

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

22 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

1. As you may know, a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee prepared last summer an analytical report on some of the issues involved in the NSC review of CBW policy under NSSM-59. This report was circulated in August to your office and to the Agencies concerned in the study and has helped appreciably to shape some of the alternatives to be considered by the Study Group.

2. The PSAC group concluded that our capability to conduct operations in a toxic environment was dangerously deficient and that we should move to improve it. In doing so, major emphasis was to be placed on binary weapons which could be safely stored and easily handled so that a number of domestic and international political problems would thus be eased. The conclusion concerning our capabilities is very important and should be taken into full account during policy formulation since it appears that we are weak in absolute terms, as well as relative to the Soviet Union. I hope you have had an opportunity to read their report, but would like at this time also to direct your attention particularly to three major recommendations that the United States

- renounce all offensive BW
- stop completely the procurement of material for offensive BW
- destroy existing stockpiles of BW agents and maintain no stockpiles in the future

The report details the technical reasons for this recommendation; I concur in it.

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3. I understand that the Department of Defense in its contribution to NSSM-59 indicates a willingness to forego the further development of an offensive BW capability while maintaining R&D programs on defensive measures and to an extent that would avoid technological surprise by an enemy. This would involve no engineering development and no operational systems. However, the question of existing stockpiles of BW agents is not addressed specifically by DOD.

4. If the President should decide to forego offensive BW as a policy, the timing and the phasing of a public announcement will be of crucial importance insofar as public reaction, domestic and international, is concerned. There is a large reservoir of skepticism, cynicism, and incredulity that has developed as a result of our past lack of policy and the inconsistency of past statements in this area. The results of the NSSM-59 review are being awaited impatiently by the press, the public, and the Congress.

5. I suggest that the President announce his conclusions from the study at the earliest possible date. If the final decision includes elimination of offensive BW, the announcement might be accompanied by a publicly announced order for immediate destruction of all existing stocks of BW agents. Our stocks consist of only small quantities of ineffective agents anyway, and, rather than allowing them to disappear through attrition and non-replacement, their destruction offers the President an opportunity to underline the policy change in a most dramatic and convincing fashion.

6. During the last week of December 1969, the annual meeting of the American Association of the Advancement of Science in Boston will feature a symposium on CBW. Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, who represented the United States on the United Nations Study Group on CBW and who also chaired the PSAC CBW panel and Mr. Albert Hayward, Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering for Chemical Technology, have agreed to participate in the Symposium which will be attended by large numbers of interested citizens and, very likely will be nationally telecast on network TV. (It will certainly be on the educational network.) If the President's decision could be announced in advance of this symposium and if Dr. Bennett and Mr. Hayward could prepare their papers on the basis of the new

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policy rather than the present situation (they must submit their papers early in December) the public climate might be improved and a "new start" might be generated in this heretofore controversial area.

7. I hope that you will carefully consider the possibilities for "packaging" the announcement of the results of the NSSM-59 study, and that you will agree that a public announcement by the President would be appropriate.



Lee A. DuBridge  
Science Adviser

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