### CONFIDENTIAL

# RELEASED IN PART

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ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 C-01 DODE-00 EUR-01 HA-09 L-03 INRE-00 INR-01 H-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 P-01 SS-01 PM-01 RP-10 SNP-01 SP-01 TRSE-00

T-01 /034W

-----31FA89 131453Z /38

P 131444Z MAY 92

FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0673

INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 01981

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, RW, UG

SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR

- CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. SUMMARY. IN DISCUSSIONS MAY 10-11 WITH A/S COHEN, RWANDA'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINED A TWO-PRONGED APPROACH TO ENDING RWANDA'S WAR WITH THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF): DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF RESULTING IN A PEACE TREATY ON THE ONE HAND AND CONFIDENTIAL

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NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH UGANDA ON THE OTHER. HE
SUBSEQUENTLY INCORPORATED INTO HIS STRATEGY COHEN'S
SUGGESTION FOR A NON-AGGRESSION TREATY WITH UGANDA. THE
FOREIGN MINISTER SAID ALL ISSUES WERE NEGOTIABLE. COHEN
SAID IF ALL PARTIES REQUEST US TO, THE U.S. WOULD
PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND PROVIDE TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE ON DEVELOPINGHS
MQCK MUSEVENI IN" TO FUTURE COMMITMENTS WITHOUT FORCING
HIM TO ACKNOWLEDGE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR. RWANDA'S
NEW MINISTER OF DEFENSE ASKED FOR U.S. HELP WITH THE
DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY, DEMINING THE BORDER AREA,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 MAY 2012
DATE/CASE ID: 27 APR 2005 200103014

[]NCLASSIFIED

OPENING THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR AND HAVING UGANDA WITHDRAW AID FROM THE RPF. END SUMMARY.

# TWO-PRONGED APPROACH

- 3. AMBASSADOR HERMAN J. COHEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICA, DISCUSSED PROSPECTS FOR RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE GOR-RPF WAR AND RELATED ISSUES IN A JOINT MEETING MAY 10 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BONIFACE NGULINZIRA AND DEFENSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA. ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING FOR THE U.S. WERE AMBASSADOR FLATEN, DCM LEADER, ECON OFFICER ZORICK. PRESENT FOR THE RWANDAN SIDE WERE AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ALOYS UWIMANA AND A NOTETAKER FROM EACH OF THE MINISTRIES.
- 4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINED TO AMBASSADOR COHEN THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT'S TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY FOR RESOLVING THE WAR WITH THE RPF. HE SAID THE APPROACH WOULD INVOLVE BOTH POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE RPF AND CONFIDENTIAL

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NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH UGANDA. HE TOLD COHEN
HE WILL GO TO KAMPALA THE WEEK OF MAY 18 (PROBABLY MAY
18-21) TO MEET AND DISCUSS DATES AND LOCATION FOR FUTURE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF AND TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH
UGANDA. (NOTE. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE INTERIOR
MINISTER AND THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR REFUGEE
AFFAIRS WILL ACCOMPANY THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THIS
TRIP. MDR AND PL PARTY LEADERS MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE.
END NOTE.)

5. THE MJ WGZLT IN A
PEACE TREATY SIGNED BY THE TWO PARTIES. THE FIRST PHASE
WILL BE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE,
WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE FOR THE
NEGOTIATIONS. A MECHANISM FOR MONITORING THE CEASE FIRE
WILL BE NECESSARY IF THE CEASEFIRE IS TO BE EFFECTIVE.
HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF NEUTRAL OBSERVERS OR A
TEAM CONSISTING OF THE TWO PARTIES. THE SECOND PHASE
WILL BE THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE THAT WILL HAVE TO EXAMINE
SIX ELEMENTS: REFUGEES, NATIONAL UNITY, THE
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS, A NATIONAL CONFERENCE, THE
PARTICIPATION OF THE RPF IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE
INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER
STRESSED THAT ALL OF THESE ELEMENTS ARE NEGOTIABLE. THE

MINISTER SAID THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE DIRECT AND WITHOUT MEDIATORS BECAUSE MEDIATORS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO INFLEXIBLE POSITIONS. FACILITATORS TO PROVIDE A NEUTRAL VENUE OR OBSERVATION MIGHT, HOWEVER, BE USEFUL.

6. IN HIS TOAST TO AMBASSADOR COHEN AT A DINNER LATER THAT EVENING, THE MINISTER CLARIFIED HIS CONCEPT OF CONFIDENTIAL

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MEDIATION: HENCEFORTH MEDIATORS, INCLUDING THE U.S.,
WOULD FACILITATE MEETINGS RATHER THAN SERVE AS AN
OBLIGATORY CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

7. UGANDA, THE MINISTER SAID, WOULD BE KEY IN THE PROCESS. THE GOAL OF RWANDA'S NORMALIZATION EFFORTS WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO ABANDON ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RPF AND TO HAVE UGANDA ENCOURAGE THE RPF TO ACCEPT

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	PM-01 T-01	P-01 /034W	RP-10	SNP-01	SP-01	SS-01	TRSE-00

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P 131444Z MAY 92 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0674 INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 KIGALI 01981

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, RW, UG

SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR

THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. NO RESULTS CAN BE EXPECTED WITHOUT UGANDA'S PARTICIPATION AND COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF SECURITY AND TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

COHEN BRIEFS ON TALKS IN UGANDA

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8. RESPONDED FA	AVORABLY TO THE S	TRATEGY OUTLI	A/S COHEN NE BY THE	1.4(B)
MINISTER. I VERY USEFUL	HE AGREED THAT MU	SEVENI WAS KE	Y AND COULD BE	1.4(B)

9. RPF READY TO NEGOTIATE. COHEN TOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE RPF IS READY TO NEGOTIATE AND THAT IT HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION OF FRANCE TO THE NEXT NEGOTIATING SESSION IN PARIS. HOWEVER, HE SAID, THE RPF DOUBTS THE FREEDOM OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO NEGOTIATE. HE SAID THE RPF CITED THE CONSTITUTION, THE CONTINUING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT, AND THE OBSTACLE OF THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY AS THE BASIS FOR ITS SKEPTICISM. COHEN SAID HE URGED THE RPF TO FIND OUT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WHETHER ITS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT.

10. RPF DEMANDS. COHEN REVIEWED FOR THE RWANDANS THE RPF DEMANDS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE N'SELE ACCORDS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN; INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES; AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE TO PROTECT RETURNING REFUGEES; A NEUTRAL OBSERVER GROUP FOR A CONFIDENTIAL

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CEASEFIRE; THE PRESENCE OF THE U.S. AT NEGOTIATIONS
BECAUSE OF DOUBTS OVER THE NEUTRALITY OF THE FRENCH; AND
A CEASEFIRE (ONE THAT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN LAYING
DOWN ARMS). THE ONLY NON-NEGOTIABLE DEMAND, HE SAID,
WAS THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN.

# U.S. ROLE IN TALKS

11. AMBASSADOR COHEN TOLD THE RWANDANS THAT THE U.S. HAS FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE FACILITATING ROLE OF THE FRENCH IN NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE RPF HAD ASKED FOR A U.S. PRESENCE AND SAID THE U.S. IS READY TO BE PRESENT PROVIDING ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE FRENCH, ARE READY FOR THE U.S. TO PARTICIPATE. COHEN SAID THE U.S. CAN FURNISH TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO HELP WITH DEFINING THE TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE AND WITH THE ISSUE OF INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES.

# INTEGRATION OF FORCES AND DEMOBILIZATION

12. COHEN NOTED THAT PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA BELIEVES INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY WILL BE THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT OF THE RPF'S DEMANDS. COHEN RECOUNTED HIS SUGGESTION FOR LINKING INTEGRATION WITH DEMOBILIZATION: FIRST INTEGRATE ALL THE FORCES AND THEN DEMOBILIZE AN EQUAL PROPORTION OF BOTH FORCES. THE DETAILS, HE SAID CAN BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE HELP OF EXPERTS. BUT EVERYONE WHO RETURNS, REFUGEES AND SOLDIERS, MUST BE REINTEGRATED INTO RWANDAN SOCIETY. IN RESPONSE TO THE CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 KIGALI 01981 02 OF 04 141135Z MINISTER'S QUESTION, COHEN SAID THE RPF HAD NOT INDICATED HOW IT THOUGHT INTEGRATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE.

13. RWANDA'S NEW MINISTER OF DEFENSE, JAMES GASANA. NOTED SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES TO REINTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES: MANY RPF FIGHTERS HAVE SERVED IN THE ARMY OF ANOTHER COUNTRY, RAISING THE QUESTION OF LOYALTY; VARIATIONS EXIST IN THE LEVEL AND QUALITY OF TRAINING OF THE TWO FORCES; COHEN'S SUGGESTION RISKED LEAVING MINORITY TUTSI OVERREPRESENTED IN THE ARMY.

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P 131444Z MAY 92 ZDK

FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0675

INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 KIGALI 01981

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NON-AGGRESSION ACCORD

14. DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA (WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL PARTY) ELABORATED ON THE ROLE UGANDA AND ITS ARMY HAS PLAYED IN THE WAR: THE NRA CONFIDENTIAL

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- 16. THE LAST ELEMENT, COHEN SAID, WOULD AVOID THE ARGUMENT OVER WHERE THE TROOPS ARE AND PERMIT THE CEASEFIRE TO BE IMPLEMENTED. HE SAID THE ENTIRE ACCORD COULD BE DEPOSITED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH WOULD ENGAGE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN PROVIDING GUARANTEES.
- 17. THE RWANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM OVER SUCH AN ACCORD. HE ASKED WHETHER SUCH AN ACCORD COULD BRING CHANGES ON THE GROUND, WHAT THE CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD DO IF IT WERE BROKEN, AND
WHETHER UGANDA WOULD ACCEPT. HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO

WAY RWANDA COULD LET MUSEVENI GET AWAY WITHOUT ACCEPTING
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR IF THERE WERE NO IRON-CLAD
GUARANTEES OF PEACE.

HE NOTED THAT SIMILAR
ACCORDS WITH COMMITMENTS WERE USED IN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA
AND ARE UNDER DISCUSSION IN MOZAMBIQUE.

18. LATER THE SAME DAY, HOWEVER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER
HAD ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF IN HIS
TOAST TO COHEN LATER THAT EVENING, HE STATED THAT RWANDA
WOULD NEED POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FROM
FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO SIGN AN ACCORD

1.4(B)

U.S AID REQUESTED

- 19. IN SUMMING UP AID RWANDA WILL NEED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS PLAN, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE TOLD COHEN THAT U.S. HELP WOULD BE NEEDED:
- -- TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT FROM THE RPF SO SINCERE NEGOTIATIONS CAW PROCEED;
- -- TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO OPEN THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR SO RWANDA'S ECONOMY CAN BEGIN TO RECOVER;
- -- TO ASSIST IN DEMOBILIZATION BY PROVIDING CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 KIGALI 01981 03 OF 04 141135Z REINTEGRATION TRAINING AND REHABILATION FOR HANDICAPPED VETERANS; AND,

-- TO HELP WITH DEMINING AREAS NEAR THE FRONTIER SO CIVILIANS CAN RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND BEGIN FARMING AGAIN.

COMMENT

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P 131444Z MAY 92 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0676 INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 01981

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

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SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR

THE FOREIGN MINISTER APPEARS READY TO TAKE 20. NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE WAR IN A NEW DIRECTION. INTENTION TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH THE RPF AND TO NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY WITH UGANDA ARE TWO IMPORTANT DEPARTURES FROM THE POSITION OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT THAT SHOULD OPEN NEW AVENUES OF DISCUSSION FOR ALL CONFIDENTIAL

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KIGALI 01981 04 OF 04 141136Z PAGE 02 PARTIES. AMBASSADOR COHEN MADE IT CLEAR TO RWANDA THAT THE U.S. IS WILLING TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF AND UGANDA AND HE OFFERED SOME

SUGGESTIONS ON SEVERAL POINTS. HE DID NOT GET INVOLVED WITH NEGOTIATING DETAILS, SUCH AS TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE, BUT DID OFFER U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WHEN THE TIME COMES.

21.	
	1.4(B)
THIS POSITION CONTRASTS	
SHARPLY WITH THAT PRESENTED TO AMBASSADOR COHEN BY THE	
PRIME MINISTER AND HIS CABINET OFFICIALS. IT MAY SIGNAL	
DIFFICULT INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS AHEAD, EVEN THOUGH THE	
NEW STRATEGY FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS PRESENTED AS A	
TRANSITION GOVERNMENT POSITION. END COMMENT	

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