DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW
(RCS CSHIS-6 (R3))
1 OCTOBER 1990 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1991

(c) (S/NF) (u) <u>Counterdrug Efforts</u>. Army overt HUMINT collection against the counterdrug target matured during FY91 as INSCOM collectors gained experience against this hitherto unfamiliar target, especially in the four counterdrug operations approved in the previous fiscal year. DAMI-POH coordinated with DIA, INSCOM, and others in the intelligence community to ensure that INSCOM's counterdrug efforts were operationally sound, effective, and in consonance with guidelines and procedures developed by DAMI-POH previously for collectors to follow in focusing on the narcotics target. Success was evidenced by greatly enhanced collection by INSCOM elements against the drug target without operational compromise.

(d) (U) <u>Overt HUMINT Support to Operation Desert Storm</u>. (u)

1) (S/NF/WN) FY91 opened with Division action officers working with their counterparts throughout the intelligence community to provide support to CENTCOM on behalf of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. DAMI-POH worked closely with INSCOM, the 513th MI Bde, DIA, CIA, AIA, and others in the intelligence community to streamline contact coordination procedures to enable Army collectors to identify, access, and debrief knowledgeable sources in the shortest possible time.

2) (S/NF/WN) Army collectors worldwide focused on the Iraqi target, with major contributions made by the 66th MI Bde, the US Army Operational Group, and, most significantly, the 513th MI Brigade. Army overt collectors achieved several significant successes in their support to CENTCOM. One noteworthy first was the real-time utilization of HUMINT to nominate, target, and destroy Key Iraqi command, control, communications, and other military targets. This first was made possible by unprecedented cooperation between Army intelligence collectors, Washington-based analysts, and CENTCOM targeteers to set up real-time communications

links and feedback mechanisms.   CENTCOM collection requirements were often transmitted, responded to, and satisfied within a matter of hours to provide highly accurate targeting data.   Targets were often destroyed within hours of receipt of this information.

3) (S/NF/WN) Innovative approaches were the hallmark of the Army's HUMINT effort. The use of highly knowledge-able Army overt HUMINT sources to review and clarify IMINT products enabled CENTCOM to refine its targeting efforts to a degree never before possible in the history of warfare. Hundreds of key Iraqi targets were destroyed as a direct result of this lash-up. Almost as importantly, given the political and religious sensitivities in the region, this approach allowed CENTCOM to identify mosques, hospitals, and the like, enabling US and coalition forces to avoid damaging them.

4) (S/NF/WN) Several operations conducted by the 513th MI Bde illustrate the extent and significance of the Army's overt HUMINT support to the Gulf War. One key operation was the in-depth debriefing throughout Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm

5) (S/NF/WN) Another outstanding 513th MI Bde operation involved the debriefing

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The information provided by this source significantly contributed to the impact of the air campaign and thereby shortened the ground campaign, which undoubtedly saved many American and coalition lives.

6) (S/NF/WN) ████████████████████

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(e) (S/NF) PW/MIA Exploitation. Army efforts to assist in the resolution of the PW/MIA issue continued unabated throughout FY91. DAMI-POH worked closely with INSCOM and DIA to follow up on several leads that were identified and to ensure the information possessed by these was provided to key analysts working this problem. Most significantly, Army debriefers led a large-scale debriefing effort ████████████████████

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All
information obtained from this endeavor, as well as from other
debriefings conducted throughout the year, was provided to DIA for
analysis and follow-through.

(2) (C)

     (a) (S/NF)

In
addition, a large number of published reports had (or should have
had) direct value to tactical commanders. These reports included
the positions of Iraqi units, status of their equipment, location
of key facilities, their tactical radio equipment, and their
ability to direct artillery fire.

The volume and quality of reporting should have
shown that we can quickly re-focus existing assets in a crisis.

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