

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

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FROM: NEW YORK	C04400/NYK	02-May-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTV UNSC	Immediate
CC: BEIJING	BONN	Routine
BRUSSELS	CANBERRA	Routine
GENEVA	HARARE	Routine
LONDON	MADRID	Routine
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
PARIS	SANTIAGO	Routine
TOKYO	WASHINGTON	Routine
TO: Defence		Immediate
MFAT	(MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1) (DSP3, EAB)	
DEFENCE HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI)	
DEFENCE MOD	(GENTLES)	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Sec-Gen has proposed that Council reconsider its decision to down-size UNAMIR and instead consider taking or authorising more forceful action to restore order;
- Council members see Sec-Gen's letter as driven, at least in part, by desire to avoid political responsibility for what is happening in Rwanda;
- RPF has circulated statement declaring its dissatisfaction with Sec-Gen's Special Rep and arguing that time for UN intervention is past;
- Council will hold initial discussion of Sec-Gen's letter tomorrow, 3 May;
- Meanwhile Tanzania has announced that Government and RPF have agreed to meet in Arusha tomorrow.

Action

Comments on New Zealand's response to Sec-Gen's letter

Report

As reported in our separate message, Sec-Gen sprang a

surprise on Council members last Friday evening by circulating, without prior warning, his letter (faxed separately) requesting Council to reexamine its decision in Res 912 reducing the UNAMIR force level and limiting its mandate, and proposing that Council consider taking or authorising more forceful action to restore order in Rwanda.

2 Nigerians intend to open discussion at informals tomorrow afternoon on how Council should respond to the letter. There was a preliminary exchange today, however, at a lunch meeting of the non-permanent members of the Council hosted by Gambari. In introducing the subject, Gambari referred to announcement from Tanzania that there was to be a meeting of the Government and the RPF tomorrow at Arusha where OAU Sec-Gen, Salim, would also be in attendance. He also noted that the Sec-Gen had been in contact with OAU President, Mubarak, to explore what the OAU and the UN might be able to do.

3 Preliminary comments by others confirmed a degree of irritation with the Sec-Gen over what is seen by most Council members as partly an exercise in blame shifting. As was demonstrated at the Minister's meeting with the Sec-Gen last week, Boutros Ghali is taking the line that the Council erred when it down-sized UNAMIR ten days ago and is conveniently ignoring the fact that the Council was acting on the only realistic option he put before it. That said, Council members recognise that the gravity of the situation is such that they must respond promptly to the Sec-Gen's letter.

4 Gambari wants the OAU to take the lead in formulating the international response. From his remarks today, it appears that he would be happy to contemplate either an expanded UNAMIR with a more vigorous mandate or the establishment of an OAU force along the lines of the West African force (ECOMOG) in Liberia which would operate in support of UNAMIR and would be funded through a UN operated trust fund.

5 It was clear from Gambari's remarks that he would support whatever outcome would be more likely to be readily agreed. His comments suggested that he doubted it would be possible to secure support in the Council (ie from the US) to funding an expanded operation from assessed contributions. But he indicated he would be happy to contemplate an operation run by the OAU, provided it was funded externally. He emphasised that the OAU had no capacity itself to fund the operation, and recalled the funding difficulties that had been encountered with the expanded force for Liberia when Zimbabwe had declined to provide the battalion it had promised because it would not be paid the fee it was after.

6 We expressed some doubts as to the wisdom of a Desert Storm type authorisation to States to take "all necessary measures" to restore peace to Rwanda, and Brazilians and Argentines questioned the appropriateness of intervention by Rwanda's neighbouring States. In response, Gambari

acknowledged that any African force would have to be under the OAU umbrella and should have a clear relationship with UNAMIR if it was not part of it. He also volunteered that Uganda would be precluded from participation given Musaveni's clear links with the RPF (though another member of the Nigerian Mission told us privately that they had had reports of a 30,000 force being assembled in Uganda) and that Zaire was probably ruled out as well since it had shown a "preference" for one side (the Government) even if it had not actually taken sides.

7 Gambari said that given the above and Burundi's situation, Tanzania and Kenya were the obvious countries of the region to take the lead, though he also said that there would be a need for involvement of countries of north, west and southern Africa as well. At this, Bizimana, the Rwandan PR, intervened to argue that forceful action by Tanzania would be inconsistent with its role as facilitator of the Arusha agreement. Bizimana went on to advise Gambari that he would be sending him a letter today with a formal request from the Rwanda Government seeking increased UN assistance.

8 No reference was made at the lunch to the latest position of the RPF who sent a statement to all Council members over the weekend in response to the Sec-Gen's letter. Statement (see accompanying fax) expresses publicly comment RPF made to us as President last Friday about their dissatisfaction with Special Rep Booh-Booh and goes on to argue that there is no need for forceful UN intervention and that such intervention would be seen as an attempt to protect the Rwandan Government.

9 Tomorrow's discussion of the Sec-Gen's letter is bound to be only a preliminary exchange in a debate that is likely to preoccupy the Council for all of this week. Few Council members will be ready to offer definitive proposals; most will want to gauge the general feeling in the Council and will want the Sec-Gen to provide more detailed recommendations before taking firm positions. They will also want to know what is happening at the new talks that are supposed to be getting underway in Arusha tomorrow.

#### Comment

10 It is far from clear at this stage how close the speculation at today's lunch is to reality. Much of what Gambari said was based on the hope that the US (and Japan) would be persuaded to contribute to intervention in Rwanda, perhaps through funding for an OAU force rather than through a UN operation funded through the peacekeeping budget. A quick check with the US Mission this afternoon, however, revealed that notwithstanding some speculation in the weekend press that the US might be prepared to support regional intervention to stop the bloodshed, the Mission is not expecting to be instructed to advocate or support such an approach. They advised that Washington's focus remains on the situation of the refugees and on following up the

measures proposed in paras 6-8 and 14(b)-(d) of the weekend's Presidential statement.

11 It is not clear at this stage how seriously the RPF statement should be taken. RPF were clearly angered at extent that Rwandan PR was able to influence the discussions on the Presidential statement last Friday. Unless they are suddenly able to take control of the rest of the country, we doubt that they would directly oppose international intervention through or in coordination with the UN, provided they are persuaded that their view point will be accommodated. Their confidence in the UNAMIR Force Commander should help to bring them to accept an expanded presence; but Booh-Booh's replacement may be part of their asking price. We do not, however, consider that their statement should dictate the Council's response any more that should the position of the Rwandan Government.

12 We consider that New Zealand should indicate a willingness to contemplate expanded international action to restore peace to Rwanda, provided that realistic and achievable goals for such action can be set. As a first step, therefore, the Sec-Gen should be asked to provide more detailed recommendations for the Council to consider.

13 On the mechanics of possible intervention, we think we should to express a preference for any expanded international action to be undertaken by the UN itself; ie through an expanded UNAMIR. Only this way would the international community be able to keep proper control of the operation, both in terms of setting its objectives and in controlling its personnel. This should not mean that we are opposed to regional action by the OAU in conjunction with the UN if there are problems in securing agreement for the UN itself to act, but this would be a second best option. The least good option would be for the Council simply to authorise States to intervene as they saw appropriate. Given the tensions in the region, such action could well result in the problems spreading to neighbouring countries rather than alleviating the situation in Rwanda.

End Message