

TOP SECRET

June 22, 1960

1- Kohler  
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Foy:

I note a sentence in POLTO 2440 (recounting Norstad's June 10 missile briefing of NAC): "Emphasized NATO forces must be ready to react two to five minutes after warning." SACFEUR thus appears to be thinking in terms of a missile force which would be fired after warning of impending attack and before Soviet missiles had landed, e.g., five or ten minutes later.

This seems to me rather inconsistent with the emphasis in this briefing on the need for "mobility and/or hardening...in order to survive." If the missiles can survive initial attack, they need not react quickly. One of the main reasons for favoring deployment of second - rather than first - generation MRBM's in Europe, in fact, was to avoid the necessity for such an instant reaction - by deploying a weapon which could survive enemy attack and which need not therefore be fired on a "strike first" basis.

The inconsistency between these two aspects of the briefing seems sufficiently important so that it might be useful to get some clarification from Paris, - perhaps in a letter or telegram to Thurston.

I attach an outline of the questions that might be put to him.

Gerard C. Smith

TO: EUR - Mr. Kohler

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1. Note Puget June 11 statement projected NATO missile forces "must be ready to react from two to five minutes after warning" following on his statement that Soviets will in 1963 have "missile capability for surprise attack with accuracy and in large numbers."

2. Also note emphasis in SACEUR's briefing on need for mobility and dispersal "in order to survive".

3. If projected MRBM forces to be fired after warning and before Soviet missiles had landed (as implied para 1) why emphasis on survival? If intended that missiles would be fired after surviving attack, why emphasis on need to react 2-5 minutes "after warning"?

4. Wld appreciate clarification.