

85

pe

UNDP 062/80
RECEIVED
21 APR 1994

FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 210730Z FCO
TELNO 1434
OF 210155Z APRIL 94
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA, ROME, DHAKA, WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA, ACCRA, DAR ES SALAAM
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR

MY TELNO 1410: RWANDA

81

SUMMARY

1. Secretary-General's recommendations on the future of UNAMIR fail to materialise. Situation on the ground still tense. Heavy fighting around Byumba. Efforts to achieve a cease-fire continue. The Belgian contingent have now left. In addition some non-essential UNAMIR military personnel have also left. Humanitarian situation deteriorating. I underline once again the need for the Council to take a substantive decision on UNAMIR this week and express hope that the Secretary-General's recommendation will not be further delayed.

DETAIL

2. During informal consultations of the Security Council on 20 April Gharekhan (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) told Council members that the recommendation of the Secretary-General to which he had referred on 19 April were not yet available and he wished to withdraw all that he had said previously as to what the report might contain (para 6 of TUR). He hoped something would be available on 21 April but could not guarantee this.

3. Gharekhan reported that the general situation in Rwanda remained tense. The fighting had been intense on the morning of 19 April but had declined later on. The ICRC, with UNAMIR's assistance, had been able to evacuate the wounded from the stadium shelled on 19 April. The number of casualties had increased to 40 dead and 100 seriously wounded. There was heavy fighting around the regional city of Byumba. Efforts to negotiate a cease-fire continued.

[REDACTED]. The last of the Belgian contingent had left on 19 April. 264 non-essential UNAMIR military personnel had also been evacuated to Nairobi. UNAMIR's force strength was therefore now at 1707. The humanitarian situation was deteriorating. In particular the sanitary conditions at the national stadium and the King Faisal Hospital were now serious. UNAMIR had escorted an ICRC convoy to distribute food to the 4000 or so displaced people still in the stadium. UNAMIR forces were continuing to regroup in Kigali. 237 Ghanaians had evacuated from the DMZ into Kigali where they had deployed with the rest of their contingent at the airport. The remaining 87 members of the Ghanaian battalion were expected to arrive in Kigali late on 28 April.

4. Gambari (Nigeria) said he was disappointed at the situation on the ground but not discouraged. He drew attention to the meeting held in Kampala under President Musaveni's auspices (Kampala telno 120 refers). This had made some progress. He also noted that a meeting would be held between the parties and regional leaders in Arusha on 23 April which was aimed at persuading the parties of the futility of a military solution to the problems in Rwanda. The Secretary-General of the OAU was also contacting regional leaders. Gambari also noted that there was a draft resolution on the table. We should aim to take this forward. Whatever our recommendations on UNAMIR's future mandate, there was a need for the Council to make a political statement on the events in Rwanda.

5. In response to questions Gharekhan said that UNAMIR had been unable to resolve the problem of the control of the airport. There had been no attacks on UNAMIR in the past 24 hours and no deliberate hostility. But while the fighting continued there was always a danger of UNAMIR getting caught in the crossfire. The process of evacuation of non-essential personnel was not complete. But much would depend on what the Council decided on the future of UNAMIR. There was no basis for the figure being reported in the press that 500 military personnel were about to leave. But in this connection he added that troop contributors might in the end decide themselves whether they wanted to stay. They might force the issue sooner rather than later.

6. I said that while the ultimate decision on the presence of UNAMIR did indeed rest with the troop contributors since if they were to decide to leave then, force majeure, the Council would have to accept this. But this was not a desirable outcome. The

Security Council should be taking decisions on which the troop contributors could base their actions rather than the other way round. We were arriving at the point when we needed to agree to a regrettable but necessary downsizing of the operation. We should do this in a logical and properly planned way, not by default. Furthermore we should not discredit ourselves by taking decisions which were only viable on paper. When we took a decision on the size of a UN presence in Rwanda it should be on the basis of numbers of military personnel which we were sure could be achieved. But whatever happened the Council must not postpone a decision on Rwanda beyond the coming weekend. I supported the Spanish Ambassador's call for assurances that we would receive the Secretary-General's recommendations on 21 April.

7. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) said that as President he had been encountering increasing numbers of colleagues outside the Council who were expressing grave concern that Security Council had not yet said or done anything about the horrific killings in Rwanda. It was not easy to explain whether to the press or to other UN members, why the Security Council was not pointing the finger at someone since it was clear from the Secretariat and other reports that the bulk of the killing was the responsibility of one side. He endorsed my plea for an early decision, as did Cardenas (Argentina), who said that the force was in limbo without a mandate and the Council's continued failure to rectify this was difficult to defend.

COMMENT

8. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. One of the options is reported to be to increase the force level, despite the fact that, as noted in para 8 of TUR, the Force Commander has recommended an immediate scaling down of UNAMIR.

HANNAY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

118

MAIN 106

.EAST AFRICA
AD(E)
AD(S)
APD
CCD
CFSP UNIT
CONSULAR D
EAFD/ODA
ECD(E)
ERD
HRPD
INFO D//BRIEFWRITERS
LEGAL ADVISERS
NENAD//
NEWS D

NTCD
PUSD
RAD
RFD
UND
PS
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD
PS/BARONESS CHALKER
PS/PUS

ADDITIONAL 12

ASSESSMENTS//
MODUK//DI(ROW)
MODUK//SEC(O)(C)
PS/NO 10
//

HOME OFF//B3 DIV
HMT//
DTI// XAAA3
DTI//

NNNN