they -- that the municipality didn't have authority?

With respect to municipal process, I -- I say

that the findings of the tribunal in respect of the process are made out in the evidence. If you read any of the evidence here it's quite clear the municipality had no process for receiving or issuing permits at all. And I think in the

 substance of my friend's presentation he came to accept that, that the municipal application for Amparo, that it's a reasonable conclusion for the tribunal to conclude that the municipality was uninterested in the application, uninterested in the permit application, until it became politically necessary to take steps against the landfill site, and not for any legitimate regulatory purpose.

With respect to what the argument characterizes as an agreement to operate as a non-hazardous site, I -- my friend, I think, fairly in his material -- it's characterized as an agreement in places, but I think in his oral presentation, he made it clear to Your Lordship that it was an offer, not an agreement, but an offer. And I -- on Friday, frankly, with respect to that, I think I dealt with that as fully as -- as I need to, but I'll give you some specific references.

And then finally with respect to the miscellaneous category, I say that there are express, clear and reasonable conclusions with respect to the municipal law. And I use -- or domestic law, which includes constitutional, State and municipal legal conclusions which were made, and that it was a question of fact for the tribunal, and that the relative expertise of the witnesses, which my friend vigorously assails in the submission, was not a matter that comes even approaching a question of law, much less a cause to set aside the award.

And I may say this in my material: I actually observe, and I think it's -- it's something that's fair to observe in this context, that far from the expert witnesses for Metalclad being the justifiable object of criticism, you have a situation here where the United States of Mexico had decided to respond to this claim by saying this is -- and in fact some of the witnesses say this is something we learn in kindergarten, that the municipality has this

43	authority. This is a universal fact which all
44	Mexicans adhere to.
45	The lawyers for Metalclad said effectively
46	nonsense. What the United Mexican States are
47	saying is simply a distortion and a

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41 42

1 misrepresentation of their own law. And frankly, 2 lawyers who are willing to do that I think ought 3 to be regarded as having integrity and courage 4 rather than being criticized for not being closer 5 to the Mexican United States. 6 And with respect to selecting who got the law 7 right, you had, beyond any doubt, on the panel a 8 person who was more capable than anybody in this 9 room of deciding what the proper Mexican law was 10 in the form of Mexico's appointed professor of 11 law, Mr. Siqueiros or Dr. Siqueiros. 12 THE COURT: But by saying that, aren't you suggesting that then, therefore, he made the finding of 13 14 domestic law rather than finding it as a matter of 15 fact? 16 MR. COWPER: No. I'm saying that for somebody who has to -- and it's clear from the transcript that all 17 18 of the panelists understood it to be a finding of 19 fact, but that if -- if you're dealing with an 20 issue of law and selecting between two expert 21 treatments of a foreign law, that someone who's 22 familiar with a foreign law can more readily 23 understand the arguments respecting both sides 24 than someone who has a complete new introduction 25 to it. That's all I'm saying. I say there's no 26 support for the conclusion that the tribunal did 27 anything other than find this as a question of 28 fact before them. 29 Now, when you say -- and it's important of 30 course that the process of finding the law when 31 you're sitting as a tribunal and the question of 32 law, it's a question of fact before you, is the 33 same process that a lawyer undertakes in arriving 34 at a legal question if he's reaching a -- you 35 know, it still remains a legal question, but it's 36 a question of fact having regard to the containing 37 views of the law on the evidence before you. All

I'm saying is you had three people who are

international lawyers who approached it as a

question of fact, and one of them was familiar with the legal system that was before him.

Now, I'd like to then, if you could, turn to

Chapter 5, and I can skip through some of this.
You should note in respect of Section B, which I
deal with at page 91, and there's a whole bunch of
evidence on this issue. But with respect to my
friend's characterization of the municipality and

the community and the political climate, you ought to know there was a substantial contest between the parties as to whether in fact the local community supported or opposed this.

And Metalclad's theory of fact, which it led substantial evidence on, was there was no genuine political opposition to this. It was motivated by political decisions made by officials, rather than acting on the will of the people, which was what was said in the evidence.

And the principal places that I -- I'm sorry, the principal points of evidence are that the -- Metalclad in fact conducted polling. Metalclad called witnesses or filed declarations of people who said this project has substantial support because it provides jobs, the local people do not object to its -- its conduct. And then there was a whole body of evidence that was led by Mexico to the contrary. All I'm indicating is that wasn't an accepted fact before the tribunal. The tribunal didn't find it necessary to reach a conclusion on that, but you ought to know that that was one of the contests in the evidence before them.

If you go to page 92, I'd like, if I could -- my friend filed as part of his case a -- black and white photographs of what I think he -- I think somewhat ungraciously referred to as a building and a hole in the ground, which is my -- my client's site and facility.

If you could go to our extracts, which are the blue binders, and I'm going to be dealing with this for the rest of the presentation, so you may want to have those at hand.

And at 44 we have provided coloured photocopies for Your Lordship of photographs of the site. And I believe these are all photographs which my friend filed in -- in black and white or in -- in less quality in any event.

Are you at that tab?

41 THE COURT: I am.

42 MR. COWPER: I'm not going to deal with each one, but

43	you'll see that the first one is an evaporation
44	pond. And that membrane is an aspect of the
45	operation of the of a facility like this.
46	You can skip the next one. The next one
47	shows the collection ditch.

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3
       I believe, to the Triple A report, which is what
4
      it says at the top left. But you'll see if you go
5
       to what's called page 1, but it's about five pages
       in --
6
7 THE COURT: I have it.
   MR. COWPER: -- you have a facility entrance and
9
       guardhouse. Down at the bottom you'll see there's
10
       a number of buildings, view of the buildings
11
       area. I can say parenthetically I don't think
12
       you're going to hide that.
13
          If you go over to the next page, you'll see
14
       there's a view over cell 4. At the bottom is the
15
       change house, that's for employees.
16
           Over at 5 is a storage area for drums
17
       containing materials.
18
           Page -- photo 6 is the truck unloading dock.
19
          At 7 there's a view of the truck scale and
20
       weigh house.
21
          At 8 there's a view of the faculty su --
22
       facility substation, the overhead power lines to
23
       the underground.
24
           Over at 9 you'll see that this is a view of
25
       the completed cells, 1 to 3. And I'm reasonably
26
       sure, although my grasp of the record isn't of
27
       course what my friend's is, but what those show is
28
       what happens after the proper storage of the
29
       photographs my friend showed you. The coloured
30
       photographs of the barrels all on the surface
31
       and -- and the things that he was criticizing
32
       which were left with the prior owners, Metalclad
       took those materials and under federal supervision
33
34
       put them into cells. And "cells" just describe
35
       the constructed pit and whatever, whether there's
36
       a membrane or not, the constructed pit and then
37
       the materials are put in and then put in the top.
       And there are various facilities for the
38
39
       gathering, depending upon whether it's a permanent
40
       or a temporary facility.
41 MR. FOY: I don't --
42 MR. COWPER: Is this wrong?
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And you don't need to worry about the maps.

If you go to the -- and these were exhibits,

- 43 MR. FOY: Yes. Yes. This is what has to be
- 44 remediated. This is the --
- 45 MR. COWPER: Yeah. I'm not --
- 46 MR. FOY: -- mixed together --
- 47 MR. COWPER: Yeah, absolutely.

1 MR. FOY: Oh, okay.

2 MR. COWPER: That's what I'm saying.

3 MR. FOY: I thought you said it was properly stored.

4 MR. COWPER: No, no.

What I'm saying is -- and I think I'm -- I think I'm right on this -- I remain right on this, is my friend gave you a photograph of everything on the surface, barrels lying aclutter (sic), et cetera.

What happened is under supervision they said before you remediate those hazardous wastes, they're not even properly stored right now. And Metalclad put them in these cells. And then the plan was to take the materials out of these cells to neutralize them, to properly treat them, to put them in proper storage areas and put them in other sites, and I believe that's correct.

Well, my friend and I can talk off the record, but I believe that's correct.

The -- the bottom is a view of a cell being constructed with -- with membranes.

Now, my friend said there's a hole in the ground and a building. And with respect, that's not an accurate characterization of the facility. But most importantly, one of the central issues of fact is can you build what you've just seen in a municipality which my friend says has never had any commercial activity, has never had anybody other than subsistence farmers wandering with their burros, can you build that and use the labour to build it and the mayor doesn't know what's going on, for not only 13 months but potentially a much longer period of time.

And the tribunal was asked to accept the explanation that for a substantial period of time no one knew that was going on. And I say with respect that's just as preposterous today as it was before the tribunal.

And if you go back to C, I'd like to take you to the -- the history that I deal there with the prior site.

And if you could go to tab 43, and if you'd

- 43
- make a note -- it's generally in reference to this, but you can make a note under paragraph 272, 44
- go to previous tabs. And my understanding is this is what was marked as the September '91 order. 45
- 46
- It's a translation, I believe. 47

42

client.

1 And -- do you have that tab? 2 THE COURT: Um-hum. 3 MR. COWPER: And this is a federal order by SEDUE as it then was, and it's obviously not everything. 4 5 But if you go to the next page, you'll see, as --6 and you have to go about ten lines up: 7 [All quotations herein cited as read] 8 9 "As per official letter dated September 3, 10 '91 the total temporary closure of the 11 company was determined from this moment and 12 until further legal resolution. It is 13 clarified closure seals were not placed in 14 the access doors at this moment so the 15 company may withdraw and return to its places of origin the 170 tonnes of 16 hazardous waste described above." 17 18 19 And that is the medical waste as I read it. 20 and that's clear from the second paragraph on the 21 first page of this exhibit. And it says: 22 23 "Once this is done the closure seals will 24 be placed. The company is forbidden from 25 this moment on to introduce any type of 26 waste or material or to continue with the 27 construction of the works that the company 28 has been performing until a competent area 29 of this Secretary of State resolves 30 whatever may proceed." 31 32 So I -- the difference between my friend and 33 I is there was a closure order, but I say with 34 respect that my friend's presentation doesn't take 35 into account that this order naturally 36 contemplated ongoing federal oversight and 37 potential approval of development of the site. And what happened between now and the next 38 39 ongoing approvals were of course further federal 40 approvals, not only to COTERIN, but also of

importance to COTERIN when it was owned by my

43	And I simply say that what you have to do is
44	read that in the light of all the subsequent
45	federal permits which were granted, and I'll take
46	you to a number of them.
47	Now

THE COURT: In -- in your paragraph 272 you -- you - you refer to this -- this document. Do I take it
 then that there's a typographical error in 272 in
 referring to 1992 as opposed to September - MR. COWPER: Yeah, I think it's September '91. I'm
 sorry about that. Thank you.

Now, at page 94 I've given you a -- I've already given you the references and the award which I've quoted at the bottom of 276. And -- and I say beyond any doubt the tribunal was aware of the issue of remediation and dealt with it in its findings respecting the Convenio.

And the Convenio was the conclusion of a -- a massive amount of evidence, of -- of things going back and forth with respect to how -- that -- this was going to operate, how it was going to move forward. The -- the permits are in relation to different matters. There's certainly an ongoing debate with respect to whether the company would be allowed to remediate at the same time it operated.

As you know, the municipality said and sought to have the federal governments disallow concurrent operation and remediation. The company said we can't do it otherwise. And that conclusion in the Convenio was to -- was to effectively side with the company and say concurrent remediation and operation will be permitted.

And it -- I don't think there can be any doubt that's what the Convenio permits, among many other matters.

Now, the other -- at the bottom of 95 it's of some importance, I think, for Your Lordship to know that in addition to permits and other matters, and there's a -- a very substantial body of evidence, only some of which was marked, about the efforts that were made by the company to commission environmental audits, audits of the site, geological studies -- or I don't know if that's the exact phrase, but suitability studies with respect to the nature of the -- the clay and

- the geology of -- of the site, to satisfy the environmental authorities of the federal 43
- 44
- government that it was a suitable site and that it 45
- 46 could with proper engineering serve as a safe
- hazardous waste disposal site. 47

Now, I say that briefly, but there was a substantial amount of effort that was going on through the historical period to satisfy federal authorities to that effect.

What had happened when Metalclad had become involved is that the previous owners hadn't successfully completed all that was necessary. They had some permits in place, my friend says partial permitting, and that's a fair statement as of the date that Metalclad becomes involved. And then Metalclad underwent a number of efforts to satisfy, and did satisfy, and the tribunal found that the federal authorities were satisfied, as to the environmental suitability of the site and the proposal for the plant and what was built with respect to the operation of such a facility.

At the bottom of 279 you may just want to make a note, and I won't quote you to it -- take you to it. But with respect to the issue of local community under tab 22, there's some evidence as it relates to polling in the community which the company relied upon to -- to contradict Mexican officials saying it was unpopular.

And there was also cross-examination of Mayor Ramos, which included challenging him as to whether there was any reliable or objective or even subjective way of determining whether there was genuine opposition in the population as a whole. And, for example, at page 81 and following Arbitrator Civiletti asks the mayor -- I'm sorry, tab 1, page 81:

 "I meant if you're trying to determine in order to grant or deny a permit whether the people approve or disapprove of it, do you determine that by a survey? Do you determine it by a plebiscite, by a referendum? How is it determined? Well, this is determined -- well, by a recount. This count or this survey is done surveying. There never was a referendum. At least the new municipality never did

43	it. But we do know the population, we know
44	the people, we know the communities. And,
45	well, we saw the interest in order not to
46	give or to deny that permit. I want to
47	repeat that this is the will of the

1 people. And I think it is fair to respect 2 the decision of the people. 3 And speaking of the people, how many of the 4 people would it be necessary to determine 5 that the people approved or consented, or 6 it was that will? Is it a substantial 7 minority? 20 percent? Does it require a 8 majority or what? 9 The truth is that I would actually tell you 10 that 90 percent or 80 percent of the people 11 of Guadalcazar were against this project, 12 against this landfill. I think that the 13 will of the majority makes the decision. 14 Even though it would be different, I think 15 that every citizen in Guadalcazar has the 16 same opportunity, they enjoy the same 17 rights. No one has more weight or carries 18 more weight than others, because there is 19 an equality of rights in our country. 20 Therefore, since they represented the 21 majority or even are being the majority, I 22 imagine I think that this should be taken 23 into account. And I dare say that it 24 represents 80 percent or 90 percent that 25 rejects or does not accept this landfill."

26 27

28

29

And pausing there, there wasn't a document that supported the view that there was a poll or a plebiscite or a referendum saying 8 or 9 (sic) percent. This was the mayor's opinion.

30 31 32

33

34

35

36

37

"Arbitrator Civiletti: If I understand your testimony correctly, as opposed to the use of the landfill for waste, that there was never any intention on your part or on the part of the council to allow reopening for hazardous waste. Is that correct?

A. That is so."

38 39 40

41

42

Now, if I could go to page 96, and this deals with the first real permitting point, I think.

And that deals with the -- what my friend says is

without prejudice or without detriment, depending
on your translation, of the terms of the first
permit. In this part I say with respect that
the -- that the argument is flawed both in its
nature and its scope. It's -- it's flawed in that

```
1
      it does not account for or give credit to the
2
      contrary view of the very permit that my friend
3
      relies upon and fails to take into account
4
      subsequent facts.
5
          Now, at page 97, and I'll take you to the
6
      permit in a moment, I do remind you that the
7
      tribunal found that even on the most expansive
8
      view of the municipality's authority that the
9
      municipality exceeded it in its consideration of
10
       denial, and I've given you the paragraphs which I
11
       read to you yesterday at page 97 and 98 there.
          At the bottom of 98 I remind you that
12
13
       Mexico's assertion regarding the terms of the
14
       federal and State permits ignores the tribunal's
15
       finding that Mexico -- Mexican federal government
       made numerous assertions regarding a lack of
16
17
       necessity for a municipal construction permit.
18
       And the tribunal found those representations had
19
       been made. And forgetting the written permits
20
       contained in the federal/State permits, Metalclad
21
       accepted and believed that it would get the
22
       municipal permit if it asked for it and that it
23
       was not lawfully required, and you'll see the
24
       findings. And I -- I say at 88 -- 85, 87 and 88
25
       they -- they are clear findings to that effect.
26
          Now, I'd like to turn now, if I may, to the
27
       permits --
28 THE COURT: Either there's an elephant in the building
29
       or we're having an earthquake.
30 MR. THOMAS: We're having an earthquake, yeah.
31 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord. I was wondering what
32
       that was.
33 MR. COWPER: I thought it was a good point. But I
34
       hadn't really gotten a -- to the purchase --
35
          Should I continue or -- I've never been
       interrupted by an earthquake before, so I don't
36
37
       know what the protocol is.
38 MR. FOY: We're supposed to get underneath things.
39 MR. PEREZCANO: This is Mexico.
40 MR. COWPER: I won't -- I won't blame my opponents
41
       for -- for the present --
42
          Should I continue? I don't know if
```

- 43 Your Lordship wants to -- to take a break or --
- or -- to know whether there's some --
- 45 THE COURT: I think we can continue, although
- 46 there's -- there's bound to be some af --
- 47 aftershock, I would think.

```
1 MR. COWPER: It scared somebody off, I think.
2
          I think Mr. Registrar is going to check to
3
      see what --
4
          Tab 5 of Volume 1, if you --
5 MR. THOMAS: Well done on the reporting.
6 MR. REPORTER: Yeah, thank you.
7 MR. COWPER: -- just to -- just to take you to
       the points, just to remind you, if you go to the
8
9
       second-to-last page you'll see the paragraph my
10
       friend relied upon:
11
12
          "This authorization was granted without
13
           detriment..."
14
15 THE COURT: Um-hum.
16 MR. COWPER:
           "...if the holder applies for and obtains
17
18
          other authorizations, concessions and
19
          licences, permissions or such that are
20
          required for the realization of the work
21
          that is the motive of the present
22
          authorization or elsewhere, its operation
23
           or other phases, when the time comes and in
24
           consideration of the laws that correspond
25
          applications made to the secretary of
26
           social development and other federal, State
27
           or municipal authorities."
28
29
          Now, on the point of construction,
30
       Metalclad's counsel below said it's very easy to
31
       know what they're talking about if you take that
32
       and you go to the very beginning because there are
33
       three specific local permits that are required to
34
       be obtained depending upon the design of the
35
       facility.
36
           And it's -- it's -- if you take for example,
37
       if you go to the second page -- and I'm not going
       to get all of this right, but it -- I'll try. If
38
39
       you go to the second page, I.3:
40
           "The development of banks for the loaning
41
          of materials not authorized in such
42
```

case..." 43 44

Do you have that with me?

THE COURT: No, I don't.

RR. COWPER: Okay. I.3, second page under paragraph:

"Site preparation stage." 4 THE COURT: I do. Yes, I have it now. MR. COWPER: Okay. "...in such case..." That is, in other words, if you have loaning of material, you say: "...in such case the respective permission must be applied for before the competent local authorities, and notification of this same permission must be presented before this general office within a time period of no more than one month after obtaining it."

And there was viva voce evidence that that permit, and Mr. Kesler explained it, was never necessary because of the way in which this facility was designed.

If you go to the -- and as I understand it, they're essentially -- on this footing, they're essentially the need for local permits if you're having to go off the site to obtain material to cover your pits. In other words, if you have to -- to lift material off land elsewhere and put it on the pits, you need a local permit to do the hauling and to take that material and to have the location. Equally -- and that's, I think, called a burrow pit. I'm not going to necessar -- there's different pits here.

Equally, if you take the material that you're using to excavate your own pits, and you have to take it off-site, you need a dumping permit from the local authority, because that's not a hazardous waste permit, that's a dumping permit.

But as Mr. Kesler explained, because of the geological suitability of the site, the very material that was taken out was temporarily stored and was then going to be used to layer and put on

13	top of the waste that was being stored inside the
14	cells. So that permit wasn't required.
15	The only point I'm making here is that there
16	was a contrary case in relation to this very
17	document which is rational, which is that the

permits referred to at the end are not permits for the construction of a hazardous waste facility, but are permits for the moving or excavation of land off the site, which is within the scope of competent authority but was unnecessary.

Now, the only other comment I would make with respect to this permit, and this is the January '93 permit, is if you look at the -- and I'm going to take you to subsequent permits. Look at the scope of the authorization at page 1.

11 THE COURT: This is at which tab?

12 MR. COWPER: This is the same tab.

13 THE COURT: Same tab?

14 MR. COWPER: It's just a separate point with respect to it.

I'm passing on from -- what I'm saying is in re -- answer to my friend's point, there are these specific references in the course of the body of the permit to potential need, and the words "in case" or "if required," for permits for moving dirt or depositing dirt within the scope of the responsibility for the municipality, and that that's -- was the explanation offered for the tribunal for the end. But it's all supervene -- superseded by the later findings of fact and later representations.

But I'm saying that with respect to my friend's construction of the permit, that is taking boilerplate at the end which has an easy and obvious explanation and purporting to make a jurisdictional error out of it, which I say is -- is a bridge way too far.

With respect to the second point though, look at the scope, if I -- if I may ask you to, on the first page of what the authorization purported to be about, under:

"First, the present authorization grants to the company the right to realize in the terms presented the works pertaining to the construction and operation of a technical landfill for industrial wastes which will

43	consist of the transport, stabilization
44	and/or neutralization, and final
45	disposition of wastes with a capacity of
46	100 tonnes per day or 36,500 tonnes per
47	year on the site owned by the company and

located in the State with a total surface area..."

Talks of -- contemplates 46 cells, complementary installations of 4 acres and areas of reforestation. And you'll see that it's for a period of a year, going over to the next page, and in fact requires the conclusion of the construction of the project within a year of beginning of the date (sic).

And there were extensions granted later, but if you read this permit as a whole, in my submission the federal government is essentially saying in this permit you have authority to do precisely that which Mr. Kesler testified he understood he had under the federal permit that was granted to him.

And I'm not forgetting that we have a land use permit, because if you go to tab 6, you'll see that in May of '93 a State land use permit was obtained. And if you have that tab, I just draw your attention to the fact that the -- the -- under the measurement and borders and location, if you go to the -- page 2, you'll see that the use of the land says:

"...on which has been in operation a temporary transfer station..."

30 Do you see that under paragraph 3? 31 THE COURT: Um-hum. 32 MR. COWPER:

 "...as an antecedent to the technical landfill requested."

So the State understands that what's happened is you had a transfer station and were moving forward, we're approving something different that's going to be moving forward.

And you'll see under the -- documentation referred to a number of documents relating to authority, and the first one, for example, is:

43		
44	"The authorization of the mentioned site	
45	for realization of the executory project of	
46	controlled landfill for hazardous	
47	industrial" waits "wastes, this	

```
1
          authorization granted by the
2
          sub-secretariat of ecology through the
3
          office of prevention and control and other
4
          similar documents."
5
6
          And then the -- the grant is at the
7
       next page. And you'll see in respect of the --
       under construction on the next page -- do you have
8
9
       that?
10 THE COURT: Yes.
    MR. COWPER: It says -- other than the area, it says:
11
12
13
           "The project must adapt to the
14
          specifications and technical requirements
15
          that the corresponding authorities
          indicate."
16
17
18
          Now, if you go to tab 7, which is, I think,
19
       the next tab, and we're now in August of '93,
20
       you'll see at the top it says:
21
22
           "Translation of COTERIN operating permit."
23
24 THE COURT: Yes.
25 MR. COWPER: We're still in '93, and I just ask you to
26
       say -- to -- to note that this is an additional
27
       authorization by the federal authorities. And
28
       you'll see under paragraph 1 it contains:
29
30
          "The activity is the operation of a
31
           controlled landfill through the collection,
32
           transport, treatment, temporary storage and
33
          final disposition of toxic waste."
34
35
          And if you -- if you turn over, you'll see
36
       that there's specific reference to the type of
37
       waste, there's specific reference to the various
       other requirements for operation. And it goes on
38
39
       for pages, requirement for logbooks. I'm just
40
       skipping, but paragraph 13 is a requirement for an
       area of the change room; and I showed you a
41
42
       picture of the changing of the building earlier;
```

the requirements in relation to residues and samples; requirements with respect to reporting; requirements with respect to any closing to generate -- the general treatment neutralization and stabilization, paragraph 20; reference to

```
1
       other technical norms; all the types of things
2
       that you would see and expect to see in an
3
       approval for -- for the operation of such a
4
      facility.
5
          Now, interesting enough, if you go to the end
6
       of that, and this is the operation of the
7
      landfill, there's no paragraph that I've seen
8
       anywhere in here which says, oh, by the way, it's
9
       August of '93, where's your municipal construction
10
       permit? Go and get your municipal construction
11
       permit. Here's an operating permit. And there's
12
       no language such as that my friend relies upon in
13
       the earlier permit referring in any way to local
14
       authorities.
15
          I don't see in fact, and I -- I may be --
16
       there may be an occasional reference, but there's
17
       no substantial reference to anybody else having
18
       authority in relation to the matters covered by
19
       that document.
20
           Now, if you go to tab -- I'd like to go to
21
       the -- tab 29 next, but keep that volume open,
       because I'll come back to tab 8.
22
23 THE COURT: Just before leaving this, this tab 7, what
24
       does this authority or permit give COTERIN that
25
       the previous one did not --
26 MR. COWPER: Well --
27 THE COURT: -- because the previous one seemed to be a
28
       permit for construction --
29 MR. COWPER: Yes.
30 THE COURT: -- and operation.
31 MR. COWPER: Yes. And I think that this essentially
32
       is a more detailed set of guidelines for the
       operation of the facility. They -- they don't --
33
34
       they're not exclusive. They -- if you read the
35
       permits as they move along, they -- they don't
36
       necessarily have totally new content. There is
37
       additional content. And I -- reading the two
       together, not being a Mexican lawyer, it would
38
39
       appear that the second deals more principally with
40
       operation and -- rather than construction, and
41
       gives a number of operating requirements as it
```

relates to operation. That's as best I can do

13	of on reading the two documents.
14	It was, I believe, characterized in the
15	evidence as an operating permit as opposed to a
16	construction and operation permit.
17	I think the first permit contemplated all of
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

the phases of the project. And the -- the operating permit placed a large number of details with respect to operating on it. And there's a number of other correspondences and letters. You -- you can expect that there would be a substantial volume of documentation flowing between the federal and the -- federal authorities and the company. And there was a substantial body of documentation.

You'll see at the very last tab there's, I think -- I've lost count. As I said, it was 65 yesterday. But there's a large number of exhibits reflecting communication largely in Spanish between the company and the -- and the federal authorities.

If we go though to the -- the next document, which is tab 29, just in the -- in the sequence, I want to take you because -- taking you later in the historical piece, but it's similar in its character. And it's of some telling import, because we're now at February '96. So we have the construction and operation permit, we have the operation permit, we then have all of the events of '94/'95.

As Your Lordship knows, we have the Convenio. We have the opposition to the Convenio. We have the demand that the munici -- that there's a stop work order, there's the permit filed. And by this date, if I'm not mistaken, we have the refusal of the construction permit, all of which are, not to be surprised, notorious public facts.

We then go to February 8, 1996. And what does the federal government do at this point? It expands the capacity of the facility.

And if you go to the language and the colour of this, this is not a federal authority saying, oops, this is a halt to the project, we're not doing anything because the municipality, which is a coordinate constitutional body, has -- has put a halt to this. If you look at the language of this document, the second paragraph says:

43	
44	"The regulation of the general law of
45	ecological equilibrium for the environment
46	in the matter of hazardous waste points out
47	in its fourth article, Fraction 10 that it

is up to the federation to authorize the construction and operation of installations for the treatment, confinement or destruction of hazardous waste. Based on the aforesaid and in agreement with the technical revision realized to the information presented by you to solicit an increase in the capacity of handling of hazardous waste..."

I point out the following, paragraph 1:

"...COTERIN is authorized to increase the capacity of its handling of hazardous waste to 30,000 tonnes per month. Installations that are located in La Pedrera with a surface..."

Et cetera. And you'll see that there's a number of other matters dealing with supervision of the site, neutralization, et cetera.

But the point being made is that the -forgetting all of the detail, in light of all that
happened, the federal government -- and my friend
said, well, there was no evidence of federal
assurances that the municipal permit wasn't
needed. But look at what they've said here, in
light of what the municipality has done, the
federal government authorizes an expansion by
tenfold two months later. And if you go to the
final document, you'll see there's no reference to
the necessity for obtaining a building permit.

Now, I'm not -- it's not my task -- and I said earlier this morning, it's not my task to -- to persuade you one way or the other on the facts, but I must say with respect to my friend that there's a substantial body of persuasive evidence that the federal government was solidly behind the project in the face of municipal disapproval.

Now, let me point you to tab 8 just while we're on that, which is a year earlier. And putting it in the historical story, as I can -- as

13	best I can, this is a letter by the federal
14	authorities to Mr. Miranda the year earlier.
15	And just putting it in its context, if I
16	understand the piece here, you have the
17	construction which has occurred perhaps in a slow

pace in the summer of '94. In the fall of '95 it picks up. You have the -- the municipal stop work order in the fall, October-November, of '94. You have -- and we haven't gotten to the Convenio which is the fall of '95.

So we have the permit out -- the application for the permit has been made by this date based on what Metalclad says is representations that in view of the federal and State permits and other matters they -- they will issue it to you, but you should show respect. I think in fact the viva voce evidence says they were told to show respect for the municipality but it would be issued as matter of course.

The -- the language in light of that historical point in the period of this letter of January 31, '95 I say is quite telling. It says, starting in the second paragraph:

"The bylaws of the general law of..." equili -- ec "...ecological equilibrium and the protection of the environment in the matter of hazardous wastes points out in its Article 4, Fraction 10 that it is the responsibility of the federal authorities to authorize the construction and operation of the installations for the treatment and confinement of hazardous waste. Based in the aforementioned and in accordance with the technical review of the information sent by you consistent with the construction plans of the disposition and support works for the cell of the controlled landfill, it is observed that this information complies with the requirements established in the official Mexican norms..."

And then there's documentary references:

"...for which this general direction of which I am in charge authorizes the

43	construction of the final disposition cell
44	for hazardous waste as well as the
45	complementary works consisting in the
46	administration building, treatment unit,
47	road system, laboratory, dressing rooms,

```
1
          maintenance, temporary storage, evaporation
2
          lagoon...lagoon and fuel station."
3
4
          And then he talks about the deposit being
5
       previously treated, et cetera.
6
          And if you go over to the next page, just the
       last paragraph I'd like to read you, it says:
7
8
9
          "Besides I let you know that the
10
          supervision and inspection..."
11
12
           Do you have that paragraph?
13 THE COURT: Yes.
14 MR. COWPER:
15
           "...that are realized during construction
16
           of the corresponding works as well as the
           operation of the cell will be up to the
17
18
          federal attorney's office for the
19
          protection of the environment on the part
20
          of its delegation in the State as well as
          of central office."
21
22
23
           No reference to any authority, supervision or
24
       legitimate role for the municipality in that
25
       document.
26
           Now, if you go at page 100 -- oh, I've been
27
       told I'm going on, but if I could just leave you
28
       with a reference and then perhaps we'll take the
29
       morning break.
30
           If -- if you care about the relationship
31
       between the specific permits required for
32
       burrow -- burrow material, deposit material and
33
       otherwise, Mr. Kesler, in his evidence in the
34
       reference I gave you at 288 at the bottom --
35 THE COURT: Um-hum.
36 MR. COWPER: -- he explains what he understood those
37
       references to be. I'm not going to take you
       there, but there was viva voce evidence saying
38
39
       hold it a second, you -- you haven't understood
40
       this at all. These are -- this is a reference to
41
       these other specific permits which weren't
       necessary, weren't sought because they were never
42
```

- required.
 And that's perhaps an appropriate point to
 break.
 THE COURT: Yes. We'll take the morning break no
- 46 THE COURT: Yes. We'll take the morning break now.47 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is

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1
      adjourned for the morning recess.
2
3
      (MORNING RECESS)
4
      (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:14 A.M.)
5
      (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:31 A.M.)
6
7 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Cowper.
8 MR. COWPER: I gather my last submission was 6.1 on
9
      the Richter scale. I don't know if that's normal,
10
       above normal.
11 THE COURT: Actually, there is a TV in the judges'
12
       lounge. It was Seattle, and they're saying it was
       6.4.
13
14 MR. COWPER: Oh.
15
          I was at page 101 and paragraph 290, and if I
       can take you to some of the viva voce evidence.
16
17
       And I'm going to take the Mexican witness, if I
       may, and that's Secretary Carabias at tab --
18
19
       and -- and I've read her evidence. And I can tell
20
       you I think it's fair to say that she wheels
21
       around this issue significantly. But I'm going to
22
       just give you one extract of part of her evidence.
23
          If you go to 66:
24
25
          "Madam Secretary..."
26
27
          At the bottom.
28 THE COURT: Yes.
29 MR. COWPER:
30
          "Madam Secretary, let me see if I can ask
31
          it this way: If the municipality took it
32
          upon themselves in the process of reviewing
          the application for a municipal
33
34
          construction permit to review the
35
          environmental integrity of the project and
36
          found it lacking, you are unaware of what
37
          those conclusions might have been as you
          sit here today. Is that correct?
38
          No. I repeat, the municipality does not
39
40
          undertake an evaluation of overall
          environmental impact. Building permit
41
          applications are reviewed on other grounds,
42
```

43	not environmental grounds."
44	
45	And then she goes to talk about, second
46	paragraph down, engineer safety, physical safety
47	et cetera.

Now, if you go to paragraph 291, there was, as my friend pointed out to you, the evidence of Rene Altamirano that a -- contrary evidence with respect to Minister Altamirano's statement concerning the municipal permit requirement. He was the witness my friend relied upon to say that it was patently unreasonable to reach a conclusion that there were any representations or assurances the municipal permit would be forthcoming or that the municipal authority did not extend to considerations beyond construction, and I've listed a number of other pieces of evidence.

In general, Rodarte, Kesler, Neveau are all to the contrary. Perhaps I can just give you one or two examples. If you go to Kesler at tab 40, page 3, and the numbers are at the bottom, paragraphs 11 and 12:

"I can underscore the fact that such was not the statutory environment Metalclad sailed into. It was rather much like that described in Mr. Altamirano's testimony. Our due diligence turned up the fact that municipalities can issue construction permits, but nothing indicated that it was a prerequisite to constructing and operating a federally approved hazardous waste landfill. Certainly the 1998 LGEEPA..."

And that's the federal law.

"...made it clear that hazardous waste authority resided with the federal government. Matters of non-hazardous waste are within the authority of State and local governments."

Paragraph 12:

"Federal officials confirmed this to us when we raised the question of the

43	municipal construction permit with them in
44	September of 1993. They, Dr. Lujan,
45	instructed us that federal authority was
46	primary in matters of hazardous waste, that
47	a municipal construction permit was not

1 necessary. They, Mr. de le Cruz confirmed 2 this in October of 1994 when the 3 municipality purported to shut down our 4 construction because we had no construction 5 permit. It was reconfirmed in January '95 6 when INE..." 7 8 And that's another federal authority. 9 10 "...authorized more construction at the 11 site which was carried out under 12 PROFEPA..." 13 And that's the federal -- another federal 14 15 agency. 16 "...supervision. It was ratified in 17 18 November '95 in an agreement with SEMARNAP, 19 the Convenio, and again in February '96 20 with another authorization from INE, this 21 one increasing our landfill capacity by a 22 factor of 10." 23 24 The -- he was not the only witness who said 25 that. There were -- there's a substantial body of 26 other evidence. 27 But if you go to tab 15, just to take one 28 other witness for the moment, and you go to 29 Mr. Neveau -- oh, and you need to turn to page 138. These are extracts. It's about five or six 30 31 pages in, line 18. 32 THE COURT: Um-hum. 33 MR. COWPER: Are you with me at line 18? Sorry. 34 35 "We didn't believe that the city had any 36 authority or the municipality had any 37 authority over the construction of the site at all. As a matter of fact, we discussed 38 39 it at length with both Garcia Leos and 40 Senior de le Garza and the permit was not an issue. I want to confirm this, Mr. 41 42 Neveau. It is your testimony today that

43	the company did not have a policy of
44	applying for local authorizations.
45	No. That's not true. The company had a
46	policy of complying with all local
47	regulations. This was not considered one

1 2	of them."
3	Okay. And and in respect of my friend's
4	reliance on Leos, if you could turn over to page
5	140 and 141.
6	And I don't know if Your Lordship observed,
7	but Mr. Leos, in his declaration, referred to some
8	exhibits respecting letters he had prepared. And
9	then without reference to a document he says:
0	
1	"I subsequently gave an opinion that a
2	permit was required."
3	
4	No rubber no no document to that
5	effect.
6	Mr. Neveau's evidence to the contrary is
7	contained in the following passages, you'll see
8	starting at the line 20 of 140:
9	
20	"A. [sic] No. Your letter of September
21	the 9th asked Mr. Leos, Garcia Leos, for
22	his opinion as to the primacy of federal
23	permits."
24	
25	I think that should be a "Q" rather than an
26	"A." If you look over the top, it says:
27	
28	"A. It did."
29	
30	THE COURT: Um-hum.
31	MR. COWPER:
32	"A. It did.
33	Q. This states as a fact that federal
34	construction and operating permits take
35	precedence over State and local
36	authorizations. Do you see that?
37	A."
88	V 0
39	Yes. Sorry.
10	"It doos
ŀ1 ŀ2	"It does.
-	Q. Are you aware that Mr. Garcia Leos

43	testified that he subsequently informed the
44	company that the statement that federal
45	permits take precedence over local permits
46	was not correct and that it was necessary
47	to obtain a municipal permit?

A. I was not aware he ever testified to that, nor do I think it's a fact."

And I've given you at the -- at the reference to 291, and I'll read you some of Ambassador Jones's evidence, and you have as well evidence from Kesler in his redirect.

I will draw your attention to the fact that Rodarte's memorial is to the same effect on tab 13, but I -- I think for my purposes I've referred to enough evidence on that point.

The -- if we go to page 102 next, the point my friend makes in relation to Mexican legal advice as I understand it is that, either through due diligence or the evidence of Leos, the company had learned that a municipal permit was required, and there was similar contrary evidence. There were -- officers of the company said no.

Fundamentally what we were told is we should challenge any assertion of authority by the municipality. We should go and seek an Amparo if they seek to assert their authority, but that it might be a problem. And as -- the central answer I have to my friend is: Metalclad said through our due diligence we've learned about the prior permit. We learned about the risk of municipal construction.

And then they commenced their story to say how they were persuaded that it was not -- that they didn't have any authority; that the federal officials told them that there was no authority; that they continued with the work without applying for it on the basis of those representations; that that work continued openly and in the sight of everybody for a substantial time; that when the stop work order came, federal officials said don't stop, continue, but apply out of respect for the municipality.

Now, I've given you the -- and I've just read you the reference to de Neveau dis -- Neveau disagreeing with the alleged receipt of oral recommendations from Leos, who was the former

43	counsel who was called by Mexico.
44	So I'd like to turn, if I can, to 104. And
45	my friend placed great emphasis on this document
46	But I I'd like to draw your attention to its
47	particular terms.
	-

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1
          If you go to tab 42, and I don't think I've
2
       done this yet, done it myself. If you turn to tab
3
       42, this is Exhibit 43, and this is the '91
4
       refusal.
5 THE COURT: Um-hum.
6 MR. COWPER: You'll see this is informing you of the
       decision to deny the permit as a result of the
7
8
       Cabildo session. Then after the capitalized names
9
      you see:
10
11
           "The applicant company does not have, 1,
12
           environmental impact study as required by
13
           SEDUE..."
14
15
          Or SEDUE (inflection), which is a federal
16
       agency; number 2:
17
18
           "...land use authorization as required by
19
           the State government."
20
21
          And then:
22
23
           "3, control of high risk imposed by this
24
           project."
25
26
          And it says at the bottom:
27
28
           "In addition, the number of studies
          conducted by Gonzales show the area is not
29
30
           suitable to establish the cemetery, thus
31
           the application is denied."
32
33
           My point being here, first of all, the first
34
       two grounds for refusal are the absence of federal
35
       permits and State permits which were subsequently
36
       obtained. The miscellaneous and the third ground
37
       are directly related to environmental
       considerations which the tribunal found were
38
39
       beyond the authority of the municipality.
40
           So for my friend to say, well, how -- how
41
       could the tribunal overlook this, when the history
42
       is that subsequent to this the permits were
```

obtained, the State land use permit was obtained and all of the concerns respecting the environmental issues were addressed and answered to the satisfaction of federal authorities, how he can say, well, how -- the municipality can clearly

turn down the permit in '94 and '95 because they turned it down in '91. That fails to account with respect to the contrary case, which was that the situation had changed dramatically and there was no existing basis for the municipality to decline the construction permit when it was supplied by the new management -- or applied for by the new management.

Now, I do make a brief point on page 105. My friend said I think on several occasions that there were two denials. And if you look at the second document, I say with -- and I've given you the reference at 302, the second document is simply a rubber stamp by the municipal president who is newly elected. There's no new consideration of anything. There's not a new application. All they say is we confirm the earlier conclusion.

And if you go to tab 19, I say that's evident from the document itself at tab 19. And you go to the -- it's the attachment to the translation of the declaration of Mendoza. It's headed "Letterhead."

Do you have that?

25 THE COURT: Yes.26 MR. COWPER: Sorry.

And it says the first substantive -- it's the second full paragraph:

"The only order of business is the denial that was issued by the municipality during the period of 1989 and '91 in regard to the construction of the industrial cemetery located in the site of La Pedrera."

And then they go on to talk about how they're -- they don't like it, and they say at the bottom:

"Today, in light of a possible reopening, this honourable municipal council, after hearing the voice of the residents and

43	through"
44	
45	I think it should say.
46	·
47	"its representatives, determines the

denial of any permit that favour the continuity of this company."

There was no permit application before them. This was simply, if you will, a declaration of continued political will on the part of the municipality.

Now, over to page -- I think I've essentially given you what I say in 105 and 106, and refer going to the terms of the Convenio in 106.

And I just remind you that at the hearing Metalclad acknowledged the notice that there might be a risk and the notice that there might be a -- a -- an assertion of authority from the municipality and dealt with that in its subsequent evidence as to how it investigated and how it was satisfied there was no authority, and how it determined to go forward with the knowledge and approval of federal officials.

So I go to the next point, which is the option agreement. And I said earlier this morning that my friend stopped short of an important point in his dealing with the evidence, which was what happened to that option agreement subsequently rendered it completely irrelevant to the issues before the tribunal.

And if you go to the reference at 311, which was Kesler's re-examination or redirect -- and I've given you the '96 amendment agreement extract as well. But if you go to tab 16, and it's at -- and -- and you may want to -- let me just -- this -- this actually addresses several of my friend's points. But while I'm there, if I may, I'm going to give you references on a number of points.

But let me start at 250, and this is again Mr. Kesler. At the bottom at line 19 is the question:

"Do you recall the essence of the amendment in this agreement?

Well, this came 18, maybe 15 months after

43	we purchased the site and the landfill had
44	been built. You know, we never complete
45	these things, but it was essentially ready
46	for operation. Indeed, we had anyway,
47	we had accomplished all of the construction

1 and training and so forth that had to 2 precede the actual operation. And it was 3 important..." for us to make -- or "...to 4 us to make an arrangement with Mr. Aldrett 5 whereby we reduce some of the long-term 6 payments in favour of other considerations 7 on his part. It was a negotiation of three 8 or four months that led to this amendment 9 and reflected the fact that we had now 10 completed it. 11 Mr. Kesler, in the document that we 12 referred to just before this one that 13 contains the language that Mr. Thomas took 14 you through..." 15 16 And that's the amended agreement my friend 17 relies upon, the earlier document. 18 19 "...about some contingencies with respect 20 to the governor's support and 21 the...municipal...the issue of the 22 municipal licence. That language is not in 23 this agreement of January 10, '96, is it? 24 A. You're exactly correct. 25 Q. Why isn't it there? 26 Because by January 10, 1996 we had received 27 assurances from the highest level of the 28 Mexican government that our project would 29 open. And let me tell you what I mean by that. Not only had we signed the Convenio 30 31 with PROFEPA on November 24th, but we had 32 been granted an expansion of our permit 33 recognizing the created capability of the 34 treatment facility so that it was now 35 licenced for 360,000 tonnes instead of 36 36 per year. The federal government had 37 lifted the seals that were put in place at 38 the time the transfer station was closed, 39 so that enabled us to then open the 40 transfer station and begin remediation.

They had agreed with us we could operate

for at least five years. And there was

41

42

43	another permit given, if I'm not mistaken,
44	at the time the liner was I'm sorry, the
45 46	liner permit came after the agreement."
40 47	After the January agreement, there's another

permit from the federal government in relation to the use of a double liner or a liner on the facility. That's what he's talking about there, but it occurs after this point in time.

"There was one other thing we relied on, however, before this agreement. In October '95 President Zedillo was to visit the United States. We had been working with not only the embassy but the Department of Commerce to try to get a message to President Zedillo we needed his help, that there was a federal versus State confrontation brewing that needed his involvement in. And we were able to get a commitment from the White House to take our case to Mexico.

"And in a meeting that occurred a few days before President Zedillo's visit to Washington that fall, Mack Maclarty of the White House met with Luis Tellez..."

Or I may have gotten that wrong.

"...Tellez, who was President Zedillo's chief of staff at that time, to discuss issues that would be on the agenda between the two presidents when they met.

"And I understand this is something that is common before two heads of State meet. We were on that agenda. And after this meeting Mack Maclarty came back and reported to our counsel here in Washington, Senator Dubai, that he was assured by Mr. Tellez that this matter would be solved and to take it off the agenda, so that when the presidents meet together, it's not part of what they're going to discuss. You have my assurance, he said, this is solved.

"And for that reason we felt like this issue of whether or not we had to be prevented because of a local construction

43	permit was simply not an issue and no
44	reason to have it in the agreement and no
45	reason to have it conditional whatsoever."
46	
47	Now, my friend put to you that on a patently

42

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2
      that Metalclad was concerned with, aware of,
3
      worried about the municipal permit. And with
4
      respect, in light of that evidence, you would have
5
      to find the tribunal to be well-founded in finding
6
      that that evidence goes nowhere because it
7
      immediately gets amended. There's an explanation
8
      for the amendment. And the amendment, which my
9
      friend didn't take you to, takes that out because
10
       of the assurances which were in the evidence. And
11
       those very assurances were accepted and found as a
12
       fact by the tribunal.
13 THE COURT: You say it was immediately amended.
14 MR. COWPER: I'm sorry? Amended later, yes.
15 THE COURT: There's two intervenors.
16 MR. COWPER: There's a substantial time period, I
17
       understand.
18 THE COURT: Yes.
19 MR. COWPER: Did I say immediately? I'm sorry.
20 THE COURT: I thought you did.
21 MR. COWPER: I -- I apologize.
22 THE COURT: Perhaps I misheard you.
23 MR. COWPER: Just -- just understand I actually take
24
       and put some weight on that time period, because
25
       that's the critical time period the tribunal deals
26
       with, which is the construction, the
27
       representations, the additional permits. And
28
       that's why I took you earlier to that period. So
29
       we're dealing with a period when it's removed, all
30
       of that's occurred. And so it is, with respect, a
31
       responsible explanation for what's happened. And
32
       it's -- it's responsive to what they say, which is
       we knew of the risk, but eventually we were
33
34
       satisfied that the risk was not going to be
35
       realized. And we had assurances from the federal
36
       government it either wasn't necessary or at the
37
       period in '96 it would follow as a matter of
38
39
          I'm at -- going on to the next point, unless
40
       the -- you have another question on that issue --
41 THE COURT: Oh, I'm just thinking that really the
```

critical time is when -- when Metalclad made the

unreasonable basis the option agreement showed

next payment under the agreement, because the payment was conditional upon getting the municipal permit. The time that they waived that was when they made the next payment, not -- not in January of '96. It just so happened that they amended the

agreement in January '96 --2 MR. COWPER: Um-hum. 3 THE COURT: -- and no longer felt it was necessary to put that provision in there. 5 MR. COWPER: I'll look at that over the break. But I think that the -- the critical question is not whether the payment was made, the critical question was was there a body of evidence on which the tribunal could conclude that Metalclad believed, as it held, they believed and honestly believed at the material times that the municipality did not have authority to refuse, and that they had authority to continue. That's the -- you know, that's the issue of fact for the tribunal. And I'm saying that my friend attacks that by

And I'm saying that my friend attacks that by referring to this agreement. And the attack doesn't go anywhere for two reasons; firstly, even if it's paid, it's not an irrefutable fact. It's just a fact which the tribunal, among a host of facts, had to take into account. And there is an explanation for it.

Now, it may be, as Your Lordship's observed, that it's a fact that -- that -- that goes in favour of Mexico's case. But there's a -- a substantial body which go to the contrary, because over that time period, as I've indicated to you, the record is replete with correspondence and authorities being provided by the federal government. And the evidence is replete with conversations occurring between Metalclad officials, Metalclad representatives and the federal officials urging and authorizing Metalclad to proceed on.

Now, I think for the purposes of the -- the legal consideration as the tribunal viewed it, it was we have the investment being put in in -- you know, the dollars are being spent increasingly through the time period. But the critical period is '94 and '95 when the -- when the facility is being built, when the studies are being conducted, when the environmental audit is being done. And

- then it's not until, as you -- as Your Lordship knows, the fall -- I say December of '95 that the 43 44 municipal permit issue comes back to effectively be determined by the municipality to deny the 45
- 46

47 permit.

So I think from the tribunal's point of view what they had to determine was was Metalclad acting in good faith in accepting the federal assurances, in accepting the federal permits for what they appeared to be and making that investment. And it was the municipality acting within its authority under Mexican law in purporting to deny the permit and shut down the facility. And they address those questions. They talk about those questions. And I say they make findings of them on the basis of substantial evidence.

Now, with -- that leads to my next point, which is the issue of representations by federal officials. And in listening to my friend, I -- I think he essentially said to Your Lordship, well, none of the Mexican officials with the exception of one possible exception agreed that they had made representations.

He didn't deal, if you go to 110, with the evidence of Mr. Deets, Mr. Neveau, Mr. Carvajal, Mr. Kesler, Mr. Miranda. He said, and I take it he is to say later, that no weight should have been given to Mr. Rodarte, but that Mr. Rodarte is clearly a -- a witness whose evidence was available to the tribunal. He wasn't cross-examined, and they may have decided as a result of his non-appearance to put no weight on it, but he wasn't alone.

On this footing, as you'll see at paragraph 314, there was a chorus of witnesses from Metalclad's side saying we did indeed receive those representations over the material period of time.

Now, all I say is that in order for my friend to succeed, he has to, I say of course under the international act, elevate this to a jurisdictional point, from an issue of fact to a jurisdictional point.

Even under the commercial act it has to be elevated into a question of law. And upon that footing, my friend says it has to be patently

43	unreasonable. That's the I think the burden he
44	accepts. Whether it that's the burden or
45	whether the burden I've asserted is correct, which
46	is no evidence.
47	On either one, properly speaking, there is a

```
1
      substantial number of witnesses on this side.
2
      there's a substantial number of witnesses on that
3
      side. That is the core of the fact-finding
4
      process I say that the tribunal went through.
5
          Sorry, did you have a question on that?
6 THE COURT: I'm just wondering if the point you're
7
      trying to make at paragraph 314 is different from
      the point you were making at 291.
8
9 MR. COWPER: At 291?
10 THE COURT: Yes. You make reference to different
11
       extracts, some of them the same.
12 MR. COWPER: Oh, okay. I -- I think, if you want to
       make a note, the relationship between those is my
13
14
       friend separately dealt with his reliance on
15
       Altamirano and then the issue of the federal
       representation. So what 291 does is give you a
16
17
       selected answer to Altamirano particularly. And
18
       then 314 is the broader selection of evidence with
19
       respect to federal representations generally.
20
          So I -- I guess logically 291 is a subset
21
       of -- of the issues of fact dealt with in 314.
22
          Is that responsive to your question?
23 THE COURT: Yes, it is.
24 MR. COWPER: With respect to these, and I'm not going
25
       to go into them in great length, I say just
26
       identifying the fact that there is a body of
       witnesses is and should be sufficient. But I'll
27
28
       give you a couple of references.
29
          Let's take Mr. Deets as the -- as an
30
       example. Tab 4.
31 THE COURT: It's only sufficient if you're right.
32 MR. COWPER: Yes, My Lord.
          Actually, I'm going to take that, because I
33
34
       say it's actually sufficient even if I'm wrong,
35
       because I've said to you there's a substantial
36
       body of evidence. But even if I'm wrong on that I
37
       say my friend has to take this issue of fact, if
       he's under the commercial act, and make it an
38
39
       issue of law. And so I say he's actually
40
       undershot the necessary burden.
41
          Now, if I'm wrong on that, I say nevertheless
42
       the obvious conclusion here from the evidence is
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- this isn't a case where you say here are ten witnesses, here's a substantial body of evidence, 43
- 44
- and the tribunal accepted the tiny slice of 45
- 46 evidence offered by the other side where -- where,
- on review, if you were to say, for example, you 47

had a jurisdiction, if you were to hold you had a jurisdiction to interfere if you thought there was a preponderance or a substantial imbalance in the evidence on a review of the -- of the whole record, and that the tribunal clearly erred in giving weight and effect to a small piece of evidence rather than a large piece of evidence, even if that's the test, and I'm -- I have to be wrong on a couple of things before we get there, what I'm saying to you is it wasn't a -- one witness, it wasn't just Mr. Rodarte, it wasn't just Mr. Deets or Mr. Kesler, or Mr. Neveau; they all contributed evidence which substantiated the position of Metalclad that there were representations.

And indeed, my friend said there was no -no -- in his view no documentary evidence of the representations.

I say to the contrary, that if you just take the logical consequence of the two letters that I read you earlier this morning and say if I receive these, would I -- after having a federal official say I am in charge, this is my project, here it is, would I conclude that I can't continue with the construction which has been ongoing for six months which he and I know have been going on for six months unless and until I get a construction permit from a local municipality?

I say we don't even on this point get to a question of uneven weight. In fact, I think on a reading of the whole, it's quite clear that the protestations to the contrary were insubstantial by Mexican officials. But I say that even if I'm wrong on those first two points, I nevertheless submit to you that Metalclad in this case had a substantial body of evidence and the tribunal accepted it.

Now, if you go to tab 24 under tab 4 -- page 24 under tab 4 -- now, I -- I'm sorry, I could be wrong on the last one. No -- you know, that's -- that's obviously logically available. And if I'm wrong and there's not a substantial body of

43	evidence at all, there's no evidence, then ther
44	I I concede that my friend would would then
45	be be safely home with respect to this point.
46	At page 24 under tab 4 with Mr. Deets, you'll
47	see para paragraph 72:

41 42

1 2 "Having reviewed parts of the 3 counter-memorial I am astonished that the 4 Mexican government now takes the position 5 that we were supposed to get..." 6 7 Do you have the same page as me? 8 9 "...a local construction permit. This is 10 not what they told us when we were siting 11 and permitting La Pedrera. I was aware 12 that Mr. Aldrett had applied for a local 13 construction permit and had been turned 14 down by the municipality because he was 15 missing some documents." 16 17 And that's actually not an unfair 18 characterization of the document I showed you 19 earlier. There's no land permit. There's no 20 federal permit. 21 22 "As part of our continuing due process, I 23 requested our local counsel to advise us on 24 whether we should apply for a permit 25 again. Our counsel subsequently advised us 26 it would be best to seek guidance from 27 INE." 28 29 Which is of course the federal authority. 30 "I wrote to Dr. Reus in September '93 31 32 right after we had made the decision to 33 purchase COTERIN. Since I was aware that 34 he intended to see Governor Sanchez within 35 the next few weeks, I stated what we had 36 learned from our local counsel and asked 37 his opinion. Dr. Reyes told me unequivocally not to worry about applying 38 39 for such a permit since the 1988 ecology

law had reserved hazardous waste for the federal government and, thus, a local

manifest construction permit was not

43	necessary. Since we had all our federal
44	authorizations, we were set in terms of the
45	required permits. See Exhibit 5 attached."
46	
47	Now, he was cross-examined, and I've given

42

1 you a reference under tab 17 to elements of his 2 cross-examination from page 263 and 266. But he 3 was a person who wasn't Mr. Rodarte, who my friend 4 said should be disregarded. He wasn't Mr. Kesler, 5 who my friend said should be disregarded. And he 6 was a witness who filed a declaration and was 7 cross-examined. 8 With respect to Mr. Neveau, I've given you a 9 reference under tab 15. His evidence is really 10 substantially to the same effect. 11 THE COURT: I think that's what you read previously --12 MR. COWPER: Yes. 13 THE COURT: -- under the previous paragraph. 14 MR. COWPER: Thank you. 15 I don't believe I've referred you to Carvajal, and that extract is under tab 20. And 16 you may recall that he had a declaration. If you 17 18 go to page 45, you'll see that he says: 19 20 "Now, in your opinion, Mr. Carvajal, the 21 construction permit was a legal 22 requirement? 23 A. Considering that there are no building 24 permits in Guadalcazar, it is a requirement 25 which is in the law but which, however, 26 there was no way to implement it. 27 Q. So it isn't..." 28 29 And this is his cross-examination. His 30 evidence in chief was essentially the same effect 31 of Mr. Deets. 32 33 "Q. So it isn't the law? 34 Yes. In the State law, but not in the 35 municipal. There was nothing to implement 36 it. There was not enough regulation, 37 municipal regulation. There was no way to request a permit or to know how much it 38 39 cost." 40

You go over to page 47, and this is again in

his cross-examination, line 9:

43	
44	"And you suggest the municipality told you
45	it was not going to follow the law?
46	 A. Well, what the municipality told us
47	was that the permit to build was no problem

1 2	in itself, so that if it was a legal requirement, it would be issued without any
3	problem.
4	Is that what you understood?"
5	•
6	And I think that should be a "Q" there.
7	
8	"Yes, Mr. Perezcano, or that they were
9	really not to observe, not to obey the law
0	as the rest of the people who are building
1	in"
2	
3	And I think it should be in Guadalcazar.
4	And he's referring there to the the fact
5	which appeared fairly notorious, and which my
6	friend referred to, which there had been building
7	going on and no one had either sought, obtained or
8	pursued a building permit.
9	And I give you another reference here which
20	is evidence that someone actually went to the
21	State office, which under the law is required to
22	receive all the building permits for the
23	municipality, and found not a one from Guadalcazar
24	and not a one from other municipalities in the
25	State of San Luis Potosi.
26	I give you a reference here to the
27	declaration of Mr. Kesler. And if you go to tab 3
28	at page 4, August '93
29	Do you see that?
30	THE COURT: Um-hum.
31	MR. COWPER:
32	"The operating permit was granted by the
33	federal government. At the time it was
34	granted, Rene Altamirano said that it would
35	be the federal government's responsibility
36	to obtain any needed political support
37	necessary in the State and local
88	community. He assured us we had all the
39	legal authority we now needed to build and
Ю	operate but that Mexico was a country that
11	worked on the basis of broad-based
12	political support which he said they would

43	obtain on our behalf. In the meantime, he
44	asked us not to announce the fact that
45	we've been given the operating permit until
46	he had the opportunity actually to make the
47	announcement in the State himself with the

State and local authorities.

"We also met with Dr. Sergio Lujan in the month of August. And he reiterated the fact that we had all of the legal authority we now needed to build and operate our facility. He also asked us not to make any public announcements until he had the chance to visit in person with the governor and prepare the way for the actual construction start."

 That of course is a substantial body of other evidence from Mr. Kesler on that theme, and I won't take you to that.

If you go to tabs -- Mr. Miranda's evidence at 21 and 22, and let's start at 21, if we can, at page 5. And you'll see that at paragraph 19 to 25 he deals with the summer of '94. And he talks about the construction maintenance going on at the site.

And I said to you earlier that in the summer of '94 the company had been asked to go slow, and that there was construction and maintenance going on during that time period. So there's -- my friend says that was a cover for what was going on, but the company said as part of its case that in the summer of '94 construction remed -- construction maintenance was primarily going on. But if you go to -- at 19, and I just refer you to this, he says:

"During the summer and fall of '94 I was in regular communication with officials at PROFEPA both in the San Luis Potosi State offices and the main offices regarding the construction...construction maintenance we were doing at the site."

And then I -- you can skip the next page which talks about --

41 MR. FOY: Sorry, just to save my -- myself time, could42 my friend read paragraph 20, please?

43	MR. COWPER: I can read 20 to 27 if my friend would
44	like.
45	
46	"On July 18th I wrote to Garcia outlining
47	a specific task COTERIN was undertaking as

part of a plan of regular maintenance."

1 2 3

The difference between my friend and I is not that there was no reference to maintenance; it is that my friend seeks to explain everything that occurred on the basis of a representation about only some of what occurred. And aside from it being an intensely factual question that was before the tribunal, it's not an overwhelming point at all on the whole of the evidence. If you look at paragraph 26:

"Further, PROFEPA officials knew that COTERIN was constructing the infrastructure for the landfill. They knew this through their own inspections of the site and their knowledge that remediation of the site would be in situ, i.e., that remediation would take place on-site. On-site remediation in turn requires the construction of the facilities where the wastes are neutralized. This was the plan that had always been contemplated by COTERIN and the federal government."

And coming back to my friend getting excited earlier in the morning, the cell that I showed you was the place where the unremediated material that had been on the surface was sitting there waiting to be taken out again, neutralized, properly treated, and then properly put into a hazardous landfill. That was its temporary cell, okay, and that's what he's talking about here.

Everybody knew that, first of all, it had been put in there by Metalclad management, and that the construction of the other cells was necessary before you could take the material that hadn't been remediated out, treat it with other material coming in and put it into the new cells.

Now, if you go to page 7 -- Do you want to interrupt me again?

42 MR. FOY: Well -- no.

- 43 MR. COWPER: Okay.44 MR. FOY: I think -- I think my -- just for a moment,
- I guess. 45
- 46 What my friend has said is that the
- construction that was occurring was for the 47

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1 purposes of remediation only, and I agree with 2 that. 3 MR. COWPER: No, I didn't say that. 4 I said that the purpose of the construction 5 was characterized in this as maintenance. And 6 my -- as I understood my friend, he said it was 7 related to remediation and maintenance. And what 8 I'm saying is he explains or purports to explain 9 the construction of the entire facility that was, 10 the tribunal found, out and for everybody to see 11 as somehow going on under the cover of maintenance 12 or remediation work, and that that's totally 13 inadequate to what the evidence is. It doesn't even come close, with respect, to fairly 14 15 characterizing the evidence of the witnesses. 16 What Metalclad said was there's absolutely no doubt that the work going on included maintenance. 17 18 included work in relation to the remediation, but 19 it also included the construction of the 20 facility. And that was a necessary conclusion 21 because federal officials knew that the facility 22 was necessary for the ultimate remediation of the 23 materials which my friend has gone on and on about 24 last week. 25 You can't remediate until you have someplace 26 to put them, if you're going to do it on-site. 27 And that's what this witness is talking about when 28 he says their knowledge that remediation of the 29 site would be in situ. You have to build the 30 facility in order to take those materials out, 31 remediate them with other materials and put them

they know the site was being built?

And I say there was overwhelming evidence that everybody knew the site was being built, and

in proper, permanent storage.

And you'll recall my friend said, well,

burn it, take it to some other facility. But that -- what I'm saying is in relation to the

there's another alternative. You can truck it or

facts of this case. The question was: Did the

municipality know what was going on? Did the

federal officials know what was going on? Did

13	that the municipal contrast protests to the
14	contrary were were feeble indeed.
15	And I'll take you to Mr. Ramos's evidence.
16	If you read all of Mr. Ramos's evidence and you
17	find him persuasive on any point, with respect,

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1
      I'd be surprised. He is an unpersuasive witness
2
      on any question of fact, just read on his own. He
3
      says in relation to this point that they didn't --
4
      he couldn't provide any explanation as to why the
5
      permit hadn't been processed; he just didn't
6
      know. But he thought that the company had
7
      reminded them that they had applied for the
8
      permit. And then when they were reminded, they
9
      turned it down. That was his explanation for a
10
       13-month delay while this whole facility was being
11
       built within his municipality.
12
          Now, page 7, if you go to paragraphs 38 to 32
13
       (sic), you'll see:
14
15
          "Mr. Rodarte and I spoke with
          Mr. de la Cruz at the PROFEPA offices
16
17
          in Mexico City."
18
19 THE COURT: Sorry, where are you?
20 MR. COWPER: I'm at 28, page 7.
21 THE COURT: Oh, okay. Sorry. I thought it --
22 MR. COWPER: Yeah. This is dealing with the -- the
23
       order to stop construction in the fall of '94.
24 THE COURT: Um-hum.
25 MR. COWPER:
26
          "...with whom I communicated on a frequent
27
          basis about the municipality's order to
28
          stop construction. We asked him whether
29
          the Guadalcazar Cabildo had the authority
30
          to close down the construction at the site
31
          as they had purported to do."
32
33
          Now, bear in mind the context. He's already
34
       explained that construction beyond remediation, as
35
       my friend phrases it, has been ongoing for some
36
       time to the knowledge of federal officials. He
37
       says:
38
39
          "The federal government..." has "...had
40
          always told us it had exclusive
          jurisdiction over the regulation of
41
          hazardous waste disposal matters. de le
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43	Cruz reaffirmed the federal government's
44	pre-eminence in the area of hazardous waste
45	disposal to us, but suggested that as a
46	sign of respect for the municipal
47	government, COTERIN should apply for the

1 permit anyway. He said that we should 2 continue to construct. And he assured me 3 that the municipality would issue the 4 municipal construction permit as a matter 5 of course on the payment of fees. In any 6 case, de la Cruz said that there was no..." 7 reases "...no reason for the municipality 8 to deny COTERIN's application. 9

"I submitted..."

10 11

This is the man who made this -- made the application:

12 13 14

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23

"I submitted COTERIN's application to the municipality on November 15, 1994, but we heard nothing on the application until December of the next year that the application had been refused.

"Meanwhile, as instructed, we proceeded with construction. We even received an additional federal construction permit on January 31, '95..." offering us "...authorizing us to do the final construction works on the landfill."

24 25 26

And I think I referred that to you earlier. Paragraph 32:

27 28 29

30 31 "All of our construction was highly public. A number of officials and citizens visited the site between October 26th, '94 and the completion of construction."

32 33 34

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Now, this was hotly contested. I mean, Mexico said and provided -- you've heard my friend's explanation for it. But there was clear and direct evidence available to the tribunal that when the municipal stop work order arrived, that it was federal officials who represented that the company should continue constructing, and that the municipal permit was not necessary to continue, and that they'd have no choice but to issue the

permit, and direct evidence that nobody heard from the municipality until December of the next year, when coincidentally the Convenio was concluded on terms that did not expressly include the State and the State's governor, and did not include the

municipality. That's when the municipal permit was denied.

Those were all facts that are found in the tribunal's award and were available to them on the evidence.

Now, Mr. Parrish has said that in my enthusiasm I've also taken you to -- and the cite I just gave covers the extracts which I've referred to under J at page 116, so you may want to make a cross-reference there to the references I make at 332. Because I'm -- I'm dealing at 314 with the general knowledge, general federal representations. And then I deal in detail at 332 with the -- my friend's argument that the work was remedial only.

But while I'm with Mr. Miranda, let me turn to tab 22, which is another declaration of Mr. Miranda, if I could. And you'll see on page 2 -- he says at the top of page 2. It's not numbered. Tab 22, page 2:

"I was in charge of supervising the construction work performed in the landfill. During the time that the construction of the landfill..."

And it goes May '94 to April '95.

 "...took place, several groups of people from the municipality, the State and authorities from the municipality visited the landfill."

He talks -- the purpose of invitations was to create awareness of the benefits that the landfill would bring to the region and to let the people see for themselves the landfill.

And the third paragraph, he says:

"Overall, during construction time more than 30 elementary school teachers and more than 300 inhabitants..."

43	
44	I take that of the municipality
45	
46	"visited the landfill."
47	

1 If you go to the next page, the third full 2 paragraph -- or second -- third full paragraph: 3 4 "Officials from the delegation of PROFEPA 5 in San Luis..." Potos "...Potosi, 6 particularly..." no -- no "...David Leon 7 Carvajal, attended regularly, every six 8 weeks on average, to verify that the 9 construction was taking place according to 10 what the company informed in its monthly 11 reports to INE and to..." FRO "...PROFEPA. 12 "During the construction period, the 13 company asked me to collect signatures of 14 support from the communities surrounding 15 the landfill. I collected around 600 signatures during this period. In all 16 17 cases the great majority of adults were willing to sign the petition for support to 18 19 the landfill without receiving any kind of 20 retribution." 21 22 And I think he means "contribution" in that. 23 24 "During the construction period there were 25 no indications the municipality opposed the 26 construction of the landfill or that we 27 should have obtained a local construction 28 permit until October of '94 when the 29 municipality informed the company they did not agree with the construction." 30 31 32 Over at the top: 33 34 "We suspended the works briefly but 35 re-initiated them once..." 36 37 And I think it says -- under the stamp it's 38 "we," w-e. 39 40 "...once we obtained the consent of PROFEPA and the positive opinions of all 41

federal officials we consulted with. Their

43	arguments were that if the federal
44	government issued its permits and the State
45	had already issued the land use permit, the
46	municipality could not oppose the
47	construction of the landfill in such a

location. At best they only had to review the details of the construction marked in the State laws. They stated this was equivalent to buying a house in a zone where houses were to be built according to a State licence, and then having the municipality denying the permit instead of just regulating the maximum heights and other characteristics proper of such investments."

So the -- the contest of fact here was around this issue really along these lines: Metalclad said we were served with -- and I think this is a -- a handwritten stop work order in October. And it explained what subsequently happened by telling the tribunal, in this and other testimony, that we were concerned because now the municipality had purported to exercise authority through some form of official action. And we went to the federal authorities we had been dealing with.

And the tribunal had before it the evidence that the federal officials did not stay silent, did not say, oh, better not do anything while you're trying to get that permit, but rather said, no, they don't have authority, keep building.

And Your Lordship asked me what was a critical issue on another fact, the critical point here is that after the municipal's stop work (sic), there's clearly construction ongoing. How can the municipality explain -- assume that somehow all this activity had gone without their notice or was understood to be remedial by, as my friend would have it said, until the time the stop work is issued.

I mean, the municipality has determined to stop work. And we know as a fact, and no one's disputing, that the -- that the -- in January and February and March there was substantial construction ongoing because there was an opening in early March. Where is the municipality? And

43	why would Metalclad go ahead and complete the
44	construction if it thought that it had no
45	authority to do so? And why would it not discuss
46	the matter with federal officials?
47	And finally, if the federal officials didn't
	-

42

alphabet a couple of times.

2 position, why would they continue to issue 3 authorities, permits as I've indicated to you, 4 affirming letters, and indeed continue to receive 5 reports and otherwise be aware that the 6 construction was being completed? That was the 7 issue of fact. 8 And I say with respect on that issue, 9 Metalclad had a very compelling and indeed 10 overwhelming case with respect to those facts. 11 And that's what the tribunal found led to the 12 unfairness of the subsequent shutdown of the 13 facility. 14 Now, I make the narrative on that point at 15 110, page 111. And then we've dealt with page -that -- with respect to the point I -- I think 16 17 I've essentially answered that, and I've given you 18 the references there. 19 I've indicated to you the contest in the 20 evidence between Leos and Neveau, which I've given 21 you a reference to at the top of page 115. 22 With respect to the point on 116, I've --23 I've read you the -- Miranda's evidence with 24 respect to that. 25 There is a chronology which I've referred you 26 to on the third reference in paragraph 332. One 27 of the exhibits here was a chronology of 28 effectively correspondence between the company and 29 the federal officials on a number of topics. And 30 if you could just turn to that so I can tell you 31 what it is, and I won't read you a lot of it, but 32 if you go to tab 24 --33 And Mr. Parrish says I got the number wrong 34 yesterday, so I won't assay a number, but you'll 35 see that between A --36 Do you have that tab in front of you? 37 THE COURT: Um-hum. 38 MR. COWPER: The first few pages are effectively index 39 and characterization of the documents which 40 follow. And it goes from A to triple letters, and 41 I think triple letter N, as it goes through the

make these representations, if this wasn't their

13	And it's in reverse chronological, so that
14	the last one is the earliest one. And if you go
1 5	to, say, for example, page 7 and come back, you'll
16	see that there are inspection reports in '93. The
17	last two mentioned documents are inspection

reports from the federal authorities.

And if you follow that up, and just stay to the chronology, what you see is a substantial volume of documentation passing between the company and the federal officials and back and forth with respect to various miscellaneous matters throughout -- between December of '93 and February of '96, which is the -- the first mentioned document, relating to the progress on the project, what is being built, what's going to be built, construction -- essentially construction reports, inspection reports and the like.

And that evidence was all available to the tribunal and was a basis on which they could find as a fact that these events were well-known to federal officials, and it was a body of evidence as to what was happening so they could arrive at a conclusion as to whether any protestations on the part of the municipality ought to be accepted that they didn't know what was going on.

Now, Mr. Ramos or Mayor Ramos I refer to at 333. And his evidence, which is a bit of a highlight of the case here, included, as I've said at the top of 117, that he admitted on cross-examination that members of the council, I believe, observed the construction of the site through field glasses.

Now, he is translated. And I don't know if it's the translation or -- or his own language, but it's -- it's -- some parts of his evidence are difficult to understand. And they are on points apparen -- apparently contradictory of other points he makes. But let me just say that he says, if you go to Mr. Perez -- Perezcano's evidence leading him at page 63 under tab 1 --

Do you have that?

"Don Leonel, do you know on what date the construction of works at the landfill was concluded?"

And he says:

43	
44	"The landfill works were carried out in
45	different stages I don't believe
46	consecutively. When an environmental audit
47	was carried out, it's mentioned at some

1 point. It says that it was shut down, it 2 was closed. But even while this 3 environmental audit was being carried out, 4 the people from the company were building." 5 6 So he volunteers in his own evidence in chief 7 that he knew, he knows that when the audit was 8 being carried out, the people from the company 9 were building. 10 11 "The site was closed down. Personnel from 12 the...A..." 13 14 My -- my friend got this right. 15 MR. THOMAS: Ayuntamiento. 16 MR. COWPER: "...Ayuntamiento inspected the place, and 17 it was found that works were being carried 18 19 out within the property. 20 Q. But do you know on what date the works 21 concluded definitively? 22 Well, no. That would be difficult for --23 after that the works continued within the 24 property. And this is because we sent 25 people to review the scene. Indeed, 26 periodically we were looking in from 27 outside through binoculars, because from 28 the fence to where the work was going on 29 was different forums..." 30 31 And I think he may mean different views. 32 33 "...including when we were told the result 34 of the audit. We pointed that out, that 35 having a permit and an audit, this 36 corresponded to the federal or State 37 government, the famous environmental law on ecological factors. And in tandem, the 38 39 construction work was going on. So during 40 the three years it was being asked why is construction going on when there's no 41 construction permit?" 42

43	
44	So on Mexico's witnesses' evidence, I think
45	it's a fair construction to say that a trier of
46	fact listening to that could draw a fair
47	conclusion that the mayor was aware through

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1
      personnel he sent out, through inspections,
2
      through people looking through binoculars, through
3
      whatever other sources he had during the material
4
      time period that people were asking why is
5
      construction going on when there's no construction
6
      permit?
7
         And I'll stop there if I may.
8 THE COURT: I don't know if this is a minor point, but
9
      I think that you're missing page 64 in your --
10
       that you read.
11 MR. COWPER: Oh, thank you. I'll find that.
12 THE COURT: You read it as if it was continuous,
13
       but --
14 MR. COWPER: I don't think 64 -- 65 is not
       continuous. And I -- I found that last night, and
15
16
       I -- and we didn't get the -- the page. I'm
17
18 THE COURT: We will now take the luncheon break and
19
       reconvene at 2.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
21
       adjourned until 2 p.m.
22
23
       (NOON RECESS)
24
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 12:30 P.M.)
25
       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 2:00 P.M.)
26
27 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Cowper. Please continue.
28 MR. COWPER: Thank you, My Lord.
29
          We -- we were able on the break to capture
       Your Lordship's copy of page 64, which -- which we
30
31
       did not have in the record. And if I could take
32
       that opportunity to ask you to go to tab 1, and
       I'll just complete the -- 64 and indicate some
33
34
       other matters. You'll recall that I -- I read
35
       from the bottom of 63 over to 65. And the answer
36
       at the bottom of 63, starting at the beginning of
37
       that sentence, not in the middle of the answer:
38
39
          "Indeed, periodically we were looking in
40
          from outside through binoculars because
          from the fence to where the work was going
41
42
          on was quite some distance. Indeed, there
```

43	was movement of machinery. There were
44	details suggesting that they continue to
45	operate and working and, indeed, they never
46	stopped working within the facility.
47	President Lauterpacht:follow up on your

42

1 last answer, Mr. Ramos. You said 2 that...I'm just following up your last 3 answer, Mr. Ramos. You said that you sent 4 people to review the scene and that they 5 used binoculars. Now, when did you do 6 that? 7 That was done during the three-year 8 period. We took care through the person in 9 charge, which was the director of public 10 works, to check whether work was going on inside because this problem was exclusively 11 12 under the director of public works who was 13 the one who initiates a request or 14 application for construction. 15 You said this -- you said you did this 16 during the three years." 17 18 And just pausing, he -- he -- and I think 19 it's clear, he came into office in January of 20 '95. This is the mayor. 21 22 "My question ought to be, therefore, more 23 specific. Did any of this observation take 24 place during the period from January to 25 December '95?" 26 27 And that's the reason that the president has 28 picked that time, is that that's the first year of 29 his serving as mayor. And December of '95 is the 30 date of the refusal. 31 32 "On different occasions in different forums 33 including when we were told the results of 34 the audit, we pointed that out, that having 35 a permit or an audit that this corresponded 36 to the federal or State government, the 37 famous environmental audit." 38 39 And I read that before the break. 40 Now, I should say I re-read this. I won't

read the next five or ten pages, but let me

summarize what I think they do.

13	Essentially President Lauterpacht and the
14	witness go back and forth for the next several
1 5	pages with President Lauterpacht trying to be
46	trying to understand what he knew when, and trying
17	to narrow it down, and trying to understand what

part in December and what part in January.
Effectively the witness comes back to the theme
that we did it periodically or we did it
continuously, it was always going on. It's quite
clear that the witness never gets exact about it.

But on the reading of the whole of the evidence, it's my submission that it's very clear that the witness was saying that at the time he and other people in the municipality were aware that construction was ongoing.

And if you go to the very end of the passage, because then Arbitrator Siqueiros comes in on page 71. And if you go to page 73, 'cause the witness as he goes on is getting the point that ev -- that -- I -- I think, and just reading between the lines, everybody is wondering if all of this was known, why wasn't any steps taken? If you go to the bottom of 73, it says:

"This is why in due course..."

Do you have line 20? THE COURT: Um-hum.

24 MR. COWPER:

"The only thing I would want to tell you is I don't know why it wasn't followed up on at the time. The truth is I don't know why it was followed up on as soon as the company reminded us."

And that was the evidence I referred to you earlier with respect to the best explanation he could give having regard to his earlier admissions as to why the permit was refused in December of '95.

And you'll see at the bottom that Mr. Perezcano for -- counsel for Mexico comes back to this, talks about the demonstration. And the witness again on 75 comes back and said -- says, and this is in relation to March of '95:

[&]quot;I understand that the majority of the

43	facilities had already been built because
44	it was going to be it was going to be an
45	opening for their operation. I want to
46	repeat that they continued working, but I
47	think the basic thing, that they already
47	unitik trie basic triirig, triat triey affeady

had that. And afterwards they continued constructing. But I think that the basic part was already built, and the facility almost was constructed in order to be able to operate."

 So I simply say that from one of the central players in the municipal side of matters read as a whole there was substantial evidence before the tribunal that part of their finding that the construction went on openly, not only as it related to the matters explained of by my friend, which he characterizes as remediation, which might otherwise be called remediation or maintenance, but also the construction of the facility. And even within the confines of this witness alone, I say there is no other reasonable construction of the evidence.

Now, I'm at -- and I think I can go on to 119. And I need to correct something in our argument here.

You'll recall that on Friday I told you that my construction of paragraph 46, which refers to the demonstration, is that there was not a finding of fact that the demonstration was caused by the government. And you'll see that in paragraph 340, in this document we assert the implicit finding. I don't say that. There are -- there was a view within our team that that was an implicit finding. I don't assert that to you. So you should take out that first sentence from our submission.

And my submission is, as I said on Friday, over on page 120, that I read the final sentence as a finding of chronological observation rather than a narrow finding of causation; that is, these were part of the events. And chronologically from that point on, the landfill was never operated. There were a number of causes, and they're referred to in other parts of the tribunal. I don't say that the tribunal found that that was the sole cause that prevented the operation of the

43	landfill.
44	If you could go to page 120, there's another
45	correction I need to make. And by the way, the
46	the references at the top I don't take you to are
47	the some of the evidence in relation to the

42

capitals.

2 chilling effect on the operators in respect of 3 their perception of what was likely to happen to 4 their ability to operate the landfill. 5 If you go to 120 at paragraph 344 --6 THE COURT: Um-hum. 7 MR. COWPER: -- there's a correction here because we were having difficulty finding -- if you go five 8 9 lines down, we say the previous order was not put 10 into evidence. I wasn't able to find that. 11 We did find that, and that's at tab 28, if 12 you can make a note there. And I'd ask you to 13 turn to that, because there are two points which 14 emerge from that document. 15 And you'll -- there was this -- there were several references in the evidence, and I think 16 17 I've read you at least a couple, of people saying 18 that in the fall we got the authority to lift the 19 seals, and that that was a part of being able to 20 operate the plant and to remediate the -- the 21 improperly, not-yet-remediated material that was 22 in the cell that I showed you this morning. 23 If you go to tab 28, this is the document 24 saying: 25 26 "...lifting the seals in the landfill, 27 September 94." 28 29 There are two documents. You'll see on 30 page 2, and I think this is a translated document 31 again, at the top of that second page: 32 33 "...located and lifted closure seals in 34 the fronts of a bunch of equipment and 35 places." 36 37 Do you see that? 38 THE COURT: Um-hum. 39 MR. COWPER: And then if you go over two pages, 40 September 6th, '94, if you go down below, it's the 41 third paragraph, the paragraph after the

demonstration. There's no doubt it was and had a

43 THE COURT: Um-hum. 44 MR. COWPER: You'll see:

45

46 "With the purpose to reiterate the closure

47 seals on..."

1 2 3

And I think that is effectively lifting, but it says:

"Front-end loading, front-end loading and storage materials located in the inside of the land field with that sill [sic]."

So my understanding of the oral evidence and that document is that the seals were lifted. And at least potentially what that meant was the federal authorities were putting the landfill in a position, which was then confirmed in the Convenio, that access could be had to the old material, which my friend has given you a number of submissions on, as well as new material which could then together be treated properly, neutralized or otherwise rendered into an inert form, put into a form that would be properly stored and then put into a proper hazardous land -- waste landfill.

I think I can skip -- I've given you basically all of what I had to say from there through to -- there are a number of other references, but I won't take you to them until you go to page 127.

And I wanted to take you briefly to Ambassador Jones's evidence. And if you go to that tab, which is tab 14 I believe, Ambassador Jones became involved later in the piece. He was the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, as I understand it, from '93 to '97, so he -- his office comprehends the -- the relevant period of time. And if you go to page 2, paragraph 4:

"Mexican officials at the federal level told me that they had agreed with our position on Metalclad and that they had tried very hard to convince the officials of both the San Luis Potosi State government and the Municipality of Guadalcazar of the merits of the project

43	and to accept and approve it. However,
44	these same officials alalso emphasized
45	that they were powerless to force State and
46	local officials in San Luis Potosi to
47	support the Metalclad project."
	• • •

And then he talks about Governor Sanchez. And effectively, through a variety of diplomatic initiatives, the ambassador became involved in an attempt to solve the political problem and get the governor onside, and that's really the body of his evidence here.

But he speaks about the governor. And just to give you a -- a sense of the -- of the debate here, not only as it relates to the ambassador versus the governor in which the ambassador paints the governor's involvement in very unfavourable light, but also as to the dispute between the evidence because, in somewhat undiplomatic fashion, this evidence takes issue with the governor's evidence in pretty clear and unvarnished terms.

You'll see in paragraph 5 he says after the -- respecting gover -- meetings with the governor:

"On some occasions he would promise to help resolve the issue. At other times he alleged that Metalclad had committed improprieties or said that the company had no legal rights he could enforce."

And then paragraph 6:

"In his witness statement, Governor Sanchez Unzeuta says that in our first meeting in or about May of '96, he told me that Metalclad would never be able to obtain municipal permits that would allow them to legally operate the La Pedrera hazardous waste landfill. He also states he was able to convince me that Metalclad was a dishonest company.

"Contrary to the governor's statement that we met a few weeks after he received a phone call from Hermio Blanco in May of '96, I believe it was not until August of

43	'96 that I finally met with Governor
44	Sanchez Unzeuta for the first time. And
45	then not until"
46	
47	Over the top of the next page:

1 2 3

"...I had threatened to list the State of San Luis Potosi as being unfriendly to foreign investment that he requested a meeting with me."

And you'll see he says in paragraph 8:

"Furthermore, and contradictory to the governor's witness statement, I believed at the time, and still do, that it was the governor or his government of San Luis Potosi who was less than honest about the events surrounding the permitting of the landfill rather than Metalclad.

"I had spoken with Metalclad representatives on several occasions and believed they were doing everything possible to satisfy the federal government's and the governor's concern about the technical suitability of the site, gaining the necessary permits, educating the community about the benefits of the project and so forth."

And then at the bottom he talks about a request he had made of the governor in paragraph 9. He says with respect to (a) at the bottom of page 3, in respect of one assertion he says at the bottom that the governor's assertion is incorrect.

Do you see that? It's not on a matter of substance, but just giving you a sense of the difference between the witnesses.

Over on the top of page 4, and this is in relation to -- let me read the whole thing:

 "Governor Sanchez Unzeuta's assertion that in a meeting of September '96 I said I would send the evidence against Metalclad regarding alleged improprieties committed by Metalclad in getting a..." stand lee

43	"State land use permit from his
44	predecessor's government to the Department
45	of Justice is incorrect. On the other
46	hand, both I and the commercial officer
47	present in the meeting only told him we had

a sworn obligation to uphold the laws,
which included the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. Our official obligation was
to report alleged violations such as this.
Notwithstanding this, as far as I know,
these allegations were found not to have
merit."

With respect to (b) he refers to his testimony about disregarding intention he says is false. He says -- then states that to the contrary. And then he -- with respect to (c), he characterizes the governor's evidence as an attenuation of the truth. That's four lines down from (c).

And he says that he was not applauding the governor at all. If you go over to the next page, paragraph 11:

"When I left Mexico as ambassador in June '97, I never fully understood why neither the State government of San Luis Potosi nor the municipality would permit Metalclad to operate when, A, the company seemed to have all the necessary legal documents and requirements and, B, the technology Metalclad brought to the project would actually improve the environmental conditions for the people of that area. All this in a nation whose land is plagued by the urgent and threatening reality of millions of tonnes of hazardous waste being dumped unlawfully in its environment every year."

 Now, for a diplomat, that's a pretty strong-worded disagreement with the governor, the governor's stated role and the views as to whether Metalclad had been treated fairly.

Now, I can pass from that all the way through -- I'm coming close to the end of this.

If you go to page 130, one of the aspects --

and I say this at 365. One of the aspects of the curious delay in this is that the various time periods referred to as being responsive to a construction application were either ten days or at the outset four months.

And there was expert evidence on the four-month period as I recall. One of the Mexican law experts says that would be regarded as the furthest extent that would be considered permissible.

And my understanding is that Mexico and the tribunal, before the tribunal, conceded that four months would be the outside time period. So my friend is mumbling, and I'll try to find that from the memorial and so you have a specific reference.

If you go to -- at that point, could you add to the references under 365 pages 73 and 74 of Mr. Ramos's evidence? I don't think you need to refer to it. But I say that the dilatory aspect, that is, the -- the curious and I say not satisfactorily explained coincidence of the timing of the denial of the permit, and the delay since the permit had been applied for, was an important fact before the tribunal.

The other fact that I refer to at 366, which I indicated to you on -- on Friday, and -- and obviously Ambassador Jones puts the governor more centrally in the piece, as you'll see at 366, included in the evidence as it related to the municipal process was the governor's involvement in two -- I'm just pick -- picking two respects, but two important respects, one of them being that it was clear on the evidence that the lawyer, Mr. Serrato, who became involved with the municipal council, was either recommended or sent by the governor.

And I've given you the extracts at 366 which are to that effect, and it's at page 16 of the governor's evidence, and I think it's at page 15 of Mr. Ramos's evidence.

Also -- and the second point is that -- yes. It's page 16 in this, of the governor, in which he essentially said that Mr. Serrato had become involved at his request.

And the second point though is that on the critical meeting, and I said this to you earlier,

it was the governor who chaired the municipal council. This governor came down and chaired this meeting which resulted in the -- in the denial. And that's at page 21 of Mr. Ramos's evidence, tab 27, lines 9 to 11. He attended and presided at

the meeting.

And so there was before the tribunal evidence from which you could conclude that, far from it being an independent concern of the municipality, that the municipality's decision to deny the permit was part of the governor's political opposition which flowed from the fact that the federal authorities had not included him in the negotiation of the Convenio and had taken exclusive responsibility for that.

I can then go to -- skipping through to 133, and I -- I only say in relation to -- and I checked the transcript, but although the title of P in my friend's book says:

"...failure to have regard to agreement allowing the operation of the site as a landfill..."

In his oral submissions he characterized that as a proposal or as an offer by the municipality, and I say that has no controlling importance in the matter before you.

If you go to 134, if -- if you're so curious, Mr. Kesler in his memorial talks about the substantial amount of work that was involved at this time period, and it's the reference under 378, which was carried out in relation to a 2,000-page environmental audit. And there's a summary in the record, not the full audit.

Then there was a reaudit of that audit, which involved -- and I can get confused here. But there are members of the university who became involved and audited the audit. There were environmental and health studies, numerous other things which were carried out by the company throughout that time period to satisfy federal authorities and to satisfy or what they hoped would satisfy any political opposition.

Now, if you go to page 135 I on Friday told you that in our submission the whole proposal of a -- of a dump made no sense. In page 381 I -- I

- have been unable to find the specific reference to the prices per tonne. Those were what I 43
- 44
- understand to be the right prices. But let me just refer you to this, and I'll give you the 45
- 46
- specific reference. 47

There was a general report about the economics, which is the Triple A report which is attached, it is Volume 3 to the memorial. The whole report is there. And the point I'm making there, it doesn't matter what the precise number is, is that the -- the price that you can command for the operation of a hazardous waste landfill is in a completely different order, understandably -- just common sense tells you that -- than it -- than it is for just dumping of ordinary waste. And those are totally different facilities, totally different uses of the property.

And the finding of the tribunal was the only reason this investment was made, the sole purpose of making this investment was the operation of the facility for a hazard -- hazardous waste landfill, and that's what was built.

At the bottom of 135, just giving you a little bit of an explanation of what treatment is in -- has in mind, I've given you a -- a cross-reference to the evidence that the waste is taken in; it's removed; it's put in treatment containers; it's neutralized either by addition of base or acid materials; it's solidified by evaporation; it's added -- cement's added; the waste is formed into blocks and then placed in a lined storage cell.

That's essentially what the -- the operation involves, and that's apparent from the permits and other things. You can inter -- and I've given you the reference at the bottom which also explains that.

Now, we can then go to Q at 137. And I've quoted you there, and I don't know that I need take you to it, but I will just briefly, at tab 32, at those pages there's the exchange between counsel and the tribunal respecting the role of domestic law in the overall matter. And you'll recall in this passage we dealt with local remedies.

If you -- if you -- well, maybe the best way to do it is to start at 140. And just bear in

43	mind these aren't continuous, so the previous page
44	is not 139. This really starts the debate, and
45	this is counsel, I believe:
46	
47	"The president earlier raised the question

of what is the role of Mexican law in this proceeding, and it is an important question because I think every witness of the respondent, with the exception of the experts, and perhaps even they, was cross-examined as to fine points of Mexican constitutional and environmental law. I would record that all of the witnesses who appeared on behalf of Mexican State in the past two weeks were laywitnesses. They were not expert witnesses."

So a very large grain of salt ought to be taken with respect to the statements of laywitnesses under cross-examination with respect to fine points of Mexican law.

But the most important point with respect to this issue is this:

"It is well-established that international arbitral tribunals recognize the domain of the domestic courts. It is the domestic courts who are vested with the jurisdiction to determine questions of domestic law. International arbitral tribunals are not vested with the jurisdiction to make these determinations."

And if you go over to 142, President Lauterpacht says:

"Just pause there, because the points you were raising raise quite fundamental issues of international jurisdiction.

"How do you distinguish the situation confronting us in this case where we were having to look at Mexican law for the purpose of determining whether Metalclad had acquired a valid right to operate on which claim it is based from the situation in relation to, let us say, an exhaustion of local remedies that might come up in any

43	international tribunal, where the defence
44	of the respondent State is that the
45	national on the claim of State [sic] has
46	not exhausted local remedies and a debate
47	ensues on that very question, was there a

local remedy to exhaust?"

The point he's saying is, even if you're in a local remedies rule, you have to have evidence before the international tribunal as to whether there was a local remedy; that's a question of the local law, and you tend to call expert witnesses to establish or refute the existence of local remedies.

So that's -- he's saying even if you are in that territory, there's still evidence before the tribunal and a finding necessary.

Mr. Thomas's answer:

"Yes. Well, on the facts of this case there was a local remedy to exhaust. That's not the question I'm raising. I'm saying -- Mr. Thomas -- in principle [sic]..."

Question by President Lauterpacht:

"You are submitting that we do not have jurisdiction to decide a question of Mexican law, though the consequences of that assertion we will come to in a moment. But you're saying as a matter of principle an international tribunal does not have the right to decide a question of Mexican law. That is how I hear you.

"I then say to you, if that is so, how do international tribunals in other cases where the question of local remedies is relevant proceed?

Mr. Thomas: Perhaps I've not stated the proposition correctly.

"If I've evoked the question that you propose back to me, my point is not that this tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider Mexican law as a matter of fact. The questions of domestic law are fact, and that is well established in the

43	international jurisprudence.
44	"But questions as to the internal
45	invalidity of rules of national law
46	according to the concept of the reserve
47	domain of domestic jurisdiction fall to the

domestic courts."

1 2 3

And if you go over to 145, just reading the president's observations starting at line 10:

"Just stopping for a moment, let's leave fair and equitable aside and concentrate on expropriation.

"For purposes of expropriation, something has to be expropriated. We have to identify those. And we can only identify it in terms of the rights of Metalclad under Mexican law.

"Supposing we agree with you entirely that Mexican law is a question of fact. The tribunal still has to decide as a fact what the content of the relevant Mexican law is. You are quite right in saying it is a matter of evidence.

"But when all the evidence has been heard at the end of the day, the tribunal has to decide as a fact the content of Mexican law. Do you disagree with that? May I consult? Pause. Well, as a matter of principle, we think the way in which you put the propositions are correct. We agree that these are questions of fact."

So I -- I simply say in reading the colloquy, if that's the right word, between counsel and the tribunal, that both understood that what was being done was determining questions of Mexican law as a question of fact, and in -- the subsequent determination of whether there had been a breach of the treaty arose out of the findings of fact as to Mexican law and other facts.

And if you go to page 138, I've given you the references at the bottom of 389 to the battle adjoined on those issues.

Now, I say with respect I'm not going to deal with R and S at any length. Those are matters which in my submission do not rise to points of

43	law, let alone points capable of reversing or
44	setting aside the award; that is, issues of
45	municipal law fall within the submissions I've
46	already made. And the weight of experts surely in
47	my submission must be a matter squarely within the

jurisdiction and the privileges of the tribunal.

Now, the -- the last section in my friend's submission on this point deals with Ecological Decree. And I've already -- it's a little bit difficult to follow because of the nature of his attack on it and then my response, and then his further supplemental term.

But let me just leave you with this on the Ecological Decree: My friend ultimately in his submission, if he has to deal with Ecological Decree, says that the tribunal erred in interpreting the decree and that their interpretation was unreasonable. I say that's squarely a question of law. That's an interpretation of a quasi-legal document. It's clearly a question of law.

It's a question of law of -- of, if you will, Mexican law. But it's a question which was a finding by the tribunal within their jurisdiction. I think you could characterize it as a question of Mexican law, because it's an interpretation of a Mexican document that was commented on by all of the experts. So for the purposes of the tribunal it's a question of fact.

But even if it was in some form or fashion capable of being elevated to a question of law, when he gets to the decree, if he has to, he's ultimately resigned in my submission to -- to quibbling over the interpretation of the decree. And the tribunal found that the effect of the decree was to permanently ban the operation of the landfill.

Now, the only point that I haven't dealt with there is my friend's interpretation of 109 and 111 of the award. And I looked at the transcript on this, and I -- I don't think I've commented on it, and I do need to.

If you could go to the award, because I understand my friend makes a different point that I haven't really addressed, which was in his submission the finding in 111 was conditional, if I understand what he's submitted, and I'll just

- take it there.
- 44 If you have page 36 of the award -- sorry.
- 45 THE COURT: Um-hum.
- 46 MR. COWPER: I believe my friend -- the words he used
- in characterizing 111 was -- was that the tribunal

found that the decree would, if implemented, constitute an expropriation. And that's his characterization, as I understand it, of the last sentence of paragraph 111.

And in reply, let me say that that interpretation is, firstly, irreconcilable with the last sentence on paragraph 109, which says the decree had the effect -- had the effect of barring forever the operation of the landfill. But it's also, with respect, not a fair interpretation of the final sentence of paragraph 111.

What I say is, well, aside from the obvious observation that the word "if" is not in the sentence, that the reference to implementation and the word "would" is the implementation of the Ecological Decree would, in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to expropriation.

In other words, the decree would, if it was by itself, constitute an act tantamount to expropriation, not if it were implemented constitute an act tantamount to expropriation. So that's my respectful submission with respect to a fair interpretation of those two paragraphs.

Now, on page 145, and I've indicated this to Your Lordship, Metalclad's position below was on this issue the tribunal had before it evidence which would have required some embarrassment to the government of Mexico. But it had evidence before them which was reports from the governor reported in the press on which he was cross-examined, and they make no findings about this, in which Metalclad strenuously urged the tribunal, said you should have regard to the fact that he was reported as saying that's the very purpose of the decree.

And I say on the finding they -- they clearly say we do not have to make any finding of intent or purpose. They clearly say that's unnecessary for them, but it was a matter that was before them. They could have on the evidence chosen to disbelieve the governor and to find that -- indeed, forgetting the fine niceties of

43	interpretation that the governmental purpose
44	behind the decree was to forever bar the
45	landfill.
46	And if you think of the context, what's
47	happened is, not only everything that's happened

has occurred, there's then a filing of
Chapter 11. There's a highly public claim made
against Mexico. And then, as you know, the decree
is issued later. It fits with the story of the
governor's -- as advanced by metal -- Metalclad of
the governor's opposition to the project.

That finishes Chapter 5. And I'll deal with Chapter 6 very briefly.

There are essentially two points made here, and my friend Mr. Thomas made these last week. The first point which he dealt with at length was the issue of the accounting and the handout, and the allegation that the -- there was a deception on the tribunal.

And I deal with that in Section B of this chapter. And I dealt with this on Friday afternoon. And I'm content to rest on my submissions that I made you -- to you Friday afternoon in respect of that issue.

As I set out in my submission, that is a matter squarely within the common experience of tribunals, squarely within the revenue -- the -- the area of fact, and even more importantly is not something which it can, even at the beginning, constitute an allegation of deception on the tribunal or -- and I believe my friend used the word "fraud" on several occasions.

The second point he takes I can deal with similarly shortly, and it is: He briefly took the point as it related to corrupt practices alleged to arise from the payments to Ms. Ratner and then the subsequent association with Mr. Rodarte.

Now, aside from the preliminary observation that the question was one of fact on which there are no findings -- because there's no -- not a breath of finding in this award with respect to these allegations -- I make this observation, and that is: With respect to Ratner, my friend was not as careful as I -- in my submission he said -- he ought to have been to delineate the fact that the agreement to make the payments to Ratner predated Metalclad's purchase of the company.

43	In other words, the commitment to make these	
14	payments and that's why I think we're now	
1 5	dealing with Chapter 6, and we've already dealt	
46	with however many factual points before this	
17	the agreement to make the payments predated.	

And during Metalclad's supervision I think there's a \$10,000 payment. But on Kesler's evidence they were committed to making those payments to all the Mexican shareholders in the pre-existing company. She received equal consideration with other shareholders. And he testified he did not know until later that she was the wife of Mr. Rodarte. Clearly a question of credibility. Clearly no finding. Clearly no basis in my submission for setting aside award on the basis of fraud or public policy.

With respect to the second arm of that, which is at the very end of my -- of his submission he started to talk about the '93 period as opposed to the '91 period and when Mr. Rodarte was a consultant to the Mexican government and also, as he set out, performing duties for Metalclad, and he set that out.

In my submission, what -- what isn't done there with respect to his presentation of it is that he doesn't take you to the response of Mr. Kesler, which I've given you at page 154, paragraph 446 which is to say, no, he wasn't an employee in '93 and we weren't violating the laws. We were satisfied that his involvement with our company while he was a consultant as opposed to an employee was not a violation of Mexican law.

Now, with respect, those are points which, if they had this severity and the gravity that the --my friend suggested, they ought to have been raised and pointed to with far greater specificity and far greater persuasiveness than my friend even attempted.

In my friend's 110-page argument before this tribunal they are mentioned on about a page-and-a-half. In the oral argument which went for a long period of time, and we read it a couple of times, but there may be a few syllables on this point, but no more. And so the absence of any finding by the tribunal is a -- is a product of the way in which the argument's evolved.

There's also, by the way, no mention of my

- 43
- friend's first theory, which was this is a securities fraud. And I -- you can go and read Mr. Kesler's cross-examination. There are hours 44
- 45
- 46 of allegations in his cross-examination of
- securities fraud. By the time you get to the 47

Submissions by Mr. Cowper Submissions by Mr. Greenberg

final denouement of this case, Mexico is not pursuing that theory. Now, the -- I'm not suggesting they abandoned it, but I'm saying in -- in the context you can understand why the tribunal didn't deal with it at all.

Now, and finally, on principle even the case my friend refers to says as it relates to a portion of an award that might be characterized as an improper payment perhaps that ought not to be enforced as a matter of public policy. And if you look at that, that is a white chip; in this particular poker game, it's \$10,000 or thereabouts. It's nothing in my submission to justify even a consideration of setting aside the award as a whole.

Now, that completes my submissions on Chapter 6, and we then have Chapter 7. And I'm afraid I have to tell you that I didn't leave anything for Mr. Parrish on the facts by the time I finished it. I did warn him that that might actually occur. But you won't be hearing from Mr. Parrish.

But Mr. Greenberg was going to take Chapter 7. And because I haven't stopped it -- started it, he still has something to say. So I'd like to pass it over to him, if I may.

27 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Greenberg.28 MR. GREENBERG: Thank you, My Lord.

As Mr. Cowper said, my submissions will address the issues covered in Chapter 7 of our outline of argument which relate to the alleged failure to give sufficient reasons in the award addressing all of the questions before the tribunal.

My submissions will cover four general themes, that's, first, that the award on any standard provided sufficient reasons dealing with the questions before the tribunal.

Second, that the law in Canada in regard to arbitral awards is that the failure to give sufficient reasons or even any reasons at all is not a basis for judicial intervention.

43	Third, that the law under the ICSID
44	Convention which is relied on by Mexico as the
45	sole basis for this part of its submissions
46	involves a different arbitral regime with a
47	different review process, different review

criteria, and which was made expressly inapplicable to the form of arbitration under the additional facility rules.

And we've quoted in our outline Article 3 of the additional facility rules which states expressly that the ICSID Convention does not apply to this form of arbitration.

Fourth, the legislature in both of the arbitral -- arbitration acts before you, and the drafters of the additional facility rules, have provided for other procedural safeguards specifically to address the issue of insufficient reasons, and Mexico has failed to avail itself of those remedies.

Now, dealing first with my -- my first theme that sufficient reasons were given, I begin with this theme because in my submission it provides a complete answer to my friend's complaints on any measure of -- of what are sufficient reasons. And the Court need not go beyond the terms of the award itself to dispense with my friend's argument on this point.

Now, dealing first with the complaints relating to the sufficiency of reasons which are found in my friend's outline of argument, those are, first, that the tribunal failed to address prior contamination and remediation and, second, that the tribunal failed to deal with the existence of domestic legal remedies.

Now, I note before going on at this point that even the authorities relied on by my friends relating to the ICSID Convention accept the proposition that a tribunal need not expressly address a ground in its reasons that is implicitly ruled out by another finding within the award.

And at paragraph 467 of our outline of argument I quote from Professor Schreuer, picking up where my friends left off. And you'll see in the second paragraph of the quote:

"A tribunal need not provide reasons if it rejects arguments that are logically ruled

43	out or rendered irrelevant by the reasoned
44	acceptance of other arguments."
45	
46	Now, in my submission that paragraph covers
47	off most of my friend's complaints with respect to

the tribunal's treatment of contam -- the contamination and remediation issue.

On that question, the tribunal held that environmental issues relating to a hazardous waste landfill, including questions of contamination and remediation, fell within the exclusive authority of the federal Mexican government, and that it was satisfied in respect to those issues.

Those findings are found at paragraph 48 -- and I won't read them to you, because I think all of these paragraphs have already been referred to you -- in paragraph 48, which the -- in which the tribunal dealt with prior contamination of the site and remediation obligations in addressing the Convenio; in paragraph 86, the tribunal held that the federal authority was controlling and exclusive; and in paragraph 96, in which the tribunal held that the federal government was satisfied that the project was sensitive to environmental concerns, principally relating to the agreement in the Convenio.

In my submission the combined effect of those findings cover the field in respect of contamination and remediation and make it unnecessary for the tribunal to address the municipality's view of those issues.

Now, as a subset of that first issue, my friends have impugned the tribunal for failing to address the motives of the municipality specifically in respect of denying the construction permit. However, the tribunal held that the motivations for the municipality denying the permit outside of construction considerations were improper.

That implicitly addresses the other motives the municipality may have had. And those findings are found at paragraph 86 in which the tribunal held that the authority of the municipality only extended to appropriate construction considerations, and that the municipality's denial of the permit for any other reason related to anything other than the physical construction or

43	defects in the site was improper.	
44	Now, additionally at paragraph 92, and I I	
45	will ask you to have reference to paragraph 92 of	
46	the award, paragraph 92 the tribunal held:	
47		

"The town council denied the permit for reasons which included but may not have been limited to the opposition of the local population, the fact that construction had already begun when the application was submitted, the denial of the permit to COTERIN in..." nine "... December 1991 and January 1992, the ecological concerns regarding the environmental effect and impact on the site and surrounding communities."

And then the tribunal concludes:

"None of the reasons included a reference to any problems associated with the physical construction of the landfill or to any physical defects therein."

So the tribunal clearly dispensed with the issue of the motivations underlying the municipality's conduct in denying the permit on the basis that its jurisdiction was limited generally to non-hazardous waste landfills, and specifically in respect of the construction permits was restricted to considering actual construction issues.

Now, the second assertion in my friend's outline is that the availability of domestic legal remedies was not dealt with. Now, that particular submission has been addressed ad nauseam in our submissions so far.

Paragraph 97 and the note therein addressed the issue of domestic legal remedies. Now, in their submissions my friends take issue with the correctness of those conclusions. But the correctness of those conclusions is not the issue when you're dealing with the sufficiency of the reasons.

Now, Mr. Cowper has already addressed the point that my friends raised regarding the municipality's willingness to allow a

43	non-hazardous waste site. There was no agreement
44	in place regarding that. There was nothing for
45	the tribunal to consider in its reasons in that
46	respect.
47	In the course of their submissions, my

 friends stated that there was no reference by the tribunal to the permitting history. In paragraph 50, however, the tribunal notes that the municipality recalled its decision to deny a construction permit and noted the impropriety of Metalclad's construction of the landfill prior to receiving a municipal construction permit.

And then, again at paragraph 92, as I've already read, there was reference to both the previous denial and the fact that construction had already begun. And it -- the tribunal held that those were among the reasons that did -- were not associated with the physical construction of the landfill. So it gave its reasons for not placing any weight on those submissions.

Now, my friends in their submissions also referred to the demonstration and the lack of any finding of attribution. And Mr. Cowper's already addressed this. But in my submission there's also no finding that the demonstration was a basis for the breach of either 1105 or 1110.

You can go through the entire section on the tribunal's decision and you'll see there's no reference to the demonstration as a basis for any liability. The reference in the facts section was merely part of the chronology.

Now, my friends in their submissions also contended that there was no reference by the tribunal to Metalclad's knowledge of the requirement for a municipal permit. In fact, the tribunal addressed that issue at paragraphs 31, 53, 80, 87 and 89 of the award.

And in particular, if you'll have reference to paragraph 53 of the award, the tribe -- the tribunal makes a specific reference in paragraph 53 to Mexico's assertion that Metalclad was aware through due diligence that a municipal permit might be necessary on the basis of the case of COTERIN 1991/1992, and other past precedents for various projects in SLP.

And then if you'll flip to paragraph 80 the tribunal notes:

"When Metalclad inquired prior to" the
"purchaseprior to its purchase of
COTERIN as to the necessity for municipal
permits, federal officials assured it that

it had all that was needed to undertake the landfill project."

Then in paragraphs 85, 87 and 89 the tribunal goes on to hold that Metalclad was led to believe that federal and State permits allowed for construction and operation of the landfill, that Metalclad relied on those representations of the federal government, and that Metalclad was entitled to rely on those representations.

So those findings taken together necessarily dispense with the point on due diligence knowledge of the potential requirement of a municipal permit. Metalclad inquired. They were told they had all they needed. They relied on that representation, and they were entitled to. Those were the findings of the tribunal.

Now, I believe that covers all of the allegations of failure to provide sufficient reasons that my friends raised. My principal position in respect of all of them is that the complaints as to the sufficiency of the award are not borne out by a fair reading of the award.

My next theme is that under the law governing the review of arbitral awards the failure to give sufficient reasons or even give any reasons at all is not a basis for setting aside the award. Now, this review in this Court is governed entirely by one of the two arbitration acts before you.

And my friends have now submitted in their further supplemental outline that the treatment of reasons falls under the review provisions of either the International Commercial Arbitration Act or now the Commercial Arbitration Act as an error of law.

So I propose to deal briefly with the relevant provisions of the act which relate to reasons, and I'll start with the International Commercial Arbitration Act. And in dealing with that, I'll refer to a decision of this Court which is referred to in our outline of argument in which it was held that the failure to provide any

reasons at all, even where there was a requirement	
to do so under the rules governing the	
arbitration, did not run afoul of the	
International Commercial Arbitration Act.	
If you'll go to the International Commercial	
	to do so under the rules governing the arbitration, did not run afoul of the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

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1
      Arbitration Act at tab 76 of my friend's
2
      materials --
3 THE COURT: I've got my copy here.
4 MR. GREENBERG: Oh, okay. Let me just catch up to you
5
6
          And just cataloguing the relevant provisions,
7
      you'll see at Section 31 --
8 THE COURT: Um-hum.
9 MR. GREENBERG: -- subsection (1) --
10 THE COURT: Um-hum.
11 MR. GREENBERG: -- you'll see that the international
       act requires that an award be in writing. Under
12
       subsection (3) it requires the award to state the
13
14
       reasons on which it is based unless the parties
15
       agree otherwise or is a compromise agreement as
16
       provided for in Section 30.
17
          Now, if you'll skip over to Section 33(4)
18
       you'll see:
19
20
          "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a
21
          party may request within 30 days after
22
          receipt of the arbitral award the arbitral
23
          tribunal to make an additional arbitral
24
          award as to claims presented in the
25
          arbitral proceeding...proceedings but
26
          omitted from the arbitral award."
27
28
          And then Section 34, which you've been
29
       referred to, is in the next part entitled
30
       "Recourse Against an Arbitral Award," and this
31
       sets out the exclusive grounds on which a Court
32
       may in its discretion set aside the arbitral
33
       award.
34
          And so as we've submitted a number of times
35
       previously, to have the award set aside, the
36
       failure to give sufficient reasons must be shown
37
       to fall within one of these exclusive grounds in
       order for it to be a reviewable error under the
38
39
       international act.
40
          Now, my friend correctly noted in his
41
       submissions under this part that we rely on the
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Food Services of America case which is found at

43	tab 28 of my friend's authorities. Thank you.
44	And Food Services of America dealt with the
45	enforcement of an arbitral award under the
46	International Commercial Arbitration Act in more
47	extreme circumstances than are present here in

that the arbitral panel did not provide any reasons as was required by the international arbitral -- arbitration rules under which the parties agreed the arbitration would proceed.

And at page 230 of the decision at -- at paragraph 21 the Court begins its -- begins to address the issue of the arbitrators failed to deliver reasons for their award, and it says:

"Article 28(2) of the international arbitration rules requires the arbitrators to state reasons upon which the award is based. In this matter written reasons were not issued."

And the requirement for reasons in this case, as here, as in the case at bar, was based on the rules under which the arbitration was to proceed. Skipping over to paragraph 27 on the next page, the Court framed the issue as whether the failure to give reasons is sufficiently serious to render the arbitral procedure to have not been in accordance with the agreement of the parties such as to warrant denying enforcement of the award.

And in the next paragraph, at paragraph 28 the Court makes reference to Schreter and Gasmac, and they cite it to the effect that the failure of international arbitrators to give reasons did not amount to a ground upon which the Court should exercise its discretion to refuse enforcement of the award.

Down to paragraph 29 the Court cites Casey's to the same effect, that the failure to provide reasons is not a reason in and of itself to refuse enforcement of an award, and that the burden is on the respondent that it fits within one of the subsections of Section 36.

Now, that brings me to an important point, and that is that the Court in this case was dealing with its discretion to refuse enforcement of an award under Section 36 of the international arbitration act.

Now, the provisions in Section 36 for declining to enforce an award are virtually identical to the provisions in Section 34 --THE COURT: Excuse me. MR. GREENBERG: -- to the -- to the provisions in

Section 34 which provide the Court with discretion to set a -- an award aside.

And if you have reference to Section 34 and 36 of the act side-by-side you'll see that the distinctions are mainly dealing with the law that underlie -- underscores the -- the award.

Since the enforcement of the award could be from another jurisdiction, Section 34(2) and 34(2) -- I'm sorry, 34(2)(ii) and -- and (v), and Section 36(2)(ii) and sub (v) both state that -- in one case it's the law of B.C. that's the default law, and in the other case it's the law of the forum in which the award was granted; that's the default law if there's no agreement by the parties.

There's an additional ground under Section 36 to refuse enforcement of an award if it has not become binding on the parties or is suspended or set aside in the State in which the award was made, but otherwise Section 34 and 36, the grounds are virtually identical.

So although the Court in Food Services was dealing with Section 36 discretion to refuse enforcement of award, in my submission the comments in this case apply equally to considerations under Section 34 of the act.

Returning to the award at -- sorry, to the decision at paragraph 32, the Court there rejected the submission that the failure to give reasons ran afoul of Section 36(1)(a)(v) of the international act on the basis that the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or of the law of the State where the arbitration took place.

And you'll see that the Court held that:

"The issuing of reasons after the fact is not part of the arbitration process itself. The procedure of the arbitration hearing itself..."

The Court noted, was in accordance with the

.3	parties' agreement, and that was despite the fact
4	that the rules under which the parties agreed the
5	arbitration was to proceed required reasons.
6	And then the Court went on to hold further
7	that:

"Even if the failure to give reasons were considered part of the arbitral procedure, the failure does not bring into question the fairness of the hearing or of the decision-making process, and is therefore not sufficiently serious to violate the parties' agreement to have an arbitration in accord with the rules."

Now, my friend in his submission noted that the Court found in Food Services that the parties had waived their rights to rely on Section 36, and he's correct in that.

The decision, however, in regard to failure to provide reasons that the Court went on to provide is directly on point with this case, and that -- that reasoning was based on the authority of Schreter and Casey's.

And just to close the loop on that, if we can find the Schreter case at tab 59 of my friend's authorities, and the quote is found at page 377 of that tab, that the failure to provide reasons is not a ground in and of itself to set aside an award or, sorry, to refuse to enforce an award.

Schreter was also a case on enforcement of an award. In that case they were dealing not with a total failure to give reasons but the allegation that there was an omission within the reasons.

So in my submission on the authorities the failure to provide reasons despite the requirement of the rules under which the arbi -- arbitration was to proceed does not fall within Section 36 of the international act, and in my submission likewise does not fall within the Section 34 criteria.

And further, even if it could be characterized as falling within the scope of matters to be reviewed under Section 34, it is not a matter which warrants the Court exercising its discretion to set aside an award.

And that point applies in my submission with

- 43
- even greater force to this case where reasons were given and only sufficiency is questioned as in the Food Services case where there was an entire 44
- 45
- 46 failure to give reasons.
- 47 THE COURT: Would this be a convenient time to take

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1
      the afternoon break?
2 MR. GREENBERG: I think so, My Lord. Thank you.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
4
      adjourned for the afternoon recess.
5
6
      (AFTERNOON RECESS)
7
      (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:05 P.M.)
8
      (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 3:21 P.M.)
9
10 THE COURT: Yes, please continue.
11 MR. GREENBERG: Thank you, My Lord.
12
          I had just finished dealing with the
13
       International Commercial Arbitration Act. And now
14
       I'd like to just deal with a few provisions in the
15
       domestic Commercial Arbitration Act which is found
16
       at tab 74 at my friend's authorities.
17
          And I'll start with Section 25 which requires
18
       an award must be in writing and must be signed by
19
       the arbitrator. There's no requirement for
20
       reasons in that section.
21
          Section 27(6):
22
23
          "Within 30 days after receiving the award
24
          a party may apply to the arbitrator to make
25
          an additional award with respect to claims
26
          presented in the proceedings but omitted
27
          from the award, unless otherwise agreed by
28
          the parties."
29
30
          And then Section 33 which we've set out in
       its entirety in -- in our outline of argument at
31
32
       paragraph 489, Section 33(1):
33
34
          "A party to an arbitration may apply to the
35
          Court for an order that the arbitrator give
36
          more detailed reasons for an award."
37
38
          Subsection (2):
39
40
          "On an application under subsection (1) the
          Court may order that the arbitrator state
41
42
          the reasons for the award in detail that is
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.3	sufficient to consider any question of law
4	that arises out of the award were an appeal
5 6	to be brought under Section 31."
7	And then subsection (3), which makes it clear

that an award -- an order under subsection (2) is only to be made where reason -- a reasoned award was required in advance of the award being made, or there's some reason -- some other reason why no notice that a reasoned award would be required is given.

Now, in my submission Section 33 creates a separate statutory remedy independent of Section 31 of the Commercial Arbitration Act in circumstances where an arbitrator has been required in advance to give a reasoned award and has failed to do so.

In my submission the implication of this section is that it's not an error of law under Section 31 to fail to give sufficient reasons, otherwise Section 33 would be unnecessary.

Now, my friends have asserted that the failure to give reasons falls within the provisions which authorize review by this Court under either of the acts. In my submission there is no such scope for review, and in any event the Court ought not to exercise its discretion under either statute to interfere with the award on the basis of the sufficiency of the reasons.

Now, my third theme: The ICSID Convention. My friend in -- Mr. Thomas in his submissions on this point relied exclusively on decisions of the ad hoc annulment committees established under the ICSID Convention arbitration regime.

And my friend cited in this section of his argument the learned authors Mustill and Boyd for the proposition that it is an analytical error to apply the principles from one form of arbitration to another.

Now, ironically he cited that principle in the course of his submissions relying exclusively on the ICSID Convention approach to annulment, which is entirely a different form of arbitration than the regime of arbitrations under the additional facility rules.

In my submission it would be an analytical error to apply the principles from the convention

- 43 rules to an arbitration under the additional facility rules. And I note in this regard that 44
- 45
- the ICSID Convention was made expressly inapplicable to arbitrations under the additional 46
- facility rules. 47

And we've reproduced Article 3 of the additional facility rules at paragraph 490 of our outline of argument, and it's headed "Convention Not Applicable":

4 5 6

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"Since the proceedings envisaged by Article 2 are outside the jurisdiction of the centre, none of the provisions of the convention shall be applicable to them or to recommendations, awards or reports which may be rendered therein."

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Now, my friend Mr. Thomas noted early in his submissions that Canada and Mexico are not even signatories to the ICSID Convention. And so a NAFTA arbitration could not proceed under the very process on which my friend has rested this entire part of his argument.

It's significant that the ICSID Convention provides an entirely different scheme and different criteria for a review of an award than a review under the additional facility rules. A review under the convention procedure goes to an annulment committee. In that respect, the whole process stays in-house, it's never referred to the Courts.

The specific grounds on which an annulment committee can annul an award are expressly set out, and the easiest place to find those is at tab 60 of our authorities. Tab 60 is the review -- a commentary on Article 52 of the convention by Professor Schreuer, who my friend referred to. And Article 52 is the annulment article under the convention. And the very first page under the cover plate at tab 60 sets out the provisions of Article 52. Do you have that, My Lord?

37 THE COURT: I do.

38 MR. GREENBERG: And you'll see the specific grounds are set out for that -- that -- the grounds for an annulment are set out in subparagraph (1):

40 41 42

39

"Either party may request annulment of

43	the award by an application in writing
44	addressed to the Secretary General on one
45 46	or more of the following grounds."
47	And if you'll go down to (e) you'll see it's

expressly set out that one of the grounds is that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.

Now, that is very different from the statutory regime that we are dealing with under the additional facility rules and the two acts which give this Court jurisdiction to review the award to which I've just made reference earlier.

In my submission the ICSID Convention provides for an entirely different arbitral process, and it and the annulment decisions rendered under it have no bearing on this matter.

Now, there's an additional reason beyond that not to apply the ICSID Convention annulment committee's peculiar approach, and that is that it's been severely criticized for undermining the finality of awards under that system.

Now, I've set out some of the criticism of the ICSID Convention annulment committee's approach to the requirements to state reasons in our outline of submissions at paragraphs 495 to 498. And we haven't reproduced anywhere near the entire academic debate on this point. But essentially the criticisms can be summed up as follows: An overly stringent standard leading to frequent annulment destroys confidence in the arbitral system by failing to ensure a sufficient degree of finality in the decisions.

And you'll recall that there are different international arbitral regimes, and parties can agree to be bound under those different regimes. Again, the ICSID Convention is not one which Canada has agreed to.

It imposes an unachievable standard on the tribunal in particularly complex and involved matters to identify and expressly address every single issue or potential issue of fact and law to be decided. And, finally, that approach acts as a disincentive to parties to present their case in a selective and efficient manner.

And I note at this point that my friend referred you to a passage in the MINE case which

- sought to address one of these criticisms, the criticism on finality. And just in passing, he --43
- 44
- 45 he didn't refer you to the section where the
- 46 annulment committee addressed what the requirement
- to give full reasons actually was in their view. 47

So at tab 38 of my friend's authorities
you'll find the MINE case. And at page 88, do you
have that, My Lord?
THE COURT: I do now.
MR. GREENBERG: And paragraph 5.09:

 "In the committee's view, the requirement to state reasons is satisfied as long as the award enables one to follow how the tribunal proceeded from point A to point B and eventually to its conclusions. Even if it made an error of fact or law, the minimum requirement is in particular not satisfied by either contradictory or frivolous reasons."

Now, that's more tempered language than the first two annulment committee decisions that my friend made reference to. And it's very similar to the language used by the English courts in the decisions cited by Redfern which are quoted in our outline of argument.

My principal points under this theme are that ICSID is a separate form of arbitration; it's been made expressly inapplicable to the form of arbitration that we're dealing with here; the approach to the reasons applied thereunder has been the subject of criticism, and for all of those reasons the ICSID Convention and the annulment committee decisions are not relevant to the matters that you have to decide.

Now, the final theme that I wish to address: additional procedural safeguards. My friend sought to justify his submission that the award ought to be set aside based on the insufficiency of reasons because, in his submission, full reasons are meant to ensure the integrity of the arbitral process. We take no issue with -- with that submission.

However, in -- in my submission, remedies other than setting the award aside were intended to address that issue. Now, I've already touched

43	on, in reviewing the legislative provisions with
44	a which deal with obtaining further reasons
45	from the tribunal, that. And there are also other
46	such provisions under the additional facility
47	rules which govern this arbitration which allow
	_

for parties to request further reasons.

Now, just before I come back to that, I note that in this -- in this matter, and it's set out in our outline of argument, the tribunal issued to the parties questions for their response prior to the post-hearing briefs being filed.

Now, I raise this point only because the parties had an opportunity within this hearing process to advise the tribunal that the questions it believed were before it and required an answer were insufficient or inappropriate, or didn't cover the field.

Now, as I've said, I've already taken you to the provisions of the statutes which permit further reasons to be obtained from the tribunal to correct a deficiency.

Additionally, under Article 58 of the additional facility rules, the terms of which are set out in paragraph 504 of our submissions, there is an opportunity for the parties to have the tribunal decide any question which it omitted to decide in the award.

And my friend addressed this potential remedy and said -- and I don't have a note of his exact words, but said that they considered it but decided not to rely on that section because the matters that they believe were omitted were ones of substance which may have changed the tribunal's conclusion.

Well, in my submission that robs Article 58 of any real purpose. And the preferable approach is the one set out in paragraph 506 of our outline, which is a quote from J. Brian Casey dealing under the Ontario legislation with the provisions to obtain further reasons from a tribunal, and he says:

 "In some cases the tribunal may make an award which fails to deal with an issue referred to them. While there's been some discussion by authors that in certain circumstances this may taint the entire

43	award, this is not a ground for setting
44	aside an award.
45	"Instead, recourse should be had to
46	the provisions of the act requiring the
47	arbitral tribunal to explain a matter or

which permit the tribunal to correct errors or make an additional award. If the tribunal refuses to make the additional award, then possibly an attack could be made on the entire award on grounds that the applicant was not treated equally and fairly, or the procedures followed in the arbitration did not comply with the appropriate act."

And in my submission that is the proper approach to the various additional reasons provisions in the acts and in the rules themselves. The outcome of an application for further reasons will either be the explanation that the party desires or a clearer basis to -- to seek a review of the decision.

In either case, it lies ill in the mouth of a party to criticize a tribunal and seek to set aside its award for insufficient reasons without first seeking to avail itself of the very provisions intended to remedy that complaint.

In my submission, Mexico's failure to request a supplemental decision on matters it believes were omitted belies the true purpose, which was to cloak an appeal on the merits in the guise of a complaint about the sufficiency of reasons.

Now, in summary of my submissions, the tribunal provided sufficient reasons on any test. And in any event, the failure to give reasons is not a basis to set an award aside, nor is it a matter on which the Court ought to exercise its discretion to set aside the award.

The ICSID Convention approach is expressly inapplicable, it's different; it's a different regime and ought not to be applied. And to the extent there is a complaint about the sufficiency of reasons, these are to be addressed by different sections in both the arbi -- the additional facility rules and under either act.

That's -- subject to any questions, those are my submissions.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Greenberg.
MR. COWPER: Thank you, My Lord.
I have remaining Chapter 8 to do. I can either start that now or I can start it tomorrow morning. We're well within our time. We'll

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2
       if you'd like me to start now or -- or come back.
3 THE COURT: It doesn't make any difference to me.
4
          Mr. Foy, do you have any preference or any --
5 MR. FOY: Does my friend have an estimate of the time
6
       Chapter 8 will --
7 MR. COWPER: I -- I think -- I'll finish in the
8
       morning. But I -- I can start. I don't mind.
9
       But I'm just -- I'm in the Court's hands. I don't
10
       know. I take it my friend doesn't have a
       preference. I can go for -- until 4, if
11
12
       Your Lordship would like me to.
13 THE COURT: Very well. I think -- I think Mr. Foy is
14
       looking for tomorrow to -- to work on his reply.
15 MR. COWPER: Yes, okay. So we'll --
16 THE COURT: The more time he has tomorrow, I think, is
       probably preferable to additional time today.
17
    MR. COWPER: Okay, fine. I'll go -- I'll go until the
18
19
20
           If you could turn to Chapter 8, and I should
21
       say in relation that Your Lordship asked me a
22
       couple of questions of detail, and I'll look at my
23
       notes and make certain that I've asked (sic)
24
       them. But I may come back tomorrow morning just
25
       to give you any references that I haven't given
26
       you.
27
           Turning then to Chapter 8, which is
28
       the chapter respecting alleged errors of law.
29
       Your Lordship has heard me say that this is a
30
       matter that does not arise in the case, and so
31
       that's obviously my preliminary point.
32
           If I am -- and I do deal with the issue of
33
       how it should be properly construed. It is my
34
       submission that my friend's alleged errors in
35
       relation to both 1105 and 1110 ought not to be
36
       accepted. And I've indicated to you that that can
37
       sound either in a refusal to grant leave to appeal
38
       under the commercial act in respect of the issue
39
       of law, or it may sound, depending on
40
       Your Lordship's view of the act, in failing to
41
       find that the issues of international law that --
42
       that the errors alleged meet any reasonable
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certainly finish before noon. I'm in your hands

43	standard of deference to the tribunal.
44	Now, with respect to the issues of error, let
45	me say firstly this, and that is and of the
46	Myers case, if you're at tab if you're at
47	Chapter 8, tab paragraph 510

1 THE COURT: Um-hum.

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2 MR. COWPER: -- I quote the Myers case. And if you
       could go to the tab 58 of the petitioner's
4
       material, and you recall that the -- this was a
5
       decision -- and there are two. I don't know if
6
      vou've been told, but there are two written
7
       reasons: There's the majority award, which I took
8
      you to yesterday, and then at the back, which
9
       unfortunately starts page 1 but it's about halfway
10
       through, is the separate opinion of Brian
11
       Schwartz.
12 THE COURT: Yes. I -- I did appreciate there were
       different opinions. I -- I take it's -- it's
13
14
       simply a separate opinion, not --
15 MR. COWPER: Yes.
16 THE COURT: -- a dissenting opinion?
17 MR. COWPER: As he says at his title page, it's a
18
       separate opinion concurring, except with respect
19
       to performance requirements. And I think there's
20
       some difference there which I won't trouble you
21
       with, because I don't think they matter.
22
           The reason I'm referring you to Arbitrator
23
       Schwartz's opinions, as I indicated, he actually
24
       comments upon the principle that my friend speaks
25
       about with respect to the potential application of
26
       the principles of transparency in informing or
27
       influencing the concept of what is fair and
28
       equitable under 1105.
29
           And if you go to 82, page 82, it's paragraph
30
       250. And it -- the paragraphs I've guoted here
31
       and refer you to are 253 to 255. And I just note
32
       with irony that at paragraph 250 he notes that the
33
       principles of transparency were drawn to this
34
       panel's attention by the memorial of the
35
       government of Canada, and then he quotes Article
36
       1802.
37
          And just going on, he says at 253:
38
39
           "It appears to me that Canada may have
40
           breached the specific terms of Article 1802
          in this case. I will come to no definite
41
42
          conclusion in this regard, however, as
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43	S.D. Myers did not expressly argue that
44	Canada's conduct was contrary to Article
45	1802. I'm reluctant to find a breach of a
46	specific treaty provision where Canada has
47	not been properly alerted to the issue and

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2 "I
3 implic
4 the cc
5 sugge

thereby given a full chance to respond.

"I wish therefore to explore the

implications of Article 1802 primarily in the context of the wider argument that is suggested by S.D. Myers that the minimum international standard in Article 1105 of NAFTA includes a general principle of transparency and fairness in the making of regulations."

Now, before I go on, as I said yesterday, or I intended to say, the context in which these arbitrators are dealing with, it was a much more difficult struggle between legitimate regulatory oversight and the facts of our case, because what they were dealing with were multiple possible governmental goals, one of which was impermissible under the treaty, and others of which were in fact not only permissible but regarded as laudatory by the Basel Convention and other international standards.

So that some of the -- some of the purposes of the legislation asserted by Canada were not only proper in the domestic law sense, they were approved of by international convention.

Just going on, it says:

"S.D. Myers has not provided evidence that procedural fairness and transparency in the making of regulations is part of general international law and as such applicable worldwide. They appealed to the letter or stated the provision of the 1947 GATT and case law associated with it to argue that procedural fairness and transparency is part of the minimum international standard."

Then he says:

"But the GATT agreement, while widely accepted, has by no means been adopted by

43	all States."
44	
45	Now, I note that that wasn't in fact
46	Metalclad's argument below. They didn't argue
47	that the GATT agreement constituted the foundation

for the argument.

But if he goes (sic) to 256, he says:

"The argument with respect to unfair process must, if it can succeed, be formulated..."

And then he sets down below a series of propositions, the first being the terms of 1105, being treatment in accordance with fair and equitable treatment; the meaning of international law on that phrase is coloured by the words that follow, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.

And if international law had its routine meaning, those following words would be pointless. The framers of NAFTA in adopting the formulation they did must have had in mind something more than whatever protection to investors is accepted by the body of international law that applies throughout the entire world.

The interpretation of an application of Article 1105 must also take into account the letter or spirit of widely -- though not universally -- accepted international agreements like those of -- in the WTO system and those typical of bilateral investment treaties.

Even if a norm has not yet technically passed into customary international law, that norm may still be encompassed in the broad concept expressed by Article 1105.

The fact that some States may not have an elevated regard for the operation of the market, the property rights or open trade should not be used to radically restrict the interpretation of the minimum standard in an agreement like NAFTA.

States that adopt treaties that include the minimum standard as formulated in NAFTA and many BITS with express references to just and equitable treatment and full protection and security must have in mind the expectations that are reflected in a wide range of modern trade agreements and

43	practices.
14	Then he talks about the GATT as pointed out
1 5	in the Shrimp Turtle case and regional agreements
16	include specific provisions that recognize a
17	broader principle of transparency and regulatory

fairness in the making of regulation. The broader principles should be considered part of the international law referred to in Article 1105.

Then he says, 257:

"This line of argument is one that does appear sensible to me. It gives reasonable value and meaning to all of the words of Article 1105 of NAFTA. It invites interpreters of 110...Article 1105 to look to the state of the art in international trade agreements to determine the content of the minimum international standard rather than relying on personal, subjective notions of what is fair, equitable or full protection and security."

And then he goes on.

The point I wish to make arising out of that case is here's another international lawyer who states a series of logical propositions which are, I say, squarely within the debate of international lawyers.

And as he concludes, the line of argument is one that does appear sensible to me. It gives reasonable value and meaning to the words of Article 1105 of NAFTA, and in my submission that is so; that is, if you read Article 1105 as a person reading the English language, and you say did the -- did the writer of that article intend to confer on investors a right to be treated fairly and equitably as a minimum standard, that is fairly and equitably in relation to their investment, I say that they did, and that the reasons -- fair and equitable have a general meaning which sounds in precisely the kind of conduct which occurred in this case.

And so that with respect to the arbitrators in this case and their application of that concept to the conduct, they found they were not only within their jurisdiction but clearly right in so finding.

Now, what that deals with, and and	d it's
something that I averted to you earlier,	and it's
always one of the awkward parts of dea	aling with
the system of law that we're not familia	r with on
a daily basis, is, as you can tell from Ar	bitrator

Schwartz and all of the other discussions that you've had with respect to international law, that international law doesn't have a central Parliament. It doesn't have a body of statutes that you can go to that is in one place at one time and say this is statutory test. It is rather an evolving set of principles with a variety of sources for its finding and influenced by a variety of traditions and a variety of developments.

And it's not surprising, for example, that the words "fair and equitable" appear in NAFTA at the time in history they appear rather than appearing in 1910, because the post-war development of bilateral investment treaties has as one of its central goals the guarantee of something more than what was thought to be the minimum standard of treatment in the last century as it related to an investor's rights as it relates to a foreign State.

And the interpretation of this treaty requires, I say, the interpretation of the treaty when you go to the concept of customary international law. You don't leave the treaty behind. It's the interpretation of the treaty in the light of customary international law.

Now, in my argument on jurisdiction I referred you to the late F.A. Mann who wrote on the subject. And curiously enough, on almost all other topics, I'm told, he was conservative to the point of being a curmudgeon on -- in international law standards. And yet he was firmly of the view that the concepts of fair and equitable had to be given a robust meaning in order for them to achieve their objects within bilateral investment treaties and otherwise.

And so the arbitrators in this case, I say, not only were well within their jurisdiction but they applied the terms fair and equitable as understood properly by anybody reading the treaty, properly having regard to the objects and purposes of the treaty which I say, and I -- I won't say it

43 again, are expressly applicable to the	
44 exercise.	
They refer to them and I won't -	- I
hope if you'll recall, within Chapter	11
there's a reference to the agreement	, being the

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1
      whole of NAFTA; the treaty and purposes section is
2
      part of the agreement, and it referred -- the
3
      treaty, in the object purposes, refers to the
4
      agreement as a whole, including Chapter 11. So
5
      those are not strangers. They're not hermetically
6
      separated. The objects and purposes form part of
7
      the context within which the meaning to fair and
8
      equitable must be given.
9
          With respect to 1110 --
10
          And I think I'll -- I'll look at my notes.
11
       But that's, I think, all I need to do with respect
12
       to 1105.
13
          -- the -- and -- and maybe just I'll close
14
       on -- with the -- the Biloune case, because that
15
       largely deals with 1105. And my friend in his
       submissions distinguishes the Biloune case. As
16
17
       you'll recall, in the award the arbitrators refer
       to and rely upon the Biloune case. My --
18
19 THE COURT: Just before -- just before you get to the
20
       Biloune case, could you just give me your
21
       interpretation of 201 again? I don't want there
22
       to be mis -- any misunderstanding. You corrected
23
       it and I want to make sure that I've not
24
       misunderstood --
25 MR. COWPER: Yes.
26 THE COURT: -- your position.
27 MR. COWPER: 102, you mean?
28 THE COURT: 102, I'm sorry.
29 MR. COWPER: Okay. The -- the objectives of this
       agreement -- and I -- there's two different
30
31
       points. And perhaps I -- if you're meaning the
32
       reference to transparency, there's two different
       points which have arisen in our discussion.
33
34
          The -- the point I was making earlier was
35
       that the reference to the agreement, which is a
36
       defined term in 102 --
37 THE COURT: Um-hum.
38 MR. COWPER: -- is NAFTA, not NAFTA minus Chapter 11,
39
       and that when you go to Chapter 11 and you look at
40
       the provision respecting applicable law, which is
       1130 or 1131, under guard -- governing law --
41
42 THE COURT: 1131, um-hum.
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43 MR. COWPER: -- it's 1131(1), it says:
44
45 "A tribunal established under this section
46 shall decide the issues in dispute in
47 accordance with this agreement and

1 applicable rules of international law." 2 3 I say that where my friend fails is that 102 4 and the objectives of 102 by its express terms, 5 and by reason of the incorporation into 1131(1) is 6 available to the interpreters of the treaty to 7 have regard to under both the terms of the treaty, 8 under the concept of the Vienna Convention which 9 expressly says as orthodoxy in international law 10 that the objectives and purposes of the treaty are 11 to be regard -- have regard to in interpreting 12 1105 and its meaning. 13 I don't say that an investor has a right to 14 enforce Chapter 18, and I say the ar -- the 15 arbitrators did not so hold, were not asked to so 16 hold. They found a breach of 1105. 17 With respect, if you're asking me about the 18 principles and rules reference, which I think I 19 confused last Friday, what I say -- and I think my 20 friend and I are in agreement on this -- is that 21 the principles and rules in 102(1) include the 22 references to national treatment, MFN treatment 23 and transparency, and the objectives are to A through F. I --24 25 THE COURT: Then I -- I did misunderstand what you 26 were saying on Friday then. 27 MR. COWPER: Yes. I think I -- I -- what I said 28 earlier was I got it wrong. I believe that 29 it's -- I believe it's correct, and I'll look at 30 it again. And I may be able -- I don't know that 31 it's a significant point. 32 THE COURT: I -- I took you on Friday to say that the objectives of the act included transparency. 33 34 MR. COWPER: No. I understand. And that's why I came back to it and said that I believe that the 35 objectives of the act -- but the grammar here is 36 37 as elaborated more specifically through its principles and rules. 38 39 THE COURT: Yes. 40 MR. COWPER: So there's not a division between --41 principles and rules are not related in any way to objectives and A to F. Are you with me? Those --42

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1 principles and rules, principles and rules and the 2 other concepts.

> What I -- what I was intending to say on Friday, and I apologize, is that the -- the reference to as elaborated more specifically is a reference to objectives; in other words, that the objectives of the -- of the agreement, the goals, if I can put it that way, of -- of the treaty include not only national treatment, MFN and transparency, but also those stated in A to F. They're not strangers with one another. They're different ways of stating ways in which they're going forward.

Does that make sense? Or that's -- that's my submission anyway.

16 THE COURT: I think I have your point, that you're saying that the -- the -- you're saying national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency are both rules -- principles and rules and objectives.

21 MR. COWPER: Yes, precisely. They're -- they're principles and rules which -- which are -- if you will, elaborate more specifically. And I -- I'm going to get the grammar wrong. But let -- let -put it in its simplest terms.

> Those principles and rules are allied to, connected with and headed in the same direction of achieving the objectives in A to F, and they're both available. I'm not saying that only the former available or only the latter. They're all available as objectives of the agreement or purposes of the agreement, principles of the agreement or rules of the agreement. There's no division between A -- either of those categories. They're all available to the arbitrators to use as interpretive tools.

And you'll recall in the Vienna Convention, separate and apart from this argument, the Vienna Convention taken as codification of the interpretation of treaties commands people interpreting treaties to have regard to the treaties, purposes and object of the agreement.

- 43 THE COURT: Okay.
- 44 MR. COWPER: So my point is -- from a lawyer's point
- of view, is if you're looking at what they did and you're fairly reading their award, they found a 45
- 46
- breach of 1105. And they used the transparency 47

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      proper limits to inform the concept of fairness
3
      and equity, and that -- that's within their job as
4
      the arbitral tribunal having regard to the dispute
5
      between the parties.
6 THE COURT: My -- my other question is --
7 MR. COWPER: Um-hum.
8 THE COURT: -- accepting that you're correct and that
9
       1105 imports a concept of transparency, and the
10
       tribunal has said that that concept of
11
       transparency means that if -- if there's any
12
       confusion as to what the appropriate standard is,
13
       the federal government has an obligation to
14
       clarify the matter and say what it is, the
15
       tribunal has found that the federal officials said
       that you don't need to worry about a municipal
16
17
       permit, that we -- we govern, that the federal
18
       jurisdiction governs.
19 MR. COWPER: Right.
20 THE COURT: And the tribunal has found that they were
21
       right in saying that, because they found --
22 MR. COWPER: Under Mexican law.
23 THE COURT: Right.
24 MR. COWPER: Yes.
25 THE COURT: So hasn't Mexico done exactly what it's
26
       required to do under the transparency
       requirement? They just told Metalclad you don't
27
28
       need to worry about the municipality.
29 MR. COWPER: Um-hum.
30 THE COURT: The municipality's wrong.
31 MR. COWPER: Right. Well, the -- the -- the
32
       indictment of the federal government's conduct
       under the tribunal's findings doesn't relate to
33
34
       their correct representations as to Mexican law,
35
       it relates to what happens when the municipality
36
       fails to follow Mexican domestic law because --
37
          And I read you the reference earlier in the
       evidence to essentially the Mexican officials
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39
       telling company officials we're checking out of
40
       here. There's not -- we can't do anything with
41
       respect to the unlawful conduct of the
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municipality. And we're not going to do anything

referred to in Article 102 properly within its

43	because we're power I think the word in the
44	in the affidavit was "powerless."
45	So where transparency gives force to the
46	inequity in this situation is that having provided
47	the representations which encouraged the

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2
      checks out of the situation, checks out of the
3
      problem and leaves Metalclad alone facing a
4
      situation where it can't operate that which it's
5
      been properly permitted to do, and that's the
6
      unfairness. That's the inequity. That's the --
7
      that's the violation of 1105 in my submission.
8 THE COURT: You say that. But -- but you haven't
9
      really pointed me to any evidence that that's
10
       the case, because what happened was that the
11
       municipality didn't like the Convenio. The
12
       Convenio was entered into.
13 MR. COWPER: Yes.
14 THE COURT: They didn't like it. They rejected the --
       the municipal permit application at that stage
15
16
       and -- in December 1995 --
17 MR. COWPER: Well, I --
18 THE COURT: But --
19 MR. COWPER: -- think --
20 THE COURT: -- then --
21 MR. COWPER: -- it's --
22 THE COURT: -- the --
23 MR. COWPER: -- clear that the State didn't like the
       Convenio, but -- but --
24
25 THE COURT: The State.
26 MR. COWPER: -- I won't quibble with you, State or the
27
       municipality, yes.
28 THE COURT: And then the municipality went off and got
29
       an injunction.
30 MR. COWPER: Yes, based on the absence of authority
31
       under the Convenio, that's correct.
32 THE COURT: Right.
33 MR. COWPER: Yeah. And so what Metalclad was stuck
34
       with was can we secure relief for that under the
35
       Mexican court system; in other words, will we ever
36
       get a satisfactory resolution of this issue under
37
       the Mexican court system and -- or does the
       totality of what's happened to us, in light of how
38
39
       we've been invited in, how we've been encouraged
40
       to do this, constitute a breach of 1105 and 1110?
41
          Does it constitute effectively in the
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totality both unfairness and a taking of the

investment, then the Mexican federal government

13	property? And that's what they went and presented
14	to the tribunal.
15	My point is that you have to look at what
16	they've done on transparency with some care,
17	because they indict transparency as it relates to

the municipality in spades for which Mexico is responsible.

And on that footing, if you look at the evidence respecting, if you will, transparency in its proper sense, there are -- there are no records of municipal permits. Permits have never been sought or approved. There's evidence that they had never issued a permit, ever.

The permit is supposed to be granted or considered within ten days, or four months at the outset. That process isn't followed. The governor takes over the process and chairs the meeting to consider that permit thirteen months after it's been standing, during which all of the construction is present.

So -- and I'll come back to this tomorrow morning, but my view is that the -- the ambit and the thrust of the transparency concerns in the case were directed to the municipal process, criticizing the inability to obtain the permit because of the absence of a predictable and proper process.

And that with respect to the federal government, that the federal government, if you will, to use Your Lordship's phrase, actually conducted itself transparently during the early period of time but ended up at the end of the day being found responsible for the absence of transparency in the State and municipal carriage of the same issue. So I say with respect to the findings that clearly you have to be care (sic) with what they do about transparency.

The second point that I would make as well though is at the end of the day, if you look at what they've found, the observation of transparency in some respects is unnecessary for them because they end up finding an unlawful exercise of authority, that is, an excess of authority contrary to Mexican law. And that's not really, strictly speaking, a transparency problem. That's a problem that the government, for which Mexico is internationally responsible,

43	has ignored its own law and has jumped the traces.
44	Now and as I said to you, and I don't
45	retreat from this an inch, the fact that it's
46	unlawful may not be sufficient to found a breach
47	of international law, but it's relevant to a

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1
      finding of a breach of international law.
2
          All of the totality of circumstances the
3
      tribunal draws together with respect to the
4
      history of the project is what created the
5
      unfairness and the inequity which was the breach
6
      of 1105: the fact that the municipality knew
7
      everything was going on; they knew the
8
      construction was ongoing; they knew that this was
9
      being committed by the company, that the money was
10
       coming -- going into the ground; and that they
11
       then thereafter acted unlawfully, after an
12
       impermissible and unconscionable period of time,
13
       and then went and got an injunction to shut it
14
       down.
15
          Now, ultimately --
16 THE COURT: They didn't get an injunction to shut it
17
18 MR. COWPER: The injunction --
19 THE COURT: I think that's their ruling.
20 MR. COWPER: No, no. There was an injunction. I
21
       think my friend's case is that the injunction
22
       obtained in relation to the Convenio rested
23
       against the company. If I've -- if I've missed
24
       that, I'll look at that.
25
          But the injunction is not only against the
26
       governmental authorities, it -- it prohibited the
27
       company from operating as I understand it under
28
       the Convenio. There was a court order prohibiting
29
       the company from operating under --
30 THE COURT: Operating under the Convenio, yeah.
31 MR. COWPER: Yes. But the Convenio was the authority
32
       to operate, that was the concluded authority to
33
       operate which the company needed in order to go
34
       forward.
35 THE COURT: You've told -- you've told me that they
36
       already had the federal authorities.
37 MR. COWPER: Yes, that's right. But the -- the --
38
       what happened was the municipality sought and
39
       obtained an injunction based on an argument that
40
       that -- that the Convenio was without authority.
41
       No. There's no contradiction there, with respect.
42
          The -- the Convenio can be lawful, it -- as
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in any system. And someone can say I can still
get a -- an injunction which can prevent anything
from happening based on an argument that there's
no authority. Okay? Now, the situation here
which is -- put -- put in a nutshell is, once

you're there, once Metalclad's faced with that situation, is it restricted?

And I think it -- in all candour, this is the narrow point: Is Metalclad required to seek justice in the Mexican courts? Or is it entitled to say, I'm sorry, I'm not going to get justice in American (sic) courts. I have rights which are independent of my pursuit of justice in the American (sic) courts. I don't trust the Mexican courts. I don't trust the Mexican courts enforcing their own law in my favour for whatever reason.

That's precisely what Chapter 11 allows, precisely what Chapter 11 on its own terms allows, which I think the governments are all excited about, is that an investor is entitled to say, I'm sorry, I'm checking out of your system because I think at this point I've concluded that I'm not going to get justice. I'm not going to get fair treatment here. And I'm going to discharge the burden of proving that the totality of facts and -- and where I am now constitutes a breach of either 1105 or 1110.

Now -- and -- and just put yourself in Metalclad's position for a moment at that point. What are the forces arrayed against it? In Mexico we have a governor who has now become implacably opposed. We have a municipality which the governor's coming down and sitting in meetings on who's opposed. And the federal officials are saying we're now powerless, even though we've just concluded an agreement with you which was intended to allow you to operate the facility, and intended to provide for the political measures that would meet the political opposition. We're now powerless.

Is it -- with -- is -- is there any provision in this treaty which requires Metalclad to say at that point, okay, we still have to go further? We now have to challenge the injunction. We have to challenge and take whatever judicial proceedings are in place in Mexico. And I say clearly under

- 43 1121 that's not the case.
- 44 THE COURT: Um-hum. But Metalclad had been ignoring
- the municipality for at least the prior year.
- 46 MR. COWPER: Um-hum.
- 47 THE COURT: And -- and I wonder if the measure which

is really the complaint of Metalclad is -- is not the injunction.

3 MR. COWPER: Well, the -- let me come back to it and say a couple of things.

Firstly on the facts, and my friend drifted between Metalclad as a -- if you will, a legal actor and Metalclad as a political actor, there's no doubt during this time period on the evidence that Metalclad was actively trying to placate the political forces which were against the facility. So with -- with -- with respect to the facts, Metalclad wasn't ignoring anybody.

And the -- if you read the evidence, the Convenio had as its purpose -- one of the central purposes was answering, addressing and satisfying the political forces. And you'll see in the evidence, I think I've read you a couple of references to the fact that ideally they wanted the State governor to be party to the Convenio. They wanted the municipality to be onside with the Convenio.

One of the terms of the Convenio was to have a State citizen group that was going to be invited to come in that was going -- that -- under the Convenio. That springs up directly from the municipal concerns and the State concerns, may have not had any legal authority to assert them, but the con -- the purpose of the Convenio was to address and answer them.

And indeed in Mr. Ramos's cross-examination there's about six pages where Mr. Pearce takes him through five or six paragraphs of the Convenio and says: Isn't that something which you were concerned with? Yes, it is. Isn't that, you know, the citizen's committee, a discount for waste produced within the State or within the municipality on -- on waste and all those other matters?

So with -- with respect, the measure in this case was the municipal -- and -- and "measure" properly spoke -- spoken of, as you know, is not narrowly construed. It can be a number of

things. It can be an act, a regulation, a
practice, and I think clearly under international
law a course of conduct, it can be aggregate, it
can be cumulative. And so I say that the tribunal
properly had regard to what the measures were at

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1
      each level.
2
          Now, if Your Lordship's saying that the
3
      measure or an aspect of the measure which was
4
      being complained of was the obtaining of the
5
      injunction, well, that -- it may have been a
6
      factor directly related to the municipality's
7
      excess of authority, but it's not a measure that
8
      is independent of the government, if you're with
9
      me.
10
          There's no -- there's no -- we -- Metalclad
11
       didn't say we are -- we are asserting that the
12
       existence of an injunctive relief in Mexico is by
13
       itself unfair, not at all. But it's quite within
14
       1105 to say that, properly viewed, the conduct of
15
       the municipality resulted in unfair and
       inequitable treatment of our investment by the
16
17
       date that we no longer could operate.
18 THE COURT: I think I'll just come back to say what
19
       violation of the -- was there by Mexico of the
20
       transparency requirement?
21 MR. COWPER: Okay. I'll -- well, I've had that
22
       question and I've gone over the time, and I'll
23
       come back to it in the morning.
24 THE COURT: We'll reconvene tomorrow again at 10.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
26
       adjourned until the 1st of March at 10 a.m.
27
28
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 4:11 P.M.)
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