

NOTE

for

the President of the Republic

S U B J E C T: RWANDA

I am still concerned about our position in Rwanda and by the role into which our 690 soldiers could find themselves drawn, for the Rwandan army no longer fights.

There are now 900,000 refugees, practically sleeping outside, between the RPF lines and KIGALI. Their presence alone contributes to serious unrest and, soon, an uncontrollable situation.

I struggle to see why the RPF would abandon such a close victory, which would, no doubt, not even require a general offensive on its part.

I do not see, either, how to bring MUSEVENI back to our side, since we do not have the means to put significant pressure on him.

As for HABYARIMANA, the dispatch of two supplementary companies, after many other demonstrations of support, has led him to feel he is one of the African leaders best protected by FRANCE. This is not the best way to persuade him to make the necessary concessions.

Furthermore, he is, by his political intransigence, and his incapacity to mobilize his own army, largely responsible for the current fiasco.

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If the RPF retakes the offensive, our soldiers could, in a matter of hours, find themselves face to face with the rebels.

Our only remaining means of exerting strong pressure—excluding direct intervention—seems to me to be the possibility of our disengagement:

- presented to HABYARIMANA as a threat, it could lead him to relax his position;
- presented to MUSEVENI and to the RPF as a possible response to their own concessions, it would make them give up a military victory for a solely political victory.

Marcel DEBARGE should, in my opinion, be able to use this argument to facilitate his mission.

Pierre JOXE