DECLASSIFIED -Authority E012958 WH ACDA=0 DEF18.3 AUS(UI) RS/R REP Original to be Filed i NEA EUR FILE DESIGNATION E 10 SECRET/EXDIS A-678 FB0 TO Department of State RECEIVED SCI 5/ IL A TOCKTHENT OF STALE COPY NO. 2 SERIES B · Short Makes and and the State of the State RS/AN **DEPT PASS:** U.S. Delegation SALT, VIENNABATEH December 23, 1971 AGR COM FROM TAR LAB SALT MemCon SUBJECT : ARMY NAVY AIR REF USIA NSA DOT STR Attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the memorandum to Mr. Rich, Deputy Director, S/S-O, dated February 25, 1971 from Mr. Furnas, Special Assistant to the SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1971 DEC 27 AM 10 Attachment: Parsons, Garthoff-Grinevsky, Kishilov Memcon December 21, 1971 GP-3 SECRET/EXDIS FORM DS -323 Contents and Classification Approved by: Drafting Date: 12/21/71 Drefted by: SALDEL: RLGarthoff SALDEL: S. N. Graybeal Clearances:

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SALT VI

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION U.S. SALT DELEGATION VIENNA, AUSTRIA

DATE:

December 21, 1971

TIME:

12:30 - 2:30 p.m.

American Embassy, Vienna

PLACE:

5:00 - 7:00 p.m.

Soviet Embassy, Vienna

SUBJECT:

STATE OF STATE

SALT Joint Draft Texts

PARTICIPANTS:

US

USSR

Ambassador J. Graham Parsons Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff Mr. O. A. Grinevsky Mr. N. S. Kishilov


On Soviet initiative, two meetings were held (with time in between used for consultation with Delegations) in an effort to resolve a number of differences in the ABM and offensive freeze joint draft texts. As a result of these meetings, agreement was reached on the preamble and the modernization article of the offensive text, and on Articles I, II, IX, XII, XIII, and XIV of the ABM text.

Offensive Text

Grinevsky indicated the Soviet side was prepared to include a preambular sub-paragraph, as desired by the US side, to read: "taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms". Garthoff asked about the additional phrase also desired by the U.S. side, namely, "and the need to limit both". Grinevsky noted (correctly) that working level discussions had envisaged the possibility of a compromise involving acceptance of the first clause, and not the second. Garthoff acknowledged this, but hoped that the Soviet Delegation was prepared to accept the whole. Grinevsky said this was not possible, and if we could not agree on the mutual compromise, they would continue to object to the whole sub-paragraph. Garthoff said that, under these circumstances, the American side was prepared to agree to inclusion of the compromise sub-paragraph in the joint text. Accordingly, the preamble could be considered as agreed, on an ad referendum basis, without brackets.

Grinevsky noted that the revised American language for the modernization article was acceptable to his side, and he indicated the revised

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Russian language version accorded with it. Accordingly, that article was also considered as agreed in the ad referendum text.

Article I of the ABM JDT.

Grinevsky provided a new draft Article I, which read as follows:

The Parties undertake not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of the country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and also not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region in excess of the limitations provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Garthoff welcomed the move toward the American position taken by the Soviet side. He questioned the transposition of the undertaking not to provide a base..." to modify only the territorial defense. Grinevsky argued that this was appropriate because the same thought was included with respect to regional defense through the reference to not exceeding the limitations in Article III. Garthoff said that the expression "in excess of the limitations" was infelicitous, as it implied the need for a special obligation to abide by other obligations in the agreement. He suggested that the same thought could be expressed by substituting the words "except as". Grinevsky and Kishilov were clearly reluctant to propose such a change to their Delegation, but finally agreed to do so. Garthoff and Parsons said that with the specific suggested change, they would be prepared to recommend acceptance to their Delegation.

In the second meeting, representatives of both sides confirmed the acceptance of the revised language by their respective Delegations. Garthoff requested deletion of the word "also" in the English language version; after consultation with his Delegation, Grinevsky agreed.

Article II of the ABM JDT.

Grinevsky presented a revised version of Article II, based on the informal tentative draft given by Garthoff as a counterproposal the day before. Parsons and Garthoff welcomed this move on the Soviet side. Garthoff noted there was only one problem: while he had indicated at the luncheon the day before possible agreement to including the phrase "tested and" in the sub-paragraphs on ABM components, he had later phoned Grinevsky to say that this change caused difficulties on the American side. He proposed changing the term to "created". (Note: Most of these exchanges were on the basis of Russian language texts, which Garthoff translated as they were introduced. In this instance, the suggestion was to substitute

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the word "sozdanye" for the word "ispitannye") Grinevsky and Kishilov were disturbed by this suggested change, and emphasized that it could upset a very delicate situation within the Soviet Delegation, where the term "specially" constructed had been dropped only with considerable difficulty, and also that the expression "currently consisting of" had been strongly objected to by some members of the Soviet Delegation.

Garthoff restated a preference of the US side for deleting the words "tested and" but said he would seek agreement to the term "created and". Meanwhile, he had not excluded the possibility of agreeing to "tested and" and no other changes or brackets should be introduced. In the later session, Grinevsky indicated Soviet acceptance of "constructed and"--

which was taken as an English translation of the word Garthoff had proposed in Russian; based on an earlier US text. After some discussion, Garthoff and Parsons agreed to recommend acceptance of the phrase "constructed and", reserving the possibility of returning to the question of appropriate translation.

Article V of the ABM JDT

Grinevsky asked if the American side had proposed language for the suggested separate agreed understanding on future ABM systems. Garthoff said he could provide an illustrative draft statement, couched in the form of a statement by the US Delegation and incorporating the draft of an Agreed Minute. He was providing this language at Soviet request for consideration by both Delegations as a possible solution to the impasse over the American proposal for a third paragraph in Article V. (See attachment.)

In the later session, Grinevsky and Kishilov said that the Soviet side would continue to study this possible approach for dealing with future ABM systems. In conjunction with discussion (described below) of a possible Agreed Minute in connection with Article IX, Grinevsky asked if the US side was prepared to do the same for Article V and Article VI. Garthoff noted that an agreed text of such a supplementary understanding had been reached with respect to Article IX, and if the Soviet side was prepared to accept the language proposed earlier that day, we were prepared to delete Article V(3) on an ad referendum basis. Grinevsky, however, said that the Soviet side needed to study this matter further, and it was left there.

Article VI of the JDT

Grinevsky proposed considering a solution to Article VI(c) of the JDT along analogous lines to the agreed understanding proposed as a possible solution on Article V(3). Garthoff said that he did not have such a text, but at Grinevsky's request said he would undertake to provide one the next day.

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Article IX of the ABM JDT

Grinevsky said that the Soviet side continued to believe that Article IX should include explicit reference to not transferring technical documentation and blueprints, but since the US side would not do so, the Soviet side was prepared to agree to an Agreed Minute or other written understanding on this point. He proposed the following revision of the language which Garthoff had given him the day before.

'The Soviet Delegation understands the proposed Article IX of the ABM Treaty to mean that neither the US nor the USSR will transfer to other countries, and will not deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this treaty, and that this obligation includes not providing technical description and blueprints specially worked out for the creation of such ABM systems and components."

Garthoff noted that the precise form of the agreed understanding had not been determined, and we had suggested a declaration by the Soviet side which the US side could confirm. He and Parsons undertook to seek agreement from their Delegation to the revised text .

In the later session, Garthoff informed Grinevsky that the American side was prepared to accept the revised language, proposing only a presentational change to refer to "the two sides understanding" instead of stating the understanding as though it were a unilateral Soviet interpretation with which the American side was agreeing. Grinevsky again suggested that the language should be an Agreed Minute. Garthoff said that the American side was prepared to concur in the text of a joint understanding , and that the precise form in which it should be registered could be decided later, particularly inasmuch as there were other understandings also to be agreed upon. Grinevsky agreed.

On this basis, Grinevsky indicated that the Soviet side would drop its bracketed language in Article IX.


Article XI

Garthoff confirmed that the US side was prepared to accept the Soviet proposal for Article XI.

Articles XII, XIII and XIV

It was agreed that along with the other articles to be unbracketed in the ad referendum joint draft text, Articles XII, XIII and XIV on the basis

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originally worked out in Helsinki would also be unbracketed.

Garthoff noted, and Grinevsky confirmed, that the several interpretative comments in connection with Articles XII and XIII would be made at an appropriate time. Garthoff noted that it was necessary to agree on the interpretation of "special concealment measures", and Grinevsky agreed. (See separate Garthoff Memorandum for the Record dated December 21, 1971, for a parallel exchange of sides on this subject.)

Article XV of the JDT

Grinevsky and Kishilov asked if we could not deal with Article XV in the same manner it was suggested we deal with Articles V and VI, and which they had agreed to for Article IX. Garthoff said that the US side was not prepared to change its position on Article XV, and he personally thought it would be one of the last articles to be agreed upon.

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The Soviet Delegation has said on several occasions that it is opposed to the proposal by the United States to include a provision in the ABM agreement prohibiting ABM systems in the future which would use devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars to perform the functions of those components. In order to contribute to negotiating progress, while maintaining our basic position on this matter, the U.S. side is willing to drop Article V (3) if there is a clear agreed understanding as part of the negotiating record. An Agreed Minute could read as follows:

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The Parties agree that the deployment limitations undertaken in Article I and Article III are not to be circumvented by deployment of components other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars for countering strategic ballistic missiles in flight trajectory. They agree that if such components are developed and the question of deployment arises, neither side will initiate such deployment without prior consultation and agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission.