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19 February 2001 - Certified
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                   Vancouver, B.C.
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      (PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AT 10:20 A.M.)
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   THE REGISTRAR: In the Supreme Court of British
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      Columbia at Vancouver on this February 19th, 2001,
      in the matter of the United Mexican States versus
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       Metalclad Corporation, My Lord.
   THE COURT: Yes, counsel, my apologies for having to
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11
       start late. I had a matter earlier this morning
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       that didn't conclude as quickly as I would have
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14 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
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          P.G. Foy, F-o-y, appearing on behalf of the
16
       petitioner, United Mexican States, and with me
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       Mr. J.C. Thomas, Mr. R.J. Deane, D-e-a-n-e.
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          And I would also ask for leave to -- for
19
       Mr. Hugo Perezcano to join us at the counsel
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       table. Mr. Perezcano is general counsel for trade
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       negotiations for Mexico, and in -- in what is now
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       called the Secretariat of the Economy and what was
23
       called the Secretariat of the Trade and Commerce
24
       at the time. Among his responsibilities include
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       representing Mexico in all NAFTA arbitrations.
26
       And Your Lordship will know from the award that he
27
       represented Mexico in this arbitration.
28
    MR. COWPER: Yes, My Lord. Jeffery Cowper, and I
       appear for the respondent, Metalclad. And
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       appearing with me is Mr. Henry Alvarez, Mr. Brook
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       Greenberg. And although not here today,
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       Mr. Michael D. Parrish will also be appearing
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       during the course of the proceedings.
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          And with Your Lordship's leave, Mr. Clyde
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       Pearce and Jack J. Coe, that's C-o-e, Junior, will
36
       be appearing before the bar. They were counsel
37
       for Metalclad in the proceedings before the
38
       tribunal.
39
    MR. de PENCIER: Good morning, My Lord. I'm
       de Pencier, initial J., appearing for the Attorney
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41
       General of Canada.
42
          Joining me later this week or perhaps early
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       next week will be Ms. Meg Kinnear, also of the
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       Department of Justice appearing for the Attorney
45
       General.
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    MR. GILES: My Lord, I appear for the Province of
       Quebec as an intervenor. And I have with me
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       Ms. Victoria Colvin.
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          Also arriving tomorrow is a Ms. Sylvie
3
       Scherrer, who is a member of the Quebec bar but
4
       not a member of the British Columbia bar. And I
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       would ask leave for her to sit this side of the
6
       bar, if I may, when she arrives.
7
          And also, My Lord, if Ms. Colvin and I may
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       have leave to come and go without asking to be
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       excused on each occasion, I would be grateful.
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       And should we both be absent, Ms. Scherrer will be
11
       here only to watch and brief.
12 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Giles.
          And that applies to all counsel; you're free
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14
       to come and go as you wish.
    MR. GILES: Thank you, My Lord.
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    MS. THAYER: My Lord, it's Thayer, T-H-A-Y-E-R,
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       initial J. for the province of British Columbia.
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          As you are aware, we're not a party to these
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       proceedings. I would ask leave of the Court to be
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       able to sit at counsel table to conduct a watching
21
       brief on behalf of the province.
           And if I am not present, My Lord, I would ask
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       that Ms. Rachel Mete of our office who is an
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24
       articling student be given leave to sit at the
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26 MR. COWPER: My Lord, we've discussed as counsel two
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       matters which are really preliminary to the
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       hearing of the petition which was set to commence
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       this morning.
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           There are two applications before
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       Your Lordship which have been set over to this
32
       morning. The first is an application to add
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       another intervenor to the proceedings, which has
34
       been supported by an affidavit of Mr. Carten.
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       That is generally opposed.
           And I would like, with Your Lordship's leave,
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       to indicate some preliminary objections I have to
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       the application first this morning.
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           There is a second application, which is an
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       application brought to have these proceedings
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       broadcast. I don't know the position of all the
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       parties. I will be opposing that application.
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       Mr. Nelson is here to speak to that. And we would
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       propose to have that application heard second, if
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       that's satisfactory to Your Lordship.
46 THE COURT: I have no preferences. Do other counsel
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       have any preferences?
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MR. COWPER: Now, with respect to Mr. Carten's
       application, has Your Lordship had an opportunity
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       to have the materials find their way to you?
4 THE COURT: Yes, and I've read them.
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   MR. COWPER: Okay.
          In general, if I may say, there's a
7
       straightforward means of disposing of that
8
       application, My Lord.
          As Your Lordship will recall, in the
9
10
       pre-hearing phase of this matter Your Lordship
11
       directed that any parties interested in seeking
12
       intervention do so before the hearing.
           More fundamentally, Mr. Carten's application
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14
       is premised and based upon another claim that is
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       made, I understand, on behalf of another party
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       pursuant to Chapter 11 proceedings in NAFTA on a
17
       very preliminary basis; that is not a basis on
18
       which any party ought to be allowed to intervene
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       in this -- in this proceeding, particularly given
20
       the fact that my client's claim is not connected
21
       to Canada.
22
           As Your Lordship knows, this is a claim by an
23
       U.S. investor against the United Mexican States
24
       and it is in British Columbia because this is the
25
       venue of review of the award.
26
          I understand that Mr. Carten's application is
27
       premised on a claim that is being brought
28
       separately by another investor involved in Canada.
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          I should say as well, and I know Mr. Giles
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       wants to be heard on this, that there are portions
31
       of the affidavit which is filed in support by
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       Mr. Carten which are inappropriate. They speak to
33
       matters which ought not to be speaken to -- spoken
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       to by Mr. Carten, and in the technical sense
       they're scandalous in the face of the Court. They
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36
       ought not to be heard here, and I do not think
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       reference should be made to them. I say that, as
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       counsel, they are -- they are not appropriate for
39
       the relief sought.
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           And for those grounds, it's my submission
41
       that Mr. Carten's application should be dismissed
42
       summarily.
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    MR. CARTEN: My Lord, my name is John Carten, and I am
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       the person who is making an application for
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       intervenor.
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          May I speak to my application briefly,
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My Lord?

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THE COURT: Yes, you may MR. CARTEN: This dispute is a private dispute. And as legal counsel for Sun Belt Water, which has a large claim against Canada under NAFTA, I've been following the developments in the NAFTA -- in the Metalclad case.

So two weeks ago I went to the court registry and I was surprised to learn that the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec had intervened in what one would normally regard as a private dispute between two parties.

The question then arises what could be the reasons that the AG of Canada and Quebec have entered this private dispute when they are not parties to the dispute?

It is trite law but well settled that domestic court has no jurisdiction to make binding rulings on the interpretation of an international treaty when the parties to that treat do not submit to that court.

The record is clear that the Republic of the United States has not submitted to the jurisdiction of this court. So why is it that the AG for Canada and the AG of Quebec have intervened?

Well, the intervention of the AG for Canada and for Quebec in this proceeding is similar to a reference case. The Court will be asked for rulings that -- as they might apply to Canada in hypothetical situations under NAFTA, and in the absence of a real dispute in the Canadian context.

Canadian politicians and government employees will then rely on the words of the Court, or those of a higher court if the case is appealed, to justify their conduct as it relates to NAFTA.

In Canada the court -- governments have a long history of referring cases to the courts for guidance. The government then relies on the court to justify its later course of action. There are many notorious examples: the GST reference case, the Quebec separation reference, the gun registration reference.

For very good reasons the American courts, the Australian courts and the English courts do not permit themselves to hear reference cases. I cannot speak to the Mexican court.

A reference case is a politicization of the judicial process. It tends to lessen the perceived independence of the judiciary, and it's fundamentally at odds with the adversarial traditions that are the foundation of the English common law.

In the absence of a strong and able adversary arguing from a real factual situation, the court operates in a vacuum and the judgments tend to be reiterations of the political positions, although clothed in judicial language. The onus of a reference case has become accepted, an accepted part of the political process in Canada.

The intervention of the AGs in Canada in Quebec in this private dispute are clearly an attempt to turn it into a reference case.

Now, although it is accepted within Canada, the use of a reference case or similar case process before a domestic court on the interpretation of an international treaty is a highly questionable strategy. And I would suggest, My Lord, that there's a tendency or a possibility that this court will be brought into disrepute.

Now, my request is to provide the court with a factual pattern which will assist the court to develop a well-reasoned judgment if it accedes to the perceived request of the AG of Canada and Quebec.

I hope to prevent the Court from making a ruling or interpretation that will allow a continuance of the kind of political corruption and shenanigans that took place in British Columbia which gave rise to the case of Sun Belt Water.

Certainly the Court cannot decide the validity of the Sun Belt claim. But the Court can guard itself against being used in a matter that will bring it into disrepute or that would fulfill -- or that will facilitate a perpetuation of the peculiar kind of Canadian political corruption which dissuades foreign investment in our economy and brings discredit to our community.

Now, the leading legal authority, the most recent legal authority, on access of the courts is a decision of Mr. Justice Lambert in the Court of

1 Appeal with Hollinrake concurring. At page 188, 2 he says: [All quotations herein cited as read]

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"I consider it is the right of every...everyone in Canada has the right to come to court and seek the help of the court in obtaining a resolution of the legal issues that have given rise to that person's problem. Everyone in Canada has the right to seek the protection of the court from a perceived oppression by the State."

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Mr. McEachern concurred in that decision, but he did not -- with those principles. The case was appealed but leave to appeal was denied.

So it's my respectful view, My Lord, that you are bound by that decision of the Court of Appeal, and I respectfully request status as an intervenor.

Those are my submissions.

22 THE COURT: Do other counsel wish to make submissions?

MR. GILES: I -- I have one point that I wish to add to the submissions made by my learned friend Mr. Cowper, and that is that I would object to Mr. Carten being heard on the affidavit he filed which refers to Quebec.

And I make that objection on the grounds that the material is, on its face, scandalous. It's material that impugns the integrity of individuals, including members of the judiciary, and without a shred of evidence to support these imputations that is not hearsay or opinion, or invective.

Now, the -- the affidavit, the nature of the affidavit is apparent from its face. I'd only refer you particularly to paragraph 7 and 12, and 16 and 25, which in my submission amply support the chara -- the way I've characterized it.

I rely, My Lord, on your authority to protect the processes of this court which is expressly stated by Rule 19(24) which applies to affidavits. And in addition, in my submission, this type of material is a form of contempt in that it is calculated, particularly by its references to members of the judiciary at

7 Submissions by Mr. Giles Submissions by Mr. de Pencier Submissions by Mr. Foy Submissions by Mr. Carten

1 virtually all levels in this country. It is 2 calculated to lower the authority of the court. 3 And I accordingly submit that the affidavit 4 should be struck out and an order made that was 5 made not so long ago by the Supreme Court of 6 Canada in similar circumstances that Mr. Carten be 7 barred from making fur -- any further applications 8 in these proceedings, except with leave first 9 obtained on proper material. 10 And the case I referred to was one in which I 11 was counsel, and the plaintiff was a David Kunce. The defendant were a number of doctors for which I 12 acted. Dr. Kunce filed scurrilous material, in 13 14 principle the same as before Your Lordship now, 15 and the Court upon its own motion not only quashed 16 the application for leave, but on its own motion 17 made an order barring the applicant from making 18 any further applications. 19 Those are my submissions, My Lord. 20 MR. de PENCIER: Thank you, My Lord. I would agree with Mr. Cowper's submissions. 21 22 I would only add two things. The obvious one is that to the extent that Mr. Carten is concerned 23 24 with decisions on interventions, those decisions 25 have been made; we've passed that matter. 26 Otherwise, he obviously has nothing to add to 27 these proceedings. 28 Thank you. 29 MR. CARTEN: My Lord, one final matter --THE COURT: Just -- Mr. Foy -- MR. CARTEN: Sorry. 30 31 32 THE COURT: -- is contemplating speaking. 33 MR. CARTEN: Oh. MR. FOY: Just to confirm, My Lord, that Mexico's 34 35 position is that it is not satisfied Sun's Belt --36 Sun Belt's participation would be of assistance 37 and opposes the application for intervention. 38 MR. CARTEN: One farther -- further matter in reply to 39 Mr. Giles' comments being I came to this court out 40 of respect for the process of the court. The fact 41 that a few members of the judiciary misled the 42 public and the press with respect to complaints 43 that I have filed with the judicial counsel does 44 not bring the court into disrepute; it brings 45 the -- it may bring those members of the judiciary 46 into disrepute, but that's their own doing. 47 I have very high regard for the court,

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My Lord. Thank you.
   THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Carten.
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          I dismiss Mr. Carten's application on two
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      grounds. First of all, I set a deadline for
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      applications to intervene. That deadline has
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      passed, and this application is out of time.
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          In addition, I'm not satisfied that the
      participation of Mr. Carten in this process would
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      be of assistance to the Court.
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          Thank you, Mr. Carten.
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    MR. COWPER: I think it was discussed between counsel
       that we would hear Mr. -- Your Lordship would
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       hear Mr. Nelson's application next, if that's
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       satisfactory, if it would be easier.
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    THE COURT: Just before we proceed to that, and this
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       is somewhat tied in, I see we've got the tape
       machine going, we've got a realtime reporter and
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       we're now going to be talking about videotaping.
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       Can we at least get rid of one of them and have
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   MR. COWPER: I believe that's called convergence
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22
       actually, My Lord.
23
          I -- I think we can dispense with the tape
24
       recorder.
25 THE COURT: Yes.
          Mr. Registrar, you can turn off the tape
26
27
       recorder.
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    THE REGISTRAR: Yes, My Lord.
    MR. NELSON: My name is Scott Nelson, and I'm making
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       application on behalf of the Vancouver Independent
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       Media Centre to record this proceeding.
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          I've originally thought that my application
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       was not opposed by any party, but I found out this
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       morning that it is opposed by -- by counsel for
35
       Metalclad.
36
          I'd like to go through a few of the things in
37
       my chambers record. Has Your Lordship had the
38
       opportunity to -- to look at it?
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    THE COURT: I have read your materials, yes,
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       Mr. Nelson.
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    MR. NELSON: Okay. So I thought I'd start with tab
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       number 3, the affidavit. I've filed affidavits in
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       my own name so that counsel for the parties would
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       know the basis of my application.
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          Paragraph 2, I'll begin there. The
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       Independent Media Centre, IMC, is a
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       volunteer-based, non-profit international Internet
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news service which was formed in 1999. The IMC consists of 1 international and 45 regional Internet news sites. I actually have 44 in here, but there's since been another one added.

Regional IMCs operate in 15 countries worldwide, including countries in North and South America, Europe and Africa. A regional, that is British Columbia, IMC news wire service has operated from premises located at 301-303 West Hastings Street, Vancouver, since August of 2000.

The IMC broadcast both live and edited archive video and audio, as well as still images and text over the Internet. Approximately 50,000 viewers visit the international IMC site every day. I don't presently know how many viewers visit each of the regional IMC sites.

The mandate of the Independent Media Centre is to create and sustain local networks of participatory democracy and democratic communication by publishing news stories and commentary which have not been filtered by the mainstream media.

Each of the international and regional IMC sites consists of a news wire service and a storyboard. Everyone is permitted to post news stories and commentary to the news wire service. An editorial board then determines the relative significance of each item posted, and those items determined to be the most significant are moved to the storyboard.

Skipping ahead to number 9, I have been an Internet communications consultant since 1993 and a regular contributor of multimedia to the IMC news wire since its inception. I'm also a member of the Vancouver, British Columbia IMC editorial board.

I've previously made video and audio recordings of lectures, conferences and workshops for broadcast by the IMC. And I'm able to make broadcast quality video and audio recordings with an unobtrusive digital video camera mounted on a tripod with a single fixed pivot using an internal microphone and standard room lighting.

Now, if I could move to tab 1, my outline, and at page 2, international trade agreements such as NAFTA and their impact on participatory democracy is of primary interest to the IMC, its

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viewers and the public at large.

NAFTA proceedings generally and this proceeding in particular have the potential to significantly impact the ability of democratically elected local, provincial and national governments to formulate and implement public policy.

Quasi-judicial proceedings under NAFTA are usually conducted behind closed doors and are not open to the public. Accordingly, the public is deprived of the opportunity to evaluate such proceedings and hence to evaluate an important component of agreements such as NAFTA and their impact on democracy and the public interest.

By choosing the British Columbia Supreme Court as the venue for their appeal, the parties have elected to conduct the proceedings in a forum that is open to the public. Granting electronic access by permitting video and audio recording of the proceeding for broadcast to the public extends public access to a much wider segment of the population.

The Canadian federal government has stated its intention to participate in negotiations aimed at implementing a NAFTA-style trade agreement throughout the Americas. A meeting to further these negotiations is scheduled to occur in Quebec City in April of 2001. Accordingly, the timing of the current proceeding makes it of even greater interest to the public.

Page over. There is no statutory prohibition against the use of electronic recording devices in -- in courtrooms in British Columbia. I have a case here, R v. Cho, which I can hand up to you, if you'd like.

THE COURT: I think I know which decision you're 35 referring to, but --

MR. NELSON: There is no common law basis for excluding electronic recording devices from courtrooms in British Columbia, and that's also R. v. Cho. There is no statutory or common law right of privacy inside courtrooms in British Columbia other than that afforded to very restricted classes of persons, none of whom will be before the Court in these proceeding, that's R. v. Cho.

The reasons for allowing electronic public access into the courts include the need, one, to

maintain an affective evidentiary process; two, to ensure a judiciary that behaves fairly and is sensitive to the values espoused by society; three, to promote a shared sense that our courts operate with integrity and dispense justice; and four, to provide an ongoing opportunity for the community to learn how the justice system operates and how the law being applied daily in the courts affects them. That's from the Edmonton Journal v. Alberta.

An additional reason for allowing electronic access to the court in this particular instance is to provide the public with information regarding the effect of abstruse trade agreements such as NAFTA on the ability of democratically elected officials to formulate government policy.

Section 2(b) of -- of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees everyone the freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression is intended to protect the listeners as well as speakers.

Prohibiting electronic recording devices from the court is a violation of Section 2(b) of the Charter; one, the activity for which leave is sought is expressive and non-violent; two, prohibiting electronic access to courts clearly limits and is intended to limit expression; three, allowing video and audio recording of court proceedings is compatible with fair judicial proceedings and the proper administration of justice; four, the expression sought to be protected in this instance is political expression, and accordingly is entitled to the highest degree of protection compatible with the proper administration of justice.

And we've got a cite there, Daniel J. Henry, "Electronic Public Access to Court, an Idea Whose Time has Come." The case is cited within that.

The page over. This violation of Section 2(b) cannot be justified under Section 1. One, there is no rational link between banning the electronic recording of court proceedings and the fairness of the trial process; two, a total ban is an overboard restriction and cannot meet the minimal impairment test. And that's again from

1 that article. 2 I have a decision of the B.C. Securities 3 Commission regarding this issue which summarizes 4 the arguments for and against, and decides in 5 favour of allowing recording. And I can hand that 6 up to you, if you like. THE COURT: This is different from Mr. Hyndman's 7 8 letter which you attached to your affidavit? 9 MR. NELSON: Yes. This is a British Columbia 10 Securities Commission in the matter of Top Line 11 Resources. And then if you could go to tab 4 for my 12 affidavit, from that, number 2, attached to this 13 14 affidavit is Exhibit A, it's a cop -- and is --15 summarizing those articles and the arguments in 16 there. 17 Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A is a 18 copy of an article by Dale Elator provided in 19 February 1986 edition of The National, wherein 20 Mr. Justice Grange is reported as believing that 21 television cameras should be allowed in courtrooms 22 for certain trials. 23 Mr. Justice Grange was also reported saying 24 that the presence of television cameras did not 25 cause a problem, and that was at an inquiry 26 presided over by him. 27 And number 3 there, attached to this affidavit as Exhibit B is a copy of a letter from 28 29 Douglas Hyndman to Daniel Burnett dated May 11th, 30 1992. I'm advised and verily believe that 31 Mr. Hvndman wrote this letter following his 32 experience as a Chair with B.C. Securities 33 Commission hearing wherein the use of electronic 34 recording equipment was permitted. 35 In the letter Mr. Hyndman states that the presence of electronic recording equipment did not 36 37 adversely affect the decorum of the hearing, the 38 presentation of evidence or the right of the

> So electronic recording is permitted in many American jurisdictions, as I'm sure you know, the Supreme Court of Canada and many quasi-judicial hearings; it is not obtrusive, and it doesn't

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respondents to a fair hearing. Mr. Hyndman

further states that he and other panel members

recording of future commission hearings on a

would have no concern about allowing electronic

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similar basis.

adversely affect the proceedings.

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          Thank you, My Lord.
3 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Nelson.
4 MR. FOY: Mexico takes no position on the
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      application.
   THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Cowper.
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   MR. COWPER: Yes, My Lord. We oppose the application,
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      and let me go swiftly from generalities to
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      particulars.
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          I have no comment on the general issue of
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       whether proceedings should be broadcast and
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       matters of public comment that -- occurring within
       courtrooms should be broadcast.
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14
          My client's essential concern with respect to
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       the proposed broadcast of this hearing has to do
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       with the manner in which the hearing has been
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       ordered to be held and the potential risk of a
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       distorted and unfair perception in the public as
       to the issues which the Court has agreed to
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20
       entertain from Mexico.
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          The risk of confusion over what this
22
       proceeding involves has -- is -- is an obvious
       handmaiden of the public issues which have already
23
24
       been excited by the publicity surrounding the
25
       case.
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          To give you an example that just occurred a
27
       few moments ago as I walked in the courtroom,
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       there was a large hand-lettered sign indicating
       that the person who prepared it was concerned that
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       U.S. toxic waste was being dumped in Mexico.
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          As Your Lordship knows from the pre-hearing
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       matters, Metalclad in this case has constructed a
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       state-of-the-art facility for the purpose of
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       processing and safely storing hazardous waste
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       produced by Mexican industry, and not by U.S.
36
       industry.
37
          And indeed, as Your Lordship knows, the award
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       which is the subject of Mexico's application was
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       an award by three eminent international lawyers,
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       including a Mexican lawyer appointed by Mexico,
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       which found that Metalclad had been unfairly
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       treated and had had its facility which was already
       constructed and is lying idle expropriated by the
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       measures taken by the Mexican governments.
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          In the pre-hearing I indicated to
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Your Lordship that Metalclad objected to Mexico's reference to the domestic international act -- I'm

sorry, the domestic arbitration act. And our position was that the only proper statutory framework within which Mexico's complaints could be heard was the international commercial act which provides for very narrow grounds of review.

The importance of that for the present case is that I say to you that it's apparent and clear, and indeed implicit in my friend's application to have reference to the Commercial Arbitration Act, that under the international act there is no review of facts, there is no review of the merits of the dispute.

Now, Your Lordship quite properly indicated that that objection, although it was perhaps a proper objection in the normal case, could be dealt with by combining my friend's submissions under the international act and under the commercial act, and they could all be disposed of in one hearing.

And with respect to the -- the outcome of that direction was that my friend very properly has served on us a very long and extensive argument which goes into not only the grounds which he would be permitted to under the international act, but if Your Lordship has reviewed it, dozens and dozens of pages which deal with the facts that were before the tribunal and various complaints made about the facts and -- and legal issues which my friend says arises from them.

My concern is that, as a result of that direction, a broadcast of these proceedings viewed by a member of the public would be misunderstood as a re-hearing of the matters before the tribunal, would run the risk of a distorted and unfair perception of what Your Lordship has agreed to entertain on a review of the panel.

Now, that in a nutshell is my concern with respect to the broadcast of this particular hearing.

I don't address myself to the general issues of publicity. I don't -- I don't know the technology which Mr. Nelson has said is available. I haven't seen it, so I don't know whether there are any technical concerns or otherwise.

Lassume it's some form of Internet

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      broadcasting which is a bit awkward and would make
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       us all look like stick people, but I -- I've put
3
       that aside, the fact, because I probably look like
4
       a stick person at the best of times anyway.
5
   THE COURT: That was going through my mind vis-a-vis
       myself.
6
   MR. COWPER: But, as I say, with re -- arising out of
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       the manner in which we've agreed to have this
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9
       matter heard, I'm concerned about the carriage of
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       the case.
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           And I can, just before I -- I sit, close with
       this observation: If the matter was to be
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       broadcast, my main concern with respect to the
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       fairness of the hearing is that I plan on being
       silent throughout my friend's submission and not
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16
       objecting to those parts of his submission which
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       in my view are outside of the purview of either
18
       act. I'd be concerned about whether that silence
       in a broadcast environment would be interpreted as
19
20
       an agreement that Your Lordship had either agreed
21
       to hear those submissions or that they were proper
22
       under either statute.
23
           So I -- I -- I fear that the risk of a
24
       broadcast on such a matter of public note would
25
       distort and present an unfair appearance of these
26
       proceedings as it relates to Metalclad's case.
27
    THE COURT: Mr. Cowper, let me ask you this: I
       received a message through my secretary from the
28
       reporting firm that is dealing with the realtime
29
30
       reporting on this matter, and what I understand is
31
       being proposed is that the realtime reporting
32
       transcripts, so to speak, in electronic form, be
       posted on the Internet on a daily basis.
33
34
    MR. COWPER: Yes. I was going to deal with the
35
       transcript separately. I have a separate concern
36
       as it relates to the transcript, and I can deal
37
       with that right now if Your Lordship --
38
    THE COURT: It would seem to me that the concerns that
39
       you've raised would apply equally to a transcript
40
       being posted on the Internet. I don't think it's
41
       any different whether a person views the
42
       proceedings on the Internet or reads them on the
43
       Internet.
44 MR. COWPER: I -- I think the same concerns would
45
       apply. I have a separate concern as it relates to
46
       the transcript, which is that the -- I have no
47
       objection and I -- and my client would have no
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1 objection to the transcripts of the hearing as a 2 whole being made available, because it is a public proceeding. My client has no objection to 3 4 publicity in the general sense. 5 The concern is the fairness and balance. 6 If at the -- at the end, the conclusion of 7 the hearing, the transcript is available, that's something that my client would have no objection 8 9 10 The -- the -- the daily posting of the 11 transcript has two problems, one of them being the 12 partial nature of the publication. And other courts I know faced with this have banned the 13 14 daily dissemination of transcripts for that 15 reason. 16 The second issue though is this: and that is 17 I have actually conducted a 200-day trial using 18 Livenote and -- and the realtime transcripts. There are many occasions in which corrections to 19 20 the transcript appear after counsel have had an 21 opportunity to read the transcript. That's 22 particularly the case when the court reporter is trying to keep up with counsel's submissions as 23 24 opposed to evidence which, as Your Lordship knows, 25 proceeds at a more sedate pace. 26 And when we're talking about posting on the 27 Internet, it's very important obviously that 28 counsel be satisfied that their comments have been faithfully recorded. My experience is that takes 29 30 a matter of a few days after the publication of 31 the draft by the reporter under Livenote, just --32 I don't know if Your Lordship has had a Livenote 33 trial. 34 THE COURT: I have. 35 MR. COWPER: Okay. Well --36 THE COURT: A couple. 37 MR. COWPER: -- as Your Lordship knows, the live feed 38 is a very draft document. You then receive a -- a 39 subsequent draft, and then the final transcript is approved by the court. That process takes --40 41 THE COURT: Not approved by the court. It's certified 42 by the reporter. 43 MR. COWPER: Certified by the reporter. And in the normal course, counsel who have 44 45 concerns about the transcript have an opportunity 46 to say that is an error and I'd like you to go

back and check your notes. In this case we'd

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2
      And my preference would be to have any publication
3
      of the transcript deferred until the conclusion of
      the hearing.
4
5 THE COURT: Do any other counsel wish to make
      submissions?
6
7
          Mr. Foy, you're not taking any position, I
8
      take it, on -- what about on the -- the transcript
9
      of the realtime reporting?
10 MR. FOY: We have no position on -- we don't object,
11
       sorry, to the -- the posting of the transcripts on
       a daily or other basis.
12
13 THE COURT: Mr. Nelson, you have the right of reply.
14
       You get to answer the points that Mr. Cowper has
       raised, if you'd please go down before the
15
16
       microphone again.
17
    MR. NELSON: I'm not sure that I have a reply. I
       mean, you know, other than reiterating that -- the
18
19
       points that I've made. I just fall upon the mercy
20
       of the Court to bring a camera in.
    THE COURT: In posting the video on the Internet, how
21
       would you -- how would you do that? What
22
       procedure would you follow?
23
24 MR. NELSON: Yeah. I should be clear. I'm not
25
       proposing to broadcast live from the courtroom.
26 THE COURT: Um-hum.
    MR. NELSON: What I'm proposing to do is to videotape
27
       and record on -- on -- on a format known as
28
29
       Mini-DV, which is a broadcast-quality audio and
30
       video signal, and then to do some editing of that,
31
       and post that on the Internet.
32 THE COURT: And when you say doing editing, what type
       of editing would you propose?
33
    MR. NELSON: Well, I don't think that -- that there's
34
35
       that much -- I think there's going to be too much
36
       information for -- for most people to -- to deal
37
       with in terms of this, and because I can't do it
38
       live, I think probably daily summaries are what --
39
       what I had in mind.
40
          I -- I -- are you looking for further sort of
       daily summaries I would be looking at doing?
41
42 THE COURT: That's -- I think you're hitting upon the
       concern Mr. Cowper is expressing, and it's a
43
44
       concern that I have.
45
          Generally speaking, the -- the court has two
46
       concerns about videotapes or television cameras in
47
       the courtroom; one is the effect on witnesses. We
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certainly want to have an opportunity to do that.

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will not have any witnesses here. I guess it has an effect on lawyers as well, but I think I can handle the effect it may have on -- on the

The second concern is -- is a question of what is the record. And on an application such as this where I'm going to be hearing the submissions, I don't think that the record is terribly important vis-a-vis the court process.

If the matter goes to the Court of Appeal, then the Court of Appeal will probably not have any occasion to have regard to the submissions of lawyers. Generally speaking, there the lawyers will be making new submissions before the Court of Appeal.

But a -- a third concern, and the concern that Mr. Cowper's raising, is -- is a concern that -- that by editing the materials, that it is leaving in the hands of an outsider the perception which the public is going to receive as a result of these proceedings.

And my view is that I -- I would be prepared to allow videotaping if all of the videotape were placed without editing on the Internet. But if it's proposed that editing take place, then I'm not prepared to allow it because I -- I believe that the -- rather than informing the public on an unrestricted basis, which is what you express to be the objective, is that we then have a situation where -- where an edited version, which is perhaps going to be taken out of context -- I'm not suggesting that you would do anything improper. But there's a risk that it could be taken out of context, and that does concern me.

35 MR. NELSON: My Lord, the -- there's two problems there. One is because I want to videotape it, there is going to be an interval where I'm going to miss some materials as I change tapes, because each tape only has one-hour length, so I'm not -under the setup that I'm proposing I'm not physically able to record the entire proceedings end to end. And I don't want to take up the Court's time with asking people to stop while I change the tape or anything like that.

Secondly, I -- I think may -- perhaps we can get around this by -- by my undertaking to link in the -- anything that I do produce to the realtime

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2
       very easy to do on the Internet, to put up a
3
       story, to tell something and then to have a link
4
       to more information about it. And that may be one
5
       way that that addresses the Court's concerns.
6 THE COURT: I do see some difficulties in that
7
       regard. I'm not sure that's a complete answer,
       because some people will just be content to look
8
9
       at the video without having regard to the entire
10
       transcript.
11 MR. NELSON: Um-hum.
    THE COURT: Mr. Cowper, as I've indicated, I would be
12
       prepared to allow the videotaping if -- if a -- an
13
14
       unabridged version were to be placed on the
15
       Internet.
           You've heard Mr. Nelson express concerns.
16
17
       I -- I'm not overly worried about random
18
       interruptions while the tape gets changed. What
       I'm more concerned about is intentional editing
19
20
       which could possibly affect the context of the
21
       matter.
22 MR. COWPER: Yes. I -- I agree with that, if
23
       Your Lordship's disposed to permit the broadcast
24
       on the basis of the uninterrupted -- I -- I'm not
25
       concerned about anything lost over the interval.
          I am concerned that -- whether consciously or
26
27
       otherwise, editing by its nature is a selection of
28
       material, and it does raise immediately the risk
       that the material's unfairly presented, not
29
30
       that -- the members of the media of course are
31
       present, and it's their job to present materials
32
       as they wish, and they endeavour in their
33
       professional standards to do that fairly or
34
       otherwise.
35
          The main concern with a broadcast is that it
       appears to be, as Your Lordship indicated in your
36
37
       comments, a faithful and accurate record of what
38
       happened, and so there's an additional potential
39
       mischief of -- of a selection in that, and so I
40
       would be concerned about that. And I don't think
41
       that could be overcome by -- by any assurance
42
       about how the editing would take place.
43
    THE COURT: Um-hum.
    MR. COWPER: I -- I'm not concerned about the changing
44
45
       of tapes, if that's what your only question to me
46
47 THE COURT: Very well.
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transcript that's being prepared. I mean, that's

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Mr. Nelson, I'm going to allow your
2
       application, but it be on the condition that the
3
       proceedings be broadcast, and the manner in which
4
       you're planning to do that is post them on the
5
       Internet only, if the entire proceedings be
6
       posted. And I have no concerns with you doing it
7
       on a -- on a daily basis.
8
          But my restrictions is going to be that if
9
       you are to post part of any day, or broadcast in
10
       any fashion part of a day, that you have to
11
       broadcast the whole of the day.
12 MR. COWPER: I'm sorry. There's one remaining point,
       My Lord. And I would ask that the condition be
13
14
       that the entire proceedings be broadcast. As you
       might anticipate, if the broadcast stopped after
15
16
       Mexico made its submission, my client might be
17
       concerned about the fairness of that process as
18
    THE COURT: Yes. I think that follows from -- from
19
20
       what I'm saying.
           Are those conditions satisfactory?
21
    MR. NELSON: Just to be sure that I understand them, I
22
23
       can broadcast the whole proceedings but not a
24
       portion of the proceedings.
   THE COURT: Yes. But -- you can post them on the Internet or publish them on the Internet on a
25
26
       daily basis; but having done that for the first
27
28
       day, you have to realize that you are then
29
       undertaking to do it for the remainder of the
30
       proceedings.
31
    MR. NELSON: Okay. Thank you, My Lord.
    THE COURT: In connection with the -- the transcript
32
       of -- of the realtime reporter, Mr. Cowper, you
33
       raised the point of -- of the potential errors,
34
35
       and I certainly -- I certainly accept that. And I
36
       think the -- the mechanism by which we can guard
37
       against that is to simply provide that they --
38
       they not be posted on the Internet until certified
39
       by the reporter.
40 MR. COWPER: That's satisfactory. And -- and I can
41
       deal with the reporter in terms of some reasonable
42
       interval for us to comment on the -- on the
43
       transcript.
44 THE COURT: And -- and I would quite frankly be
45
       surprised if the reporter would want something
46
       published on the Internet until it had been
47
       certified as correct.
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MR. COWPER: Thank you, My Lord.

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THE COURT: It's now 5 past 11. I don't know whether
      you wish to get started.
3
4
         Just generally speaking so counsel are -- are
5
      knowledgeable, but -- I usually take a 15-minute
6
      break in the morning and a 10-minute break in the
7
      afternoon.
8
         I don't know whether it would be appropriate
9
      to take the break before you get started, Mr. Foy,
       for this morning.
10
11
    MR. FOY: What time do you intend to take the break,
12
       Mv Lord?
13 THE COURT: I'm just saying do you want to take it now
14
       or do you want to get started?
    MR. FOY: That's fine. I'm in Your Lordship's hands.
15
    THE COURT: Given the fact that I started at 8:30 and
16
       haven't had a real break yet, I think I'll take
17
18
       the morning break at this time.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
20
       adjourned for the morning recess.
21
22
       (MORNING RECESS)
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:08 A.M.)
23
24
       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:34 A.M.)
25
26 THE COURT: Mr. Registrar, here are the materials on
       the applications that we've dealt with.
27
28 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, My Lord.
29
    THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Foy.
30 MR. FOY: My Lord, I have one additional introduction
31
       and request for leave.
32
          Ms. Guadeloupe Albert, Consul General for
33
       Mexico, has joined us, and I would ask that she be
34
       given leave to sit on this side of the bar.
35 THE COURT: Yes.
   MR. FOY: I'd like to start, My Lord, with some
36
       housekeeping matters, there -- and identify first
37
38
       the materials that have already been filed.
39
          To your left, the record, the entire record
40
       of twenty volumes, has been filed together with
41
       briefs of authorities. There are four volumes of
42
       briefs of authorities.
43
          And I'll be -- just tell you now that the
44
       first two volumes contain case law. The third
       volume contains statutes and rules. The fourth
45
46
       volume contains some secondary sources and in
47
       addition, at the very end, some additional cases.
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I've also handed up a -- a binder, a red
2
      binder which contains extracts from the record.
       And I will be referring you to portions of that in
3
4
       the course of my submissions.
5
          I'll just tell you that at the -- the start,
6
       the first -- under the first tab of that volume is
       an index to the record. The first page of that
7
8
       index shows you where you will find the written
9
       arguments that were filed by all the parties. And
10
       then the rest of the index shows you where you'll
11
       find everything else.
          I would like to ask Your Lordship whether you
12
       still have the case management brief which
13
14
       contained the award.
    THE COURT: Yes, I do.
15
16 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
          I've also handed up to Your Lordship your own
17
18
       NAFTA, complete NAFTA.
    THE COURT: Thank you.
19
20
    MR. FOY: We'll be referring to that.
          You'll know from reviewing the written
21
22
       argument that it's also available in electronic
       form, and the Web site address is in the
23
24
       materials.
25 THE COURT: Yes.
26 MR. FOY: I'm also assuming that Your Lordship has the
27
       petitioner's written argument that was filed some
28
       time ago.
29
    THE COURT: I do. And I did have an opportunity to
30
       peruse it.
31
    MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
32
          We will generally be following the outline of
       the submissions that have been filed by Mexico.
33
34
       After some introductory remarks, I want to take
35
       you to the award and identify those portions of
36
       the award that cause concerns.
37
          After that introduction, Mr. Thomas will take
38
       you through Chapter 11 and its place in the NAFTA
39
       with particular emphasis on the limited
40
       jurisdiction that is accorded to Chapter 11
41
       arbitral tribunal panels.
42
          After that, we will address which statutes
43
       governs this -- these -- these proceedings, and
44
       identify the grounds for review and the extent of
45
       the review under each of the statutes.
46
           We will then review what I will call the
47
       jurisdictional errors, alleged errors. That will
```

also involve going through some of the documents that I've placed before you in the red brief.

We'll then deal with allegations with respect to the failure of the tribunal to deal with significant issues, some -- and lastly some interpretation issues with respect to Chapter 11.

Now, the outline of argument, I will not read it to you. I adopt it in its entirety. If I do neglect to refer to a particular paragraph, then I would -- I don't want to be taken to have abandoned that point. I will spend my time in oral argument emphasizing aspects of that outline.

As Your Lordship is aware, this is an application to set aside a unanimous award made by three arbitrators in an ad hoc tribunal. The president of the tribunal was Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, a professor from Cambridge England, the -- and he was jointly agreed to by the parties; Mr. Benjamin Civiletti, who was appointed by Metalclad, a lawyer from Washington D.C.; and Professor Jose Luis Siqueiros, appointed by Mexico and a lawyer from Mexico City.

Your Lordship already is aware of why this court is seized with jurisdiction to review this award. The claimant invoked in -- in this case, the ICSID additional facility arbitral rules as allowed by NAFTA Article 1120. And under those rules, and they're at tab 85 of the -- the brief of authorities, and in accordance with Article 1130 of the NAFTA, the tribunal was required to select a place of arbitration. That was done after representations by the parties.

And the tribunal -- and Your Lordship is aware that this is a legal selection, not a place of hearings, but identifies the -- the law of the arbitration itself. And when the tribunal made that selection, they noted that the formal location by reference to which the enforceability of the award is to be determined should be a neutral country, and on that basis decided it should be Canada and chose Vancouver.

The fact of this court's jurisdiction is not contested. The scope of that court's jurisdiction is contested, and depends upon which statute applies.

The jurisdiction of this court is either that conferred by the Commercial Arbitration Act or the

International Commercial Arbitration Act, only one of which applies.

I would point out that common to both is review for excess of jurisdiction. And it's my understanding from some of the draft materials I've received from the respondent -- I -- I don't have their argument yet, but I do have some draft materials -- that Metalclad concedes that under the Commercial Arbitration Act it permits a broader scope of review, including appeal on questions of law arising out of an award with leave of this court.

Now, I'd like to, just while we're on that topic -- I'm not going to argue in detail at this point which act applies, but I'd like to note some misnomers. The Commercial Arbitration Act was referred to by my friend as the domestic act. Both acts are acts of British Columbia and in that sense are domestic law.

The Commercial Arbitration Act should more properly be called the arbitration act that applies to any other arbitration. It's the -- it has a section to which I'll take you which makes it clear it applies to other than commercial arbitrations. The International Commercial Arbitration Act on the other hand is restricted to commercial arbitrations.

And while I -- I note that, the -- it is not incorrect to refer to a domestic international arbitration. The law of the place of the arbitration in the case of arbitrations like this, governed by a national law, are properly referred to as domestic international, and I'll take you to references in that regard.

Now, the applicant recognizes that there are limits on the grounds of review and appeal that are open to it and is prepared to meet the strictest tests that are applicable, both to the grounds of review and to the standard of review.

The applicant's submissions invoke this Court's traditional role in protecting -- in the supervision of arbitrators, and that is to protect the parties against excess of jurisdiction. The applicant will also ask this Court to play a role under the Commercial Arbitration Act in the interpretation of the NAFTA.

The interest that this case has already

generated indicates that the issues raised are fundamentally different and extend far beyond the issues typically arising in transnational, private commercial arbitration.

And I note that the role of the reviewing Court, or in the case of ICSID arbitrations, which are also available under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, the role of review in the supervision of NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals is expressly contemplated by Chapter 11. Chapter 11 in Article 1136 provides an automatic stay of enforcement of an arbitral award, which stay continues pending further appeal.

Now, the fact that the parties have provided for a review, recognized review either by a national court, as in the case of this arbitration, or by an ICSID annulment committee, is significant. Your Lordship is aware that it's open to parties to private arbitration to exclude judicial review. That was not done under the -- under Chapter 11.

The parties, in my submission, recognized the value of the -- error correcting value of review in the systematic development of universal rights such as those set out in the NAFTA.

This is of value to investors and States alike. And I would point out that even in the case -- or even recognizing that a NAFTA panel's decision is only binding on the parties, incorrect decisions will encourage -- if not reviewed, incorrect decisions will encourage wasted claims, claims that may be later rejected by tribunals but may be brought in sup -- by reliance upon tribunals which have erred or gone beyond the scope of their jurisdiction.

And you -- you were referred to -- in the intervention application by CUPE, to a claim made by UPS, which in the submissions that were made there that was based upon the Metalclad tribunal decision. And I think that both investors and the parties have an interest in this court's reviewing function.

The fact is that notwithstanding the technical provision of the NAFTA that provides that these tribunal's decisions are only binding upon the parties, they have a significant influential effect. And I'll be coming back to

1 that point.

Now, before I take you to the award itself, I'd like to illustrate some of the places and the things that we will be talking about, and I do that by starting with the extracts from the record.

And I'd like to start simply geographically by referring you to tab 4. These are maps that were filed by Metalclad before the tribunal.

Tab 4 shows a -- all of Mexico, and in the centre the State of San Luis Potosi in which the municipality of Guadalcazar is situated. It's in the north of Mexico, north of Mexico City.

The next map changes the scale and shows you the boundaries of the State. The dark black line shows the boundaries of the State. San Luis is 1 of 26 of the United Mexican States.

The pink portion shows the boundaries of the municipality of Guadalcazar. As you can see, it's a large boundary, and I'll be talking about the -- the place of municipalities in the constitution of -- of Mexico.

You'll see on that map as well coloured in yellow down on the left this -- the city of San Luis, and it is the seat of the State government.

If you -- you'll see as well, although it's harder to see, the town of Guadalcazar in the southern portion of the municipality. You will also see in the northern portion of the municipality a site designated La Pedrera. And La Pedrera is the site of the -- of the hazardous waste, the proposed hazardous waste landfill which is the subject of this proceeding.

Map number 3 shows that -- those locations in a bit larger scale, cutting off a portion of the boundaries of the municipality. And map 4 shows a larger scale, again showing at the bottom of map 4 the town, and at the top the site of La Pedrera. There's about 70 kilometres between the two.

Now, municipalities have a constitutional status in Mexico. The Mexican constitution requires States to organize themselves into municipalities. And the constitution, unlike in Canada, grants specific powers to municipalities.

In furtherance of their obligation to organize themselves into States -- or to organize themselves into municipalities, States, which are

the repository of all powers not expressly granted to the federation, enact municipal laws. So you will find municipal requirements in the State laws, just as you will find in British Columbia the Municipal Act in provincial legislation.

Now, this particular municipality is -- is poor and sparsely populated. The climate is hot. And the -- it consists primarily of arid desert. There is no industry or commercial activity. It does not produce hazardous waste itself. The inhabitants for the most part are subsistence farmers and ranchers.

The municipality is governed by something called a municipal council. The members of the council are elected for a three-year term, and they serve in a representative capacity. The municipal council meets either monthly or in extraordinary session and maintains written records. And I will be taking you during the course of my submissions to some of those written records.

This particular municipality due to its poverty has a very undeveloped infrastructure. The mayor shares a telephone with the public telephone system. The municipality has one station wagon, one police officer, and forty employees. It has few resources to enforce any of its legal sanctions. And given the lack of commercial activity in the municipality -- there is no large commercial activity in the municipality. You will not find in its records significant permit applications for construction of facilities as significant as this, other than in respect of this particular application. And I'll be taking you to those.

Now, in 1990 a Mexican company called COTERIN, then owned by Mexican nationals, and I emphasize not owned by Metalclad at this time, obtained a permit to operate a hazardous waste transfer station at La Pedrera. And I emphasize there's a difference between a transfer station and a landfill and ask you to keep that in mind.

COTERIN wanted to develop a hazardous waste landfill, did not have the necessary permits from any level of government, but in the meantime was given a licence to operate a transfer station.

COTERIN began to receive hazardous waste.

And instead of transferring that waste, it was dumped. It was dumped on the ground; 20,000 tonnes of it was dumped on the ground, inorganic and organic waste, 20,000 tonnes being the -- the same amount dumped at the infamous Love Canal site.

And the photos at tab 5, and again I emphasis -- emphasize this is before Metalclad is in -- is on the scene, show the waste dumped at the site of La Pedrera. There's three photos there showing the volume, showing the conditions, open bags, and again showing the -- the volume.

And I'd ask you to turn to -- to tab 61 of this book. This is a later report with respect to this waste. And these documents, I should add, My Lord, are in chronological order once we get to the documents, but it describes the -- on page -- the second page of that document, which has page 360 at the bottom, describes the conditions in 1990. And in the -- in the -- in the second paragraph under the heading "The Pedrera Transfer Station," it says:

"On October 31st, 1990, while an application to establish a hazardous waste disposal site is evaluated, the now-defunct secretariat of urban development and ecology authorized the company COTERIN to operate on the site a site for hazardous waste transfer. Between November of that year and May of 1991, the company stored approximately 55,000 drums, 20,000 tonnes and an unquantified amount of wastes, holding them in 3 temporary storage containers not authorized for that purpose."

The wastes are described. They are wastes coming from the mechanical, metal, automotive, chemical, pharmaceutical and agrochemical industries, among the most frequent are acidic acid, Poly-all (sic) sludge from smelting works; brine slag from paint; calcium sulfate sludge; polymers of something that I'm not familiar with, sediments from lagoons, magnesium silicate filtering cloth with rough seams and dirty solvents, among others.

The operation of the transfer station was 2 inadequate as the wastes stored there were not 3 even covered to protect them from the elements. 4 The discontent and distrust of all that caused 5 among the population of Guadalcazar led to the 6 closing of the facilities by SEDUE on September 7 25. 1991. 8 Early in 1992 the wastes were covered with --9 with dirt which did not guarantee the safety of 10 the site. So that subsequently the State 11 delegation of PROFEPA, a federal agency, ordered the installation of a plastic cover and clay, 12 which were put in place on August 9, 1994. 13 14 Now, I add there Metalclad has come into the picture by that time. They purchased the site in 15 16 1993, and I'll be taking you to the details with 17 respect to that purchase and their acquisition 18 of -- of this contaminated site. 19 THE COURT: You mean they purchased COTERIN in 1993? 20 MR. FOY: They purchased COTERIN in 1993. And I'll 21 take you to the purchase documents during the 22 course of my submissions. 23 Now, this contamination, not surprisingly, 24 generated intense public disapproval at the 25 municipal and local level. The municipality's 26 consist -- consistent position from -- from 1991 27 onwards was that they wanted this contamination 28 remediated. And I'm going to take you to the sum 29 of the steps that they took in the courts and 30 otherwise to attempt to force remediation. 31 The municipality wanted remediation before 32 the introduction of any new hazardous waste. 33 Non-governmental organizations, including 34 Greenpeace and local environmental organizations, 35 supported the municipality and opposed the 36 introduction of new hazardous waste. 37 Competing science was generated as to the 38 suitability of the site, the risks posed by the 39 existing contamination and the risks posed by 40 proposed operations. 41 And of course the -- there are different 42 risks associated with those different factors. 43 Operations depend upon the operator. Even though 44 the site may be suitable, safe operations in 45 respect of the disposal of hazardous waste depend 46 upon the operator.

Now, different views, different scientific

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views, were expressed as to the proper mode of remediation, but it was common ground that remediation was needed.

Even Metalclad, who purchased COTERIN, described itself -- and I'll take you to this later -- described the contamination as giving rise to serious and grave dangers. As I've noted at tab 61, the contamination led to a closure order in 1991. And those federal closure orders remained in force until February of 1996.

At that time federal authorities were satisfied that the closure order could be lifted. The municipality was not satisfied, and continued to insist upon remediation before the introduction of new hazardous waste. This led to court proceedings that I will be referring you to.

Now, the pre-existing contamination and the local opposition that it generated were known to Metalclad before it acquired COTERIN in 1993. One board member voted against the acquisition on the basis of the contamination. And I -- as I mentioned, I will be taking you to the acquisition documents which again disclose the need for municipal approval before operations could take place.

During the course of the negotiations, and again arising as a result of the pre-existing contamination, Metalclad was offered other sites in the State for a -- for a proposed hazardous waste landfill and was offered assistance to identify other sites. Metalclad insisted upon seeking to open this site.

There was, as I mentioned, a number of competing science. At the outset of its acquisition, Metalclad agreed that the initial studies of the site were inadequate. Subsequent studies were done. Technical suitability was something that experts acts -- acting reasonably could disagree, and there was disagreement.

But at the municipal level, opposition to the introduction of new waste continued, although -- and I -- I note, and this is important -- the municipality was prepared to allow operation of the site with the introduction of non-hazardous industrial waste. So the municipality wanted remediation, was prepared to allow Metalclad to operate as a non-hazardous waste landfill and then

consider what might -- what might happen after that

Now, I -- I will later take you to the documents describing how construction of the landfill occurred, and I'll come back to that. But I'd like to go back to the selected extracts and to show you photos of what Mr. Cowper described as the state-of-the-art landfill that was in fact constructed. You'll find those at tab 6. These were photographs filed by Metalclad.

They show an entrance, a -- a view, a change house, a drum storage area, and truck unloading dock, a truck scale, another view, and then over the page, a view north over completed cells 1 to 3

The hazardous waste that I showed you the photos of before and described how it was in 1994 placed -- capped over, is underneath those cells.

And I'm going to be taking you later to -- to audits of the conditions underneath there.

Those -- that cap, which shows that the mixing of the organic and inorganic waste, none of which was remediated before it was placed there, it was simply mixed all together and capped, the audit shows that there is a -- a -- gasses venting from -- from those cells and that there's a hundred percent chance of -- of explosion if those gasses are ignited.

Then you'll see what the -- the technology involved in this -- this waste landfill is -- a membrane is placed in a big hole. And you'll see that view north from cell 3 of cell 4, it -- it shows the hole. The membrane's placed in it, the waste is placed in there, and then it's covered over.

Now, the -- the remaining pictures show a test pit for geological studies and a rainwater runoff collection ditch around the site.

Now, having located you geographically and shown you some photos of the landfill, I'd like to take you to the award.

What I'm going to do in this section of my presentation is to identify those portions of the award that we will later be arguing are deficient. I'm not going to make those arguments in full as I take you through, but I am going to identify those aspects of the award that we take

1 issue with.

And it -- I start simply with the introduction, paragraph 1, and I'll paraphrase. Paragraph 1 notes that the -- Metalclad alleged interference with the development and operation of a hazardous waste landfill.

I will be showing you later in the portions of the award that in effect this tribunal found that NAFTA imposes an obligation to ensure successful implementation of investments. And I'm going to suggest that that -- that's incorrect.

Part 2 of the award describes the parties. And at this stage I would just emphasize that what we're dealing with is COTERIN, the owner of record of the landfill, as well as permits and licences which are the basis of the dispute.

I'm going to ask you to note that there are a number of other enterprises in Mexico that you will be hearing about, enterprises of Metalclad in Mexico that you will be hearing about, but that -- and you'll hear about them because of the manner in which Metalclad presented its claim for damages in this case. But we are dealing with COTERIN.

Now, Part 3 of the award describes the other entities, and I have dealt with that in my introduction.

Part 4 describes the procedural history. And I note a point that Your Lordship is already familiar with, that in paragraph 11 it's noted that the tribunal determined that the place of arbitration would be Vancouver, British Columbia. The tribunal notes that the parties accepted that determination.

At paragraph 21 the tribunal refers to a pre-hearing conference that took place in July of 1999.

And I would just pause there to familiarize Your Lordship with the proceedings under the arbitral rules governing this arbitration.

Those -- we'll be taking you to them later, but those were the ICSID arbitration additional facility rules. They provide for the extensive exchange of written materials in advance of oral hearings. Those written materials include argument, the memorial, together with witness statements, documents, and -- and expert reports exchanged by the parties in advance of any oral

1 hearing.

And Your Lordship has -- as I have noted at the outset of tab 1 of the index to the record, the parties exchanged a memorial, counter-memorial, reply, admissions and denials rejoinder, post-hearing submissions by both sides. And both Canada and the United States also filed written submissions. And I've given you the location of those, and I'll be showing you portions of them. But I -- I can -- you -- Your Lordship can see voluminous documentary record was -- was exchanged in advance of the oral hearing.

And prior to that oral hearing, the tribunal, having regard to this exchange of documentary material, gave some directions to the parties with respect to what should go on at the oral hearing. And I include at tab 3 of the red brief a letter written by the secretary for the tribunal to the parties.

And I would just emphasize one point: After -- the parties were given the opportunity to call for cross-examination any of the witnesses of the other party who have -- who had filed witness statements. And not surprisingly, the tribunal gave some direction saying that:

"The function of cross-examination..."

And this is at paragraph 5 on page 2:

"...is only to enable one party to raise doubts about the general veracity of a witness relied upon by the other party or to achieve the contradiction of a specific statement of fact asserted by a witness in a manner more conclusive if necessary than the denial of that fact achieved by the filing of relevant documentary material."

Under this mixture of continental and common law systems, the oral hearing is -- has a limited role, and that was emphasized by the -- by the tribunal.

But I will be noting, when I refer you to the -- some of the record, I will be referring primarily to documents created by Metalclad

itself. In rare cases I will be referring to witness statements, and in those cases filed by Mexico. In the cases in which I refer to witness statements filed by Mexico, it will be of witnesses who were not called for cross-examination by Metalclad.

Paragraph 23 of the award lists some of the statements that were submitted and exchanged between the parties.

Paragraph 24 notes Canada's intervention. And I paraphrase that Canada intervened to submit that Article 1110 of the NAFTA, the expropriation section, is not a codification of U.S. law on expropriation. The U.S., the United States, also intervened, again with respect to Article 1110, taking the position that Article 1110 reflects customary international law of expropriation.

Now, the next portion of the award is called -- is Part 5, and it's called "Facts and Allegations." And I contrast it to Part 7 of -- the title of it to Part 7 of the award which is called "The Tribunal's Decision." And the reason I contrast it is that, except as a recitation of allegations, Metalclad's allegations, this section is difficult to follow, that is Part 5.

For the most part the tribunal refers to, quote, assertions; quote, Metalclad maintains; or, quote, Metalclad alleges. And those references are found in paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 46, 49, 52, 53, 60 and 61.

In very few instances it's also noted that Mexico denies the allegations. And for the most part, no findings are made or appear to be made at all in this section. It's -- it's most coherent if it's described as allegations.

Having said that, you will find sentences from time to time in the -- in the course of this section, Part 5, and I'll take you to paragraph 46, for example, which says -- it talks about an event that occurred on March the 10 and notes in the -- in the third line:

"Metalclad asserts that this demonstration was organized at least in part by Mexican State and local governments, and that State troopers assisted in blocking traffic into and out to of...into and out of the site."

2 No finding is ever made with respect to that, 3 but -- that assertion, but then the next sentence 4 5 6 "Metalclad was thenceforth effectively 7 prevented from opening the landfill." 8 Well, My Lord, if that was intended to be a 9 finding, it is, as you will already be aware, 10 inconsistent with the evidence. This site was 11 12 subject to a federal closure order throughout this 13 time, until February of 1996. And so as a 14 finding, I would be arguing that that finding, 15 if -- if it were a finding, would be perverse. 16 There are other examples throughout this 17 section of Part 5 where, although for the most 18 part everything is said -- said to be assertions, where findings were not made, but -- but -- of 19 20 a -- of an example of another difficulty with this 21 section, and that is omissions. 22 And I'll take you to paragraph 54. This says that Metalclad was -- this refers to a -- a 23 24 meeting that took place in December of 1995 when a 25 municipal permit application was considered and 26 denied by the municipality. 27 Paragraph 54 notes: 28 29 "Metalclad was not notified of the town 30 council meeting where the permit 31 application was discussed and rejected..." 32 33 I'll leave that for the moment. 34 35 "...nor was Metalclad given any opportunity to participate in that 36 37 process." 38 39 And I'll -- I'll be talking about this 40 meeting and come back to that. 41 42 "Metalclad's request for reconsideration 43 of the denial of the permit was rejected." 44 45 That part is accurate.

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What is omitted, what you won't find

immediately after paragraph 54, is that Metalclad

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then went to the Mexican domestic courts to challenge the denial of the reconsideration. Metalclad initiated those domestic court proceedings, took them to one level. They were initially unsuccessful because they had failed to exhaust appropriate remedies, and then -- and they initiated an appeal from that. They later abandoned those domestic court proceedings in favour of negotiations with the municipality.

Now, as I mentioned earlier, those negotiations led to the point where the municipality was prepared to allow operation of a non-hazardous waste landfill, and Metalclad continued to insist upon operation as a hazardous waste landfill and led to this arbitration as opposed to continuing with the -- with negotiations.

But it is an important omission that the tribunal never refers, neither here nor anywhere else in this award, to those domestic proceedings. And I'll come back to the -- to the significance of that.

At this stage I would just ask you to treat Part 5 as a series of allegations and contrast it to the findings which are found in Part 7.

Now, there's one exception to that, and that's paragraph 64 through 69 of this part deal with what's called the ecological decree. And I will be later dealing in more detail with this ecological decree. But in brief this was a decree issued by the State after this NAFTA arbitration was initiated. And in paragraph 64 through 69 the tribunal deals with whether or not it's appropriate for it to consider at all those facts that occurred after the claim was initiated, after Metalclad had already alleged that its investment had been expropriated and unlawfully interfered with

And at paragraph 69 the tribunal concludes on the jurisdictional basis that it can -- it -- that the decree is within its jurisdiction, the last line, but as will be seen, does not attach to it controlling importance. So there is, I guess, an obiter finding that the decree is within its jurisdiction, but I'll come back later to the treatment of it in terms of its controlling importance.

The next part of the award is Part 6, page 23. This is a very important part of the award for this application and generally. In this section the tribunal sets out the applicable law.

Now, this is a crucial part of any arbitration award. It is appropriate for an arbitral tribunal to identify the applicable law, and that is to say the law governing the substantive dispute between the parties. The law separate from the law governing the arbitration, I'll be taking you to the arbitral authorities with respect to that. But here they're setting out the law governing the substantive dispute between parties.

Why is it crucial to set it out? The reason is is that arbitrators only have jurisdiction to decide disputes according to the rules laid down in the legal system which the -- of the parties' choice. They may not go outside those rules. If they do go outside those rules, they act in excess of their jurisdiction. And a tribunal which applies the wrong applicable law exceeds its jurisdiction.

Now, the authorities, and we'll be taking you to these, the authorities distinguish this from misapplication of the correct governing law. So it's appropriate for the tribunal to set out -- an arbitral tribunal to set out the applicable law. And this tribunal does so in two paragraphs, paragraphs 70 and 71.

They start out in the first sentence of paragraph 70 to refer to the -- that -- to re -- to state that a tribunal established pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 11, Section B must decide the issues in dispute in accordance with NAFTA and applicable rules of international law.

They cite Article 1131, and that's a correct cite. They also refer to Article 102, providing that the agreement must be interpreted and applied in light of its stated objectives and in accordance with applicable rules of international law. And we take no position on this application with respect to those two statements.

In the third sentence the tribunal refers to the objectives set out at the outset of NAFTA, noting that they specifically incru -- include transparency and the substantial increase in

investment opportunities in the territories of the parties. We'll come back to that.

They then note -- make a reference to the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties and note about -- and note the general rules set out there. And again no issue arises on this application with respect to the statements made in the remainder of that paragraph.

Paragraph 71, they then refer to one of the sentences in the preamble to the NAFTA, and we'll be taking you to these. They refer to that portion of the preamble that indicates the parties agreed to ensure a predictable commercial framework for business planning and investment.

They then referred to this, they say NAFTA further requires, and they quote:

"Each party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings of general application respecting any matter covered by this agreement are promptly published or otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable interested persons and parties to become acquainted with them."

A reference to Chapter 18 and Article 1802 of the NAFTA.

They explicitly referred to an obligation not found in Chapter 11, but found elsewhere. This point will be elaborated upon in more detail, but I want to emphasize it at this stage.

At this stage, whether you consider any of the other facts to which my friend objects you looking at in respect of this arbitration, at this stage it is evident this tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. And I'm going to show you how this excess of jurisdiction infects the rest of its findings. But the tribunal has in this paragraph misdirected itself as to the applicable law.

Investors under Chapter 11 are not entitled to bring investor-State disputes with respect to any obligations other than those contained in Section A of Chapter 11. Only the parties under Chapter 20 of the NAFTA can in part -- in State-to-State arbitration allege violations of Chapter 18.

You will see, as I take you through the rest of the reasons, that the tribunal's notion of transparency becomes the crux of its reasoning. And you will see that it bases its finding of a violation of Chapter 11 on its notion of what it thinks transparency is.

And I'll just -- just before we break for the -- for the -- for the luncheon break, I'll take you to paragraph 100 of the outline of argument, if I may, just to -- which is set out at page 26. This is a reference to a decision of the -- of an ICSID ad hoc annulment committee.

And we'll in the course of the submissions be explaining that process and these -- these tribunals. But in paragraph 100 it is noted that in dealing with a review of a -- of an arbitration under the ICSID rules:

"...the parties' agreement on applicable law forms part of their arbitration agreement. Thus, a tribunal's disregard for the agreed rules of law would constitute a derogation for the terms of reference within which the tribunal has been authorized to function. Examples of such a derogation include the application of rules of law other than the ones agreed by the parties, or a decision not based on any law unless the parties had agreed on a decision aqueo de bono. If the derogation is manifest, it entails a manifest excess of power."

They note there the distinction I mentioned earlier:

"Disregard of the applicable rules of law must be distinguished from erroneous application of those rules which, even if manifestly unwarranted, furnishes no ground for annulment..."

In our submission this tribunal in paragraph 71 has demonstrated its disregard of the agreed rules of law by seeking to apply rules, those set out in Chapter 18, other than those agreed to by the parties, those set out in Section A of Chapter

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       11, and that this disregard is manifest on the
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      face of it and of the award entails a manifest
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      excess of power, which is a ground for review
4
      under both statutes and furnishes grounds for
5
      setting aside the award without more.
6
          Now, I see it's the -- 12:30. It would be a
7
      convenient time in my submission to break.
8 THE COURT: Yes. We'll take the luncheon recess and
9
      reconvene at 2 o'clock.
10
   THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
11
       adjourned until 2 p.m.
12
       (NOON RECESS)
13
14
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 12:28 P.M.)
       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 2:00 P.M.)
15
16
17
    THE COURT: Continue, Mr. Foy.
18 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.
          I ended this morning in pointing out the
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       jurisdictional error made by the tribunal in going
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       outside Chapter 11 to the transparency obligations
22
       of Chapter 18. And in doing so, Mexico does not
       want to be taken to be conceding that there was a
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24
       breach of NAFTA Chapter 18 and that the tribunal
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       just got the wrong section; to the contrary,
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       Mexico will show that Metalclad was advised of the
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       need for the municipal permit, was aware of the
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       extent of the jurisdiction asserted by the
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       municipality, and most importantly was aware of
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       the domestic remedies available to resolve any
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       issue in that regard. And in fact, as I mentioned
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       before the break, exercised those remedies, later
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       abandoning them in favour of negotiations with the
34
       municipality.
35 THE COURT: Let me just stop you there, Mr. Foy.
36
          Although you say that you don't just stop at
37
       saying that they got the wrong section and -- and
38
       you went on with the other things that you said,
39
       if I were to agree with your -- your submission
       that the arbitration panel had exceeded its
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       jurisdiction by going into the transparency
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       issues, what -- what do you say I -- I am then to
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       do? Because it would seem to me that, if that
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       were the case, I'd simply say the arbitration
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       panel exceeded its jurisdiction and it goes back
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       to the arbitrators, and it would not be for me to
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       then decide whether -- for instance, whether there
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was compliance with the transparency provisions.
   MR. FOY: My Lord, I agree that the appropriate order
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       for this Court to make, if you agree with our
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4
       jurisdictional point, would be to set aside the
       award. I agree with that.
5
6 THE COURT: Um-hum.
   MR. FOY: Whether or not Your Lordship -- it would be
7
       unnecessary if you accept that first point to go
9
       on to opine as to whether or not Mexico is in
10
       violation of any of the transparency provisions of
11
       Chapter 18, just as it was inappropriate for the
12
       tribunal to consider that.
13
          But I want to point out that we make that
14
       legal submission, but we're not simply saying that
15
       there was any lack of trans -- we're not conceding
16
       that there was any lack of transparency. I want
17
       to emphasize that. And I will be taking you
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       through the -- Metalclad's own documents to
       demonstrate the awareness of the need for the
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20
       permit, the assertion of -- the extent of the
21
       assertion of the authority and the domestic legal
22
       means to resolve that.
23 THE COURT: Um-hum. Are you going to be submitting
24
       that -- that -- if I find that you are in error on
25
       your first submission, in other words, that
26
       transpare -- transparency is something that the
27
       arbitration panel properly looked at, are you then
       saying that -- that, based on the facts, that
28
29
       the -- the tribunal made an error of law which I
30
       could review if it's under the Commercial
31
       Arbitration Act. but -- but it would not be
32
       something I could review under the International
33
       Commercial Arbitration Act?
34 MR. FOY: No, My Lord.
35
          I will be going on to submit in the
36
       alternative that if the tribunal was entitled to
37
       look at Chapter 18, that it exceeded its
38
       jurisdiction in legislating transparency
39
       requirements that are not found in the NAFTA.
40
           And so I will be arguing that that second
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       alternative error also results in a loss of
42
       jurisdiction which would justify this Court
       setting aside the award under either statute.
43
44 THE COURT: Okay. I understand.
45 MR. FOY: I was taking you through the award, and I
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       had concluded with paragraph 71. And I'd like to
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       continue with that exercise, again emphasizing
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that what I'm doing is highlighting points that you will hear more about in due course.

In paragraph -- starting -- and this is the -- part of the decision entitled "The Tribunal's Decision, Part 7." In paragraph 72, it's noted that Metalclad contends that Mexico through its local governments interfered with and precluded its operation of the landfill and alleges violation of Articles 1105 and 1110.

In paragraph 73 the tribunal examines responsibility of the -- of Mexico for the conduct of State and local governments. And although the tribunal does not record Mexico's position fully in that paragraph -- and Mexico's more complete position is set out in its closing submissions -- Mexico is not bringing this application on -- or basing this application on their treatment of that issue

They then turn to Article 1105, the requirement for treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment. And in paragraph 74 they announced their conclusion, that Metalclad's investment was not accorded fair and equitable treatment.

In paragraph 75 they referred to Article 102, and they state -- of the NAFTA, stating that an underlying objective of NAFTA is to promote and increase cross-border investment opportunities, and then uses this language:

"...and ensure the successful implementation of investment initiatives."

You'll recall earlier this morning I emphasized that point and noted that that language appears nowhere in Article 102.

If you would turn to Article 102 in your NAFTA for a moment, you will see in Part 1, the general part, Article 102 lists a number of objectives. And one of the objectives that the tribunal may have been thinking of but misdirected themselves on is -- is 102(1)(c). The objectives include to increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the parties.

The tribunal has taken the obligation to increase opportunities and turned it into an obligation to ensure the successful implementation

of investment initiatives, again stepping outside the NAFTA text, the significance of which I'll elaborate on further.

In paragraph 75 the tribunal returns to the notion of transparency, again demonstrating that -- in jurisdictional terms, that they're considering whether or not there has been a failure in terms of the transparency obligations of the NAFTA.

And then -- then the tribunal sets out its understanding in paragraph 76. And it says:

"The tribunal understands this to include the idea that all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and successfully operating investments made or intended to be made under the agreement should be capable of being readily known to all effective investors of another party. There should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such matters. Once the authorities of the central government of any party whose international responsibility in such matters has been identified in the preceding section become aware of any scope for misunderstanding or confusion in this connection, it is their duty to ensure that the correct position is promptly determined and clearly stated so that investors can proceed with all appropriate expedition in the confident belief that they are acting in accordance with all relevant laws."

The tribunal cites no authority for this understanding of transparency. The tribunal cites no -- none of the text of Chapter 18 or the other portions of the NAFTA that speak to transparency, which we will be taking you through, to support this notion of this understanding or this duty.

And the tribunal essentially holds that federal governments have a duty under international law to actively resolve any ambiguities in federal, provincial or municipal law or ambiguities in the constitutional breach of those laws for the benefit of foreign investors.

Now, nothing is said about what occurs in a

federation when a municipality or other level of government takes a different view of what is the, quote, correct position, to use their language. Nothing is said about resort to the courts to resolve differences between levels of government as to what is the correct position. Nothing is said about the introduction of new laws, it's --particularly in the environmental area in which it is not uncommon for there to be constitutional litigation with respect to the reach of those laws.

Your Lor -- Your Lordship is intimately familiar with constitutional litigation respecting the reach of provincial environmental laws in other matters before this Court. And nothing is said there about the existence in Mexico of means to resolve constitutional uncertainties or other questions as to the scope of -- or reach of different levels of government's laws.

That understanding, it will be submitted, set out in paragraph 76 is, as I mentioned just a -- a minute ago, also an act of excess of jurisdiction in legislating a -- even if the tribunal was correct to be examining transparency, even if that was within their jurisdiction, that this amounts to the -- the legislation of a duty that has not otherwise been agreed to by the parties to the NAFTA

Now, in paragraph 77, the next paragraph, the tribunal notes that Metalclad acquired COTERIN for the sole purpose of developing and operating a hazardous waste landfill.

And I mentioned -- I -- I emphasized that in the result the tribunal has transformed a business purpose, an intention, into a property right. Nothing is said there by the tribunal about the municipality's preparedness to allow operation of this site as a non-hazardous waste landfill. It's -- it's -- it will be seen from the review of the remainder of the award that somehow this purpose of Metalclad's becomes a right.

Paragraph 78 refers to what the tribunal calls federal construction and operating permits and a State operating permit. I will be taking you to those documents. And I will be demonstrating that they have been misdescribed

there, and demonstrate on the documents themselves and what was said about the documents that they do not authorize construction.

In paragraph 79 the tribunal states what it says to be a central point. A central point in this case has been whether, in addition to the above-mentioned permits, a municipal permit for the construction of hazardous waste was required. And I note that that is a -- an issue of Mexican domestic law. And I want to -- and -- and you will see in the remainder of the award extensive -- or some discussion by the tribunal of issues of Mexican domestic law.

And I want to take you to tab 7 of the red brief, because this touches upon another jurisdictional error made by the tribunal. And I want to take you to some passages from the transcript and from submissions. And the first one at tab 7 is from Volume 1 of the transcript at page 30, and this is counsel for Metalclad in opening. So this is counsel for the claimant. And the counsel for the claimant concedes:

"This tribunal is not called upon to pass upon the legality of Mexican law."

It goes on to say:

"It's appropriate to examine its contents to see what the claimant reasonably relied upon."

That's at lines 4 through 7.

The next page is an extract from the transcript, and this is counsel for Metalclad again in closing. And at the bottom of that page, this is Volume 5 -- at the bottom of that page counsel for Metalclad is saying:

"By way of recharacterizing claimant's case, respondent has devoted several paragraphs to the proposition that the tribunal does not stand as an appellate court in relation to Mexican law and the judgments of Mexican courts."

And at line 4:

"And as to this proposition claimant can only concur of course that the tribunal is not a Mexican appellate court."

And then further down in that -- on that page, that line 12:

"Nowhere has the claimant proposed a rule of international law that an incorrect application of domestic law by a domestic court ipso facto establishes a denial of justice."

That is a denial of fair and equitable treatment.

So, My Lord, there you have the claimant's counsel, both in opening and in closing, agreeing that the tribunal is not a Mexican appellate court charged with the responsibility of the interpretation of Mexican domestic law, and agreeing that violation of Mexican domestic law does not itself establish a violation of international law.

Now, the claimant and -- and the respondent below agreed on this point. And counsel for Mexico, Mr. Perezcano's note is -- is made on the next page, Volume 5, page 19, at line 2. This is -- this is counsel for Mexico talking here, and he -- he -- he says:

"It is not up to this tribunal to decide on issues of Mexican law."

And then after that page I have included portions of the written submissions filed at -- filed by Mexico in its closing submissions under the heading:

"This tribunal need not and should not consider questions of Mexican domestic law where those points are simply elaborated on in more detail."

And I point this out to make the submission that it -- on my reading of -- of that, that both the claimant and the respondent below, both

1 Metalclad and Mexico were of the view that it was 2 not the function of this tribunal to act as a Mexican appellate court deciding upon issues of 3 4 Mexican domestic law. 5 Then I take you back to paragraph 79 where 6 the tribunal has stated the issue -- an issue of 7 Mexican domestic law, whether a municipal permit 8 was required for this -- for this landfill. 9 In paragraph 80 the tribunal notes that 10 federal officials had assured that -- Metalclad 11 that it didn't need a municipal permit. Now, I'm 12 just going to pause on that and say that there is evidence that one federal official may have said 13 that, there is -- not in writing. There is 14 15 contrary evidence in writing, contemporaneous 16 evidence of the ter -- and the terms of the permits themselves, there is legal advice as 17 18 well. And there's evidence in the very document 19 purchasing this investment by Metalclad that 20 demonstrates that Metalclad was aware of the 21 municipal permit issue and the means to resolve 22 23 Now, in paragraph 81 --24 THE COURT: Although just in paragraph 80, the --25 the -- this to me appears to be a finding of fact 26 as opposed to the earlier statements of the 27 tribunal when they were saying Metalclad asserts, 28 Metalclad alleges. There's no such qualification 29 in paragraph 80. 30 MR. FOY: That's correct, My Lord. 31 And what I'm going to be taking you to is the 32 contemporaneous documents which demonstrate that 33 there was a significant body of evidence that that 34 was not the case. 35 THE COURT: Well, are you able to demonstrate that 36 there was no evidence that that was the case? 37 MR. FOY: I'm -- the only -- I'm going to attempt to 38 con -- to convince you that that amounts to 39 patently unreasonable error. And I -- as I said 40 at the outset, there is evidence in which it -- it 41 is noted that one federal official may have said 42 this. And you're going to hear a lot about that 43 particular federal official and his association 44 with Metalclad. And you are going to hear submissions as to the unreasonableness of any 45 46 reliance upon such an assertion in the face of the

other contemporaneous documentary evidence. And

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1 it will be submitted that this, if it was a 2 finding of fact, was patently unreasonable. 3 THE COURT: All right. 4 MR. FOY: Now, in paragraph 81 the tribunal starts to 5 address Mexican domestic law, noting that experts evidence was filed on Mexican law, noting that the 6 7 experts took a different view. No reference to the qualifications of the -- of the experts. 8 9 THE COURT: If it was agreed that the tribunal was not 10 to decide questions of Mexican domestic law, why 11 were the expert reports filed, the expert opinions 12 filed? MR. FOY: There's a difference between examining 13 juridical facts as to the existence of laws in 14 15 which for an international tribunal it may be 16 appropriate to look to evidence to determine those 17 facts, and interpreting the -- the issues of -- of 18 domestic law. 19 And you're right in this sense: that it would 20 have been open to -- and in fact the -- I go back to the -- to the brief. Mexico objected to the 21 22 relevance of this evidence and said the tribunal 23 had no jurisdiction to -- to deal with it, but 24 reserved the position that if you're going to look 25 at it, here is the evidence that you should look 26 27 And you'll find those in paragraph 538 of that submission. Mexico -- it's at tab 7 again. 28 Mexico took the position in paragraph 538 that: 29 30 31 "The claimant is seeking to have this 32 tribunal sit as a court of review of Mexican municipal law to resolve issues 33 34 that do not involve international law. 35 The NAFTA does not grant the tribunal the 36 jurisdiction to make such review." 37 38 Without prejudice to this point, Mexico 39 explains its corrections on the claimant's 40 misstatements of Mexican domestic law. Further 41 below, Mexico registered its jurisdictional 42 objection and then went on to say: 43 44 "We think you have the Mexican domestic 45 law wrong." 46

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Now, I'm back at paragraphs 82 of the award

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where the tribunal starts to set out some of the Mexican laws in issue. It sets out the -- the federal general ecology law.

I note that this was a new law in 199 -- 1988, and I note a point I've made earlier that it's not uncommon for there to be litigation with respect to the reach of -- of new laws. And then in reference -- in paragraph 83 there's reference to one article of that law. In 84, reference to another portion of that law.

In 85, a -- a note that Metalclad was led to believe and did believe that the federal and State permits allowed for the construction and operation of the landfill. Again, I'm going to be submitting that that, if it's a finding, is -- is patently unreasonable. But I'm going to also be going on to note that, more importantly, Metalclad was aware of the issue as to whether a permit was required and was aware of the means to resolve that issue; that is, by recourse to the Mexican domestic courts and had contracted for that in its -- in the document by which it acquired this investment.

Now, in paragraph 86 the tribunal interprets Mexican domestic law and interprets it to conclude that the municipal permit denial in this case was improper by having been done in excess of the municipality's jurisdiction in the tribunal's view. And I just note that that is a ruling on Mexican domestic law; it is not a ruling on international law.

In that paragraph it is unclear whether the tribunal -- given what they've said earlier about there being no jurisdiction in the municipality, it's unclear whether the tribunal is accepting that the municipality had some but a limited jurisdiction. And the tribunal never goes on to consider whether in the exercise of that limited jurisdiction it was justified in denying this municipal permit application on the bases set -other bases set out in the permit denial. And I'll just note that I will be taking you to the permit denial and -- and demonst -- and showing you a number of reasons the municipality gave for refusing the permit, one of which was the construction in advance of applying for the permit.

Now, in paragraph 87 this is touched upon. It's -- the tribunal says:

"Relying on representations of the federal government, Metalclad started constructing the landfill and did this openly and continuously with the full knowledge of federal, State and municipal governments until the municipality's stop work order of October 26th, 1994."

I will be taking you to the evidence of Metalclad's that shows that the -- Metalclad was representing that that -- at that -- the construction at that time was for remedial purposes or for the purposes of the audit of the site. And I will be taking you to the evidence that they were specifically advised to obtain a municipal permit in advance of that construction.

Here in fact the municip -- the tribunal is making a virtue out of the construction in advance of obtaining the permit. And I will be submitting that it demonstrates illegality and a justifiable reason for the municipality, even aside from its environmental jurisdiction, to decline the permit application.

In paragraph 88 the tribunal returns to its transparency theme, and in the second sentence says:

"The absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal construction permit..."

So simply the -- the question as to whether it was required or not:

"...as well as the absence of any established practice or procedure as to the manner of handling applications for a municipal permit construction, amounts to a failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by NAFTA."

And I'm going to be, as I did earlier, suggesting that that is the legislation of a transparency obligation not found in the NAFTA,

completely unworkable in a federation. And on the facts of this case in which the permit application itself sets out the laws upon which it is based, on which the applicant after denial went to the courts of Mexico to challenge the denial, to -- the failure of the tribunal to consider that method of resolution of this question of the clarity of the rule again amounts to a fatal omission.

In paragraphs 89 through 93 the tribunal again in a number of different aspects repeats its finding that -- or repeats its view that it was improper of the municipality to deny the permit, improper at Mexican domestic law.

In the course of that, again one of these very significant omissions in paragraph 91, it's noted that:

"The permit was denied at a meeting of the municipal town council of which Metal...Metalclad received no notice, to which it received no invitation, at which it was given no opportunity to appear."

Without any reference to the availability of judicial review from that municipal permit denial, which judicial review was initiated in the courts and which was later abandoned by Metalclad in favour of negotiations with the municipality.

In paragraph 94 the tribunal notes that the municipality challenged what is -- what is called the Convenio. The Convenio was an agreement reached between the federal authorities and Metalclad in November of 1995, and I'll be taking you to it.

The tribunal infers from the municipality's attack upon this agreement that the municipality lacked confidence in its right to deny position --permission for the landfill solely on the basis of the absence of a municipal construction permit.

In my submission, the tribunal there again has failed to understand that the municipality was seeking to enforce what it considered was a -- a federal prohibition on the introduction of any new hazardous wastes prior to remediation, and that the municipality went to court to test its view of whether or not there was a requirement at federal

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law to remediate prior to the introduction of any
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       new hazardous waste. And that was a separate
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       issue, the need for remediation, a completely
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       separate issue from the question of the
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       introduction of new hazardous waste -- hazardous
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       waste after remediation was occurring.
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          And I'm going to be suggesting that to find a
       municipality, and Mexico, liable for recourse to
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       the courts is -- under the rubric of some denial
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       of fair and equitable treatment, again is a
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       patently unreasonable finding. And I'll show you
       later when -- where the tribunal faults the
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       municipality for seeking this relief and obtaining
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       an injunction in the meantime.
          Paragraph 95 refers to that injunction. And
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       the landfill -- and it's noted the --
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17 THE COURT: In the --
18 MR. FOY: -- landfill --
    THE COURT: -- materials that I've read I haven't seen
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       why that injunction was dissolved in 1999.
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    MR. FOY: My understanding, and I'll be going into
       this in more detail -- my understanding was that
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       the municipality's action was dismissed and
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       therefore the injunction dissolved for procedural
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       reasons on the basis that the municipality had
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       brought the inappropriate -- sought -- sought a
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       remedy under an inappropriate proceeding. The
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       municipality had filed an Amparo action, which was
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       referred to.
30 THE COURT: Um-hum.
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    MR. FOY: And my understanding of Mexican law is that
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       an Amparo action is only available to a member of
       the public against a governmental authority.
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           And as between governmental authorities the
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       challenge that should have been brought was what's
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       called a constitutional -- a controversy or
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       constitutional challenge. My understanding is
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       that that -- the municipality's action was
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       dismissed on procedural grounds, and that the
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       Amparo action having been dismissed, the
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       injunction was -- was -- was lifted. And I -- and
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       I note that there's no reference by the tribunal
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       to the fact that it was lifted; all they refer to
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       is the issuance of the injunction and not the
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       lifting of the injunction.
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           And I would suggest that if it's a violation
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       of the NAFTA for a municipality to go to courts to
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seek to assert its view of its position and in the course of that seek an injunction, that that is a patently unreasonable result.

In paragraph 96 the tribunal refers again to the ecological decree, and I'll come back to that

Paragraph 97, the tribunal repeats its finding that it's -- in its view of Mexican domestic law the municipality's insistence upon and denial of the construction permit in this instance was improper. And there you find for the first time any reference to local remedies. There's a footnote there, and it's noted that:

"The question of turning to NAFTA before exhausting local remedies was examined by the parties."

Mexico does not assi -- insist that local remedies might -- must be exhausted. Mexico's position is correct in light of Article 1121. I will be taking you to this in more detail. That is not Mexico's -- was not Mexico's position, and that is not an accurate recitation of Article 1121.

In paragraph 98 the tribunal refers to Article 1114 of the NAFTA which permits a party to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns, and notes that the conclusion of the Convenio and the issuance of the federal permits show clearly that Mexico is satisfied that this project was consistent with and sensitive to its environmental concerns.

And again, I note the omission of any reference to, anyone other than the federal authorities, environmental concerns. The municipality was not satisfied that the project was sensitive and consistent with its concerns.

Paragraph 99, there's a reference again to the failure to ensure a transparent and predictable framework. Again, all of this section really is -- running through it is the finding of Mexican domestic law as to improp -- impropriety and the failure of transparency.

In paragraph 99 the tribunal concludes that the totality of these circumstances demonstrates a

lack of orderly process and timely disposition in relation to an investor acting in the expectation it would be treated fairly and justly in accordance with the NAFTA. And there appears to be there, the -- by reference to Chapter 18, in accordance with all of the NAFTA. It appears to be again an extension of the finding outside the scope of Chapter 11.

And in 101 the tribunal holds that Metalclad was not treated fairly or equitably under the NAFTA and succeeds on its claim under Article 1105.

The tribunal then turns to Article 1110 and the issue of expropriation. The tribunal in paragraph 102 quotes a portion of Article 1110, a portion only.

Paragraph 103 I'd ask to -- to emphasize. Having quoted a portion of Article 1110, the tribunal says, without reference to any authority, without reference to any legal principle, without reference to any of the text, says -- says:

"Thus, an expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner in whole or in significant part of the use or reasonably to be expected economic benefit of property, even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State."

It goes -- and I pause to note that there -- this definition of expropriation, unsupported by authority, appears -- and -- or by the text of the NAFTA, appears to the applicant to go beyond any definition of expropriation at customary international law, which is the -- which was -- as I mentioned earlier this morning, was the point that both the United States and Canada made in their submission that Article 1110 enshrines what is meant by expropriation at customary international law.

And in particular the interference with the

reasonably to be expected economic benefit in the facts of this case when, as you'll recall, the municipality's prepared to allow operation of the landfill as a non-hazardous industrial waste landfill, this tribunal has found that that's not good enough. This is an entire taking, because Metalclad had a reasonable expectation of some higher economic benefit.

And I'm going to be submitting in due course that the -- both the law with respect to the distinction between regulation and taking and the law with respect to customary international law and expropriation do not support the tribunal's "thus" and this conclusion.

This although is just an abstract statement by the tribunal, and in order to understand what they're doing, one has to go on.

And in paragraph 104 the tribunal notes that:

"Mexico is liable by permitting or tolerating the conduct of Guadalcazar in relation to..." the Metalclad "...to Metalclad which the tribunal has already held amounts to unfair, inequitable treatment, breaching Article 1105, and thus participating or acquiescing in the denial to Metalclad of the right to operate the landfill..."

There you see where their business purpose has been elevated to a property right.

"...notwithstanding that the project was fully approved and endorsed by the federal government. Metalclad must be held to have taken a measure tantamount to expropriation."

Now, it -- I pause to ask what step was the federation to take with respect to the conduct of the municipality?

Here it appears that an expropriation has
occurred by a failure to take a step, not by a
positive step, but by a failure to restrain
another level of government in some way that is
unclear.

Again, the tribunal in paragraph 105 re -returns to its view of Mexican domestic law,
finding that the exclusive authority for siting
and permitting hazardous waste lies with the
Mexican federal government, noting this finding
consistent with the testimony of the secretary of
SEMARNAP, and I'll come back to that, and
consistent with the express language, again an
issue of pure Mexican domestic law.

And in 106 the tribunal repeats the finding that it had made in -- in its treatment of Article 1105 that in considering environmental issues, the municipality acted outside its authority.

And then this is stated to -- to elevate the -- an ultra vires act at Mexican domestic law in this tribunal's view to an expropriation by paragraph 107:

"These measures taken together with the representations of the Mexican federal government on which Metalclad relied in the absence of a timely, orderly or substantive basis for the denial of the permit amount to an indirect expropriation."

And I will -- the -- the next paragraph, the tribunal refers to the Balloon case. We will be dealing -- dealing -- which it says this case resembles. We will be dealing with the Balloon case in detail in the course of submissions.

Now, at paragraph 109 through 111 the tribunal deals -- comes back to the ecological decree, but it -- I'm not sure we need to spend much time on it. We -- we will deal with it. But at paragraph 11 -- or 111 the tribunal concludes:

"A finding of expropriation on the basis of the ecological decree is not essential to the tribunal's finding of a violation of NAFTA Article 1110. However, the tribunal considers the implementation of the decree would in and of itself constitute an act tantamount to expropriation."

You'll recall that this reference -- this decree was issued after this arbitration had been con -- commenced after Metalclad had alleged that

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this -- their landfill had been -- already been expropriated, and of course -- so there's no evi -- and -- and after Metalclad had abandoned the landfill. And so there is no evidence of the implementation of the decree with respect to this issue. And I'll -- having said that, I'll take you to what was said about the decree and how it permitted operation of landfills, but it does not appear to have been essential to the tribunal's 10 finding at all.

> Now, in the next portion of the award, the tribunal deals with damages. And we're going to come back to damages in -- in more detail.

And at this stage I would like to turn to -away from the award, having identified those points upon which we take issue, and return to the outline of argument. And very briefly I'd like you to -- I just want to make a couple of points with respect to -- starting at page 14. I've really covered up to page 14 in my introductory remarks.

And in page 14 we -- we emphasize a number of things that I think are apparent to Your Lordship already, and that is that this case involves a number of new issues. It's the first review of a Chapter 11 -- a NAFTA award. It's the first to consider whether the Commercial Arbitration Act or the International Commercial Arbitration Act applies to that review. It's the first to consider an arbitration conducted under the ICSID additional facility rules. And there are rules there that will be -- we will be referring to.

So a number of the issues that are raised are -- are new, but a number are basic.

And the most basic issue that in my submission runs through both acts and through all consensual arbitration tribunals is the requirement for the tribunal to remain within the scope of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of NAFTA arbitration tribunals like other arbitration tribunals is limited by the parties' agreement. Excess of jurisdiction is a basis for setting aside an award under both statutes and under other forms of review. That is a consistent. That -that's a consistent point.

Now, approaching that in any individual case, there are significant differences. And I'd just

like to emphasize some of them, because you will be cited cases from a number of different arenas and should be alive to the differences before determining whether or not those cases are analogous, whether they're different, whether there are significant differences.

In the materials we have cited and I expect my friend to cite, you will be seeing decisions from tribunals and review of decisions from tribunals from at least the following types of arbitrations: State-to-State arbitrations of international trade law obligations under either the GATT or the WTO or the NAFTA.

There is provision in the NAFTA for State-to-State arbitration under Chapter 20 of the transparency obligations of the NAFTA, for example. And we'll be -- that's one kind of arbitration. It has its own specific rules, and those tribunals have their own jurisdiction.

At the other end of the spectrum you'll be referred to cases arising out of private, transnational commercial transactions, usually one-off contracts.

And the best example in British Columbia is the Quintette arbitration, and the review by British Columbia courts of that arbitration, and the rules that have developed in respect of both deference and the sta -- stance of the courts to private international commercial arbitrations.

Another separate type of arbitration you'll see referred to are claims commissions tribunals. An example is the Iran/U.S. claims tribunal. There, sometimes at a State-to-State level and other times at an investor-to-State level, access is to provided to arbitrations in respect of specific claims. They -- each of them are specific and each of the commissions setting them up have to be examined to determine the limits and scope of their jurisdiction.

At another level you'll see ICSID investor-State arbitrations. The ICSID is a -- is an international convention which can be adopted by States to provide access to investors to arbitration. It usually involves the application of domestic law. It usually -- and it -- by definition in the convention is a self-contained process; it's what's called anational. It --

review under that process takes place -- review by -- of a decision of one arbitral tribunal takes place by decision of another ad hoc arbitral tribunal called an annulment tribunal. And you'll see reference to the grounds upon which those tribunals act and the principles that they have developed in a -- in the field of investor-State arbitration.

You will also be referred to the specifics of investor-State arbitration under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA which is in some respects different than each of these that I've just mentioned, and in -- in its jurisdictional respect quite the same.

They share the characteristic of the requirement of the parties' consent to the rules, but the terms of that consent, the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the applicable law to the substantive issues, the review mechanism, and the applicable law to the review mechanism are all potentially different. And before any authorities cited by either side is considered appropriate or analogous, it's important to have regard to those issues.

Now, in order to understand the specifics of Chapter 11, we have to understand it in detail and its place in the NAFTA. And Mr. Thomas is going to take you through that next. It's probably an appropriate time to take the break, for your 10-minute break, if that's convenient.

30 THE COURT: Yes. We'll take the afternoon break at this time.

32 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is adjourned for afternoon recess.

(AFTERNOON RECESS) (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 2:55 P.M.) (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 3:06 P.M.)

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Thomas.
MR. THOMAS: My Lord, I will be addressing points that
are generally made in Chapter 3 of the outline.
I'm not going to be follow -- following it
slavishly, but I will be referring to it from time

44 to time.
45 And what I propose to do in -- in this part
46 of our presentation is to deal with five issues;
47 the first is I'm going to try to provide the Court

with some background on the investor-State

Secondly, I'm going to place Chapter 11 of the NAFTA within the broader context of the agreement as a whole.

Third, I'm going to direct Your Lordship to comments that have been made in investor-State cases about the importance of jurisdiction. And I will be making the point that jurisdiction is a particularly important issue where a proceeding involves a sovereign State.

Fourth, I'll be directing the Court to the jurisdictional limitations which are contained in Chapter 11 itself.

And finally, I'll conclude with a very brief discussion of the governing law because, as Mr. Foy has already pointed out, the governing law has jurisdictional consequences for these types of disputes.

Now, this is, I emphasize, a general introduction. We'll be taking many of the points that I will be making this afternoon and elaborating upon them as we go into specific issues over the course of the next few days.

I would ask Your Lordship to start by looking at Chapter 20 of the NAFTA, and specifically at Article 2004. If you look at the bottom of the page, My Lord, you'll see that it has Chapter -- it says 20-3.

30 THE COURT: It's only when you get into the annexes -- annexes that it gets a little confusing.

MR. THOMAS: Yes. It gets very confusing in the annexes.

But you'll see that in Article 2004, it's entitled "Recourse to Dispute Settlement Procedures," and it states that:

"Except for the matters covered in Chapter 19..."

Which I can discuss further anon.

"...and as otherwise provided in this agreement, the dispute settlement provisions of this agreement shall apply with respect to the avoidance or settlement of all disputes between the parties

regarding the interpretation or application of this agreement..."

I don't need to complete that sentence.
The point that I want to begin by making,
My Lord, is that Chapter 20 contemplates
party-to-party dispute settlement for virtually
every matter which is covered by the NAFTA. There
are a few areas of the NAFTA which are carved out
from general dispute settlement, but they are very
few. And the general principle is that the -- any
part of the agreement can be taken to dispute
settlement under Chapter 20.

And in such dispute settlement, it is a party-to-party or State-to-State dispute settlement proceeding. There is no role contemplated for a private party to be able to assert a breach of obligations in any part of the agreement other than those obligations set out in Section A of Chapter 11.

So we start off with the point that Chapter 20 is the general dispute settlement mechanism of the NAFTA. And we observe at paragraph 72 of the outline that generally speaking at international law only States have personality. They are the subjects of international law. And generally speaking only States have the right to enforce international treaty obligations that exist between them.

States can, by treaty or otherwise, provide access to private individuals or legal persons to step into the shoes of a State, as it were, and assert their rights at international law. And that's what's happened in Section B of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.

A qualifying investor of a party may in specified circumstances commence an arbitral claim against another party, but not its own, for damages for an alleged breach of the obligations that are listed in Section A of Chapter 11. This of course is an exception to the general rule of State-to-State dispute settlement.

And in investment disputes ordinarily, in the absence of this kind of investor-State mechanism, it would be the investor-State that would espouse the claim at international law. In other words, if we take Metalclad as an example, in the absence

of investor-State arbitration under Chapter 11, it would be the United States that would examine the claim of its investor and espouse it as a breach of international law for duties which are owed to it as a State.

And this is an important point, this notion of espousal, because I'll be coming back to this later on in the week. What we have done in the NAFTA in Chapter 11 is to remove espousal and to allow the investor direct access to this particular form of arbitration.

I should note parenthetically, My Lord, that a State still remains able to enforce any of the obligations in Chapter 11. Those are just the same as any other set of obligations under the NAFTA as a whole. They can form the basis for a State-to-State dispute settlement proceeding under Chapter 20.

Now, this inclusion of investor-State arbitration is novel in the Free Trade Agreement context. We point out in our materials that the Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement which was the regional predecessor of the NAFTA did not include investor-State arbitration. All disputes that -- that arose under the investment chapter of that agreement would proceed in the normal course of events to dispute settlement under the general dispute settlement provisions. So the NAFTA represents a significant change in the treaty relationship which previously governed between the United States and Canada.

We point out, My Lord, that investor-State arbitration is not new. It wasn't invented with the NAFTA.

And Mr. Foy has mentioned the ICSID. The ICSID was created by a convention called the Washington convention which entered into force in 1965. ICSID stands for the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. It is headquartered in the World Bank's headquarters in Washington, D.C.

And the objective of ICSID -- of the ICSID convention was to provide for consensual arbitral proceedings against a State that was a signatory to the convention by a private party of another State that was also a signatory to the convention. So in order to invoke the ICSID

convention, the respondent State and the State of the private party both had to be signatories to the ICSID convention.

And the jurisdiction of the ICSID is derived by -- from Article 25 of the ICSID convention. The convention is included in our materials at tab 86. I don't need to take you to it now.

But what the convention provides is that disputes, any legal dispute arising out of an investment between a contracting State, or any constituent subdivision or agency of a contracting State designated to the centre by that State, and a national of another contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the centre may be considered by an arbitral tribunal established by the centre.

Now, we'll be referring to ICSID during the course of our submissions for a couple of reasons. The first is that there are three arbitral mechanisms that exist -- that exist, at least theoretically, under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA. A claimant can choose the ICSID convention, the ICSID additional facility which I will discuss in a moment, or UNCITRAL arbitration rules.

At present there's really only a choice of the additional facility or the UNCITRAL rules because neither Canada nor Mexico is a signatory to the ICSID convention. That provision was inserted in the NAFTA contemplating that at some future date one of those States, or both, would become signatories to the ICSID convention, but neither has acceded to it. So the choice at present is between the ICSID additional facility rules or the UNCITRAL arbitration rules.

But ICSID convention practice is helpful to this Court, we would submit, because there is a developed body of jurisprudence that deals with some of the issues that will be arising in the course of our application before Your Lordship. It's not a large body of jurisprudence, but in some areas it's quite detailed and it's quite illuminating and of assistance in examining some of the issues that arise -- that will arise over the course of this application.

Now, as I mentioned to you, ICSID is only available if you have both States involved being

signatories. The additional facility was created by the ICSID in 1978, and it's available to settle investment disputes where the respondent State is not a signatory to the ICSID convention, but it could choose to submit to the jurisdiction of an additional facility arbitration tribunal. And so because Mexico had not acceded to the convention, Metalclad had a choice, and it chose to use the ICSID additional facility.

Now, this was the first additional facility arbitration to be commenced ever. They created it in 1978, but it was never used until Metalclad decided to pick this particular forum of arbitration under Chapter 11. But during the time that the Metalclad case was underway, Mexico faced two other ICSID additional facility claims, one in a case called Azinian v. United Mexican States, and we'll be referring to that in -- in due course, and the other, Waste Management, which I will be referring to shortly.

In both instances the claims were dismissed, but they are two claims which are -- yield another source of -- of jurisprudence which will be of importance to this application, because we will be referring not only to these two cases but to other cases which have now been decided by Chapter 11 tribunals as we make our points with respect to this particular arbitral award.

My Lord, I -- I want to turn to the next point, which is to place Chapter 11 within the broader context of the NAFTA. And we make the point in our outline that NAFTA comprises 22 chapters. It is a very broad agreement, and Chapter 11 is really a slice of this much broader agreement.

The other chapters of NAFTA deal with such matters as trade and goods. There are a number of chapters that deal with disciplines relating to governmental action affecting trade and goods. There is a chapter that deals with trade and services generally. That's Chapter 12. There is a chapter that deals with telecommunications services, Chapter 13. Chapter 14 deals with financial services. There is a chapter dealing with temporary business travel for professionals and other business persons who move from one jurisdiction into another. So NAFTA deals with a

very, very wide array of issues relating to international trade. And the investment chapter deals with a particular set of disciplines placed within this broader context of 22 other chapters.

Much of the NAFTA is derived from rules and principles that date back to the general agreement on tariffs and trade, or GATT.

GATT was negotiated in 1947 and entered into force in 1948, and for many years was the main agreement which governed international trade relations between States. It has since been incorporated into and in a sense superseded by the World Trade Organization.

But you will look, as you -- as one goes through the NAFTA, there will be many principles which are derived directly from the GATT. And one of the principles that you have heard already, and you will hear more about during the course of this week and next week, is transparency. Chapter 18 of the NAFTA, it's lineage can be traced back to Article X, Roman numeral 10, of the GATT.

And I'm going to explain what transparency means in international trade law. First of all, it's a treaty obligation. It's set out in treaty. It's not an obligation which exists at customary international law. Rather, it's an obligation that has been negotiated by States and is included in a treaty. And the obligation is, first of all, that a treaty, a State is under an obligation to publish its laws on the theory that people who want to do business or trade into a country ought to be able to discover what the law is.

The second aspect of transparency is that a State should notify other members of the agreement of proposed measures that may affect the operation of the agreement.

And the third aspect of transparency is that a State should ensure that there are administrative or quasi-judicial or judicial measures available to challenge action taken by governments under the agreement.

So transparency deals with publication of law, notification, and establishing mechanisms to challenge governmental action for matters which are governed by the agreement.

Now, you have heard Mr. Foy mention the

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      Mexican remedy, constitutional remedy, of Amparo.
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      It is a remedy which is available in Mexico to
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      private parties to challenge governmental action.
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      And this is one of the judicial review mechanisms
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      that Chapter 18 of the NAFTA contemplates. And
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      I'll take you through this as we continue.
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          As I mentioned to you, the lineage of -- of
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      Chapter 18 can be traced back to Article 10. And
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      if you would be so kind as to look at the third
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       volume of the materials, the statues -- statutes
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       and treaties, I'd like to turn to tab 80.
12 THE COURT: It looks like they've been reorganized.
13 MR. THOMAS: Statute and treaty materials.
14 THE COURT: It should be the one on the top. The one
15
       in blue?
16 MR. THOMAS: There -- yes, they have a blue binding.
17
    THE COURT: Thank you.
18
          I should perhaps -- if you could bring up all
19
       four of the volumes.
20
          Yes, tab?
21 MR. THOMAS: Tab 80, My Lord.
22 THE COURT: Thank you.
23 MR. THOMAS: Now, the document contained here at tab
24
       80 is an excerpt from a lengthy document published
25
       by the United States executive. It's called a --
26
       a statement of administrative action. And this is
27
       published by the President of the United States
28
       when he transmits an international trade agreement
29
       to the Congress for the Congress to enact
30
       implementing legislation. And the purpose of this
31
       statement is to describe the international
32
       agreement to the legislature.
33
          You will see referen -- we'll be making
34
       reference to the American -- the United States
35
       statement of administrative action and the
36
       Canadian statement on implementation. There is no
37
       Mexican document that is equivalent to what Canada
38
       and United States prepared. But these are
39
       authoritative statements by the executive branch
40
       of the United States on one hand and Canada on the
41
       other as to what was done in the NAFTA.
42
          If you turn through that, there is a page
43
       enti -- page 642, it says:
44
45
          "Chapter 18, publication notification,
46
          administration of laws."
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47

1 THE COURT: Yes.
2 MR. THOMAS: And this is -- again, this is the
3 United States executive's description. It says at
4 the first paragraph:

"Chapter 18 sets out a number of requirements designed to foster openness, transparency and fairness in the adoption and application of the administrative measures covered by the agreement. It should be noted that various other chapters of the NAFTA, such as Chapters 7 through 10, 12, 13 and 19 provide specific detailed rules in this area."

You'll notice that in the listing of the chapters they omit Chapter 11.

He then -- the -- the statement then goes on to describe what these various obligations are. 1801 requires each NAFTA country to designate a contact point to facilitate communications between the three governments. Article 1802 closely tracks Article 2102 of the CFTA. That's a reference to the Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement. It provides that each government must promptly publish all laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings concerning subjects covered by the NAFTA.

He then -- they then go on to note that Article 1803 deals with this notification of measures that might affect the operation of the agreement.

Article 1804 requires each government to accord basic procedural guarantees to firms and individuals from other NAFTA countries in specific types of administrative proceedings that affect matters covered by the agreement. Those -- these guarantees include reasonable notice of proceedings and the opportunity to present argument.

And then you'll see finally that you have to provide for review and appeal of final administrative actions, Article 1805, similar to GATT article -- GATT Article Roman numeral 10(3)(b) requires each government to establish or maintain independent administrative or judicial review procedures.

So this is a -- a -- a fairly short and succinct description of Chapter 18 from the perspective of the United States government. A key point to note, that it's talking about transparency obligations within the context of Chapter 18. It identifies that there may be some other elaborations upon transparency in other parts of the agreement, but when it lists them, it does not list Chapter 11 as being one of the chapters in which transparency obligations are contained. There is no chapter-specific transparency obligation in Chapter 11.

Now, My Lord, if you would refer to tab 72 in the same binder, this is the Canadian government's description of -- of the NAFTA, various chapters of the NAFTA. We've not included the whole of it. But you'll see that it was published in the Canada Gazette on January the 1st, 1994, the date of NAFTA's entry into force, so this is at tab 72.

I don't know if -- my pages may have been out of -- mine were out of order, so you might -- yours might be as well, but I'm looking for page 196 at the top left-hand corner. It's page 196, and you'll see halfway down the left-hand column Chapter 18. Again, it states:

"While NAFTA's rules provide the rights and obligations that ensure that the three countries will pursue their trade and economic policies on the basis of the objectives of non-discrimination and transparency set out in Chapter 1, the provisions of Chapters 18, 19 and 20 set out the procedures that will ensure that

these rules are implemented."

Now, I -- I stop to note, My Lord, that in this instance again Canada's focusing on Chapter 18 as being the source of the transparency obligations, and it is referring to special dispute settlement mechanisms that follow, the -- a specialized one in Chapter 19 that deals with trade remedy actions, I'm going to discuss a little bit of that later on, and Chapter 20, which I've already discussed, the general dispute settlement mechanism. So Canada is orienting this

of -- the sets of obligations in Chapter 18 towards these other forms of dispute settlement, not Chapter 11.

It then goes on to note in the next paragraph, and I won't -- won't bother to read it all, but it again points back to the -- to article 10 of the GATT as being the -- the original provision dealing with transparency.

If you turn up to the top of page 197, in the upper left-hand corner there's a discussion again of the obligation upon the parties to have judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals in place to review final administrative actions regarding matters that are covered by the agreement.

I should note just parenthetically that Canada observes under point 2, you'll see a -- a heading "Canadian Legislation," that Canadian laws, regulations and policies already fully conform to the obligations of Chapter 11 and no new legislative action was required to bring it into effect. The United States makes the same observation in its statement of administrative action. It states that there is no need for legislative action to be taken.

Now, My Lord, if you would turn to Article 102 of the agreement, this is the objectives provision which was relied upon by the tribunal, and Mr. Foy has already mentioned it to you before, because the tribunal, as we indicated earlier, misstated Article 102.1, paragraph C.

I want to focus your attention on the opening sentence of Article 102, which states that:

"The objectives of this agreement as elaborated more specifically through its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency, are to..."

And then it sets out a series of objectives. The point we want to make here is that these principles and rules, national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency have separate and distinct meanings. In other words, they're not -- it's not a bundle of -- of concepts that underlie every single provision of

the NAFTA. On the contrary, they are specific concepts and specific rules. And if you take a look at the table of contents of NAFTA which just precedes that, I'll -- I'll just give you a sense of how these are expressed in the NAFTA as you go through it.

If you turn to the table of contents at the beginning of the agreement, if you look at, for example, Chapter 3, you'll see Section A, Article 301, national treatment. Well, that is the national treatment rule for trade and goods.

If we were to go to Chapter 10, you -- that deals with government procurement, the procurement of goods and services by governments. You'll see Article 1003, national treatment and non-discrimination.

In investment, the chapter on investment, Article 1102, national treatment, and so on. In other words, national treatment is a concept which is expressed in different treaty texts at different parts sprinkled throughout the agreement.

The same applies with respect to most-favoured-nation treatment.

Most-favoured-nation treatment is simply a non-discrimination principle whereby the parties agree that they will not accord each other less favourable treatment than they accord to other -- other non- -- non-parties to the NAFTA, so it's a form of protection against non- -- against discrimination.

And if you look at MFN, you'll see in Chapter 11, Article 1103, most-favoured-nation treatment is set out as a provision.

If you look at Chapter 12, again Article 1203, there's a most-favoured-nation treatment article there.

The same thing happens with respect to transparency. We have already looked at Chapter 18. Chapter 18 is the main transparency chapter. And then there are some elaborations upon transparency in different provisions, different treaty texts sprinkled throughout the agreement.

For example, if I were to refer you to Chapter 13, if you could turn to Chapter 13, on telecommunications, you'll see at Article 1306 tran -- is entitled "Transparency." And what this

is is a specific -- and I might say a sector-specific transparency obligation. It's contained in the chapter on telecommunications, and it is a further elaboration of what has been set out in Chapter 18. And you can see that in the text:

"Further to Article 1802 each party shall make publicly available its measures..."

Et cetera

So Article 1306 -- there's a number of other articles in the NAFTA like that -- is a chapter-specific elaboration upon the basic transparency obligations in Chapter 18. And at paragraph 246 of our outline, we set out at places in the NAFTA where you can find these chapter-specific elaborations.

The only reference to transparency, there's one reference to transparency in Chapter 11 and that's in -- under Article 1113. And it's a very good example of a reference out to Chapter 11.

If you were to turn to Article 1113, this is an article which entitles a NAFTA party to deny the benefits of Chapter 11 to an investor of another party. And the classic example would be let's assume that Canada does not maintain diplomatic relations with another State and that State has diplomatic relations with the United States, Canada might choose under Article 1113 to deny the benefits of Chapter 11 to a company which is domiciled in the United States but controlled by persons situated in the other State.

Article 1113 would permit Canada to deny benefits, but you'll see this reference out in para -- in subparagraph 2 subject to prior notification and consultation in accordance with Articles 1803. So there you see a reference by the drafters out to the other chapter. But that's the only reference in the whole of Chapter 11 to a transparency obligation which is situated outside of the chapter.

Now, I want to turn, My Lord, to the substantive obligations that the NAFTA parties agreed could be subjected to investor-State arbitration. This of course is absolutely

fundamental to this particular petition.

If you turn to Article 1101, following a drafting convention of the NAFTA, it sets out the scope and coverage of the agreement, and it states

"This chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained by a party relating to investors of another party, investments of investors of another party..."

I'll stay with those for the time being.
So the first question that arises, in order to trigger the application of Chapter 11, it applies to measures that are adopted or maintained by a party. And the question you might ask is: What is a measure?

Well, a measure is defined in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 of the -- of the NAFTA is the general definitions chapter. And measure according to Chapter 2 includes any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice. We'll be returning to this later on when we discuss this -- the issue of expropriation because, as Mr. Foy has already identified, the -- the -- one of the expropriation findings made by the tribunal was acquiescence of the municipality's refusal to issue the permit and its subsequent legal actions taken in the Mexican courts. And so that raises a very important issue relating to the meaning of the word "measure."

Now, if a -- an investor chooses to commence an investor-State claim under Chapter 11, it resorts to Section B. And Section B sets out the whole of the procedure that was drafted by the NAFTA parties and is available to the investor for breaches of Section A.

And you'll see the two important points here in Article 11 -- 1116 and 1117. There is a distinction between a claim by an investor on its own behalf and a claim by an investor on behalf of its enterprise. We need not worry about that.

What's important is to look at, for example, paragraph 1 of Article 1116. And you'll see that the NAFTA parties were very explicit about what provisions of the NAFTA could form the basis for a claim. Paragraph A says:

 "Section A or Article 1503(2) State enterprises...or Article 1502(3)(A) where the monopoly has acted in a manner inconsistent with the party's obligations under Section A."

Now, we will submit that the drafters of the NAFTA understood very well how to refer out to another provision of the NAFTA in order to incorporate it into the jurisdiction of a Chapter 11 tribunal. You see nothing in here with respect to a reference to Chapter 18. You see only a reference to two subparagraphs from Chapter 15.

Now, you may recall, My Lord, that Mr. Schreibman, when he appeared on behalf of CUPE in its intervention, he pointed out to you that in the UPS case that is currently underway, UPS is citing a provision of Chapter 15 which is not one of the two provisions which are included here. And that it's therefore attempting to shoehorn provisions of Chapter 15 which were not agreed by the NAFTA parties to be the subject of a Chapter 11 dispute.

And were the UPS tribunal to accede to that attempt to bring in another provision from Chapter 15, Mr. Schreibman's point would be correct that the tribunal would be acting in excess of jurisdiction, because this is what defines the subject matter jurisdiction of a Chapter 11 proceeding.

And the NAFTA parties were very clear; they did not intend for Chapters 1 through 9 and 10 and 11 -- sorry, 1 through 10, and 12 through to 22, with the exception of two subparagraphs of Chapter 15, they did not intend for provisions falling in those parts of the NAFTA to be incorporated into a Chapter 11 tribunal's inquiry. The NAFTA parties did not intend for Chapter 11 tribunals to pass upon their compliance with any other part of the

And our point is, to go back to the first -when I discussed the party-to-party dispute
settlement, only a party to the NAFTA has the
standing to assert a breach of the rest of the
NAFTA, and only a Chapter 20 panel has the
jurisdiction to review such a complaint. It's -it is -- has been committed to an entirely

different dispute settlement mechanism. And this is a fundamental point for the operation of the NAFTA.

There's some reflection of this, My Lord, in the Canadian federal legislation that implemented the NAFTA. And we referred you at paragraph 94 of the outline -- it's not necessary that you go to the statutes. But at paragraph 94 we quoted Section 6 of the North American Free Trade Implementation Act. And that provides that no person has any cause of action and no proceedings of any kind shall be taken without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada to enforce or determine any right or obligation that is claimed or arises solely under or by virtue of Part 1, and that deals with the implementation of the agreement generally, or any order or regulation made under Part 1.

And then you'll see the express carve-out. Subject to Section B of Chapter 11 of the agreement, no person has any cause of action and no proceedings of any kind shall be taken without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada to enforce or determine any right or obligation that is claimed or arises solely under or by virtue of the agreement.

Now, the effect of this type of language, that no person shall have any cause of action, was considered by the Federal Court in a case called Pfizer v. Canada. It's a decision of a trial court which -- and an appeal was taken, but the appeal was dismissed on October the 14th, 1999. We have it in our materials. It's not necessary to go to the case because we -- the quote that I want to refer to is in -- included in your outline.

But this case was an attempt by Pfizer to argue that Canada had failed to properly implement it's WTO obligations under an agreement in the World Trade Organization called the agreement on trade-related intellectual property. There is a provision that deals with the length of time that a -- patents for pharmaceuticals may be granted. And as you know, in Canada there's a -- there's always tension between the owners of the patent rights and the generic manufacturers.

The argument by Pfizer was that Canada had

failed to properly and effectively implement its WTO obligations. And the Attorney General responded that this disclosed no cause of action under Canadian law. It didn't matter what happened at the international level; it was a matter of the Canadian law as implemented by Parliament. And so the Attorney General brought a motion to strike the claim as disclosing no cause 

Now, following a review of the implementation acts for the FTA and the NAFTA, Lemieux J. states, and this is at paragraph 95 of our materials:

"What Parliament is saying is that these international trade agreements are matters of public law concerning public rights, rights affecting Canada as a sovereign State. They are not matters of private economic or commercial rights giving rise to causes of action and legal proceedings. These sections do not eliminate any private rights. They do not extinguish rights. Parliament is simply saying no such rights arise."

And the learned judge goes on to say that:

"Parliament's concern relates to the very nature of international trade agreements between sovereign States and the mechanisms for dispute settlement and the enforcement of panel or arbitration rulings. The WTO agreement provides for such mechanisms. Parliament did not want private parties, except where it may be appropriate, to initiate private actions which would disrupt or adversely affect the agreed-to equilibrium for dispute settling."

And the same comment applies to the NAFTA. The parties agreed to investor-State arbitration for a narrow slice of the NAFTA, namely the Section A obligations. And Section 6.2 of the Canadian act reflects that agreement by the NAFTA parties. So the exception to the no-cause-of-action language in Section 6.1 is provided for there. But that exception does not

change the nature of the international legal obligations.

A special right of access has been granted to investors. But these international obligations are still public rights, to use the Court's term, they're rights affecting Canada as a sovereign State, or in this case Mexico as a sovereign State. And the investor is given a special right to enforce obligations that in the absence of that special right could be enforced only by the State that is a party to that agreement.

And we submit, and we will be submitting as we proceed and make specific points during the course of our argument, that a Chapter 11 tribunal that takes upon itself the jurisdiction to apply provisions that fall outside of Section A would, in the Federal Court's words:

"...disrupt or adversely affect the agreed-to equilibrium for dispute settlement as between the NAFTA parties."

The United States has the right if it views Mexico's actions in this case to be a breach of the transparency obligations, to commence a State-to-State panel. It hasn't done so. There's been no indication that it would. And as Mr. Foy indicated, we feel that we have fully complied with Chapter 18 as it is written.

The tribunal has created a set of chap -- of transparency obligations that are not found in Chapter 18, but Mexico has no concern about the United States commencing a Chapter 20 panel proceeding in respect of transparency issues relating to this case. But it's not for this claimant and it's not for this tribunal to make this determination.

Now, we have noted in our materials how fundamental the -- the question of consent is for the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals. And consent can comprehend not only the fact of the arbitration but also the specific issues to be resolved by arbitration, and of course the consent may stipulate the governing law which the tribunal is bound to apply.

We make the point in our outline that an arbitration tribunal only has jurisdiction over

those specific issues that the parties have agreed to submit, and any award that goes beyond those issues is susceptible to challenge. This, My Lord, is a trite principle of arbitration law. At paragraph 78 we cite Redfern and Hunter --Hunter in their Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration. I don't need to read you the quote.

It's a -- a principle which is reflected at this -- at the international level, and it's a matter of great concern to States. In fact, we point out that the consent to arbitration in the ICSID convention was described by the World Bank as, quote, the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the centre. And an ICSID additional facility arbitration is no different from an ICSID convention arbitration in that respect.

At paragraph 80 of our outline we quote a passage from a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal called Waste Management. And this is a case which was brought against Mexico. And the claimant had exercised inconsistent legal remedies.

Under the NAFTA there's a -- a -- somewhat of a choice of forum with respect to damages claims. The claimant can choose to go to the domestic courts for a damages claim, or it can go to the NAFTA for a damages claim, but it can't do both.

And what happened in the Waste Management case was that the claimant did do both. It not only went to the domestic courts, it also invoked a arbi -- a domestic arbitration under the concession agreement that it had which it considered was allegedly expropriated by Mexico.

So the invocation of these inconsistent legal remedies was met by a response by Mexico that this was not permissible under the NAFTA. And when it insisted on persisting with this particular approach, Mexico filed a jurisdictional objection with the Waste Management Chapter 11 tribunal. And that tribunal by a 2-to-1 majority held, and we quote the paragraph at paragraph 80 of the outline:

"The essential constituent elements which constitute the institution of arbitration are the existence of a conflict of interest and an agreement expressing the will of the

parties or a legal mandate on which the constitution of an arbitral tribunal is founded. This assertion serves to confirm the importancy of the autonomy of the will of the parties which is evinced by their consent to submit any given dispute to arbitration proceedings, hence it is upon that very consent to arbitration given by the parties that the entire effectiveness of this institution depends."

And the tribunal found that since the -essentially the consent had been invalidated by
the fact that this claimant had chosen to pursue
inconsistent legal remedies, and Mexico had not
consented to them. And for that reason, the
majority of the tribunal dismissed the claim
against Waste Management.

Now, My Lord, I have one other case I'd like to refer you to, and I will -- if you want to stop at 4, it's probably an appropriate place to stop after this case, and it is a case called Southern Pacific Properties. It's at tab 62 of your materials, and I would ask that you refer to it.

This case is an ICSID case, tab 62. And I'll -- I'll note that this is a case that the -- where the tribunal ultimately did decide to take jurisdiction over the dispute. It found that Egypt had enacted a law, which many ICSID signatories have done, whereby it's a general law in their investment code which -- which agreed to the submission to the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals. But there was a question raised at the outset of this case as to whether or not Egypt had indeed agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal.

This tribunal, by the way, was chaired by a -- the president of the tribunal was a former -- actually, I guess at the time he was probably president of the International Court of Justice. His name is Dr. Jimenez de Arechaga. The Arechaga name will come back, because we refer to him in the course of a number of our arguments.

And so this judge from the international court looked at -- he was not sitting as international judge, he was sitting as a member of the ICSID tribunal, but he and his colleagues

looked at the question of jurisdiction.

And I want to spend just a little bit of time on the -- on the tribunal's observations, because this is where you'll begin to see the fundamental difference between investor-State arbitration and the question of jurisdiction and the much laxer (sic) approach to jurisdiction taken with respect to private international commercial arbitration where there is a presumption of jurisdiction.

In this case, at paragraph 62, you'll see the tribunal state the following:

"A second preliminary matter involves the question of whether jurisdictional instruments must be interpreted restrictively. It has been repeatedly emphasized on behalf of Egypt in these proceeding that an international tribunal cannot exercise jurisdiction over a sovereign State without its consent. This of course is an uncontroverted principle of general international law. Such consent is expressly required by Article 25 of the Washington Convention..."

That's the ICSID convention.

"...and is described as the 'cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the centre,' in the report of the executive directors..."

Those are the directors of the bank.

 "...that accompanied the convention when it was submitted to the governments of member States of the World Bank."

 And then if you skip down a couple of lines, at the bottom of that paragraph it says:

"Thus, the consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of the centre is an indispensable prerequisite to the competence of any ICSID tribunal."

 Then they go on to make this point:

"Clearly then there is no presumption of jurisdiction, particularly where a sovereign State is involved. And the tribunal must examine Egypt's objections to the jurisdiction of the centre with meticulous care, bearing in mind the jurisdiction in the present case exists only insofar as consent thereto has been given by the parties."

Now, he goes on to say:

"This is not to say, however, that there's a presumption against the confirmative jurisdiction with respect to a sovereign State or that instruments purporting to confer jurisdiction should be..." instrike "...interpreted restrictively. Judicial and arbitral bodies have repeatedly pronounced in favour of their own competence where the force of the arguments militating in favour of jurisdiction is preponderant."

Note the word "preponderant."

And then he mentions some decisions of the International Court of Justice or its predecessor, the permanent court of international justice.

And the last passage in this decision I would direct Your Lordship to is on the following page where the tribunal says:

"Thus jurisdictional instruments are to be interpreted neither respectively nor expansively, but rather objectively and in good faith. And jurisdiction will be found to exist if, but only if, the force of the arguments militating in favour of it is preponderant."

Now, we refer to this case, My Lord, because it is a very succinct and helpful summary of the importance of jurisdiction in investor-State arbitration.

We're well aware from Mexico's perspective that with respect to private international commercial arbitration the Court of Appeal of

1 British Columbia has said in Quintette that 2 there's a powerful presumption of jurisdiction. 3 We take no issue with that statement as it applies 4 to private international commercial arbitrations. 5 But our point is that this is a case of first 6 impression. And, Your Lordship, you've -- you are 7 the first judge anywhere to judicially review a 8 NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-State tribunal decision, 9 and you are the first to judicially review an 10 additional facility arbitral award. And for that 11 reason in our submission it's of great assistance to this Court to have a succinct summary of the 12 importance of jurisdiction in investor-State 13 14 arbitrations. They are categorically different from private international commercial 15 16 arbitration. We'll make that point repeatedly, 17 and you will see it reflected in the governing 18 rules of this particular arbitration, which 19 differ. And you'll see it in the sensitivity that 20 international arbitral tribunals and ICSID 21 annulment committees have demonstrated when there 22 have been breaches of the governing rules. We'll 23 be getting back to that. But I think that this is an appropriate time 24 25 to end this part of my submission, My Lord, unless 26 you have any questions about what I've said so 27 28 THE COURT: No, that's fine. Thank you. 29 Just before we conclude the hearing for today 30 then, I'll just wish to raise with counsel the --31 the timing of this hearing. 32 We got off to a bit of a slow start this 33 morning, which is not unexpected in these sorts of 34 matters. I think I had given counsel some dates 35 as to the -- my availability if we're not able to 36 finish within the 10 days allotted, and I think I gave March 6th and 7th as -- as potential dates. 37 38 I -- I endeavoured to convey that to Trial 39 Division, and I believe that I had, but without 40 too much success. I know I'm double-booked on 41 other matters on March 7th. And March 6th, for 42 reasons that I won't go into now, is still 43 potentially available, but only as -- as a last 44 resort. 45 What that leads me up to is that I think 46 we're -- we're back down to the 10 days initially

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allotted. If counsel feel that the 10 days is

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going to be insufficient, would you advise me and
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2
      we can then discuss sitting extra hours in an
3
      attempt to -- to complete it within the 10 days?
         We'll now adjourn for the day and reconvene
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      at 10 tomorrow morning.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
7
      adjourned until the 20th of February at 10 a.m.
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      (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 4:04 P.M.)
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       Transcript certified by:
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       Kevin S. Lee, RPR, CRR, for:
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