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UNSP 062/80
34 MAY 1994

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SUMMARY

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1. Secretary-General deeply concerned about Rwanda. Says UNAMIR may have to be withdrawn completely. Thinking of an African enforcement operation, seeks seeks UK and French assistance. Writes to Security Council urging it to consider what action, including forceful action, it could take or could authorise Member States to take to restore law and order and end the massacres. Quotes estimates that as many as 200,000 people may have died during the last 3 weeks.

2. Instructions requested.

DETAIL

2. When Merimee (France) and I saw the Secretary-General late on 29 April on other matters, Boutros-Ghali said that the situation in Rwanda was disastrous. He had come close to pulling out the remaining UNAMIR troops. The present option - ~~that of a skeleton UNAMIR presence - was no longer sustainable.~~ The United Nations was going to come in for increasing criticism. He was determined to think up something before the 10 May inauguration in South Africa.

3. Boutros-Ghali said that he was thinking in terms of a Liberia-style operation run by the Africans, but there needed to be some behind the scenes effort by the bigger powers. He had tried to speak to the Africans, without success. ~~_____~~. He hoped you and Juppe might be able to persuade our friends in Africa to come up with forces which we

could assist with transport and even through providing military commanders.

4. Merimee and I accepted that the situation was terrible and said that we would report the Secretary-General's request. We queried however what our Governments were likely to be able to do. I said the Security Council presidential statement then under discussion in the Council (see my separate reporting telegram) would give the Secretary-General a mandate to coordinate with the Africans to seek a solution. We had little involvement in Rwanda.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. Later in the evening the (New Zealand) Security Council President circulated to Council Members during the course of informal consultations on the draft presidential statement a letter he had just received from the Secretary-General (copy by fax to AD(E) and UND). The Secretary-General's letter reports a further deterioration in the situation in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda. UNAMIR reports preparations for further massacres in Kigali, and massacres continuing on a large scale in the countryside. In recent days both sides have begun to express lack of confidence in UNAMIR's impartiality. This is affecting their cooperation with the SRSG and the Force Commander.

6. The Secretary-General says that these developments raise serious questions about the viability of the mandate conferred on UNAMIR by resolution 912. That mandate does not give UNAMIR the power to act to halt the continuing massacres. At best it can provide limited protection to small groups in Kigali. Some estimates suggest as many as 200,000 people may have died in the last three weeks. UNAMIR's mandate is an adequate response to the resumption of fighting between the RGF and the RPF but it does not address the massacres. These can be ended only if law and order is restored, a task which is far beyond UNAMIR's present capacity.

7. The Secretary-General urges the Security Council to re-examine resolution 912 and to consider again what action, including forceful action, it could take or could authorise Member States to take to restore law and order and end the

massacres. He says that he is aware that such action would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale Member States have so far proved reluctant to contemplate. But the scale of the suffering leaves the Security Council with no alternative but to examine this possibility.

COMMENT

8. The Secretary-General was extremely distraught. He feels himself to be under great pressure from public opinion, and from some at least of the Africans. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. His idea of conscripting African states would have greater credibility if there was any evidence that he had identified and contacted volunteers willing to take part in an enforcement operation. [REDACTED]

8. I have my bilateral with the incoming (Nigerian) Security Council President on the morning of 3 May, and will require instructions on the Secretary-General's approach by 031300Z. If instructions are required before then, we will seek them on the telephone.

HANNAY

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