

115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

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FROM: NEW YORK C04452/NYK 12-May-1994

TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Immediate

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Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C23246

Summary

- With some Council members preferring NZ draft resolution, both Presidential draft and NZ drafts are on the table
- Working group is meeting now after informals for detailed consideration
- Adoption of resolution tomorrow is a possibility
- Secretariat reports intense fighting continues in Kigali (as of Wed)
- "Foreign Minister" of Rwanda is in NY and seeks call on us. US and UK delegations refuse to meet with him. Canadians advise they declined approach for visit to Ottawa and US and Belgium refused visa applications.

Action

- Confirmation that we may vote for a resolution tomorrow
- Confirmation we should not/not meet with so called Foreign Minister of Rwanda.

Report*M. R. R.*

2 Secretariat (Gharekhan) reported on the situation on the ground saying that intensive fighting continued in Kigali yesterday. The Hotel Milles Collines also came under attack from unidentified source. Movements of UNOMUR (existing UN force established on Uganda side of border) had been restricted in some places by Ugandan army. (This will impact on its ability to effectively monitor whether there is any flow of arms to Rwanda (RPF) from Uganda). Our IFF contains copy of Gharekhan's speaking notes.

3 As to the availability of troops for an expanded UNAMIR, Gharekhan said that OAU Sec Gen had advised that he had received offers of troops from "4 African countries" and mentioned Tanzania, Ghana and Nigeria in this regard. Fourth country was not identified because it's decision was not yet firm.

4 The President (Gambari) reported briefly on his meetings with RGF "Foreign Minister" and the RPF. Although both supported an expanded UNAMIR, the government preferred a bigger operation to cover the whole of Rwanda and which would interpose itself between the parties. The RPF wanted a smaller force with a more limited mandate.

5 Oman opened discussion with what is becoming something of a precondition for them relating to the need to have a cease-fire before the Council acts, saying it is inappropriate for the UN to help if the parties do not "help themselves by agreeing to a cease-fire". Although the Russians conceded there were some answers needed in this context, the line was most strongly countered by Czech, noting that the existence of a cease-fire was irrelevant to the mandate under discussion. The majority clearly accepted that a ceasefire could not be made a precondition.

6 France expressed a preference for the NZ draft but minus those elements which are not immediately related to providing humanitarian assistance (ie human rights etc). They proposed that the focus of discussion be the NZ draft although if necessary without the reference to Chapter VII. As regards the arms embargo, (like us) they indicated that they were either in favour of actually establishing such an embargo (and setting up the required Council Committee to monitor it) or leaving the issue where it currently lies with the 30 April Presidential statement (ie not the contradictory provision proposed in the Presidential draft).

7 UK noted they would not press it, but felt that the resolution should confine itself to expressing a simple mandate relating to humanitarian protection only. Second they favoured leaving flexibility to the Force Commander and secretariat as to whether, under the changing circumstances, the force was Kigali centered or border centered (ie focussed either inside-out, or outside-in). It was unwise to "saddle" UNAMIR with a particular style, though they understood that

the preferred technical option was to center in Kigali.

8 UK noted UNOSOM I had illustrated the problems with becoming focussed solely on Mogadishu port, which resulted in the Council "getting stuck for months" on that issue. UK favoured setting a force limit "of up to []" in number which would also allow some flexibility for deployment of less than that number. Lastly, UK stressed need for at least some preliminary costings on which the Council could act. (To satisfy this concern, Gharekhan noted that secretariat would be presenting a brief report tomorrow).

9 US confined itself to asking alot of (good) questions but which are difficult to answer yet. How many troops are available? What skills do they have? What equipment do they bring? How quickly could they be deployed? What countries would provide logistical support etc? (We know from the Canadians that secretariat has approached both US and Spain asking for them to join the present sole effort by Canada in flying regularly into Kigali to resupply UNAMIR.)

10 China exhibited its traditional reluctance to contemplate using the words "Chapter VII" operations but interestingly accepted that an expanded UNAMIR, focussed on humanitarian assistance, would need "sufficiently strong rules of engagement". It accepted that UNAMIR could not be expected to have the complete cooperation of the parties and might need to use force but this did not mean that it should not use every effort to gain voluntary cooperation.

11 For our part, we focussed on 4 issues: the scope of the mandate, the concept of operations, the quantum of force required and the arms embargo. On the mandate, we said France that the framework for the operation should be humanitarian not peace-enforcement and that this meant there was a focus on two tasks, protection of civilians and protection of humanitarian assistance operations. On the concept of operations, we noted the two approaches, either "outside-in" or "inside-out" and that this was essentially a technical question (on which some flexibility could be displayed).

12 As regards the quantum of the force required we put the view that stating whether the operation was subject to either a Chapter VI or Chapter VII mandate was not the real issue. What is really important is to be very explicit that the operation has the right degree of authority to use force to carry out its mandate and that this is reflected in the rules of engagement. On the arms embargo we agreed with French position as above.

13 President summed up the discussion by noting that there was general agreement to focus on a humanitarian mandate and to contemplate a phased deployment (ie so that it was not held up till the entire force was in place), that there was a flexible concept of operations and that the arms embargo be

implemented. For Nigeria, it was also important, he noted, to place the expanded mandate in a political context (ie Arusha).

14 Working Group then convened and is meeting now.

Comment

15 If it would take many days to negotiate an omnibus resolution dealing with all possible issues, then on balance it would be preferable to move rapidly ahead at this stage and secure an expanded force. We could return to the other issues as a matter of priority in the context of a report from the Human Rights Commissioner and the special session of the Commission.

16 We do not discount possibility that Council may finalise a resolution tomorrow. It is pleasing that there is much support for the NZ draft.

"Foreign Minister" of Rwanda Visits

17 The "Foreign Minister" of "interim government" of Rwanda (Jerome Bicamumpaka) is in New York and has sought a call on us. UK and US delegations have declined to meet with him, even at junior levels. Canadians advise that they have reports from their embassies about his recent visits to Bonn and to Paris which indicate that he is engaged solely in a propoganda exercise aimed at promoting extremist Hutu views. Canadian view is that he is not interested in serious discussion of the problems and on this basis they indicated to the Rwandan Ambassador in Ottawa that a visit would not be welcome. They put it to him that he would be better off seriously negotiating a cease-fire and not travelling overseas to enlist political support.

18 We are not entirely clear how the "Ministerial" appointment has been made, but Canadians emphasise that constitutionally it is the Arusha Peace Accord which provides the legitimacy for any such appointments and since this has clearly not been applied, the appointment is not constitutional. We know also that Belgium and US have refused visas for purpose of visits to Brussels and Washington respectively. By contrast some likeminded members of the Council (Spain, Czech) and some others, France and of course the President, are seeing him.

19 We would propose that we do not meet Minister given the circumstances of continued reports of massacres in "government" held areas. Grateful your views.

End Message