
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CECRET NOTORN

(b)(2)

BODY:

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT).

COMBINE: COMPLETE

SOBJ: HUMINT TO SUFFER WITH LOSS OF (b)(2)

MILITARY COMMISSIONERS (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED & B C R B T NOTORN.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOT: (U) 920710.

REQS: (U) (b)(2) (b)(1)

SUMMARY: (S/NF) RECENT DECISION TO DISBAND ARMY'S MIL COMMISSIONERS WILL IMPACT GREATEST ON THE ARMY'S HUMINT COLLECTION CAPABILITY. MIL COMMISSIONERS FORMED THE BACKBONE OF THE G-2'S HUMINT NETWORKS. G-2'S WILL NOW BE PORCED TO DEVELOP NEW NETWORKS. FROM THE GROUND UP.

TEXT: 1. -(S/NF). THE RECENT (b)(1)
DECISION TO DISBAND THE ARMY'S MILITARY COMMISSIONERS
WILL IMPACT GREATEST ON THE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)

-NOPORN-CECRED-

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COLLECTION CAPABILITY OF THE GUATEMALAN ARMY. THE MAJOR EFFECT WILL BE FELT BY THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS (G-2)
OF THE VARIOUS ZONES AND COMMANDS. HISTORICALLY (b)(1)
CONTINUED, MILITARY COMMISSIONERS HAVE FORMED THE BACKBONE OF THE G-2'S HUMINI NETWORKS THAT HAVE BEEN OPERATING IN THE MAJORITY OF THE MILITARY ZONES AND COMMANDS. (b)(2)

- 2. (C/NF) THESE MILITARY COMMISSIONERS REPORTED
 DIRECTLY TO THE ZONE'S G-2, PROVIDING A STEADY STREAM OF .
 INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES IN THEIR AREAS, TO INCLUDE
 INFORMATION ON INSURGENTS, SUSPECTED INSURGENT
 SYMPATHIZERS, ANTI-COVERNMENT ACTIVITIES BY INDIVIDUALS,
 AND ANYTHING ELSE THAT THEY WERE TASKED TO COLLECT OR
 DO. THERE WERE TIMES (b)(1)
 WHEN MILITARY COMMISSIONERS CONDUCTED ACTIVITIES,
 DIRECTED BY THE ZONE G-2, WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN LABELED
 AS ILLEGAL BY CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS. AN
 EXAMPLE WOULD BE PARTICIPATING IN THE ELIMINATION OF
 INDIVIDUALS VIEWED TO BE A THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT AND
 THE ARMY.
- 3. (SANE)— WITH THE PLANNED DISINTEGRATION OF THE
 MILITARY COMMISSIONERS SYSTEM, THE G-2'S WILL BE FORCED
 TO DEVELOP FROM THE GROUND UP, NEW HUMINT NETWORKS IN
 THEIR AREAS OF OPERATION. IN MOST CASES, IT WILL PLACE (b)(1)
 AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN ON THE ZONE'S THINNING FINANCIAL
 RESOURCES.
 RELATED REPORTING ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
 CAPABILITIES AND THE INABILITY TO FINANCE IT.:

 IN THE PAST, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONERS
 HAVE NOT BEEN TYPICAL "PAID INFORMANTS" BECAUSE THEY
 WORKED SIMPLY FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF CARRYING THE MILITARY
 COMMISSIONER'S MILITARY IDENTIFICATION AND THE POWER AND
 PRESTIGE THAT CAME WITH IT.
- 4. LC/NEY WITH THE PROBABLE LOSS OF THEIR MILITARY IDENTIFICATION. THEIR POWER AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION WILL LIKELY VANISH AS WELL,

 LIKEWISE, AS THE COMMISSIONERS LOSE THE PROTECTION ONCE PROVIDED BY THEIR IDENTIFICATION CARDS, THEIR ONCE PRIVILEGED POSITION WITHIN THEIR COMMUNITIES, PREVIOUSLY GUARANTEED BY THEIR ARMY CONNECTION, WILL VANISH ALONG WITH IT, SERIOUSLY DETERIORATING THE GUATEMALAN ARMY'S HUMINT COLLECTION CAPABILITY.
- (b)(1)(S/NP) AS AN EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF THE GUATEMALAN NAVY, ESPECIALLY ON THE PACIFIC COAST, THE LOSS OF THE COMMISSIONERS WILL GREATLY AFFECT THE MAVY'S ABILITY TO MONITOR THE TRAFFICKING OF ILLEGAL ALIENS, ARMS AND NARCOTICS ALONG THE SOUTHWEST COAST ON A REGULAR BASIS. EVEN THOUGH THE MILITARY COMMISSIONERS HAVE PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR THE ARMY'S INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SYSTEM, THE ARMY'S HUMINT NETWORK TRADITIONALLY BREN AN "ALL-MALE" NETWORK, WHICH HAS SHOWN ITS LIMITATIONS OVER TIME. SELDOM, IF EVER, DOBS AN

HOPONI -

SECRET

NOTELLIGENCE OFFICER UTILIZE PRMALES IN A COLLECTION (b)(1) ROLE. UNLIKE THE INSURGENTS, WHO RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF A DIVERSE COLLECTION SYSTEM.

(b)(1)

(b)(2)

-NOTORN-CPCDPT

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