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21 February 2001 - Certified
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                   Vancouver, B.C.
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      (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 10:02 A.M.)
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   THE REGISTRAR: In the Supreme Court of British
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      Columbia at Vancouver on this the 21st day of
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       February 2001, in the matter of the United Mexican
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       States versus Metalclad Corporation, My Lord.
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   THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Cowper.
    MR. COWPER: Yes, My Lord. Your Lordship asked us to
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       keep you apprised of timing.
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          Here's where we stand this morning. A late
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       night was put in last evening with respect to our
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       argument.
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          I've indicated to Mr. Foy this morning that
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       by midday we have -- he'll have in his hands about
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       90 percent of our written material that will be
       had. There's a couple of very brief arguments
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       which are just three or four pages in length which
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       will have to be added.
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          We will have it in his hands, the material
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       Your Lordship will have, by Friday night, with
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       references to the tabs and -- and all ordered.
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          We delivered another installment last
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       evening, and the final installment of the portion
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       I've been speaking about will be ready by midday.
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          My recommendation and suggestion would be
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       that we revisit the issue about written reply on
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       Monday when you see what we have, and when my
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       friend has an opportunity to review it on the
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       weekend. He's indicated a reluctance to have oral
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          From my perspective, I'm in an unusual
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       situation in that I didn't participate below and
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       my friends argued the case below, so we've had
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       to -- to come to grips with the record without
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       having seen it before the wintertime.
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          So my -- my client's instructions and my
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       desire, as we indicated earlier, was to take
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       advantage of this time to finish the work before
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       Your Lordship. I don't think we will know
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       objectively whether that's a reasonable goal or
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       not until my friend has a chance to see the full
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       argument on the weekend.
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   THE COURT: Mr. Foy, do you have anything to add to
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that?

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1 MR. FOY: No. I -- I think Mr. Cowper's put it
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      correctly. Until I see what it is I have to deal
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      with, or what we have to deal with, I think it's
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      premature to make any definitive plans. I -- I
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      anticipate that we will definitely want the
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      opportunity to file a written reply.
   THE COURT: Um-hum.
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   MR. FOY: We're canvassing a tremendous number of both
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      legal issues and other issues, and I think that
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       would be appropriate in this case. That's why we
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       got our written argument to my friend in -- in
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       January.
13 THE COURT: Um-hum. One thing to consider, and I
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       leave it entirely up to you, but as a possibility
       is -- is doing your reply orally but filing it in
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       written form when it's in a condition that it can
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       be filed. Obviously you couldn't deviate from the
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       written form without your friend having an
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       opportunity to say something about it, but
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       that's -- that's a possibility that we could
       perhaps pursue if necessary.
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22 MR. FOY: Well, we'll --
23 THE COURT: But again I --
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    MR. FOY: I think we'll --
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    THE COURT: I'm not going to force that on you. If
       you would prefer to have a written reply when you
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       make your oral submissions, I'll -- I'll give you
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       that opportunity.
29 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
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          My Lord, we were -- at the close of
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       yesterday's hearings we were in Chapter 9, and I
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       was -- and I had indicated that I wanted to come
       back to the tri -- tribunal's treatment of local
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       remedies. And I'd ask Your Lordship to turn up
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       page 85, paragraph 289.
36 THE COURT: Sorry, which tab?
37 MR. FOY: It's Chapter 9 --
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   THE COURT: Oh, Chapter 9.
39 MR. FOY: -- of the -- sorry, of the argument -- of
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       the outline, My Lord.
41 THE COURT: Okay.
42 MR. FOY: At paragraph 289.
    THE COURT: 289. It's just that your book looks
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       bigger than my book for some reason, maybe not.
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          Yes.
46 MR. FOY: And I'd like to -- there -- there's the
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       reference. But I'd like to take you as well to
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the -- the full passage in the award in which the tribunal deals with the -- to the extent it does, the existence of local remedies.

And that passage is at paragraph 97 of the award. And there the tribunal notes that:
[All quotations herein cited as read]

"The actions of the municipality following its denial of the municipal construction permit, coupled..." for "...coupled with the procedural and substantive deficiencies of the denial, support the tribunal's finding for the reasons stated above that the municipality's insistence upon and denial of the construction permit in this instance was improper."

Now, what the -- the tribunal does not refer to the existence of and the exercise of the local remedies by Metalclad following the denial of the -- by the municipality of the permit.

Instead, a footnote is -- is -- is set out where the tribunal says:

"The question of turning to NAFTA before exhausting local remedies was examined by the parties. However, Mexico does not insist that local remedies must be exhausted. Mexico's position is correct in light of NAFTA Article 1121(2)(b) which provides that a disputing investor may submit a claim under NAFTA Article 1117 if both the investor and the enterprise waive their rights to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach referred to in NAFTA Article 1117."

Now, as I mentioned when passing through the award, this does not state Mexico's position accurately, nor does it state accurately the content of Article 1121.

And in order to make that point, I have to step back for a moment to -- to describe the local remedies rule, which is a -- a well-accepted

1 principle at international law.

And the general principle called the local remedies rule holds that actions against a State on behalf of a private party are not ripe until that party has sufficiently exhausted avenues of redress available to it in the host State's domestic legal system.

Now, Mr. Thomas touched upon this as one of the normal incidents of international disputes normally brought by States where the State, before espousing one of their citizen's claims, will examine whether or not that citizen has exhausted the local remedies available to it.

Now, this rule is capable of being eliminated by treaty. And just as an example, this is not in the materials, but in the U.S.-Panama Claims Convention, a provision of that treaty provided that no claim shall be disallowed through the application of the general principle of international law, that the legal remedies must be exhausted as a condition precedent to the validity of any claim. So in that treaty the local remedies rule was waived.

But the international law re -- requires clear words before that waiver takes effect. And I'd ask you to turn up tab 20 of the brief of authorities for that proposition.

This is ELSI case. We've referred to this decision already. And at paragraph 50 of this decision there's a discussion about the question of modification of the local remedies rule by treaty. This is the decision of the -- of the majority. It's at page 31 at the bottom, paragraph 50. And in the middle of that paragraph the United States had been arguing about the extent to which the rule was modified or not in this case. The International Court of Justice said this:

"The chamber has no doubt that the parties to a treaty can therein either agree that the local remedies rule shall not apply to claims based on..." alleges "...alleged breaches of that treaty or confirm that it shall apply. Yet the chamber finds itself unable to accept that an important principle of customary international law

should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so."

And in the circumstances of that case the argument was rejected that the local remedies rule had been eliminated by treaty. And I'll be coming back to the -- to the -- to the ELSI case.

Now, I'd now like to take you to Article 1121 of the NAFTA, which is the article referred to by the tribunal in its footnote.

And there you'll recall the tribunal refers to Article 1121(2) which applies to the situation where an investor submits a claim under Article 1117 and requires -- and these are condition precedent to the submission of a claim.

"A disputing investor may submit a claim under Article 1117..."

And then down to (b), if they:

"...waive their right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any party..."

Not just the party, but any party:

"...or other dispute settlement..."
proceedings "...any proceedings with
respect to the measure of the disputing
Party that is alleged to be a breach
referred to in Article 1117, except for
proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or
other extraordinary relief, not involving
the payment of damages, before an
administrative tribunal or court under the
law of the disputing Party."

 Now, you'll notice that what the tribunal in this case has missed is that this waiver only applies to the right to initiate or continue claims for damages, that it has no application to claims for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief.

None of the domestic remedies that were open to Metalclad and in fact exercised by Metalclad in

this case following the municipal stop-work orders and following the denial of the municipal construction permit involved the payment of damages. Those remedies related to either seeking a -- declarations that the -- of excess of jurisdiction or other extraordinary relief. And Article 1121 had no impact, did not speak to the question of the exercise of those remedies or --or their juridical significance once they were invoked.

And in our submission the tribunal was not justified in entirely ignoring the -- both the existence of and the exercise of those local remedies by its misreading of Article 1121. In our submission Article 1121 does not waive entirely the local remedies rule, the general principle accepted in customary international law that claims are not ripe at the international level until one's exhausted the reasonably available remedies.

Instead of considering the existence and the exercise of those local remedies in this case, Your Lordship's aware that the tribunal substituted itself for the domestic courts to rule on domestic Mexican legal issues, to rule that in its view the municipality acted improperly, and then, in another leap, to equate that domestic impropriety with a violation of the treaty.

ELSI also speaks to this second aspect of what the tribunal did here. And I'd like to return to tab 20 and the ELSI case. I'll just give you some of the background to that case.

In that case a -- a U.S. company located in Italy threatened to close a plant in Palermo. The mayor of Palermo, in response to local opposition, requisitioned the plant, which was occupied by its workers. A series of local remedies were engaged in by the company against the mayor's requisition order. It went from the mayor to the prefect. And the prefect, after a significant delay in time, annulled the requisition order on the basis that it -- that the mayor lacked -- or that the order lacked the juridical cause that might justify it.

Now, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from that, leaving the prefect's order to have been held to have been made in excess of power.

These facts were juridical facts. They were in front of the International Court of Justice. The United States, espousing the claim of the company, relied upon this finding of illegality at domestic law to attempt to establish a violation of the treaty. And I'll go to how the tribunal treated that starting at tab 20, paragraph 124.

So recalling that -- it's the number at the top -- you have -- is 74. Recalling that the Italian authorities, legal authorities, have found that the act of the mayor was illegal under Italian law, the question arose, well, did that amount to a violation of the treaty?

And at paragraph 124, the chamber of the international court says this:

"Yet it must be borne in mind that the fact that an act of a public authority may have been unlawful in municipal law does not necessarily mean that that act was unlawful in international law as a breach of treaty or otherwise. A finding of the local courts that an act was unlawful may well be relevant to an argument that it was also

arbitrary."

And this treaty in this case prohibited arbitrary treatment of foreign investors.

> "But by itself and without more, unlawfulness cannot be said to amount to arbitrariness. It would be absurd if measures later quashed by a higher authority or a superior court could for that reason be said to have been arbitrary in the sense of international law. To identify arbitrariness with mere unlawfulness would be to deprive it of any useful meaning in its own right. Nor does it follow from a finding by a municipal court that an act was unjustified or unreasonable or arbitrary, that that act is necessarily to be classified as arbitrary in international law though the qualification given to the impugned act by a municipal authority may be a valuable indication."

Now in this case of course we had a finding -- and I'm going to carry on with those passages -- had a finding by the courts of -- of Italy with respect to that.

In the instant case, the tribunal had instead no such finding, had in fact -- the finding was to the opposite effect. Metalclad's application to review the denial of the municipal permit was dismissed, and then later abandoned in favour of negotiations. The tribunal not -- have not referred to that, substituted itself for the Mexican courts to find a finding of illegality at municipal law. But as ELSI points out, even if that had been the case, that is not -- not enough.

And they go on at the -- in the ELSI case in paragraph 126 to consider whether this amounts to arbitrary conduct at international law. And at the bottom of paragraph 126, just above para -- the paragraph just above paragraph 127, it's noted that:

"It was of course understandable that the mayor as a public official should have made his order in some measure as a response to local public pressures. And the chamber does not see in this passage of the prefect's decision any ground on which it might be suggested that the order was therefore arbitrary."

And Your Lordship will see later on that the municipal denial, permit denial in this case, was made in response to local public pressures; that's not a -- seen to be an arbitrary act.

Over the page the chamber deals with the allegation that -- the finding by the Italian courts that the prefect acted in excess of his authority therefore made it arbitrary. And in the last five lines of the first paragraph there it's noted:

"The analysis of the prefect's decision as a finding of excess of power with the result that the order was subject to a defect of lawfulness does not in the chamber's view necessarily and..." of it

"...and in itself signify any view by the prefect or by the Court of Appeal of Palermo that the mayor's act was unreasonable or arbitrary in the international sense."

Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law; in other words, incorrect in law, as something opposed to the rule of law. This idea was expressed by the Court in the Asylum case when it spoke of arbitrary action being substituted for the rule of law. It is a willful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks or at least surprises a sense of juridical propriety.

Nothing in the decision of the prefect or in the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Palermo conveys any indication that the requisition order of the mayor was to be regarded in that light.

Again, the Court goes on or the chamber goes on to note the circumstances at the time.

"You must remember the situation in Palermo at the moment of the requisition with a threatened sudden unemployment of some 800 workers at one factory."

When I get to the facts of this case, I'll be reminding the Court of -- of a fact the tribunal did not refer to, and that is the situation with the prior -- arising by reason of the prior contamination of the site.

"It cannot be said to have been unreasonable or merely capricious for the mayor to seek to use the powers conferred on him by the law in an attempt to do something about a difficult and distressing situation. Moreover, when one looks at the requisition order itself, one finds an instrument which in its terms recites not only the reasons for it being made, but also the provisions of the law on which it is based. One finds that, although later annulled by the prefect because the intended purpose of the requisition could not in practice be achieved by the order

itself, it was nonetheless within the competence of the mayor of Palermo, according to the very provisions of the law cited in it. One finds the Court of Appeal of Palermo, which did not differ from the conclusion that the requisition was intra vires, ruling that it was unlawful, as falling into the recognized category of administrative law acts of excess of power. Furthermore, here was an act belonging to a category of public acts from which appeal on juridical grounds was provided in law, and indeed in the event used not without success. Thus, the mayor's order was consciously made in the context of an operating system of law and of appropriate remedies of appeal and treated as such by the superior administrative authority in the local courts. These are not at all the marks of an arbitrary act."

My Lord, the municipal permit denial in the instant case was made in the context of an operating system of law in which -- from which there were remedies available in Mexican domestic law, which remedies were exercised and later abandoned, and I will be attempting to demonstrate cannot be said to be -- have been considered arbitrary or unreasonable in the international law sense.

At this point in my argument what I am stressing is the tribunal's total failure to consider -- to -- to approach the question by reason of an examination of this context, this larger context of the operating system of Mexican law, and instead to substitute itself to determine its view of the municipality -- the extent of the municipality's jurisdiction, and to do so upon, it appears, a -- a misstatement of the terms of Article 1121 of the NAFTA.

And I note that you don't see the International Court of Justice in the ELSI case re-examining Italian law to substitute its view. What you do is -- what you do see on -- on Italian law. What you do see is it examining those juridical facts to see whether or not they amount

to a violation of international law.

Now, before I leave ELSI, there's another point in ELSI that I'd like to refer to. ELSI also addresses the question of the situation where an international tribunal is faced with a theoretical issue of domestic law. And the particular issue that was considered in ELSI was -- was -- arose in the context of the argument with respect to the local remedies rule.

The United States argued that the local remedies rule had not been exhausted because the -- or, sorry, had not been -- the Ital -- Italy argued that the -- that locals (sic) remedy rule had not been exhausted because the company did not, itself, in the domestic proceedings assert a violation of the treaty itself. This had not happened. And the question was, well, theoretically what would have been the case if the -- if such an allegation had been made in the lower courts?

And at paragraph 62 the international court deals with -- deals with this point. In the middle of that paragraph, 62, after setting out the details of the decisions made, it says:

"When in 1971 Raytheon consulted two Italian jurists on the question of local remedies for the purposes of a diplomatic claim, it apparently did not occur to either of them to refer even as a possibility to action under Article 2043 in conjunction with the treaty. It thus appears to the chamber to be impossible to deduce from the recent jurisprudence cited what the attitude of the Italian courts would have been had the two companies brought an action some 20 years ago in reliance upon Article 2043 of the civil code in conjunction with the provisions of the FCN Treaty and the supplementary agreement."

And then they say this:

"Where the determination of a question of municipal law is essential to the Court's decision in a case..."

The international court's decision.

 "...the Court will have to weigh the jurisprudence of the municipal courts; and if this is uncertain or divided, it will rest with the Court to select the interpretation it considers most in conformity with the law.

"In the present case, however, it was for Italy to show as a matter of fact the existence of a remedy which was open to the United States stockholders in which they failed to employ. The chamber does not consider that Italy has discharged that burden."

So in some circumstances, in the absence of juridical facts with respect to the issue, where the determination of a question of municipal law is essential to a finding of an international tribunal, the Court will have to decide that as a matter of -- for itself. That is not the sit -- that is not substituting itself as a reviewing court for the domestic court to reinterpret juridical facts or to ignore juridical facts and substitute its views on what Mexican or domestic law is.

In respect of all of the other steps that had been taken in the ELSI litigation, and there were numerous, that -- the chamber simply details what happened and notes what happened, and then asks was there a violation of international law having regard to that context; very opposite of the approach taken by this tribunal, which was to not mention at all the court proceedings taken by Metalclad, and then assume that those proceedings had been brought before it and -- and examine the domestic legal issues.

The only mention of domestic legal proceedings made by this tribunal was -- was with respect to the proceedings, the Amparo proceedings, brought by the municipality against the Convenio. And I'll -- I'll return to those in more detail.

And the only -- interestingly the only thing the tribunal did there was to -- to criticize the

municipality for having taken those proceedings and obtaining an injunction from the courts and inferring that this suggested a lack of confidence on the part of the municipality's position.

So those were the only domestic proceedings referred to in the -- in the award. And you -- one must be careful in reviewing the award not to confuse the Amparo proceedings brought by the municipality with the Amparo proceedings brought by Metalclad. The latter are not mentioned.

Now, yesterday in my submissions I also indicated that I would return to the reference to the Waste Management case, and that's at -- I'd ask Your Lordship to turn that up. That's at tab 69. It's in Volume 2 of the book. This again is a decision of a -- a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal. It's a decision on jurisdiction. There's a -- a majority judgment and a dissenting judgment.

The majority con -- and -- and the dissent consider the requirements of Article 1121 where claims for damages are involved, so it's unlike this case. But it's -- considers a situation where claims for damages were advanced by the claimant both in the domestic courts and in front of the NAFTA und -- under Chapter 11.

And the question was whether a conditional waiver which was filed by the claimant in circumstances where the claimant continued damages claims in the domestic courts, whether or not that was effective to amount to the waiver required by Article 1121.

And the majority held that the -- the waiver in those circumstances was ineffective and that the jurisdiction of the tribunal had not properly been invoked. The conditions precedent to a Chapter 11 arbitration had not been met.

The dissenting arbitrator took a different view of what was claimed by the claimant and thought that the jurisdictional issue really should be put over to a hearing on the merits. And in the -- but in the -- and I'm going to be taking you to some of the things he said.

The reason for that is that he deals with some issues that are not dealt with the majority, but the difference between the two was that he thought this issue of jurisdiction should be put over to the merits.

Interestingly, the -- this arbitrator was Mr. Highet, who was one of the counsel for Italy in the ELSI case, an experienced international practitioner. And his reasons are at the second set of reasons, his dissenting opinion is about halfway through.

And I'll just, while I'm here, make a -point out some things that are -- relate to points earlier made.

In his introduction to the dissenting opinion he notes in the -- the reason he's doing this, just before paragraph 1.

13 THE COURT: Um-hum.

14 MR. FOY: He says -- and -- and this again is to distinguish Chapter 11 awards from private international commercial arbitration. You don't normally see dissenting opinions. He says:

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"The precedential significance of this award for future proceedings under the North American Free Trade Agreement cannot be underestimated. In addition, the award will be an important guidance to future potential NAFTA claimants. It is for this purpose that as complete an understanding as possible be expressed of the legal issues involved."

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Very unusual in arbitration to see this, but appropriate in the -- in his view in -- in the circumstances of NAFTA Chapter 11.

Turn to paragraph 8. He also there makes the distinction made in the ELSI case between the legal obligations at municipal law and legal obligations at international law. He says:

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"There must be and is a distinction to be drawn in juridical terms between the legal obligations of Mexico under Mexican law and the legal obligations of Mexico under its international treaty obligations imposed by NAFTA. If this were not true, arbitrations could be commenced under NAFTA for remedies under national law, such as actions for payment of money had and received, goods sold and delivered, actions for breach of contract, actions for breach of warranty,

lawsuits respecting zoning modifications, litigation concerning unauthorized strikes, lawsuits about collective bargaining, and so forth.

"It is inconceivable that any of these complaints had been intended by the NAFTA States party to be resolved in NAFTA arbitrations. Proceedings relating to them could never have been proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing party that is alleged to be a breach referred to in Article 1116 within the meaning of Article 1121."

In his view they were beyond the scope of the waiver and would not have been intended to be part of it.

He goes on on paragraph 9:

"This is consistent with the normal rule."

He says -- in this context he says:

"Jurisdiction is never to be presumed."

And I -- we've touched on that point in other submissions.

He also touches upon the question of a -- a NAFTA tribunal dealing with Mexican domestic decisions at paragraph 45, where he says:

"When could a NAFTA tribunal be placed in the position of reversing a decision of, for example, the Mexican courts? The NAFTA tribunal would of course have no jurisdiction to do so. What would have to be alleged in respect of those decisions would not be a disguised appeal of these decisions, it would have to be a NAFTA claim, such as for a substantial denial of justice in respect of those proceedings. And that again is a separate matter from conducting appeals under local law, but not asserting the protection of the treaty itself..."

Again, making the distinction a -- a NAFTA

tribunal has no jurisdiction to in effect reverse a decision of the Mexican courts. It asks and ought to ask a different question: Has there been a violation of a standard found in the treaty?

He in paragraph 46 endorses the passage of the Azinian case to which we've already referred you to, noting that the quote made in the Azin -by the Azinian tribunal:

"A governmental authority surely cannot be faulted for acting in a manner validated by its courts, unless the courts themselves are disavowed at the international level."

Coming back to ELSI:

"...unless looking at the domestic legal system as a whole one can find a denial of the rule of law, an outrage."

Now, that -- those comments are made in a case in which there were claims for damages, parallel claims for damages, which Article 1121 does speak to.

In the instant case, as I mentioned, the remedies -- the domestic legal remedies that were available to and exercised were not claims for damages, and Article 21 (sic) had no application to them at all. And those points are made in the outline at paragraphs 289 through 292, 289 through 292.

That completes the submissions with respect to that chapter, My Lord.

And I'll turn to the next chapter, which is -- introduces a new topic, the excess of jurisdiction in the treatment of Article 1110.

Now, in this section the first point we make is one I made during the course of going through the award, and that is that the tribunal's disregard of the applicable law and misdirection with respect to the infusion of transparency requirements into the customary international law standards of 1105 also infected its analysis of Article 1110. I took you through paragraphs 102 to 112 of the award where it was repeated in different ways, the -- the transparency, the -- the tribunal's view of the failure to comply with

the transparency obligations.

That was part of this tribunal's analysis of Article 1110. But to the extent we're correct that the tribunal made jurisdictional error in the treatment of Article 1105, the same defect affects the rest of their decision under Article 1110.

That point's elaborated upon in paragraph 304 where we quote a portion of the award in which the tribunal holds that a measure tantamount to expropriation can be shown by permitting or tolerating the conduct of the municipality, and thus participating:

"...in the denial to Metalclad of the right to operate the landfill, notwithstanding...the project was fully approved and endorsed by the federal government..."

And I note there that -- the -- the measure so-called referred to here -- here identified by the tribunal. And you'll recall Mr. Thomas's identification of a requirement for a measure in order to bring a claim under Chapter 11 is not a positive act but a fail -- an alleged failure to act on the presumption that the NAFTA imposes upon the federal authorities a positive obligation to take steps against the local municipality, because on -- because of this tribunal's view of the impropriety of the municipality's act at Mexican domestic law, saying nothing about whether or not that issue ought to have been one resolved in the Mexican domestic courts.

There's no question there was a contest between the municipality and the federal level with respect to the extent of their jurisdiction. The question for the tribunal was -- this tribunal, wasn't whether there was a contest or not; the question was whether or not there was a legal means available to resolve that contest.

And again, in paragraph 106 and 107 of the award, you see the tribunal mixing the notion of the improper permit denial together with the representations of the Mexican federal government and the absence of their view of a timely, orderly or substantive basis for the denial by the municipality of a permit as amounting to an

1 indirect expropriation.

Now, in the -- paragraph 307 we've set out the text of Article 1110. We've done that for a purpose, because immediately thereafter we set out the tribunal's version of Article 1110.

And you'll see there, without reference to authority, without reference to commentary, without reference to anything other than quoting the text of Article 1110, this tribunal goes on and says:

"Thus..."

And concludes:

"...expropriation...includes not only...deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert and incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property, even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State."

Now, this single sentence constitutes the tribunal's -- the entirety of the tribunal's analysis of its jurisdiction over expropriation as conferred by Article 1110.

And I'd like to take you to -- this -- this is not included in the outline at this place, but it is elsewhere in the outline -- to characterizations by the -- that have been made by ICSID tribunals of jurisdictional error by reason of this kind of statement of law limited to the postulation of a -- of a statement without any demonstration of the existence of the principles upon which it's based, without any reference to legal texts, judgments or scholarly -- scholarly opinions.

That has been held to amount to an excess of jurisdiction as demonstrating the tribunal's failure to apply the applicable law. And I'll take you to a secondary source, which -- which

summarizes a portion of one of the ICSID tribunals in order to demonstrate this point at tab 99.

You'll recall that ICSID tribunals are empowered to apply domestic law. And in -- this is a reference to the Klockner case. And I'll take you to pages 340 and 341 of this article, which is an analysis of some of the ICSID annulment awards which -- the first ICSID annulment awards were arou -- were the subject of great scholarly debate, because the first -- one of the first ones -- first committees, ICSID tribunals, was in -- in fact annulled by the first annulment committee. And the president of the tribunal who was annulled was -- had been the president of the International Court of Justice, a very well-respected international lawyer.

And when his first decision, or his tribunals' first decision, was -- was annulled, it gave rise to a lot of scholarly debate back and forth between international lawyers and -- as to whether or not the annulment committee had it right, whether or not ad hoc review was appropriate, whether the extent of their review was appropriate, et cetera. So you'll see in the materials a number of cases -- or, rather, articles dealing -- dealing with that.

The -- the Klockner claim involved French civil law. And at the bottom of 340 there was a note -- note of the text -- at the very bottom, that the committee examined the text of the award on a principle of law. We need not bother with the -- with that because it's over the page where -- with -- with the details of it.

But over the page it's noted:

"In criticizing the adequacy of this statement of legal grounds for the tribunal's award the ad hoc committee..."

That's the annulment committee.

"...commented that it may immediately be noticed that here the tribunal does not claim to ascertain the existence of a rule or principle but asserts or postulates the existence of such a principle which, having postulated its existence, the tribunal

assumes or takes for granted that it's a basic principle of French civil law.

The committee asked whether the basic principle of French civil law referred to by the award comes from positive law and stated that it is impossible to answer this question by reading the award, which contains no reference whatsoever to legislative text, to judgments or to scholarly opinions."

It's very similar to the "thus" paragraph that I've read from our award. It -- it postulates a principle without any reference to legislative text, to judgments or to scholarly opinions.

The author of this article states the result of the annulment committee's analysis of this -- of this approach, stating:

"In conclusion, it must be acknowledged that in its reasoning, limited to postulating and not demonstrating the existence of a principle or exploring the rules by which it can only take concrete form, the tribunal has not applied the law of the contracting state. The award was therefore annulled."

So that was an additional point I wanted to add under -- underneath paragraph 309 of the outline, that this single sentence in paragraph 102 of its award does not allow the parties to identify, to be confident that its tribunal has applied the applicable law. None of that language in their paragraph 102 is found in Article 1110.

Now, the next point I make at paragraph 310, a separate jurisdictional point that appears from the language that is used rather than from the --from the lack of reference, what the tribunal appears to be doing here is putting together two concepts. And you'll -- I'll take you later to some treaties which do put these -- these concepts together in the treaty language itself. And those concepts are expropriation on the one hand and interference with economic benefits on the other hand.

There are treaties in which the parties have conferred upon claims commissions or tribunals the jurisdiction to determine whether there's been any interference with your property rights. This is not one of those tribunals, but this tribunal appears to have mis -- mistakenly assumed that jurisdiction.

And this point's made in paragraph 310. The -- these two notions, expropriation and interference with the property rights, are set out there. The -- in general international law, and you'll know from what I said about both the U.S. and the Canadian interventions in the tribunal below, their position and Mexico's position that Article 1110 states customary international law with respect to the meaning of expropriation, that does not include mere interference with property rights or economic benefits. Yet this tribunal considered itself -- that it had the jurisdiction to consider interference with the reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property, not just the taking or expropriation of property.

On the next page of the outline I give an example of a treaty which does vest this jurisdiction, and this is the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. And there the tribunal was granted jurisdiction to consider all claims arising out of, quote:

"...expropriations or other measures affecting property rights."

Article 1110 has no equivalent provision. And it's -- it's noted in the commentary on investment treaties, from which Chapter 11 was -was derived, that they vary in their text. And they -- they in some cases do provide this additional jurisdiction, in other cases they don't.

And in paragraph 314 we've referred to a -- a general text which summarizes the basic and different types of investment protection treaties. And reference is made to the U.S. model protection treaty, which is -- turns up frequently. And they contrast that with an example they give of the U.S.-Zaire Bilateral

Investment Treaty which prohibits:

"...any other measure or series of measures, direct or indirect, tantamount to expropriation..."

And then going on:

"...(including the levying of taxation, the compulsory sale of all or part of an investment, or the impairment or deprivation of its management, control or economic value)..."

Any impairment of economic value can give rise to a claim under that treaty. And the commentators note that this:

"...provision represents possibly the broadest scope in investment treaties with respect to indirect expropriation insofar as the inclusion of measures that cause the 'impairment...of...economic value..."

That:

"'...equates expropriation with a host of measures which might not otherwise be considered as such under general international law, let alone under liberal systems of domestic law.'"

In those comparisons the -- the authors are noting a number of things, first of all, that expropriation at customary international law does not include mere impairment of economic benefits, or I would say reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefits.

It also demonstrates that there are treaties
 where that jurisdiction has been conferred upon
 tribunals. And it demonstrates the kind of
 language that can be used in order to accomplis

tribunals. And it demonstrates the kind of language that can be used in order to accomplish that goal.

Article 1110 doesn't contain that language.

Article 1110 doesn't contain that language.
And in its terms is even more restrictive than the
U.S. model in that it only speaks of a measure
being tantamount to expropriation in the singular,

rather than measure or measures which could -- to measures or series of measures in the -- in the other treaties.

So notwithstanding that the parties have with knowledge of the types of language out there to confer this kind of jurisdiction, have chosen not to do so, this tribunal appears to have assumed a jurisdiction in -- in the commentator's view beyond even the possibly broadest scope used in the U.S.-Zaire treaty. It includes jurisdiction where there's inte -- incidental interference with reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefits.

Now, the -- this appears from this one paragraph of the tribunal's award. It -- no reference to authority is made, as I mentioned at the outset. And it's unclear whether or not they -- this tribunal was misled by the citation of the U.S.-Iran claims tribunal cases which were put before it.

It was argued by the parties that those cases are not informative of the jurisdiction of this tribunal because, as I mentioned earlier, the U.S.-Iran claims tribunal was empowered to deal with any measures affecting -- but it's -- I can't make that -- I can't make that point out, because there is no reference to that jurisprudence by this tribunal.

I mean, it's really part of the first part of my concern with this aspect of the -- or the -- of the award, that there is no reference to legal texts, judgments or scholarly opinions in support of this postulation of a -- of a jurisdiction which in my submission doesn't appear in the -- in the text of Article 1110.

I should say that -- I should clarify what I was saying.

The -- it was argued by Metalclad that the jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal should inform this NAFTA's tribunal's jurisdiction. It was arti -- argued by parties to the NAFTA, Canada the U.S. and -- Canada and Mexico, that it should not, pointing out the more expansive jurisdiction granted under that -- under that treaty, the jurisdiction to consider measures affecting property rights.

So I make three points in respect of the tribunal's treatment of expropriation at this

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1
       stage, the first being the fact that their
2
       analysis was infected by their earlier
3
       jurisdictional error with respect to Article 1105
4
       and their disregard of the applicable law; the
5
       second, that they made a statement of law outside
6
       the text of the NAFTA without demonstrating the
7
       existence of any of the underlying principles,
       demonstrating a fail -- again, a failure to apply
8
9
       the applicable law as agreed by the parties, both
10
       amounting to an excess of jurisdiction; and then,
11
       thirdly, by assuming a jurisdiction not conferred
12
       by the -- by Article 1110 by assuming that it went
       to incidental interference with
13
14
       reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefits where
       that jurisdiction is conferred by other treaties
15
16
       but not by this one.
17
    THE COURT: Go ahead.
18
    MR. FOY: And that takes me to the -- the end of that
       chapter. And I'm going to now turn to -- I've to
19
20
       date -- although I've made some reference to
21
       matters not referred to by the tribunal, I haven't
22
       taken you into the record. I've based my
23
       submissions upon the award as it's disclosed.
24
          I'm about to take you into the record and to
25
       refer to some of the -- the underlying facts.
    THE COURT: And in doing that, I think we should
26
       probably take the morning break now.
27
28
           Are you going to be referring me to the
29
       extracts or the record itself?
30
    MR. FOY: I'm going to be referring you to the red
31
       volume of extracts. Before I get to that, I'm
32
       going to refer you to some authority with respect
33
       to the propriety of doing that.
    MR. COWPER: My Lord, I wonder if I might inter --
34
35
       interrupt my friend with one small point, and that
36
       relates to the chapter he's just finished, and
37
       it's a matter Your Lordship may wish to give us
38
       direction on.
39
           On my reading of the tribunal, the tribunal
40
       was prepared to and did find, in relation to
41
       expropriation, that the ecological decree was an
42
       expropriation of Metalclad's asset independently
43
       of the other measures it relied upon.
44
           My friend in his submission to you in
45
       relation to the award had said, no, it was obiter
46
       dicta, they didn't do that.
47
           My concern being this: I'm going to say
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2
      that in order for my friend to set aside this
3
      award, he must not only attack successfully the
4
      findings he has referred to today but the
5
      alternative ground with respect to the impact of
6
      the ecological decree which they found permanently
7
      brought the end to Metalclad's ability to operate
8
      this, in addition to the other measures they
9
      found.
10
          My main concern being in my friend's present
11
       state he hasn't endeavoured to approach that
       because in his view it isn't an obiter. And I
12
       just wish to say we're not in agreement on that,
13
14
       and I'm a little bit worried that I'm only going
15
       to hear his argument in reply with respect to that
       issue, and I have identified this as an issue with
16
       my friend.
17
18
          I -- I think it would be more satisfactory if
       he would deal with that in his principal argument,
19
20
       but I leave that to Your Lordship.
    THE COURT: Mr. Foy?
21
    MR. FOY: I can assist my friend. I will be dealing
23
       with the ecological decree when I deal with the
24
       facts. And I will be -- I'll be repeating the
25
       argument that I made with respect to whether or
26
       not this tribunal was prepared to rest this award
27
       upon the decree, and in my submission they were
28
       not and made that clear, but I will also be,
       before reply, further -- making further
29
30
       submissions with respect to the decree.
31 THE COURT: On that we'll take the morning break.
32 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chamber. Chambers is
33
       adjourned for the morning recess.
34
35
       (MORNING RECESS)
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:10 A.M.)
36
37
       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:24 A.M.)
38
39
   THE COURT: Yes. Proceed, Mr. Foy.
   MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
40
41
          Just returning to the point we discussed just
42
       before the break, Mr. Cowper and I have discussed
       this. The -- it's not -- he has now advised me of
43
44
       his position with respect to the ecological
       decree. I had -- hadn't seen his argument nor
45
46
       been advised of that before.
47
          Our primary position is that the ecological
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that. I'm going to rely upon that finding and say

decree did not form a basis for this award. If -- and as I understand Mr. Cowper, he's advised me that the respondent will be taking the position that it was a basis for the award. A reply position to that will be that if that was the case, and we say it's not, then the tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider it and ought not to have considered it, it having been promulgated after the filing of the notice of claim.

So I just want to make sure my friend -- and my friend and I have had this discussion, and he understands that that's the position we'll be taking. And I will be, in deference to my friend, attempting to articulate that position at -- at the end prior to his -- to his submissions, but it is not in my outline right now because I haven't seen his response.

My Lord, I was turning to Chapter 11, but -- and what I'm going to do with Chapter 11 is to actually take you to documents themselves, the materials from this selected extract book. I'm going to be taking you to witness statements. I'm going to be taking you to documents created by Metalclad. And I'm going to be taking you to some public records of the municipality.

In the case of the witness statements, I'm going to be commenting on the fact that particular witnesses were not cross-examined.

The primary documents upon which I'm going to rely were documents that were Metalclad's own documents.

But before I go to that, I just want to revisit the propriety of examining the record in the context of an attempt to demonstrate patently unreasonable error and by reference to a recent Supreme Court of Canada case referred to in our -- in our standard of review section which summarizes some of the principles, and it's at tab 66 of Volume 2.

This was a review of an arbitration board dealing with a labour arbitration grievance.

The -- in the facts of the case, a dis -- a teacher had been discharged by an education board after writing abusive and threatening letters.

And the majority of the arbitration board ordered the teacher's conditional reinstatement. That decision was challenged. And the question was

whether the arbitration board's decision was patently unreasonable.

And Mr. Justice Cory delivers the -- the reasons of the majority, the court -- sorry, for the majority for -- for eight of the nine justices and reviews briefly the duty of deference owed in this case to the administrative tribunal starting at page 503.

And I'll just note that this decision got to the Supreme Court of Canada after the Ontario Court of Appeal had overturned the divisional court on the basis that the divisional court had permitted itself to review the merits to a greater extent than is appropriate under the definition of patently unreasonable. So the -- the Court of Appeal said you shouldn't have looked at the record to the extent you did when you found this decision patently unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada, as I will demonstrate, found the Court of Appeal to be wrong in that regard and that it is appropriate to review the record in these circumstances.

Now, after having emphasized the duty of deference on page 503, the very high degree of deference owed to the labour arbitration boards on page 504, the review of some of the authorities as to what constitutes a patently unreasonable decision on page 507, and the emphasis on page 508 at paragraph 46 that -- or paragraph 45, that the Court can only intervene where the evidence viewed reasonably is incapable of supporting a tribunal's finding of fact, findings of fact, noting that all these tests are strict, and yet -- and noting this, and I emphasize this at the bottom of paragraph 46:

"Yet courts also have a duty to protect parties from a decision which is patently unreasonable."

And going on in paragraph 47:

"In order to decide whether a decision of an administrative tribunal is patently unreasonable, the Court may examine the record to determine the basis for the challenged findings of fact or law made by

1 the tribunal..."

Refers to Mr. Justice Gonthier's judgment in National Corn Growers to which I referred earlier, and then goes on to say, referring to the Lester case:

"This Court conducted a review of the record to determine whether there was any evidence which could reasonably support a particular factual finding made by a labour relations board."

It goes into the facts of this particular case and the question of whether or not the board was -- had made a patently reasonable or unreasonable finding in that this teacher ought to be reinstated, that his conduct was temporary rather than -- the -- the improper conduct was temporary rather than something that would

21 continue. 22 And in

And in the course of dealing with that question of fact and that inference, one of the important points that the Supreme Court of Canada makes is that the board, the arbitral board, didn't refer to a piece of evidence. And that -- you'll find that at page 519 in paragraph 72.

And there was a significant item of evidence with respect to this teacher's conduct in a letter that had been written after the board of inquiry's decision, but before the hearing before the board of arbitration. And that -- and the -- Mr. Justice Cory notes:

"Curiously the majority did not even refer to it."

And then went on to say it was serious error, in paragraph 74, notwithstanding that this evidence in fact came up after the original decision, that it was -- in -- in paragraph 74 in the last sentence:

"In this case it would not only have been reasonable for the arbitrators to consider this letter, it was serious error for them not to do so."

And the Supreme Court of Canada goes on in the circumstances of that case to conclude that the divisional court had been correct in quashing the decision and on the basis of this -- this patently unreasonable finding.

So there's -- this is not an international arbitration, but it is review of an administrative tribunal entitled to the highest of deference in our system, and the Court affirming that in certain circumstances it -- it is appropriate in the application of this very strict test to consider portions of the record, and that -- that it may in some circumstances be serious error to fail -- to fail to have regard to cogent evidence.

In our courts, leaving aside review of administrative tribunals, there's authority that, although there is no obligation on any trier of fact to -- they're not bound to accept any evidence in the face -- in the face of cogent evidence on a point, it may be serious error for a tribunal -- a trier of fact not to give a reason for refusing to deal with that -- with that particular evidence or for rejecting it if one feels bound to do so. In the very least, in a review of this type it is appropriate.

And so I'd like to turn to the -- to the red book and refer to some evidence. By way of reminder, the first tab of this book simply contains an index to the record which is there for convenience.

The second tab I didn't refer to. This is a chronology. This was prepared by Mexico. This is not a Metalclad document. And it's there -- and it's not all of the facts. It would not be accepted by Metalclad. Mexico attempted to set out facts in bold and in brackets where they were in contention. I -- I only put it there in case I lost track of where things happened in the chronology, and for that reason only.

Where this started, Your Lordship will recall, was with tab 5. Tab 5 are the pictures of the contamination of the site that occurred in 1990/'91 when operated by the Mexican company COTERIN prior to its being owned by Metalclad. This contamination led to local opposition.

And I'd like you to turn to tab 8. This is a letter -- or, sorry, this is the record of a letter to the State governor of February 9, 1991. And it's signed by 13 of the municipal presidents of the surrounding municipalities -- sorry, signed by 12, supporting the municipal president of Guadalcazar with respect to this point:

"The undersigned municipal presidents of the Highland region hereby respectfully appear before you to express our full moral support to our colleague, the municipal president of Guadalcazar, who, echoing the residents of this municipality, definitively opposes the establishment of an industrial waste landfill in the site called La Pedrera located a few kilometres from the intersection of...this being a high-risk project to the physical health of the residents of the neighbouring communities and that of future generations."

The -- the -- the document is signed by each of the municipal presidents, indicating the initial -- and what Your Lordship will see is the long-standing opposition to the siting of an industrial waste landfill at La Pedrera.

Now, the next tab -- and these tabs from here on, My Lord, are arranged chronologically for the most part. I'll tell you when there are exceptions to that.

The next tab is a reference to a -- a -- an inspection report again generated by the contamination that was occurring by the deposit at the -- at the transfer station. This is a federal inspection report. And you'll see at the top it's in the municipality, La Pedrera site, on March 12, 1991, the undersigned inspectors of the SEDUE delegation. And I'll just pause there.

SEDUE is the federal secretariat of urban development and ecology, was at that time. That secretariat is now called SEMARNAP and was for a time SEDESOL. And you'll see references to these other names later.

SEMARNAP, I would call it the -- the Ministry of the Environment. It has different arms, and

one is called INE, I-N-E, and another, PROFEPA.
INE is the permitting arm of the Ministry of the
Environment and PROFEPA is the enforcement arm,
the Attorney General's arm. And I'll -- when I
get to certain documents I'll indicate from where
they emanate. But this is the federal Ministry of
the Environment investigating the contamination.

And you'll notice that the local representative of SEDUE in the State of SLP, it's noted here is Rodarte Ramon, in compliance with the State delegate's inspection order contained in this letter, visited COTERIN at La Pedrera, the municipality. And the manager of the company, Aldrett Leon, was being informed of the content of the record of this inspection.

And I'll just take you down to the -- the -- you'll notice there's reference to drums of waste that are there, and then just this note in the next paragraph:

"It is calculated that..."

This is by March 1991:

"...approximately 9,000 tonnes of wastes are stored. This waste is not confined. It lays only on the ground and in the open."

So there was the inspection report again arising out of the contamination that we saw the pictures of.

The -- in addition to the municipal authorities in this -- in this area, there are local Ejidos, which are communal land holdings which also have a representative structure. And they -- you'll find them throughout -- throughout the municipality. They too demonstrated their opposition in the next document, tab 10, to this contamination and to the proposal to turn this site into an industrial landfill. And this document is signed by a number of the Ejidos or representatives of the Ejidos and states this:

"Further to these problems, others are added, such as the intention to turn the municipality of Guadalcazar into an

industrial landfill with..." well-know
"...with the well-known environmental
harm, all of which has been originated by
the federal SEDUE representative in
physics, Rodarte Ramon, who, with a very
arrogant attitude, tried to mislead the
community in order to reduce the importance
of the petition to close the landfill in
disregard of the municipal authorities."

You'll see some conflict between Rodarte Ramon and the local community from the outset of these -- of these facts.

"The community of Guadalcazar desires to express the following: that the sovereignty of each municipality be respected, and that any actions in each of them be taken pursuant to our Magna Carta, our constitution."

They're saying here that they don't -- they don't want this landfill in their -- in their area.

Now, the next document is at tab 11. And this is the -- COTERIN, although it had been authorized on a temporary basis to conduct this trans -- transfer station activity, its plan was to open a landfill. And in the course of attempting to realize that plan, it sought approvals. It sought approvals at the federal level, State level and at the municipal level.

And this document dated August 15, 1991 is the application by COTERIN when owned by Mexican investors before Metalclad's involvement for a municipal construction permit. And it -- I've only -- its only portion -- a portion of it has been translated.

And I'd ask you actually to look over at the Spanish version just to see that in the second paragraph this application for a municipal construction permit is based upon certain articles of the ecologic and urban code of the State of SLP. And those are -- they're numbered there. And I'll just ask you to note 63 and 64. These are laws contained in the State legislation with respect to municipal requirements that were

discoverable by COTERIN in 1991 and were transparent to COTERIN in 1991, and were the -- made the subject of their application for a municipal permit.

The next document is a translation of the municipality's response to this first permit application, and it's a letter. And you'll recall that the principal of COTERIN is Aldrett, Salvador Aldrett. And this is a letter from the then-municipal president to Salvador Aldrett dated October 1, 1991. It's on the letterhead of the municipality. And it's re the denial of the construction permit. It's addressed to Salvador Aldrett, and says:

"By these means..."

This is the -- the municipal president.

"...I inform you of the decision to deny the construction permit to the industrial waste landfill. This decision was taken at the extraordinary Cabildo session September 30, 1991."

The municipal council, when it sits in session, is called the Cabildo. The municipal council sits in session both in ordinary sessions, which are regularly scheduled, and in extraordinary sessions called for special purposes.

The representatives of the municipal council are named, including the municipal president, and those others. And they note:

"After finding that the applicant company does not have, 1, an environmental impact study as required by SEDUE, the federal authority; number 2, does not have a land..."

That should be "land-use."

"...authorization as required by the State government; and, number 3, does not have control of the high risk posed by this project...

It is noted that, in addition, the number of studies conducted by Mr. Ottoman that show the area is not suitable to establish the cemetery, and that's the landfill, thus the applic -- the application submitted to the Ayuntamiento, and that's the municipal council, is completely denied.

So in 1991, after the contamination caused by the approval -- temporary approval of the transfer station, and upon application for a construction permit for a haz -- for industrial waste landfill, hazardous waste landfill, the municipality -- and an application made on the basis of stated laws, the municipality denied that application to COTERIN when owned by Mexican investors.

Now, the next tab is out of -- is taken from the -- Metalclad's reply in which, and I'll get to this later, but in which it is admitted by Metalclad that it is a matter of corporate record that COTERIN, while owned by Mr. Salvador Aldrett, sought a municipal construction permit from the Municipality of Guadalcazar. That permit was denied on September 21, 1991.

Metalclad was aware, after it did its due diligence, prior to exercising the option to purchase COTERIN, that as matter of corporate record COTERIN had applied unsuccessfully for a municipal construction permit as early as 1991. The -- and Metalclad admitted that.

The next document is dated January 20, 1992.

These are the minutes of a public meeting of the municipal council sitting in session as -- as the Cabildo. And what had happened here, My Lord, is there had been a change of administration.

The -- the application for the municipal construction permit made in September and denied in December of the previous year was revisited by the incoming municipal council who had just been elected and had taken office in January of '92. And this records the minutes of this -- this meeting. Cabildo meetings are public, and the minutes of them are a matter of -- of record.

This document insi -- indicates a confirmation by the new municipal administration of the opposition to any siting of a hazardous waste landfill at La Pedrera. And it notes in the

City of Guadalcazar, State of SLP, on January 19, 1992, they -- they're assembled in, again, the Cabildo room, the following: the municipal president and the other municipal councillors, noting that, in the next paragraph, the only order of business is the denial that was issued by the municipality during the period of 1989-1991, previous administration in regard to the construction of the industrial cemetery located in the site named La Pedrera.

The background shown in the record of this Cabildo about this difficult reality in our municipality are the following: First, its construction took place almost in secret, using the excuse that the drilling of wells was to improve the agriculture in the area.

Second, the former State governor denies the existence of the use of land permit issued by the State government. In the meantime, thousands of tonnes of waste are being accumulated in the mentioned area.

One of the candidates to the government of SLP, after visiting the site, states in another city in that State that this area has an industrial dump and is not a control landfill, and after being elected governor directs a closure. That's a fact that had happened elsewhere.

At the same time, the representatives of the Ejidos of all the municipality opposed to -- the operation of this dump in Ejido land of the municipality.

And then it's noted that the -- there was a closure by the central office of SEDUE in September of 1991, closure of the site.

"And today in light of a possible reopening, this honourable Cabildo after hearing the voice of the residents of Guadalcazar, and through its representatives, determines the denial of any permit that favours the continuity of this company in Guadalcazar."

There you'll see the municipality acting in its -- the municipal council acting in its representative capacity. These are elected representatives, as I indicated at the outset of

my description of the municipality. And they're reacting to their view of the voice of the residents of the area, and as representatives of the -- the voice of the area determining basically their opposition to any permit that would favour the continuity of this company. This is a company that in their view has illegally dumped 20,000 tonnes of hazardous waste.

Now, in -- by the time -- by this time in 1992, the next document, Metalclad has entered into business in Mexico in a number of investments. And my friend Mr. Thomas will detail those in -- in more detail.

But this document is here simply to indicate that one of those other investments in which Metalclad was a shareholder in 1992 who was seeking to -- in a different municipality in the same State, was seeking approval to install an industrial hazardous waste recovering and disposal facility, went and applied for a municipal construction permit.

And this is a letter from the municipal council of that municipality in 1992 directed to the company Eco Administracion. And Mr. Thomas will locate that company in the scheme of -- of Metalclad's investments in due course. This is a letter granting a municipal construction permit to that company. It notes:

"In response to your application, allow me to express to you that in the Cabildo that took place on September 18, 1992 your application to install an industrial hazardous waste recovery and disposal facility in the municipality was assessed taking into account certain considerations. And on this basis by resolution of the Cabildo you are authorized to carry out the construction and installation of your project."

And they ask for other things to be sent to them.

The -- the only reason this document is here is to demonstrate, as I'll demonstrate again and again, that Metalclad was well aware of the need to apply for and obtain a municipal construction

permit in advance of attempting to construct this kind of facility.

The next document is -- now relates back to COTERIN, that -- that other document related to another proposed facility in another municipality of the same State. But this document relates to COTERIN. And this is the federal permit dated January 27, 1993 that was referred to by the tribunal as the federal construction permit. That's how the tribunal refers to this.

There are in the -- in the -- the document that I've put at the -- at the outset here has the translation of this document that was filed by Metalclad. And I'm going to take you to the next tab, which is a witness statement filed by Mexico to explain why I've just made the -- the comment that I've made.

This is a translation of the witness statement of Rene Altamirano. He was a SEDUE representative at the time of these events. He participated in the authorization of the transfer station when it was owned by Mexican investors at the La Pedrera site. So he -- he participated in the authorization of that temporary use. And he goes on from there to describe the steps taken from his department's perspective with respect to the proposed approval of a hazardous waste landfill. And he starts over on paragraph 6, and he notes that:

"The approval process for a hazardous waste landfill site must proceed in stages. It is a delicate process that requires a series of highly specialized studies and tests be carried out which must be analyzed by the competent authority in order to approve the construction and operation plans."

This is only one of a num -- of permits, the federal he's talking about. There's only one of a number of permits that must be obtained from the competent authorities.

He talks about how he thought he was authorized to allow the temporary storage of the wastes. And then he notes in paragraph 10:

"Unfortunately, some time after receiving the authorize (sic) to build the transfer station, and while the environmental impact statement for the establishment of the controlled landfill was being prepared along with detailed technical studies, COTERIN began to receive hazardous waste without constructing the authorized transfer station, which basically consisted of an environmentally safe storehouse. The wastes received were simply placed on or in the land without any neutralization or treatment. COTERIN did not have any authorization to receive the wastes under these conditions."

He describes the reports that were done, the investigations. And in paragraph 16 notes his order of a closure, complete and temporary closure as a security measure. And he notes in paragraph 18:

"From that time on..."

September '91:

"...the federal department had to deal with a very difficult situation.

Around 55,000 containers of dangerous waste, approximately 20,500 tonnes, had been deposited on the site, be it simply placed on top or partially buried in the land without the appropriate treatment or any safety measures at all."

The situation was complex. On the one hand, one of the department's objectives, federal department's objectives, was the installation of a certain number of controlled hazardous waste landfills in different sites throughout the Mexican republic in order to meet the needs of the country in this area.

Further, the results of the studies requested from COTERIN showed that the La Pedrera site was suitable for this purpose.

On the other hand, COTERIN had created an environmental hazard by receiving unauthorized

dangerous waste, significantly damaging its credibility as the operator. This resulted in the distrust of COTERIN in the local community and, moreover, had damaged the credibility of the federal environmental authorities.

The -- notwithstanding those difficulties, the federal authorities decided to proceed with investigation of the appropriateness of the site from the federal perspective as a hazardous waste landfill, and he describes that. And he -- and he describes the law under which they're operating at that time. And he notes in paragraph 22:

"I want to emphasize that this was the first hazardous waste landfill permitted under the new law. The first commercial facility was another facility, but that was long before 1988 law, the federal law and the regulations."

So they -- he talks about the respective authorizations that -- from the federal perspective, and the capacity that they were prepared to authorize.

And he goes on to talk about meeting the Metalclad representatives at the beginning of 1993. He talks about the Santa Maria del Rio project that Metalclad was involved in, and that was the one to which I showed you where they -they did obtain a municipal permit. He talks about meeting with Mr. Kesler and Mr. Neveau.

He talks about -- in paragraph 27 he talks about directing the -- directing the tribunal's attention to the particular language of the permit that was granted by the federal authorities in January of 1993, the permit that I've just -- was under the previous tab. He says:

"I direct the tribunal's..."

In paragraph 27:

"I direct the tribunal's attention to the matters concerning the language in which we communicated, because I'm absolutely certain that I discussed the issues regarding federal jurisdiction with the..."

fed "...with the Metalclad representatives. I remember that I specifically said that the authorization granted only referred to the approval of the conditions of the site and of the technology plan to be used there. This authorization did not mean that the federal government could..." applove "...could approve land usage because that was an issue concerning the State and the municipality. I have no doubt that I made this very clear in my discussion with Metalclad's representatives.

"I also remember that Mr. Rodarte Ramon gave the impression that he believed they would prevail over the State and municipal concerns."

That's the -- "they," the federal authorities would prevail over the State and municipal concerns.

When I, in discussion yesterday, mentioned was there any evidence of federal privacy, the -- and -- and the -- it was to this evidence that I was referring. Mr. Altamirano is saying he remembers a federal official, Rodarte Ramon, the one that was described earlier as causing difficulties in the area, gave the impression that he believed -- he's an engineer, by the way, not a lawyer or constitutional lawyer -- that he believed that they would prevail over the State and municipal concerns. He thought the influence of the federal government could tilt the decision in favour of the project.

"However, I was always careful in my position as general director to ensure that the powers conferred on the federal authority to grant permits were fully exercised, but never invading the local government's sphere of jurisdiction.

"The tribunal should know that in Mexico the environmental laws with broad scope are relatively new, and that many of the matters relating to the division of jurisdiction have not yet been resolved. For example, in 1983 the constitution was

amended to give more powers to the municipal governments. These powers have not been fully exercised but are recognized by the constitution. Therefore, as a federal public servant, it is clear I had wide powers, though not absolute nor exhaustive. As shown in Exhibit 9 to my statement, when the..." department "...when the departmental technical group approved the application..."

COTERIN's application.

"...I authorized COTERIN's environmental impact statement and the risk study on January 27, 1993..."

That's the document I've just referred to.

"...and granted the federal permit for environmental impact. I specifically stated the following: This authorization is issued without prejudice to the holder's need to apply for and obtain other authorizations, concessions, licence permits or such that are necessary to conduct the works that shall be applied by the Secretariat and/or by other federal, State or municipal authorities."

So the very permit, the first federal permit, issued by SEDUE contained on its face proposition that it was up -- without prejudice to the need of the holder to apply for other permits.

 "This meant that the authorization could not be considered as an authorization satisfying all legal requirements..." by the company -- sorry "...all legal requirements the company had to meet in order to establish a hazardous waste landfill."

In other words, it meant that this authorization did not supersede other federal, State or municipal authorizations the applicant in addition needed to obtain and construct and

1 operate the hazardous waste landfill. 2 3 "Permitting processes similar to those in 4 the United States where if...where if the 5 county does not grant a land use permit for 6 a hazardous waste landfill, the site cannot 7 be authorized." 8 He refers to some cases in the United States 9 10 of which he's aware. 11 "Metalclad had held themselves out to be 12 13 professionals in the area of hazardous 14 waste management. They ought to have been 15 aware of this risk, especially given that 16 they were planning to invest heavily in 17 Mexico." 18 19 Now, in the next paragraph he refers to the 20 Metalclad's translation of the document. And 21 that's what I've put at -- in the previous tab. 22 And he says: 23 24 "Metalclad's translation of this 25 paragraph..." 26 27 The tenth paragraph in his view is not 28 accurate. He says: 29 30 "Metalclad's translation states this 31 authorization is granted without detriment 32 if the holder applies for and obtains other 33 authorizations." 34 35 Well, he says: 36 "The permit actually states this 37 38 authorization is issued without prejudice 39 to the holder's need to apply for and 40 obtain other authorizations, concessions, 41 licence or permits that are necessary to conduct, including federal, State or other 42 43 municipal authorities." 44 45 That -- I'm going to come back to that, it --

in Metalclad's own documents with respect to the

question of whether or not there was any confusion

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in that regard.Then he no

Then he notes in paragraph 32:

"I want to refer to the scope of the authorizations granted to COTERIN by..." the "...by INE in 1993..."

That's the permit we're talking about.

"...and to draw the tribunal's attention to the text of such authorizations and to the legal basis for it being granted.

"Metalclad refers to those authorizations as final construction and operation permits. However, those permits are not legally construction nor operation permits, and are instead authorizations prior to the construction and operation of a controlled hazardous waste landfill."

You'll see in this -- this -- this will become clear throughout, that there's a number of documents from the federal authorities indicating that although the federal authorization is a necessary requirement, it is not a sufficient requirement for the construction of a hazardous waste landfill. That's what he's saying here.

What the federal authorities do is grant the authorization with respect to their view of the environmental -- their view of the environmental impact study that is required by their department and whether it's properly prepared and demonstrated that the environmental impact could be prevented or mitigated as -- as set out in the study submitted, and that's in paragraph 33.

And he notes in -- he makes the same point in paragraph 36. The paragraphs from the law, the regulations and the authorizations, along with this clause 10 that he's translated, shows that a construction permit was never granted. It's a misnomer to call this a federal construction permit. But instead what was granted was an authorization in relation to the requirement regarding environmental impact, as shown by the Mexican legislation.

He goes on in paragraph 39 to make the necessary but not sufficient point that I have

noted, and says:

"This is a principle..."

In the last sentence of paragraph 39:

"This is a principle that Metalclad's lawyers should have been completely aware of."

And I'll be taking you later to legal advice given to Metalclad on the record which shows that they were completely aware of that and advised Metalclad in that respect.

He also notes in paragraph 48 his assumption that an investor like Metalclad would have retained Mexican legal counsel that would know this -- this basic principle of each level of government requiring to be satisfied before all authorizations were -- were obtained, and noting that:

"In establishing a business, especially a highly regulated facility such as a hazardous waste landfill facility, requires multiple authorizations from different authorities."

Then he notes in paragraph 51 and 52 there was, in his view, a series of factors at play here; one was the prior conduct of COTERIN, which -- which the -- made the task of obtaining support for the introduction of any new hazardous wastes to this area very, very problematic.

This generated -- he says there was local opposition to the project. And it was -- seemed to him that the governor was not sure of how to respond to it. But it was there. It was a fact.

And Your Lordship will hear later on that it was a fact, not just by reason of the municipal council and its view of the residents, but also other -- other actors in the -- the scheme of these things. Non-governmental organizations were also opposed and supplied their opposition as well. And opposition had started from the beginning, from 1991, and this particular site was never able to shake it.

Now, before leaving that witness statement, I would just note that Mr. Altamirano was not called to be cross-examined. You'll recall when I described the procedure followed by this tribunal under the additional facility rules involved the exchange of witness statements, and involved the opportunity of the opposing parties to call for cross-examination any witness who had filed a witness statement. Mr. Altamirano was not called by Metalclad to be cross-examined at the hearing.

I now come at tab 18 to the -- the first document, legal document, introducing Metalclad to this investment. This is the original April 1993 option agreement between the Aldretts and Metalclad for the purchase of COTERIN.

It's later amended, and then it's further amended. And it's not really the ultimate version of the document that is -- is significant from the perspective of the submissions that I'm making, but what Metalclad's own document discloses about what they knew about the municipal permit issue and what they knew about the means to resolve any uncertainty with respect to the municipal permit issue.

So we start with the -- the original option agreement. And Mr. Aldrett states that he's the owner of -- of the land on -- that upon -- of the site of La Pedrera and that he's the owner of the shares of stock of COTERIN. A number of other representations are -- are made.

And at page 4 of the document, it's -- in paragraph 4 it's noted that the -- there is reference made to the January 27, 1993 permit that we've just been talking about, addressed to COTERIN by the National Institute of Ecology, granting authorization to it for the establishment of a confinement of industrial hazardous waste at La Pedrera, noting that based on various official authorizations it had already made confinements of industrial hazardous waste.

And then it notes in paragraph 6, this is the -- the -- the vendor noting these things:

"At present it..."

46 COTERIN,

01 (5 %)

"...has applied before the local authorities and all other corresponding authorities of the State of SLP for the necessary permits and authorizations pursuant to the corresponding applicable law to install at La Pedrera a confinement of hazardous industrial waste."

Now, the vendor doesn't disclose that their application to the municipality had been denied and that -- but that becomes a matter of corporate record. And I'll show you what happens, what Metalclad does to amend this agreement on account of that. What they're just simply saying here is that they've applied.

And they set out in this document in the third clause on page 5 the -- the form of the payment of the price. There's a promise to -- to sell. And then there's a price set out, and it's in various installments. The first installment is \$450,000 U.S. on a date of the transfer of the shares. Then further installments of 500, 500 and 500, and another hundred -- or \$1,500,000 are to be made within 30 days after the first payment and 30 days thereafter. That's the original arrangement.

Over the page -- I mentioned this is -- this is in effect an option agreement. Over the page, the terms that the option is open is set out in the -- on page 6 in the term called "Fifth Term." It says:

 "The term of effectiveness of this..."
provi "...promise of sale agreement begins
as of this date and ends after 20 working
days counted as of the date COTERIN has
obtained all the local permits and all
other permits required pursuant to
applicable law which allow it to operate
forthwith, and without any further
proceeding or authorization, hereinafter
referred to collectively with the federal
permits as the permits."

So this -- this document -- this option remains open for -- from the start of this date until 20 days after COTERIN has all the permits.

1 And I'll come back to that.

"...whether..."

The document, like a document of this type, allows for inspection of COTERIN for due diligence to be done by Metalclad, including, at the bottom of page 7, due diligence in respect of the permits which COTERIN has:

And I'm at the bottom of page 7, over the top of page 8:

"...whether federal or local and all others required pursuant to applicable law to operate the confinement of hazardous industrial wastes at La Pedrera."

Well, that's one of the things that they're entitled to do, inspection, access to the facilities of COTERIN, as well as to its corporate documents, to disclose that.

They deal with liability for the contamination already made in the eleventh term on page 8.

Now, I'll come back to the timing of this sequence, but I'd like to jump ahead to the amendment to that agreement at tab 23. I'll come back in sequence. But if you'd jump ahead to tab 23, this is an amendment, September 9, 1993, to the promise agreement that we've just been examining. Again, it's a -- an agreement between Metalclad and Salvador Aldrett.

This document notes the price had been agreed upon to be paid, \$450,000 on the exercise of the option, and then 1.5 million in a series of installments within 30, 60, 90 days thereafter. It notes that. And that -- that has changed. That becomes changed by this document.

This document exercises the -- the option and says at page 3, clause D, that:

"On this date and by means of this agreement within the term of effectiveness of the promise agreement..."

And I'll come back to -- to that. That has to be, as you'll recall, before COTERIN has

received all the necessary permits.

"...within the terms of effectiveness of the promise agreement the beneficiary..." notices "...notifies the promisors in COTERIN that it exercises the right to purchase the shares of the capital stock of COTERIN."

And they wish to amend the purchase agreement pursuant to these provisions. And they make a number of changes. But the ones I'll take -- draw your attention to are on page 6 and 7.

And here, instead of paying the 450,000 and then the 1.5 million in the sequence suggested, they agree to pay the 450,000 in paragraph A. And then I'd like to read paragraph B. And I'd like to emphasize paragraph B on page 7:

"The payment of..."

The next installment, the \$500,000:

"...shall be made within 20 days following the day in which the government of the State of SLP through its current governor has authorized to proceed with the construction needed for the operation of a controlled confinement of hazardous waste located in the lot of land geographically known as La Pedrera with the surface of 814 hectares pursuant to what it was authorized to COTERIN by another federal permit dated August 10, 1993."

That we'll come back to. And so this is payment will be made on condition of two things happening, 20 days of the governor authorizing construction to proceed and:

"...that the municipal permit for the building of the aforementioned confinement has been obtained by COTERIN or, as the case may be, definitive judgment in a writ of Amparo that allows to legally proceed with the building of such confinement."

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What Metalclad is doing here is conditioning
2
      payment of $1.5 million of a $1.9 million purchase
3
      price upon obtaining approval from the governor,
4
      from the State, and either the municipal permit
5
      being issued for construction or a definitive
6
      judgment in a writ of Amparo, or a legal remedy
7
      that allows COTERIN to legally proceed without
8
      such permit.
9
          And in this document Metalclad is
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       demonstrating both its knowledge of the municipal
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       permit issue and the legal means, the writ of
       Amparo, to resolve that legal issue if there's any
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14
          This is the document by which Metalclad
15
       acquires this very investment.
          Now, I think I'm close to the break by my
16
       watch, maybe a bit fast.
17
18 THE COURT: This would be a convenient place.
19 MR. FOY: This would be a convenient time to break.
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    THE COURT: We'll take the luncheon break and
       reconvene at 2 o'clock.
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22 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
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       adjourned until 2 p.m.
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25
       (NOON RECESS)
26
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 12:28 P.M.)
27
       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 1:58 P.M.)
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    THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Foy.
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    MR. FOY: My Lord, I was at tab 23, the amended option
       agreement whereby this investment was acquired.
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       And I was pointing to that clause whereby the
       purchaser conditioned payment of three-quarters of
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34
       the purchase price upon obtaining State approval
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       and municipal approval or, as the case may be,
       definitive judgment in a writ of Amparo allowing
36
37
       COTERIN to legally proceed.
38
          And I'd ask you to recall the tribunal's
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       characterization of the failure of Mexico in
       paragraph 99 of the award, where the tribunal
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42
43
          "Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and
44
          predictable framework for Metalclad's
45
          business planning and investment."
46
47
          Now, I would submit that this document, the
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document whereby Metalclad acquired this very investment, discloses Metalclad was able to fashion a business plan around the acquisition of this investment by providing for transparent and predictable framework; namely, the writ of Amparo, to resolve any question with respect to the need for municipal permit.

These documents taken together, the original option agreement and the amendment, show Metalclad's awareness of the municipal permit issue, the local permit issue, and show that not having obtained the municipal permit as of the time of the exercise of the option in September of '93, that planning had to be done around that, and was done.

Now, I -- the very next tab discloses Mr. Kesler's evidence for Metalclad with respect to this amendment so that you have that. And he says -- and this is Mr. Kesler for Metalclad testifying before the tribunal:

"The amendment explains really the reason for the amendment to the Aldrett contract was to the extent there was any risk at all, we wanted him..."

The -- Aldrett, the vendor, to share that risk:

"He was representing it they don't issue permits."

So he's saying Aldrett was representing that the municipality don't issue permits.

"And if they did, they would have to for the payment of a few pesos. So we said, fine, take that risk with us."

Now, I pause to note that for what is represented to be a risk of the payment of a few pesos Metalclad conditioned payment of \$1.5 million.

And I -- I add that, as I mentioned at the outset, this agreement was further amended. And I don't rely upon it to show the final mode of agreement between these parties, but to show

awareness on the part of Metalclad, both of the municipal permit issue and the means to resolve it

Now, I'd like to go back in the sequence. I had started with the option agreement at tab 18 and then skipped ahead. And I'd like to go back in the sequence to tab 19. And tab 19 is a translation of the State land use permit dated May 11, 1993. And I just direct you to the bottom of page 383, that this State land use permit says at the very last paragraph on that page:

"This licence does not prejudge on the rights of ownership of the solicitant with respect to the site for which this is issued and does not authorize works, constructions or the functioning of business or activities."

So it would be incorrect to conclude that with the federal environmental impact study permit and the State land use permit there had been authorization of the construction. Both on their face demonstrate in my submission that that's not the case.

Now, the next document in sequence is a letter of June 1993. There was a meeting between representatives of Metalclad and the governor of the State, the new governor of the State, who came into the administration after the issuance of this -- the permit I've just showed you, in which a meeting occurred. And the governor writes this to Metalclad in June of 1993. There are -- there is a heated debate during the course of the hearing as to what was entirely the subject of this meeting, and I don't -- I don't need to go into that. What the governor says here is in the last paragraph:

"I wish to emphasize that as long as they..."

Metalclad:

"...comply with the environmental standards of the different levels of government and respect the genuine

interests of the community, then the projects presented for my consideration have the necessary support to carry them out successfully."

The next document -- again, notice of the need for requirements, complying with the environmental standards of the different levels of government, and the need to respect the genuine interests of the community.

The next document is a federal permit as well dated August 10, 1993, again from the National Institute of Ecology. And I would just direct you to paragraph 36 of that document, which is on the second-last page of it.

That -- this authorization is contained -- it refers to the law, the federal law:

"...for which the company, COTERIN, must subject itself to all of the established dispositions in these legal instruments as well to the applicable norms to those activities which are the motive of this authorization."

And there's -- the evidence was that that was referenced to the other levels of government, the other applicable norms to these activities.

The next document was -- is one of Metalclad's securities and exchange commission filings filed on August 17, 1993. And I just note the page 9 of -- it's just over the page there. There's an extract from this filing in which Metalclad is telling the public through its filings that:

"In April 1993 the company entered into an agreement in principle to acquire 94 percent of COTERIN..."

That's the -- the option to purchase.

"...which owns a permitted hazardous waste landfill near Guadalcazar, SLP. COTERIN has received the construction permit from SEDESOL and anticipates the State and municipal land use authorizations by

September of 1993."

Now, that statement we know from the option agreement, which is the next document in the sequence dated September 9, 1993 under tab 23, that COTERIN had not obtained the municipal permit, because otherwise that amendment to deal with the delay of the purchase price would not have been necessary.

And that's reflected in tab 25 as well. This is a letter from Metalclad to the federal institute, the National Institute of Ecology. And in the third paragraph of this letter dated September 16, 1993 the -- Metalclad is requesting assistance from the federal authorities, and it says this:

"We now have the construction and operating manifest from the..."

From INE:

"...and the land use manifest from the State of SLP. We have the support from many individuals who are State and federal staff, individuals within the academic community, people from the communities near the site, union leaders and..." industrial leaders "...industry leaders.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to secure the support from the municipal president of Guadalcazar. We intend to meet with him to discuss his concern and have developed a community awareness and social development program."

And this program, they say, is aimed at educating the people about the safety of the -- of their proposed facility. And he says in the next paragraph:

"We are prepared to begin construction immediately upon receiving the authorization from Governor Sanchez Unzeuta, but we are not sure if a manifest is necessary from the Guadalcazar municipality. Our law firm in SLP believes

that a municipal manifest may be needed for construction."

So they've received legal advice that a municipal permit may be necessary. He's asking the federal authority:

"If you believe it is appropriate, we would appreciate your discussing the municipal permit with the governor."

And they attach a -- a letter in that regard again indicating that, as with any other investor, seeking to site a new facility, they have prudently sought legal advice, and their legal advisor has said you might need a manifest from the municipality. They've already contracted with the vendor to -- to deal with that issue and for the means to resolve it.

The next document is another municipal record from the municipality recording a meeting in the -- of the municipal council again on October 25, 1993. And again, the prospect of the opening of this landfill is before the municipal council, or the prospect -- the proposals with respect to that. And the meeting is con -- is convened under a -- an agenda which includes .5 in the agenda, a submission before the municipal council of the citizen urgency to reject the reopening of the hazardous waste landfill. So there's been a continued indication of the opposition to any opening of the -- of a hazardous waste landfill.

And over the page, the municipal council has received a copy of a letter from Mr. Carlos Salinas to Mr. -- a copy of the letter for Mr. Carlos Salinas requesting the fulfillment of an April 29, 1992 precedential resolution for closing definitively the hazardous waste landfill. And as a response to the citizenship claims this municipal council urges to the municipal ecological Regidor -- this is one of their officials appointed to deal with ecological issues -- that:

"...as soon as he can to comply with all the needed proceedings to give security to the Guadalcazar inhabitants that the

landfill will never reopen and that, on the contrary, that works will be initiated in order to remove the waste storage at the cemetery..."

What the municipality wanted was remediation of the contamination that had been there since

"...with the goal to protect this..."
municipal "...municipality, environment and
its surroundings so as the underground
already damaged by the high hazardous
waste..."

So they're requesting assistance at the federal level for definitely the closing and remediating the contamination that is there already. This again is a public record of the municipality.

The next tab refers to a series of exchanges that took place in the media between Metalclad and the governor with respect to the continued municipal opposition and -- and the attempts made by Metalclad to convince the community that the -- their proposal was in their interests.

I have it here for the purpose of showing -- and I -- I just turn over the page to paragraph number 2, to showing that Metalclad itself was aware of the serious danger arising and the risks arising by reason of the contamination. And par -- in paragraph 2 Metalclad points out that they were not responsible for the introduction of the -- or management of the transfer station and the introduction of the hazardous wastes in 1991.

That's correct. They -- they didn't deposit it there. Whether they, having acquired COTERIN, became legally responsible is a different issue, an issue for Mexican domestic law that I -- I don't need to go into.

But I note that Metalclad is stating in about the sixth line down:

"We recognize that a serious danger exists, in the event that the facility approved by the federal government cannot be operated, given the number of containers existing on

the site may reach up to 120,000 in number, representing close to 30,000 tonnes of dangerous and toxic waste deposited only in ditches which do not meet the construction standards and are only covered with dirt without complying with the minimum safety conditions and standards and which may pose a great danger to the health of the inhabitants of the communities.

"Given this grave danger, Metalclad is ready to treat and confine these wastes, investing the amount of \$5 million to meet these ends, thereby avoiding further damage that at this moment is already posed to the detriment of the environment."

Well, you can imagine the -- the inhabitants of the municipality having been concerned about dama -- the risks to health and the environment posed by the presence of this contamination, having that confirmed by Metalclad itself in a public advertisement, describing the matter as one of serious and grave danger to the health of the inhabitants of the communities.

Now, of course, what Metalclad wanted to convey was that, well, if we're -- if we operate, we will in the course of that operation remediate this -- this hazardous waste. The municipality saw remediation as a separate issue that did not involve the introduction of any new hazardous waste. Remediation of course of contamination like this can be done in situ by incineration, by taking away the waste to another location.

There is no scientific or other requirement for a remediation to occur by reason of the introduction of new hazardous waste. The two were -- are very separate. And in -- and -- and it's more expensive to incinerate. It's more expensive to take it away. But certainly it's not -- it's not required that there be the introduction of new hazardous wastes in order to remediate this existing problem.

And what the municipality wanted was, having this problem confirmed, they wanted remediation.

And of course Your Lordship again is aware fully of the -- the costs that can be involved in remediation, the complex legal issues that can

arise as between owners, prior owners and -- and the like, the governments and others, with respect to remediation of hazardous sites.

It -- it -- you're well aware, more -- more fully informed than perhaps anyone in this room --6 THE COURT: I am aware.

MR. FOY: -- save Ms. Thayer, who may be here. 7

THE COURT: Who has disappeared.

9 MR. FOY: Who has disappeared.

So Metalclad confirms, in my view, the -- the worst fears of the community. And likely this has the effect -- and you'll see that this has the effect not of calming opposition but of the opposite.

The next document is another document along this -- again from Metalclad, the document at tab 28, noting by Metalclad to the government -- to the State governor that they have not started to construct or operate the facility because they have not the consent of the State government.

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"The real and only risk that may exist at La Pedrera are some 120,000 containers with close to 30.000 tonnes of hazardous wastes which cannot be neutralized while we are not permitted to carry out the necessary works."

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Well, as I've said, that could be neutralized by incineration, by other means. It doesn't require the operation of a hazardous waste landfill and the introduction of new waste.

And they note that in their view there's been some misinformation of the public as to -- to their plans and proposals. The next doc -- and that again is common in these con -- the siting of controversial sites like hazardous waste.

The next document is the response of the State government to these public statements in which the State notes again the -- the deposit of the waste, and in the third paragraph in the last two sentences:

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"The public positions of both the federal and State authorities are in agreement that the authorization by the State government is necessary to operate such a facility."

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And you'll recall that that was one of the conditions precedent to the payment of three-quarters of the purchase price, approval by the State government.

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"The State government also advised it is essential to have the consent of the inhabitants of Guadalcazar who have repeatedly expressed their opposition publicly and to the mass media. The State government..."

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At the bottom of the page:

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"...acknowledges the imperative and urgent need to have a hazardous waste disposal facility which protects the environment..."

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And notes there their requirements, which is a safe site and their proposals that this should be carried out.

And I note B:

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"...with the consent of the population inhabiting the region in which the installation will be located and others which may be affected."

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And C:

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"They must also comply with all the requirements and authorization which the laws set out in a joint federal, State and municipal agreement."

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Indicating clearly that -- to the investor, to everyone, that municipal approval is going to be required in this regard.

Now, of course Metalclad knew that from the outset of requiring this investment, either get municipal approval or a court order indicating that it was not necessary. It also notes -- it -the State's position was although they were looking for an operator to deal with this problem, it wasn't necessarily going to be Metalclad. And

that's in the last paragraph.

Now, I'll note later that, because of the contamination of this site, other sites within the State were offered to Metalclad. But Metalclad was not prepared to spend the time necessary to get federal permits for those other sites. I'll come back to that.

Under the next tab we have the response of Metalclad to the -- to the State government and to public opinion. And in the fifth paragraph, the second from the bottom, Metalclad indicates, and I quote:

"We agree with you, that the..." construct "...that the consensus of the population of Guadalcazar is required in order to be able to construct and operate such a facility."

And then over the page:

"We recognize the sovereignty of the State of SLP and the independence of the Municipality of Guadalcazar."

They had of course recognized that in the agreement whereby this investment was acquired.

Now, that document has been reproduced in a couple of places. It's also at tab 32. And so I don't need to repeat that.

Now, negotiations had gone on between -- at the State level between Metalclad and the -- an official in the State, Pedro Medellin, responsible for environmental matters at the State level. And the let -- a letter of May 26th from Medellin to Metal -- sorry, yes, to Metalclad through their lawyer notes a number of proposals that were being made at that stage of the -- of the arrangements, because the State did want to promote their -- the goal of having a hazardous waste landfill somewhere in the State.

They set out these -- these proposals which did not result in agreements, but in -- indicates the position. And the -- it was suggested that the concrete agreements would include, in number 1.

"Remediation of the final confinement

cells of the site known as the transfer station at La Pedrera probably requiring in situ reconfinement and incineration pursuant to the highest technical standards paid for and done by Metalclad."

So remediation of that site was seen as something that could be done.

Then under number 3:

"The establishment and operation of a hazardous waste landfill in an area of the State to be determined by common agreement where Metalclad will again prepare the local studies required by law and to guarantee in the view of federal, State and municipal authorities safe operations. In such a case, the State government will fully support Metalclad and provide technical information and will facilitate local technical assistance."

One of the reasons that the prior contamination had led to such extensive opposition to this particular site, it was thought that it would be best to remediate this site and try and find somewhere else that the inhabitants might be content to have a hazardous waste landfill to be determined by common agreement.

And then over the page -- and -- and I should note at this stage that Metalclad had at this time, and Mr. Thomas will take you to this in more detail, but plans to have many facilities throughout Mexico of many different types, including -- we mentioned a couple at Santa Maria del Rio and the other -- and another one. So it was also -- the site at La Pedrera was also talked about in here.

In number 4, it says:

"The decision of opening a landfill in La Pedrera to receive hazardous waste in addition to the existing waste will be subject to convincing State and municipal authorities that the facility could operate with high safety standards."

And B:

"That the community accepting its operation, such acceptance being assessed jointly by State and municipal authorities and the company, following a truthful and clear proposal to the community of the conditions and implications of operation."

So the -- from the State perspective they were prepared to assist Metalclad in finding another site. They were prepared -- or they -- they were encouraging remediation of this site. And they were prepared to consider operation of this site if the municipality could be convinced and these other conditions would be satisfied.

Now, that was not acceptable to Metalclad, and I don't suggest that it was. But it -- it -- it would be relevant to one of the findings the tribunal makes that I'll come back to.

Now, there was some construction took place. And you recall I -- I referred to the -- a -- a later document quite a bit earlier involving the -- an order of PROFEPA for the installation of a plastic cover and clay of the existing contamination which took place, according to that document -- which were put in place on August 9, 1994.

And we're getting into the time where -where construction activities appear at the -- at the site; by some records that may have started as early as May. But there -- the point I want to make about it is that there was confusion arising from the documents as to whether that construction involved simply putting this plastic and clay and sealing the existing site, involved remediation work in other words, or involved work being done which was necessary to audit the site, because further audits were being required at the federal level that -- scientific studies having been done earlier had been deemed inadequate. And so work for -- done for the purpose of the audit or work done for the construction of the landfill that you saw in the pictures at tab 6 earlier, which really is some additional holes and a couple of buildings in addition to the covered cell -- the three cells where the contamination is.

Stop work order -- a stop work order was issued by the municipality on June the 6th upon some of this activity occurring. And this is the response from Metalclad to that stop work order. And this is dated June 8th, 1994. And it's to the municipal president of Guadalcazar from Metalclad. And it notes, first of all:

"Metalclad anticipates being able to give you co-operation of the company."

And in the next paragraph they are confident they can elaborate a plan of action that will satisfy the requires of the community. And they want to inform you that as a result of what is agreed between the municipal and the ecological coordination and environmental matter of the State government the past June 6th, in the document attached to your memo, the activities in the site were suspended that same day. So by reason of this action they -- activities were suspended.

"However, it's important to take notice that when the works were suspended, the edge that protects the cells from the currents of the rainwater was left unfinished. Without this edge, the currents of water, they're abundant right now, may find their way towards the dam."

And they say that -- they ask that they be allowed to continue with fixing that aspect of it so that there's not further contamination or -- or transfer of contamination, and notes:

"Due to what has been exposed here and taking into consideration the will of our company to co-operate with the municipality and at the same time attend at these demands, we ask to meet with you as soon as possible."

So they're asking to meet with the municipality in response to an order from the municipality that -- work stop, which they agree. They say -- they suspend that, but ask for some permission to -- to do some additional work or

some work necessary to protect against environmental harm.

And they write to the municipal president in June proposing a number of things. And this is a translation of that. And at the bottom of the page they're proposing, A, to clean the site with the proper infrastructure, to invest a large amount of money, to do a number of other things, to allow the municipality to directly supervise the activities, preferentially hire residents, actively participate with the municipality.

And the -- Metalclad requested that they be given an opportunity to demonstrate that it was possible to professionally operate a hazardous waste landfill without risks to health or the environment of the community and with benefits for the people. He offered to provide information showing how developed countries have done it, and invited the municipal official to jointly elaborate a working plan that would satisfy the community and leave distress, miscommunication and other types of error behind in order to promote regional development in compliance with municipal, State and federal laws.

The next document is a more detailed proposal for Metalclad in July of 1994 identifying the steps they propose in order to get municipal approval. They talk about remediating at a cost of \$3 million, investment in construction of the infrastructure to confine in an adequate manner or incinerate at the site the waste that has been deposited there before, including operation. And they give estimates of the costs of these things, a number of the same things that we referred to earlier in the proposals as to their view of the benefits for the municipality that would be flowing from this.

So they're proposing this to the town council so that they can carry out the cleanup and operation of the landfill. And they're -- Metalclad's position throughout is -- is as consistent as the municipality's is. The municipality wants remediation first without the introduction of new hazardous waste. Metalclad wants remediation to occur concurrently with the introduction of new hazardous waste, an operation of a new hazardous waste landfill.

And they're never able to bridge that gap. Again, there -- this is just a letter to the -- the next tab, tab 37, is a letter to the chairman of Metalclad from one of the law firms retained by Metalclad in Mexico in July of 1994, noting that they -- the -- they can't operate this landfill at present because of the opposition of the municipal authorities and some local ecological groups.

Again, we're -- we're well aware of the -- the opposition by now. And this is -- just confirms it.

The next document is again -- and I remind Your Lordship, they -- there was some activity going on at the site at this time, either sealing up the existing contamination or remediation work. As it turns out, there's -- actually what's happening is construction of the other facilities that you saw in the pictures.

But in the course of doing that work, Metalclad is representing -- COTERIN is representing to the federal authorities that the work it's doing involves remediation. And this is -- this portion of the translation notes -- of this document notes that:

"Since Metalclad acquired COTERIN on September 9, 1993 the only work that has been performed is..."

And then it's noted:

"...installation of a water tank, remediation, strengthening the borders, remediation of a bridge..."

Or a small dam, rather.

"All such activities are part of the landfill's regular maintenance program."

So that's what the federal authorities know of -- of what's going on at that time. And that document is also under the next tab, or at least the translation of it in the counter-memorandum is there.

Now, in August of 1994 lawyers for Metalclad,

the Mexican counsel for Metalclad, write recalling
a -- a meeting that has occurred with respect to
this -- this issue, a meeting with Ariel Miranda.
And I'll -- I'll be reminded precisely what his
position was. Okay. He was the local manager of
COTERIN. And these points were discussed with
him, and I'll start with point 2:

"He mentioned to me the already discussed and decided matter to apply for a building licence in La Pedrera, Guadalcazar."

So the lawyers have already discussed with the local manager for Metalclad the need to apply for and the decision to apply for a building permit from the municipality.

"If it is denied, to proceed before a federal judge filing a petition to obtain from him an order constraining the city council to grant the building licence."

That would be the writ of Amparo mentioned in the amended option agreement.

"I informed him..."

The lawyer informed the local manager:

"...about the fact that this was already mentioned some time ago."

The need to do this.

"With the additional information that the building licence was applied for by COTERIN and denied..."

And that was in 1991, you'll recall that.

"...and for such reason there is no certainty of the results if we proceed as mentioned. In any event, if this is Metalclad's decision, we may go ahead as requested since there's nothing to lose except by the city council to refer us to the previous denial of the licence, chances

are that..." being made "...in the name of 1 2 a new applicant...if we make the name in 3 the new applicant, the city council will 4 not refer to the previous denial. And if 5 this is so, this new denial will give us 6 the opportunity to go to the Federal 7 Court." 8 9 So either way, whether they deny it, if we do 10 it in the name of COTERIN or in the name of the 11 new applicant, we can go to the Federal Court. 12 13 "In order to proceed as requested, please 14 provide us with..." 15 16 Certain documents. 17 18 "We await your instructions in this 19 respect." 20 21 Now, he also notes there that opposition 22 continues because they discuss in point 4: 23 24 "Up till now Ariel Miranda doesn't know 25 for sure if the Guadalcazar priest is still 26 misleading the people about the landfill, 27 because nobody was sent last Sunday to 28 check if he talked against the opening of 29 the landfill." 30 31 So in the local community in public places 32 the opposition is still apparent to the lawyers of 33 Metalclad, to Metalclad itself. 34 What I'd like to -- this -- this -- I'd like 35 to go to the response to this, because this is 36 copied to Mr. Dan Neveau, one of the principals 37 of -- of Metalclad, or decision-makers in 38 Metalclad. And his response to the lawyers is at 39 tab 42. And this is a memo from Dan Neveau to 40 Mr. Garcia Leos: 41 42 "...re your letter dated August 17, '94. 43 This is in response to the above-referenced 44 letter. 45 "Following up on your points..."

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I'll go to number 2:

46 47

1 2 "...regarding the application for the 3 building licence in La Pedrera, I am of the 4 opinion we should probably not apply for 5 the permit. We have the authority from 6 PROFEPA to construct and maintain the 7 project." 8 That's the federal authority. 9 10 11 "I would like your opinion whether or not 12 this authority supersedes the licence to 13 construct." 14 15 Whether federal authority supersedes the 16 municipal authority. 17 18 "I don't know that it does us any good to 19 go before a body such as the city council 20 and know that we are going to obtain a negative result. I think I would rather 21 22 ignore the problem rather than raise it to 23 a level of awareness. I think we need to discuss this further." 24 25 26 He also makes a comment on the -- on the 27 priest and the opposition. He says: 28 29 "I'm also very interested in this priest. 30 I understand we've got some action 31 regarding the archbishop." 32 33 It goes on: 34 35 "Seems to me that this guy who is 36 answering for the right hand of God needs a 37 little earthly direction." 38 39 And he expresses in paragraph 5 frustration, 40 seeing Metalclad as a multinational company of 41 some -- it says he's -- he experiences frustration 42 to be continued like a sec -- continued to be 43 treated:

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"...like a second-class citizen with no

respect. That will only serve to thwart

any industrialization of the State that may

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occur from other multinational companies who have less patience than we do."

Now, he's asked here -- first of all, his lawyer has said we've already discussed the issue of the need to apply for a building licence from the municipality.

We know that they've -- and -- and if they deny it, that we'll go by way of writ of Amparo to resolve the issue. We've known that since September of 1993. Mr. Neveau says, well, I'm not really sure. I'd like your opinion on this subject. And I'd like to go to tab 51, which is the witness statement of Garcia Leos, or an extract from the witness statement. Garcia Leos was the recipient of this -- of this memo.

And as with Mr. Altamirano, this witness, Mr. Garcia Leos, was not required for cross-examination. And he says this:

"They..."

And he's talking about Metalclad.

"...told me that they had been informed that as an activity regulated by federal law there were no requirements for a municipal construction licence. They also stated that they knew that in 1991 the municipality had refused to issue such a licence to the previous owners of the site. I informed them that whoever had advised them that they did not need a permit was wrong.

"On August 17, 1994 I wrote to Mr. Xavier Guerra to set out how Metalclad should apply for the municipal permit. I did not receive a reply from Mr. Guerra. Instead, I received a written response from Dan Neveau in September. He wrote to me stating that in his opinion we should not request the permit because Metalclad had already obtained PROFEPA's authorization to build and operate the project. He also stated that an application to the municipality was not a good idea. Mr. Neveau told me he preferred to ignore

this problem rather than applying to the municipal authorities.

"Later on, in response to Mr. Neveau's request for my opinion, I informed him that whomever told him that no local licence was required was wrong, and that a construction licence was necessary for a project of this size and importance."

Going back to the tribunal and Mexico's failure to ensure a transparent and predictable framework, the investor has obtained legal advice. Has -- there's -- a question arises, as often is the case in complex matters. He's requested a legal opinion as to whether a municipal permit's required. And he obtains a Mexican legal opinion which says, yes, it's required. He's also given advice of the means, the legal means, to resolve that issue if that advice is not satisfactory, i.e. the writ of Amparo.

Remem -- recalling what ELSI said about looking at the conduct of the State in the context of its entire legal system and not simply the mayor of Palermo's issuance of the requisition order, but as against the entire system, and with -- this tribunal in my submission made patently unreasonable errors in that finding by failing to have regard to this very evidence. None of this is referred to by the tribunal.

Like the case involving the board of education case, that -- there, the one letter that had been written by the teacher that had been neglected to be referred to led the Supreme Court of Canada to identify serious error. And in my circumstances the -- and I'm going to come back to the tribunal's award and identify other places, but the tribunal's finding in paragraph 99 that there was a failure to ensure a transparent and predictable framework on the basis of the legal advice given, the structuring of the investment itself cannot -- cannot stand.

I -- I also pause at this point to -- to note another of the tribunal's findings that Metalclad -- I'm going to get to the actual permit application which comes up in November of this year, but the tribunal found that Metalclad made

that application, quote, in the full expectation the permit would be granted. And again, here Mr. Neveau says I don't know that it does us any good to go before a body such as a city council and know we are going to obtain a negative result.

How the tribunal could find that Metalclad, quote, had the full expectation the permit would be granted against this evidence not referred to is in my submission patently unreasonable. And I'll show you additional evidence with respect to that expectation.

I mean, the expectation was, if there was an expectation, was that there would be a denial, and that we'll then proceed through the court process to resolve the issue as to whether or not the municipal permit is necessary.

Now, here's another -- I -- and I now return to tab 43.

19 THE COURT: Do you intend to skip tab 41?20 MR. FOY: No, My Lord, I didn't.

Yes. I wanted to. Thank you, My Lord. I jumped ahead to the -- that's right. I went from 40 to 42 and then onwards. And now, you're right, I'm back to 41.

This again relates to some of the construction work that was ongoing and a site visit by Federal officials on August 16 as to the nature of the construction. And it's noted that:

"On August 30th, PROFEPA issued a resolution on its August 16 verification visit finding inter alia that COTERIN had been doing some work at the site, but it was justified to prevent an environmental hazard. Transfer station did not fully comply with the applicable technical requirements. Shutdown stickers should be removed on a provisional basis, but only so that COTERIN can conduct some further remedial work."

You'll recall, Your Lordship, that the -from 1991 on this transfer station had been
subject to a federal shutdown order. Now, dealing
with this -- allowing some work to be done to
prevent an environmental hazard and some other
further remedial work. And then it goes on, it

says:

"COTERIN must arrange for a comprehensive environmental audit by an independent expert to assess the situation at the site and prepare a detailed list of the origin, location and quantity of hazardous waste in the containment cells. COTERIN shall inform PROFEPA of the results of the audit and shall not operate at the proposed site or accept further deliveries of waste until the environmental audit and remedial work are completed."

This was taken -- this becomes an issue, a separate issue, as between the municipality and the federal authorities. The municipality takes this to be an order that this -- the closure order, the federal closure order, shall not be lifted until the environmental audit and remedial work are completed. Until remedial work is completed there will be -- that was the municipality's position.

And the municipality later became embroiled in litigation to attempt to establish its view that this federal order required remediation before any lifting of the closure order. And that's important, because the tribunal -- that's the -- it turns into the municipality's Amparo against the Convenio.

Later I'm going to show you the Convenio, which is the lifting of the federal closure order before a remediation has occurred. And following that, the municipality took the position that that violated this order, this resolution, and sought to enforce this resolution by -- in the courts. That's why I referred to this at this stage.

Now, that's just an extract of -- of the -- of a larger document, which is -- is set out behind that. And you'll look at the clause, the particular clause in -- that was relied upon later by the municipalities at page 7321, which says:

"The introduction to the installation of any type of waste is strictly prohibited so long as the studies are not realized and the remediation actions take place."

I'm now at tab 43. And this is September of 1994 where Metalclad through its local representative, Ariel Miranda, is writing to the federal Attorney General's office, PROFEPA, again describing the work that they are doing and propose to do.

And here they're saying COTERIN is -- is doing the environmental audit. They've been ordered to do an environmental audit. And we need to do some works in order to do that audit. We are requested to practice engineering and general maintenance works which allow us to maintain the landfill in good condition. A remediation program in situ will derive (sic). It says:

"For the mentioned actions, it's necessary to build some civil connections among which we can mention..."

And they note an evaporation pond and some other works.

"We believe that these works can be developed in a parallel to the audit in order to comply with the requirements of such authority."

So they're representing to the federal authorities that they need to do some works in order to comply with the audit.

The response to this document is at tab 47. And here the federal authorities in response to the letter of September 20, 1994, in which was mentioned the need to construct some works in --as -- as part of the -- in order to conduct the environmental audit and the possible remediation of the site:

"I wish to inform as follows: The State delegation under my responsibility does not oppose your company conducting construction of the works mentioned above in the understanding that your company shall obtain the corresponding construction permits for the described works from the municipal and State authorities in

accordance to their respective jurisdiction."

Now, this -- there again we -- we're now in November of 1994. We have had advice to Metalclad with respect to the need for a municipal construction permit from Metalclad's own lawyers, from the State governor, from the federal authorities, from their own documents whereby they acquire this investment. And yet in the original memorial that was filed in this case, the statement was made by Metalclad that not until December of 1995 did any State or local official allege that such a permit was necessary. And that's in the memorial at paragraph 17 for your notes.

The original claim in this case in the memorial in our submission -- and I should add, the memorial did not include with it the amended option agreement. That document Mexico had to discover by going through, I think it was securities filings in -- in the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to obtain. Mexico had to discover that in fact Metalclad knew from the outset about the need for the municipal permit in order to rebut the allegation that not until December '95 did any State or local official allege that such a permit was necessary.

The claim as presented in the original legal opinion presented by Metalclad was that the -- such a requirement could not be discovered by a reasonable investor. I've demonstrated that -- that it was not only discovered -- discoverable, but discovered, and that that pleading was -- was simply false.

This is -- this communication from the federal officials in November of '94 saying, you know, your company shall correspond with the necessary permits for the municipal and State authorities is completely consistent with the original permit in that -- of -- granted by the federal authorities in November of 1993 in which, as Mr. -- January of 1993. And I took you to the witness statement earlier describing that that was -- permit was stated to be without prejudice to the need to acquire approvals at the other levels of government. That was known from the

1 outset.

Now, the -- the other fact that I've been eliciting during the course of these most recent documents is that the construction that was occurring around this time, August/September 1994, was construction in relation to remediation and the audit. And that was admitted in the -- under the next tab, tab 44. I have an extract from Mexico's materials referring to this letter describing the work as maintenance work, and that was admitted.

Paragraph 456 of -- of our document noting this work was necessary to do some maintenance work was -- was admitted. And that's the next document in that page where, in Metalclad's admissions and denials, paragraph 456 is admitted.

This becomes relevant to one or the other findings made by the tribunal with respect to the fact that this construction occurred prior to the issuance of a construction permit, and that the municipality was -- was aware of that. And I'll -- I'll come back to that. The construction that was occurring was represented by Metalclad to be remediation construction.

Now, where -- when it appeared to the municipality that it may be going beyond that, and recalling that there had been a stop work order originally in June, another stop work order, a handwritten stop work order, was delivered by the municipal officials to the site of -- on October 26th, 1994.

So some construction activity has already occurred. The municipality has issued one stop work order and construction has continued to occur. They've issued another. And at this stage, Metalclad decides to apply for a municipal construction permit.

And that's thematically a new topic and would be a convenient point to break.

41 THE COURT: Very well. We'll take the afternoon 42 break.

43 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is adjourned for the afternoon recess.

46 (AFTERNOON RECESS)

47 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:06 P.M.)

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       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 3:20 P.M.)
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3 THE COURT: Thank you.
4 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
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          I was at November 1994, tab 46, indicating
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       that after this most recent stop work order by the
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       municipality, the handwritten one of October 26th,
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       1994, Metalclad took steps to apply for the
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       municipal -- municipal permit.
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           And I -- I pause here to just note that -- or
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       to recognize that, yes, this was a handwritten
       stop work order. This municipality, as I
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       indicated at the outset, does not have a developed
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       infrastructure or the means to enforce its -- its
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       orders in a -- in the same way as a very developed
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       municipality that we -- we might be familiar
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       with. And I make no apology for that. It's a
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       fact. And it's a fact that should be remembered
       as part of the background and context of this --
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       of the facts that are -- are before you and were
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       before the tribunal.
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           But in any event, the -- at tab 46 again you
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       have the lawyer for Metalclad sending to the local
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       representative the laws that are -- the applicable
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       laws with respect to the application for the
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       municipal construction permit. And as I
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       mentioned, these laws, like all municipal
       legislation, is included in the -- included in
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       State legislation, just as municipal laws here are
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       included in provincial legislation.
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           And in particular the lawyer sends Articles
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       122 and 123 of the general bylaw of the Ecological
       and Urban Code of the State, as well as Article 63
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34
       and 64 of the Ecological and Urban Code.
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           And you'll recall in the original permit
       application in 1991, in August of 1991, that
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       Articles 63 and 64 of the Ecological and Urban
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       Code were the articles relied upon by COTERIN at
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       that time in order to apply for a construction
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       permit. The articles were discoverable. They
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       were transparent. They were capable of being sent
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       by the lawyer to Metalclad. And translation of
       those, the articles of -- that are sent, are --
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       are included. And they include the requirements
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       for the application for a construction licence,
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       what you have to indicate. They include the
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documents that must be attached. And they include

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in the articles here the cases in which a construction licence is required and that -- as well for new construction.

And as well in Article 64 you'll note down the page in the fourth paragraph from the bottom, the -- a repetition of the legal advice that was contained in the -- in the witness statement to which I referred where Garcia Leos said that whoever told you you don't need a permit is wrong; you'll need one where the works are of such significance as -- as this one, and that's from the law. It says:

"...where the construction or work are located in centres of strategic population or that they generate significant impact in its area of influence."

And the phrase that was used by the lawyer at tab 51 in his witness statement was:

"A construction licence was necessary for a project of this size and importance."

And I -- I contrast that to other construction in the municipality, recalling that there was no commercial activity in this municipality, that the activities of the inhabitants included subsistence farming and ranching. It's not surprising that there were not records of other construction permit applications of this type or of any type, but there was with respect to this very same proposal. The August -- the 1991 application used the same laws. And the lawyer advised that for a project of this size and importance that will generate significant impact in -- in its area of influence the Article 64 is engaged.

And I've already taken you through the -- the document in the next tab in which the federal authorities again at the same time as they're deciding to do this by reason of the municipal stop work order, they're being advised by the federal authorities make sure that you get your municipal permits and State permits.

And then the lawyer writes again on November 14th, 1994. And you'll see that this letter is

addressed to Eco Administracion and Dr. Rodarte.

By this time Dr. Rodarte is -- and you'll hear as -- precisely when, he is now acting for Metalclad, and has been for some time. That's another issue, and we'll come back to that.

But this is asking for more information with respect to completing the application, because not enough has been -- the municipal permit application, because not enough has been provided, so please send me these essential documents. And he notes, the lawyer notes:

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"The lack of documents mentioned above obviously will lead to a negative response, because the municipality will take advantage of every omission, as little as it might be, to refuse to issue the construction permit."

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Now, he knows of the municipal opposition. He's -- everyone's alive to that, everyone except the tribunal that said that Metalclad applied in the full expectation that the permit would be granted. That's not the advice Metalclad had from its lawyers.

He also gives them some advice about the closure order. He notes:

"Next Wednesday, November 16 is the last day to present an Amparo action against..."

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And I'll call that the closure order.

33 34 35

"...by virtue of which the provisional closure order was issued."

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He's giving legal advice that you have at least two remedies here. One is to take the position the municipality has no business at all in this area and challenge the closure order; alternatively, you can apply for the municipal construction permit. And I'll come back to -- to the significance of that.

43 44 45

The -- he goes on to say:

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"If we do not challenge these acts before the indicated date through an Amparo

action, the result will be that the closure will become final, in which case there will be no appellate recourse. It is also true that the result of the Amparo action is uncertain."

He's not clear whether they're going to succeed or not, but the courts are there and available.

According to Garcia Barragan -- Garcia -- Garcia Barragan is another Mexican lawyer who advises Metalclad throughout the proceedings. He believes that the decision to contest or not the closure order through an Amparo action should be taken in consideration of the political aspect. This would entail the reaction of the current or future municipal council in relation to the fact that their decisions were contested by an Amparo action. He's basically saying, you know, if we start a fight at this stage, it has an impact on the reaction of the municipality. But he, Garcia Leos, advises:

"We should also take into consideration that we cannot get the suspension of the refuted acts because they have already occurred."

They've already constructed. They've already done some construction without a construction permit.

 "We would also put in danger the current work that is being carried out at La Pedrera, notwithstanding the supposed closure, and this could be a ground for a final closure order."

He's saying you've already put yourselves at legal -- illegal jeopardy by reason of proceeding with construction in advance of obtaining a permit.

"Regarding the above, I would appreciate it if you could give me any indication whether I should present the Amparo action..."

That's against the closure order.

"...or not because of...in case of the former, I need time to prepare."

Now, I'll take you from there, tab 48 and that letter, to -- back to tab 51, where in his witness statement Garcia Leos elaborates, and it's tab 51, paragraph 50. He says:

"In November 1994, after the municipality issued a shutdown order, Metalclad decided to apply for the permit. I reviewed a draft application for the municipal construction licence concerning the work that COTERIN wanted to carry out at...La Pedrera...at the La Pedrera site after Mr. Ariel Miranda requested me to do so."

This draft had been drafted by someone else.

"I also recommended to the client it file an Amparo action against the municipal shutdown order. However, in a telephone conversation Garcia Barragan, Metalclad's lawyer in Mexico City, told me that the decision should consider the political aspects of such an action which could mean the possible reaction of the municipal authorities that could lead to a definite or a definitive closing of the site.

Nevertheless, I did not share his opinion, therefore the company decided not to exercise its legal rights."

They took Barragan's advice rather than Leos'.

"On November 15, 1994, therefore, the application for the municipal construction licence was presented to the municipality."

So of the two choices available, challenge the closure order and the entire jurisdiction or accede to the jurisdiction and make the permit

application, Metalclad chose the latter. And he notes:

"On November 15...therefore, the application for the municipal construction licence was presented to the municipality. By this act, according to Mexican law, the company accepted the legitimacy of the permit requirement."

Now, I'm going to remind Your Lordship that neither you nor the tribunal has to determine the correctness or incorrectness in Mexican domestic law of the advice that's being given here or whether or not that act amounts to an estoppel or an acquiescence in the legitimacy of the requirement at Mexican domestic law. That was not the issue before this tribunal. It's not the issue here. The issue here was whether or not there was a violation of international law by the failure to provide a transparent and predictable framework for Metalclad's business planning and investment.

These documents and the advice of the laws that we've referred to demonstrate that, like other investors, Metalclad had been given complete advice on the predictable framework for ordering its affairs. Make this application; if you're unsuccessful, let's go -- we'll go to the courts by way of a writ of Amparo.

And it's that that had to be tested at the international level, not the intricacies of the -- of the particular legal advice, not whether the municipality is correct in its assertion of its jurisdiction or the extent of it, or the -- or that Metalclad's view of that jurisdiction is -- is -- is correct, but whether or not there was a predictable and transparent mechanism available to foreign investors to resolve any issues like that

Now, the -- the application is made in November, and I just want to -- to turn to that. I'll come back to the document at 49. November 15th, in five pages, the municipal construction license application is -- is attached and -- or is -- is set out, and then it appears at tab 52.

And you'll note that the -- the application

is made in the name of COTERIN. The -- the advice to perhaps move this into a different name is not taken. The application is made and it -- I'm now at -- under tab 52 in the -- on the third page in, page 8536. And the first paragraph notes that the application's made by COTERIN. The second notes that it's made pursuant to a number of sections, including Section 63 and 64 of the Ecological and Urban Code, the same sections, the transparent sections, that were a matter of corporate record to Metalclad before it purchased this investment. And it describes the proposal, a -- a hazardous waste landfill that's proposed to be built, recalling construction's already occurred, and a stop work order has been issued; describes the facilities intended to be built.

And then at -- over the next page it sets out the legal basis for this application, referring to the Ecological and Urban Code, the same law, providing and regulating the municipal construction permit, and noting that the Municipality of Guadalcazar is empowered to issue it. This is Metalclad's document.

And then in Roman numeral 8 down that page, noting the -- the advice that it had been -- that it had received, and the terms of the -- of the law:

"It is necessary to request the municipal construction licence in any place in the entity where the constructions or works will generate a significant impact in the influenced area and environment due to its dimensions and necessities of framework, services and transport so as in the case of risks it may generate."

As -- as Garcia Leos had advised, the construction licence was necessary for a project of this size and importance.

Now, that application is made. And at tab 53 the lawyers for Metalclad note that that's been --been done and on --

"On November the 15th, on which Ariel Miranda picked up from my office the application, we've not had any news about

the development of this matter. I know from indirect information that the municipal president is against granting it and is waiting for the new city council to decide, since I don't want to be confronted with a short deadline to appeal against any decision of the city council. Please inform me as soon as possible."

So again, the lawyers are -- are giving advice that you can anticipate denial of this permit. We already know that. And again, it's -- it's apparent to -- to everyone except the tribunal, who says that this application was made in the full expectation the permit would be granted. I mean, that cannot stand with these documents.

Now, what happened here at the municipality was a change in administration. Every three years the administration changes. And it changed in -- almost immediately thereafter by the end of December. And a new administration came in in January.

The new administration -- and again, this is -- this is directly contrary to a finding of the tribunal. The tribunal said that there was no consideration given of the application until a year later in December of '95 when the application was dismissed. In fact, that -- that's not the case.

This document at tab 54 again is a document from the municipal council, one of its public records, that -- pointing out the landfill problem. And this is on February the 13th, 1995. So this is the new administration having just come into -- into power.

And the -- the municipal president at this time testified. And he testified that in fact in his administration there was no bureaucratic continuity; everyone who worked for the municipal council was replaced on the election of the new administration. But, notwithstanding that, the -- the municipal council took up the issue and noted:

"On this point..."

 The records note:

"On this point, the municipal president stated that he could not decide the issue regarding the landfill independently. The municipal council affirmed their support for the denial of the landfill's opening. And the president states the discussions with these individuals will only be held in council meetings. And with respect to general matters, the proposal to create an environment committee is approved."

Now, you'll recall I referred very briefly to the environmental Regidor, who had been responsible for -- at the municipal level for environmental matters. This administration proposes to create a committee to response -- be responsible for those matters. And the municipal president is saying I'm not going to deal with this alone. I'm going to -- the municipal council as a whole is going to have to deal with this.

It's -- there -- everyone is well aware.
They had -- people had campaigned on the -against the opening of the landfill. Everyone was
well aware of the local opposition. And he's
saying this is not -- this is not your normal
case; we have to deal with this as a whole.

Now, the -- this occurs in February. What's happening at this time, according to Metalclad's documents, its SEC filings, is that the construction that had started under the rubric of remediation and had continued -- started in -- in '94, had -- had continued, is accelerated. And according to Metalclad's press releases, the construction is completed by March of 1995, so completed that they -- Metalclad proposed to have a grand opening of a landfill facility.

So they filed a -- a permit application in November of 1994. They fully anticipate its denial, but it hasn't yet been formally denied. They continue construction in the face of that with their lawyers' advice that they go to court if the -- against the closure order or they can apply for the permit. And if they do apply for the permit, they acquiesce in the municipality's jurisdiction.

And they then continue construction at -- and say that it's, on their documents, completed by March, so before the municipality's had any -- has -- other than this February note, has dealt with -- with the application.

Now, I'm going to come back to that, because the tribunal makes a virtue out of this illegal construction, saying that the munici -- the Metalclad constructed openly and without resistance, and municipal officials sat on their permit application and then denied it because it had already been constructed. The fact is on Metalclad's evidence it was already constructed by March.

And what Metalclad represented to the shareholders in this letter on paragraph -- or tab 55 is that construction began, according to them, on May 16, 1994. Several factors delayed the beginning of commercial operations, they say. And they say they were asked to proceed slowly, using only local labour, institute a social development program.

But now they say, and this is March 6th, '95 they say to the public:

"I'm happy to say that the project has the full political support from the president, Ernesto Zadeo, at the top, who was recently praised by the Mexican investment board in recognition of his support for our project, on down to the environmental enforcement agencies of Mexico, the governor of the State of SLP, Governor Unzeuta, to the community of Guadalcazar and the microcommunities that surround our site known as La Pedrera."

I'll just -- I'll just leave that. It -- in terms of the international issues, it's -- it's really not -- it doesn't add a lot other than to note that -- this point in the sequence.

Now, the -- Metalclad proposes to have an opening of this facility. And the -- they're advised by the Mexican embassy not -- not to do that on March the 8th, 1995. And that's at tab 56 where the Mexican embassy notes:

"We've been informed today that the authorization to operate the Metalclad facility and SLP is still pending of approval."

You'll recall not only is the municipal permit application outstanding, but there is still a federal closure order, has been since 1991.

"We received notification of this from the representative in Washington, the Secretary of the Environment for Mexico. Accordingly..."

They're advised:

"...it would be premature to make the public announcement of the Metalclad opening before this matter is resolved by the Attorney General for the protection of the environment."

PROFEPA.

"So please contact me as soon as possible to discuss this."

And you'll know from reading the tribunal's reasons that there was what was originally billed as a grand opening, later billed as a facilities tour on March the 10, 1995, at which there was a demonstration against any introduction of hazardous waste to the -- to La Pedrera. There are assertions and allegations made by Metalclad with respect to State sponsorship of -- of that, and a -- I'll come back to that.

The fact is there was a demonstration. It dispersed after a few hours. And one might have expected there would have been a demonstration when one's announcing a grand opening of a -- of a facility that's subject to a federal closure order, a municipal closure order, and at which permit applications are outstanding.

You'd also -- that demonstration, I should say, was attended by a number of people who -- I mean, demonstrations happen around these kinds of facilities. And not all of the people who

demonstrate at such actions, not all of their actions are attributable to the State. Very often non-governmental organizations, citizens, other individuals will demonstrate and will interfere with ingress and egress of people. That's a common manifestation in a democracy, and in my submission does not -- when it's dispersed after a day, doesn't amount to much of anything other than a demonstration. The tribunal took it further, and I'll come back to that.

Now, the -- that attempt to open was also commented on by -- to Metalclad by their own lawyers at paragraph 57 in which they say in the second paragraph:

"We consider that the approach worked out by Dan Neveau consisting in the organization of the opening event without the necessary written consent of the State and local authorities affects directly the good relationship which for so many months has been developed with lots of efforts with many people, with Pedro Medellin."

You'll recall I took you earlier to proposals that had been made by Pedro Medellin to allow remediation of this site and the search for sites in other locations and the possible opening of this site if the community could be brought on-board. And what the lawyers are saying is that this premature organization of the opening, just as the embassy was saying, has had a negative impact with the -- with the progress that you're trying to make.

Now, the next document is in March of 1995. And this is addressed from the municipality to the municipal president and the secretary to the then-secretary of the environment at the federal level, who are concerned about the possible opening of this -- of this facility. There's been this grand opening/facilities tour. There's been this demonstration. There's been this construction activity in advance of construction permit. You have a municipality without a lot of infrastructure and with -- concerned about its ability to enforce -- to ensure no new hazardous waste comes to this contaminated site. And they

write to the federal officials indicating they intend to defend their autonomy, the first paragraph:

"We constitute a united municipality, and we intend to defend our rights and autonomy."

They're concerned about the fact that permits were issued by others, leading to the irreversible damage, they call it, of the hazardous waste landfill. They're concerned about the intent to reopen it. And they repeat in the third paragraph the municipal government has -- at all times has refused to grand authorization, and on the contrary are requesting the total closure and sanitation of the site. Again, the municipality's position consistently throughout is we want remediation. And they're asking for assistance at the federal level to -- in -- in that regard.

They note that:

"Secretary, we are sure that as Mexicans, the same political constitution protect us, and we have the right to express our inconformity."

They're going to express that right in a later way by actually going to -- seeking Amparo against the Convenio themselves. Again, part of a legal, ordered environment under the constitution which ought to be open to a -- both the municipality and Metalclad, and was.

"We are not in favour of allowing the reopening the landfill. And on behalf of interests different from those of the municipality..."

They're worried about the damage to the environment, gets even more -- more polluted. The -- they want remediation. And I -- I'll go back now to the -- to tab 49.

 One of the reasons they want remediation is that -- you'll recall that I referred to the August 30, 1994 resolution which prohibited the introduction of new hazardous waste.

I just want to take you to the document at tab 49, because COTERIN requested a clarification with respect to that -- that document, and it's noted here. And you're --

"You've asked about the resolution of August 30, 1994 requesting to operate the hazardous waste landfill at the end of the audit. And I inform you as follows..."

 That the prohibition imposed continues, and the audit does not end with the studies, but with the completion of the corrective actions, at the bottom of the page, of -- of remediation.

"Accordingly", it is ratified..."

Over the page.

"...that COTERIN shall not introduce any type of waste into the confinement until the prevailing situation of the site is known through the studies referred to, and the correct measures established in such audit are performed. Neither shall COTERIN operate the hazardous waste landfill until the total remediation of the site."

It goes on:

"I do not omit to mention that your represented company shall obtain the corresponding permits and authorizations from the competent State and municipal authorities."

Again, federal advice in November of '94 about the need to satisfy the State and municipal authorities and, in the municipality's view, the prohibition on any operation until total remediation.

The audit continues and the opposition continues. And a document at tab 59, a May 24 PROFEPA memorandum, discusses the solutions that might be available for the problem. It notes a number of -- of facts. And I'll just skip through them. It notes at the bottom of the first page

I've included that -- of those declaring themselves against the reopening of the landfill.

It notes the opposition of non-governmental organizations, including Greenpeace and local environmental organizations. It notes that the press is predominantly reflected at the thought of the diverse sectors that are against the landfill.

It talks about solutions that there might be. It notes in the second paragraph under this point that:

"From the legal point of view the construction of the landfill has been considered proper. It is because of this that presently the company has obtained the issuance of corresponding federal and State authorizations lacking only the construction licence, which is a matter of municipal competence."

Notes, notwithstanding the above:

"The construction and operation of the landfills contravene the environmental disposition in matters of dangerous residues."

Noting:

"The company began the construction works without counting on the authorizations in matters of environmental impact in the operation of landfill control wastes."

Grave irregularities were discovered.
With respect to the reopening, they note,
over the page, that we'd like to have a landfill,
but -- and we could approve it and fine the
company and do various things. On the other hand,
they note in the fourth paragraph on -- on that
page:

"One must not forget that the municipality has an element in its favour, the lack of the authorization of the construction licence."

The federal authorities are never asserting 2 that they have the ability to completely override 3 the municipality. The -- their advice, both in 4 November of '94 and earlier, is -- and from the 5 earliest permit, is, don't forget, get the 6 municipal authorization as well. 7 And that point's noted in the -- in the third 8 paragraph under that heading, reopening of the landfill and implications. 9 10 11 "It is worth noting that the federal authorizations are granted without 12 13 prejudicing the local authorizations." 14 15 And then you'll recall that language from Mr. Altamirano's witness statement and the January 16 17 '93 permit, without prejudice to the need for 18 local authorizations. 19 Now, My Lord, I see the -- it's almost 20 4 o'clock. I'm about to enter into a new topic. 21 I think it would be convenient, for me at least, to take a break at this stage. 22 23 THE COURT: Yes. I'm prepared to adjourn for the 24 day. We'll reconvene at 10 o'clock tomorrow 25 morning. 26 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is 27 adjourned until the 22nd of February at 10 a.m. 28 29 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:59 P.M.) 30 31 Charest Reporting Inc. 32 Certified Realtime Court Reporters 33 Vancouver, British Columbia 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47