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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Special Asst has seen

JCSM-315-69

21 May 1969

DEP SEC. HAS SEEN

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Contingency Plan for North Korea (C)

1. (S) In response to your request, dated 8 May 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated a smaller (two-three aircraft) B-52 strike as a possible contingency option. An outline plan for a "quick strike" capability against a North Korean airfield using a limited number of B-52 aircraft is forwarded herewith. Additional plans utilizing other than B-52 aircraft are being investigated for possible application and will be forwarded at a later date if deemed practicable.

2. (S) The plan for a strike on a North Korean airfield using three B-52 aircraft (Appendices A and B hereto) is provided with two options which are intended to convey a political message without major provocation.

a. Option One of the plan would be executed from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa (or from Guam, if directed), using three B-52 aircraft from the ARC LIGHT force to strike Pyongyang East Airfield in North Korea. This option could be executed on short notice, on a day-to-day basis, with 10 hours from initial notification until the target is struck, or within 4 hours from a prior alert posture (from Guam it would require 13 and 7 hours, respectively). It would entail limited disruption to Southeast Asia operations and should achieve a significant element of surprise. The approximately 65 tons of ordnance expended would achieve a reasonable amount of damage to the North Korean Air Force command/control complex adjacent to the capital city of Pyongyang.

b. Option Two of this plan would be executed from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, using three B-52 aircraft from the ARC LIGHT force to strike Saamcham Airfield, North Korea. This option could also be executed on short notice, on a day-to-day basis, with 26 hours from initial notification until the target is struck, or within 7 hours from a prior alert posture. It would entail limited disruption to Southeast Asia operations and should achieve an element of surprise. The approximately 38 tons of cluster bombs (BLU-26s) expended would achieve a reasonable amount of damage to revetted aircraft on the airfield.

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c. These options would be conducted at night, and/or during adverse weather, using a low-level attack profile. The probability of an aircraft loss in either option is considered to be less than 10 percent.

3. ~~(S)~~ Attacks of the type described in the foregoing contingency options provide quick response to any hostile act by the North Koreans, have little implication of third nation involvement, minimize the impact on Southeast Asia operations, and inflict an adequate level of damage with a minimum amount of physical force. The probability of major US losses is low.

4. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the outlined plan is feasible, and, if quickly executed in response to another North Korean hostile act, there is a reasonable chance of not provoking the North Koreans into a retaliatory action of such magnitude as to involve a major conflict. Further, this plan provides options which would convey the message that the United States will not tolerate North Korean irresponsibility.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Attachments

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APPENDIX A

OUTLINE PLAN FOR A STRIKE ON A NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELD USING THREE B-52 AIRCRAFT

<u>Purpose:</u> To provide an outline plan to attack a single airfield complex in North Korea with three B-52 aircraft.	<u>1</u> <u>2</u> <u>3</u> <u>4</u> <u>5</u>
<u>Targets:</u> Option One - Pyongyang East Airfield. Option Two - Saamcham Airfield. For description and significance, see Appendix B.	<u>6</u> <u>7</u> <u>8</u>
<u>Task Organization</u>	<u>9</u>
a. <u>Strike Force:</u> Option One - three B-52s. Option Two - three B-52s.	<u>10</u> <u>11</u>
b. <u>Support Forces</u>	<u>12</u>
(1) Option One: Search and rescue forces available in the Republic of Korea.	<u>13</u> <u>14</u>
(2) Option Two: Three KC-135 tanker aircraft and search and rescue forces available in the Republic of Korea.	<u>15</u> <u>16</u>
<u>Concept of Operations</u>	<u>17</u>
a. Option One: Three B-52 aircraft will launch from Madana Air Base, Okinawa, to execute a strike against Pyongyang East Airfield, North Korea. The entire prestrike profile will be flown at low level during hours of darkness and/or adverse weather to provide maximum surprise and cover. Desired time on target (TOT) is 1800Z (0300I). Egress from the target will be at low level until outside the hostile environment. Aircraft will be loaded with M117 (750 lb) bombs internal and MK-82 (500 lb) bombs external. The target area is 1600 feet square with the desired mean point of impact in the center of a triangle formed by the National Air Force Headquarters, National Air Defense Headquarters, and a Sector Air Defense Headquarters. Total target damage expectancy is considered reasonable, and the possibility of degrading command/control	<u>18</u> <u>19</u> <u>20</u> <u>21</u> <u>22</u> <u>23</u> <u>24</u> <u>25</u> <u>26</u> <u>27</u> <u>28</u> <u>29</u> <u>30</u> <u>31</u>

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for a short period exists. Time from launch to strike is 1  
2 hours and 40 minutes (2+40 hours). All B-52 aircraft will 2  
recover to Kadena at approximately launch plus 4+50 hours. 3

b. Option Two: Three B-52 aircraft will launch from 4  
Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, to execute a strike against 5  
Saamcham Airfield, North Korea. After air refueling, aircraft 6  
will fly a low level prestrike profile during hours of darkness 7  
and/or adverse weather to provide maximum surprise and cover. 8  
Desired TOT is 1800Z (0300I). Egress from the target will be 9  
at low-level until outside the hostile environment. Aircraft 10  
will be loaded with cluster bombs (BLU-26s). The target area 11  
is 6,000 by 2,000 feet encompassing the earthen-revetted air- 12  
craft parking areas adjacent to the runway. BLU-26 munitions 13  
are effective against aircraft in earthen revetments and the 14  
damage will tend to be confined to those aircraft. Attack 15  
axis is planned for maximum bomb string effectiveness. Time 16  
from launch to strike is 5+46 hours. All B-52 aircraft will 17  
recover to Andersen Air Force Base at approximately launch 18  
plus 10+55 hours. 19

c. If aircraft and crews are placed on prior alert, the 20  
targets can be struck from Kadena within 4 hours of 21  
notification and from Guam within 7 hours. 22

d. If directed, Option One can be launched from Guam 23  
with the resultant increase of approximately 3 hours 24  
additional time from launch to strike. 25

Timing: 26  
a. Option One: (All times D-Day) 27

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>PLACE OF EVENT</u>	<u>WASHINGTON TIME (EDT)</u>	<u>KOREAN TIME (I)</u>	<u>GREENWICH TIME (Z)</u>	
ARC LIGHT Decision 1/	Washington	0400	1700	0800	28
Launch	Kadena	1120	0020	1520	29
Recall Decision 2/	Washington	1120	0020	1520	30
Time on Target 3/	Target	1400	0300	1800	31
Recovery	Kadena	1610	0710	2010	32

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b. Option Two:

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>PLACE OF EVENT</u>	<u>WASHINGTON TIME (EDT)</u>	<u>KORMAN TIME (I)</u>	<u>GREENWICH TIME (Z)</u>	
ARC LIGHT Decision 1/	Washington	1200 D-Day	0100 D+1	1600 D-Day	<u>1</u> <u>2</u> <u>3</u>
Launch	Guam	0815 D+1	2115 D+1	1215 D+1	<u>4</u> <u>5</u>
Recall Decision 2/	Washington	1200 D+1	0100 D+2	1600 D+1	<u>6</u> <u>7</u>
Time on Target 3/	Target	1400 D+1	0300 D+2	1800 D+1	<u>8</u> <u>9</u>
Recovery	Guam	1910 D+1	0810 D+2	2310 D+1	<u>10</u> <u>11</u>

- 1/ In Order to generate aircraft to meet the optimum TOT, it is necessary to discontinue an equal number of ARC LIGHT sorties from Kadena (Option One) or Guam (Option Two) at this time. 10  
11
- 2/ Recall decision by the National Command Authorities would be required not later than the time indicated. 12
- 3/ The optimum TOT is considered to be 0200 local Korean time. One minute elapse between first and last aircraft. 13

Estimated Losses 14

a. Friendly Forces: Probability of an aircraft loss in either option is considered less than 10 percent. 15  
16

b. Civilian Casualties: Minimal in either option. Confined to civilians on the airfield. 17  
18


Effects on Southeast Asia Operations: Minimal. 19

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APPENDIX B  
SELECTED NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELD TARGETS



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Appendix B

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SALIENT FEATURES

SELECTED NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELD TARGETS (TWO)

<u>TGT #</u>	<u>NAME SIGNIFICANCE</u>	<u>STK A/C</u>	<u>AAA DEF</u>
380-8009	<u>Pyongyang AF E</u> 6,600' concrete runway. Main structures: hangar, 6 revetted ammo storehouses, operations/control tower, admin, support, 29 acft revetments. Natl Air Defense Hq. 4 NM E Pyongyang.	3	Light
380-8016	<u>Ssamcham AP</u> 8,200' concrete runway. Main structures: UG hangar, 5 UG maint/storage, 4 maint shops, 18 storage, 6 warehouses, 2 operations/control towers, 4 admin, 29 support, 63 acft revetments. Major jet fighter bases on w coast (AOB: 106 MIG 15/17/19/21). 44 nm N Pyongyang.	3	Light

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