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TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL, ^{RONN}
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 12 APRIL 1994
 NUMBER: **1095**

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SUBJECT: RWANDA

1. After receiving briefing from Gharekhan on the Belgian Foreign Minister's meeting with you, we have had extensive discussions with Special Representative and Force Commander in Kigali who present a less alarmist assessment of the situation. (The Belgian view is reflected in New York by the their Mission's interpretation of paragraph (ii) of attached statement of African Group (Annex I) as calling for enforcement action in Rwanda).
2. We believe that Belgian assessment should be viewed in context of their decision, apparently already taken, to withdraw from UNAMIR.
3. Attached (Annex II) is a summary of discussions held in the Security Council today. Opinion was divided, with support both for retaining UNAMIR in Rwanda as well as withdrawing it. It is clear that delegations are awaiting some guidance from you, and were informed that this necessarily must be based on assessment of Special Representative and Force Commander, which was imminent.

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4. Both Booh-Booh and Dallaire are strongly against the premature withdrawal of UNAMIR. Even though UNAMIR cannot discharge its mandate in the present circumstances, there is a fair chance that negotiations can be started between the RPF and the Armed Forces, to bring about a cease fire and then to try to restore the peace process. Their assessment is based upon a document received from the Rwandese Army (Annex 3) proposing direct negotiations with the RPF.

5. While the RPF is on the offensive following the large-scale killings of their supporters, this phase may pass as more sober opinions prevail in favour of negotiations. RPF already has indicated that it would consider a coalition government with moderate Hutus.

6. The situation was reviewed between Annan, Goulding, Riza and Baril. We are of the unanimous opinion that, in view of the above considerations, we should not take a precipitous decision to withdraw UNAMIR. We recommend that tomorrow afternoon the Council be briefed on your Special Representative's recommendations (once received in writing and reviewed here at Headquarters). Members may then be willing to wait for your definitive recommendation, to be made after assessing whether the offer by the Armed Forces (an unconditional cease-fire) really could lead to meaningful negotiations. (This recommendation could well be the maintaining of a political presence of UNAMIR, with a reduced military contingent - somewhat on the lines of Angola).

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7. Gharekhan will be contacted on Wednesday as SRSB's report is received, and we shall await your guidance before taking a position in the Council.

8. Incidentally, Force Commander redeployed some Ghanaian troops to Kigali but remainder are still very much in the DMZ rather than having "fled" from there. He has used his troops to escort convoys of civilians of UN system and foreign nationals to safety either by road or to airport by UN/Franco-Belgian flights. He states that even if Belgians have decided to withdraw, he can keep his remaining troops in position for a short while to see if the negotiations open the way toward the resumption of the Arusha plans. He would need equipment to replace that taken away by the Belgians, and we could try to provide this, if it is decided that UNAMIR stays on for a while.

Respects and regards.

SECRETARIAT EXECUTIF DE L'ORGANISATION
DE L'UNITE AFRICAINE AUX NATIONS UNIES



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PRESS RELEASE No. NY/OAU/AG/1/94

STATEMENT OF THE AFRICAN GROUP
ON THE SITUATIONS IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI

The African Group at the United Nations met today in Session to review developments in Rwanda and Burundi, following the tragic death of both Presidents Juvenal HABYARIMANA and Cyprien NTARYAMIRA. The Permanent Representatives of Rwanda and Burundi to the United Nations briefed the Group on the latest developments in their respective countries. In this context, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda informed the Group of the establishment of an interim government. The Group was further briefed on the consultations taking place at the level of the Security Council.

Having discussed the reports made the African Group expressed its concern over the gravity of the situation in both countries, and particularly in Rwanda where thousands of lives were lost.

On the initiatives to evacuate foreign nationals, the Group underlined that the Rwandese people who cannot be evacuated anywhere should equally be a matter of concern for the international community.

In its consideration of the urgent need of restoring peace, stability and security in Rwanda and Burundi respectively, the African Group,

(i) Calls for an immediate ceasefire and an end to the mindless violence which is engulfing Rwanda;

TD TD (ii) Urges the Security Council to take urgent actions to help protect the lives and property of civilians in Rwanda, and to consider expanding the size and mandate of UNAMIR in Rwanda;

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- (iii) Reiterates the importance of the full implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement;
- (iv) Emphasizes the readiness of the OAU to cooperate with the United Nations in the implementation of the said Agreement;
- (v) Strongly appeals to the International Community to increase humanitarian assistance to commensurate with the scale of human tragedy following the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi.

New York, April 11, 1994

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Tuesday, 12 April 1994

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Rwanda

Mr. Riza said the situation in Kigali was still violent and chaotic, with the interim government having departed and the RPF having taken over most of the strong-points. The Force Commander's efforts to bring about a truce and cease-fire had been unsuccessful so far, so he was persevering and would be sending letters to both parties. The Special Representative and he were in contact with the Defence Minister. The only radio station still functioning was broadcasting inflammatory propaganda, particularly against Belgians. France had extended its presence and postponed its departure: it was not known for how long. The RPF was demanding that foreign troops leave soon because it did not want to hold its fire (against the government troops controlling other parts of the airport) indefinitely. If the evacuation was for some reason not completed on time, it was hoped that the RPF might be induced to continue not to fire. Regarding UNAMIR's future, Mr. Booh-Booh was preparing a report with recommendations on its future.

Nigeria said the departure of French and Belgian troops would lead to a vacuum both of authority and security. The Council would need to consider what to do if one of the parties to the Arusha peace accord seized power through force. The NAM Caucus was working on a draft resolution, which should be ready tomorrow, dealing with these points as well as the plight of the civilian population.

France recalled that the presence of its troops in Rwanda had a relatively old history; in the past they had greatly contributed to stability and balance. They would probably leave tomorrow, and this would indeed lead to a vacuum. The RPF must understand that it would have to go back to negotiations. On UNAMIR, there were two options: to reinforce its presence and mandate; or to withdraw. France did not yet have a position, but a Somali-type operation would be very difficult.

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The United Kingdom thought that both the options presented by the French were deeply unsatisfactory (the second because it would give a very negative impression of the UN throughout the region), and presented two more alternatives that came somewhere in between the French proposals: that UNAMIR remain in its present configuration; and that it be drastically scaled down (as in Angola).

Spain felt all four options on the table were unsatisfactory, but did not add to their number. The United States had major doubts about the viability of UNAMIR in the present circumstances; it certainly could not carry out its mandate, and may even be a ^{use} stabilizing factor.

A number of delegations felt there was an urgent need to get the views of the Force Commander and of the Secretary-General by tomorrow morning. The views of the two major troop-contributors (Belgium and Bangladesh) were also sought. Mr. Riza hoped that the views of the Force Commander would be received tomorrow. He also stressed that the mandate of UNAMIR had never been to protect all the civilians, but rather to implement the Arusha agreement. The killings should not therefore be seen as a failure of UNAMIR.

It was agreed that the President would make some remarks to the press, regarding the need for a cease-fire etc., while a draft resolution would be presented for members' consideration tomorrow.

Libya-Chad

Mr. Riza said it should be possible to have a small preliminary reconnaissance team in Tripoli by Thursday. Much depended on how much support was provided by Libya.

Angola

Brazil, Nigeria, Russia, Spain and Oman all blamed the current deadlock in the Lusaka talks squarely on UNITA, which was