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**President Reagan's Meetings with
General Secretary Gorbachev**

May 29-June 2, 1988

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Background Book

The Secretary

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THE PRESIDENT'S BACKGROUND BOOK

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START

I. WHERE WE STAND

- o We have agreed on the outlines of a START agreement:
 - Deep reductions to 6000 warheads on 1600 delivery vehicles (bombers, missiles);
 - 50% cut in Soviet heavy missiles;
 - 4900 limit on ballistic missile warheads.
- o But much hard work remains to be done, including:
 - Sublimit on land-based ballistic missile warheads to make forces more stable;
 - Limits on sea-launched cruise missiles; and
 - Effective ways to verify limits on mobile missiles.

II. BASIC CONCEPTS

Destabilizing Weapons:

- o We have tried to convince the Soviets of the need to have tight constraints on the most destabilizing weapons -- fixed, land-based ballistic missiles. We point out that these are fast-flying, non-recallable weapons which are based in increasingly vulnerable silos. In a crisis, there would be incentives for a side to use them in a first strike, rather than risk having them destroyed.
- o The Soviets object, in part because they have nearly two-thirds of their warheads on fixed, land-based missiles. They argue that their shift to mobile missiles will make their land-based forces less vulnerable and remove one major source of instability. They assert that mobile land-based missiles are no more dangerous than submarine-based missiles, on which the U.S. relies heavily.
- o The Soviets say that they would accept a sublimit on land-based ballistic missiles only if we accepted an equal sublimit on our submarine-based ballistic missiles, a proposal we cannot accept.

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Verifiability: Two of the major unresolved issues in START relate to this issue:

- o Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs): These small, accurate, "slow-flying" missiles are being installed on many U.S. naval vessels. They are carried in a launcher which also houses weapons not subject to START limits, such as ship-to-ship missiles.
 - The Soviets have proposed tight numerical limits on SLCMs, both nuclear and conventional.
 - We will not limit conventional SLCMs. However, we have agreed to ceilings on nuclear SLCMs if ways to verify those ceilings can be found.
 - But we do not know any way to verify such ceilings:
 - o with confidence we could detect Soviet cheating;
 - o without compromising sensitive systems; and
 - o without violating our policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on a particular ship.
 - The Soviets have suggested intrusive verification schemes involving shipboard inspections and technical approaches which they seem unable to explain in any detail. They realize that, even with unverifiable limits, the U.S. would be compelled to comply with limits, while they would not be so constrained.
 - This remains a serious point of disagreement.
- o Mobile Land-Based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): These new weapons are mounted on special rail cars or heavy trailer-truck vehicles which can travel over dirt roads or through fields. Their mobility makes them difficult to target -- which could discourage attack during a crisis. But mobility also makes it difficult to monitor their numbers -- potentially raising questions about compliance with agreed limits. They are extremely costly systems, compared to existing missiles.
 - The Soviets are deploying two types of mobile missiles: about 100 single-warhead road-mobile missiles and a few ten-warhead missiles mounted on rail cars. We have begun to design two similar types: the single-warhead, road-mobile Midgetman and the ten-warhead, rail-mobile Peacekeeper.
 - The Soviets want to allow a number of each type and have proposed a variety of verification measures. Although our formal position calls for a ban on mobile missiles, we would be willing to reconsider if ways could be found to verify limits effectively. We are currently studying this problem.

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FACT SHEET: DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATIONS

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I. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE LAST SUMMIT

- o January: U.S. tabled separate draft treaty based on Washington Summit Joint Statement.
- o March: U.S. tabled additional Predictability Protocol.
 - U.S. has also suggested ways to minimize disputes over permitted activities -- for example, by removing constraints on space-based sensors.
- o April: Soviets handed over draft agreement preserving key Soviet positions (including blanket nonwithdrawal pledge).
- o May: After stalling since the Summit, Soviets finally began to participate in drafting a joint text, building on the Summit language, that reflects areas of disagreement as well as agreement.

OUR THEMES

- o We have gone the extra mile to meet Soviet concerns:
 - Agreed to period of nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty;
 - Proposed predictability measures;
 - Agreed to discuss stability before end of period;
 - Offered ways to avoid dispute over permitted activities;
 - Agreed to continued observance of the ABM Treaty after the period (unless and until the sides decide to deploy).
- o We will, however, preserve our rights:
 - To conduct SDI research, development, and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, to see if defenses that meet our criteria are possible.
 - To withdraw to protect our supreme interests;
 - To deploy after nonwithdrawal period with six months' notice if follow-on discussions do not result in agreement otherwise.
- o Soviet linkage to START is unacceptable. ABM Treaty was premised on strategic offensive reductions; those reductions should occur without any preconditions.
- o Ironical that Soviets seek a pledge of U.S. adherence to ABM Treaty when they are clearly violating it by construction of their illegal radar at Krasnoyarsk.
 - Soviets must resolve this violation before a U.S. commitment to nonwithdrawal is possible.

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NUCLEAR TESTING

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I. BACKGROUND

- o Formal negotiations began November 1987; agreed first priority is improved verification for/ratification of Threshold Test Ban/Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNET).
- o Negotiations now proceeding on parallel tracks:
 - Negotiation of verification protocols to Treaties;
 - Preparation of Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) at U.S. and Soviet test sites.
- o Expect to have ready for signature at summit:
 - Comprehensive JVE plan;
 - Verification Protocol for PNET.
- o Following conduct of JVE in late summer, will complete TTBT protocol, then submit both Treaties for ratification.

II. U.S. POSITION

- o For effective verification, require right to use CORRTEX (hydrodynamic method) on all nuclear tests over 50 kilotons.
- o Agreed to JVE to satisfy Soviet concerns about CORRTEX.
- o Following ratification of TTBT/PNET, U.S. will enter negotiations on intermediate limitations in parallel with effective disarmament process.
- o Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) remains long-term goal, but only when we no longer depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security/stability.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Verification preference is seismic; will accept limited use of CORRTEX as way to "calibrate" or improve seismic.
- o Insist JVE is necessary to prove effectiveness, non-intrusiveness of CORRTEX before completing TTBT.
- o Continue to press for further testing limitations (yield and number per year) and near-term CTB.

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COMPLIANCE


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ABM Treaty Review

- o Treaty requires a review at each five-year anniversary of the entry into force.
- o Soviets want to reaffirm commitment to ABM Treaty as signed in 1972; are pressing to conduct required review soon.
- o As parties to the Treaty we also are committed to conducting the Review -- it must begin by October 2, 1988.
- o Preparations for the Review have begun; no decisions have been made on the timing, forum, and venue.
- o Key issues for U.S. will be resolution of Soviet violations or appropriate U.S. response to uncorrected violations.

President's Noncompliance Report

- o December 1987 Report reaffirmed findings of previous report:
 - that the large phased-array radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is a clear violation of ABM Treaty.
 - A new violation this year involved the deployment of ABM radars from a missile test range to an electronics plant at Gomel.
- o The Soviets invited U.S. experts to inspect the radar components at Gomel and Moscow in late December 1987; results of the visit are still under study.

Compliance and Treaty Ratification

- o In committee hearings on the INF Treaty, key Senators have said that Soviet noncompliance, especially the radar at Krasnoyarsk, will be given careful scrutiny before the Senate will agree to a START or Defense and Space Treaty.

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NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

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- I. Bilateral Consultations
 - o U.S. and USSR interests very similar - both countries strongly oppose proliferation of nuclear weapons.
 - o U.S. and USSR have completed ten rounds of semi-annual consultations since early 1980's.
 - o Next round scheduled for June 13-15 in Vienna, Austria.
 - o These talks have been increasingly productive.

- II. Common Interests
 - o Both countries strongly support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as lynchpin of the non-proliferation regime.
 - o Maintenance of strong IAEA safeguards a key common objective.
 - o Both countries have worked to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), another important aspect of the non-proliferation regime. This is the 20th anniversary of the treaty.

- III. Key Issue
 - o Critical problem remains preventing a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan.
 - o We want the Soviets to urge India to participate in constructive dialogue with Pakistan.
 - o U.S. has expressed concern about Soviet lease of nuclear submarine to India and Soviet agreement to sell nuclear reactors to India without requiring safeguards on all India's nuclear facilities.

- IV. Nuclear Cooperation
 - o In late April, the U.S. and USSR signed an agreement to exchange technical and safety data on civilian power reactors.

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY

I. BACKGROUND

- o 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons, but does not restrict possession or transfer.
- o U.S. has been in forefront of international efforts to negotiate comprehensive, global ban on chemical weapons.
- o In 1984, Vice President Bush tabled U.S. draft treaty at 40 nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
- o At Geneva summit, agreed to intensify bilateral talks with Soviet Union to facilitate global ban negotiations.
- o Have conducted exchange of visits to U.S., Soviet chemical weapons facility as confidence-building measure and means to promote greater openness.
- o U.S. modernization program proceeding on schedule; final assembly of binary weapons began December 16, 1987.

II. U.S. POSITION

- o Pursue effective, verifiable global ban on chemical weapons.
- o Prompt, mandatory challenge inspection with no right of refusal essential for all suspect sites.
- o U.S. continues to have verification concerns regarding undeclared stocks/facilities; novel agents; wants bilateral data exchange with USSR prior to signature of Treaty.
- o Studying ways to develop effective verification, ensure security of all states within chemical weapons treaty regime.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Have publicly acknowledged possession; announced production moratorium, size of stockpile (50,000 tons).
- o Now accept most of U.S. draft treaty in principle, including challenge inspection with no right of refusal and prior data exchange. Fine print still unknown.
- o Pushing for early completion of treaty; accuse U.S. of stalling to acquire binaries.

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PROLIFERATION

I. THE PROBLEM

- o The number of states possessing chemical weapons has grown dramatically. Approximately 15 states now possess chemical weapons; several more are actively seeking such capability.
- o Chemical weapons are known as the "poor man's atomic bomb" -- a cheap, effective weapon for third world states.
- o Proliferation is particularly acute in conflict-torn regions, such as the Middle East and south Asia.
- o Have also seen alarming increase in use of chemical weapons -- in clear violation of 1925 Geneva Protocol.

II. THE SOLUTION

- o U.S. has adopted three-part program of concrete measures:
 - Technical measures, such as export controls, to slow proliferation by drying up supply, raising cost;
 - Direct political action with proliferating states and other third parties to discourage acquisition;
 - Support for international investigations of use to prevent illegal use.
- o U.S. has taken steps in all three areas; strongly encouraged other states -- East and West -- to do the same.

III. INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE

- o At Geneva summit, agreed to initiate dialogue with Soviets on problem of chemical weapons proliferation.
- o Three rounds of bilateral discussions have identified considerable common ground: Soviets accept concept of U.S. three-part approach, have imposed export controls, support investigation of use.
- o However, no evidence Soviets have applied political pressure to prevent spread, use of CW.
- o U.S. has also engaged friends and Allies: 19 member "Australian Group" has adopted chemical "warning lists", condemned CW use.

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FACT SHEET: CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE/CST

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I. BACKGROUND

- o Progress in nuclear arms reductions has drawn renewed attention to Warsaw Pact conventional superiority.
- o NATO Summit statement of March 2 set priority for future conventional stability negotiations (CST) on ground forces, e.g. tanks and artillery, essential for "seizing and holding territory."
- o Deliberations with East on CST mandate, and with Allies on CST proposal, continue to show progress.

II. U.S. AND NATO POLICY

- o Objective is to eliminate conventional disparities and Soviet capability for surprise attack and large scale offensive operations.
- o Allies agree to use equal ceilings in proposal to force large Eastern reductions, but France resisting U.S. concept of Atlantic-to-the-Urals-wide ceilings.
- o Adoption of a CST mandate must be part of a balanced outcome to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting.
- o Continuing Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna provide leverage for establishing an acceptable new forum.

III. SOVIET VIEWS

- o Moscow has called for the elimination of military disparities, but denied its overall conventional superiority.
- o In Sofia response to NATO Summit statement, Soviets continued to seek inclusion of dual-capable (read theater nuclear) systems in CST.
- o Soviets also proposed immediate exchange of conventional force data; we oppose this attempt to leapfrog a balanced result to mandate talks and Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting.

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CDE IMPLEMENTATION

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I. BACKGROUND

o 35-nation Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) agreed on a set of military measures in September 1986 which include:

- prior notification of military activities (above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks);
-- exchange of annual forecasts of notifiable activities;
-- mandatory observation of exercises above 17,000 troops;
-- on-site inspection as means of verification.

II. IMPLEMENTATION

- o Soviet and Warsaw Pact implementation in the first 15 months encouraging.
o In general, both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have properly forecast, notified and invited observers to their exercises.
-- Warsaw Pact observation programs more restrictive than NATO's; Western observers have found it difficult to assess the size and scope of Pact activities.
o Ten on-site inspections have been conducted; Warsaw Pact countries generally have met requirements for receiving Western inspectors.
o Five inspections so far this year, including two by the U.S. on a Warsaw Pact exercise in Hungary and a non-notified Soviet exercise in the GDR. The Soviet Union has inspected a NATO exercise in Norway.
-- No instances of non-compliance have been identified, although some questions have arisen from both East and West about possible misuse of restricted area provisions of inspection regime.

III. NEXT STEPS

- o At the Vienna CSCE meeting, NATO has proposed further negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures among all 35 CSCE states to build on results of Stockholm.

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COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY (CSIS)

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I. Background

- CSIS has been the centerpiece of Moscow's approach to the UN since 1986. Gorbachev personally associated himself with CSIS in his September 1987 Pravda article.
- This initiative signifies new Soviet emphasis on the UN as an instrument for advancing its geopolitical goals and as a propaganda tool for promoting "new political thinking."
- CSIS is a broad multilateral action program, with many proposals inimical to the West. For example it seeks to:
 - o Undermine SDI through creation of a "world space organization."
 - o Erode deterrence through negotiation of a treaty on non-first-use of nuclear weapons and creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.
 - o Complicate U.S.-Soviet nuclear testing talks through immediate multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

II. U.S. Position

- U.S. strongly opposes CSIS as long-term threat to UN Charter and system. It's adoption could lead to:
 - o Redefinition of UN Charter;
 - o Creation of new, redundant international organizations;
 - o Further politicization of UN system.
- Though prepared to deal with individual proposals on their merits, we do not accept premise that the world community needs a new "comprehensive system" for peace and security.
- Soviets suffered major setback at last fall's UNGA; over half of UN states withheld support from CSIS resolution.
- Nonetheless, Soviets seem intent on promoting CSIS and its component elements. U.S. will continue to resist.

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FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF U.S.-SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

- o There have been positive developments in Soviet human rights performance under Gorbachev, but much more needs to be done.
- o "Unofficial" organizations have been tolerated, even some devoted to political issues, but their members have often been harassed.
- o Some public demonstrations have been allowed to take place in the past few years, but beginning in the fall of 1987 Soviet policy became more restrictive.
- o Legal and institutional reforms are necessary, if there are to be lasting improvements.
- o A review of the legal system is under way, but it has so far produced little in the way of concrete results.
- o About 350 political prisoners have been released since February 1987.
 - We have the names of over 300 remaining political prisoners, however, and there may be many others whose names we don't know.
- o In this year of the Millenium, it remains difficult for believers to practice their faith.
 - At least half the political prisoners we know of are in prison as a result of their religious beliefs.
 - Religious education outside the home is forbidden.
 - There are not enough places of worship, not enough clergy, not enough religious literature.
 - The Ukrainian Orthodox Church remains forcibly incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church is banned.
- o Emigration levels began rising in 1987 for the three groups permitted to emigrate: Germans, Armenians, and Jews.
 - But barriers to emigration remain: requirement for an invitation from a close relative, requirement that adult applicants have parental permission, arbitrary use of "state security."

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FACT SHEET: LISTS OF CASES OF SPECIAL INTEREST

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- o Almost all the cases on the "short list" of "cases of special interest," first presented in September 1986, were resolved.
 - In February, Secretary Shultz presented a new list of 17 cases to Shevardnadze. You presented the list in March, and the Secretary presented it again in April.
 - To date, there has been little concrete progress on the 17 cases. Baptist Vitaliy Varavin did receive exit permission recently, however.
 - Soviet officials have given hints that other cases might be resolved, but these hints have not yet materialized.
- o The Department of State also maintains representation lists of divided spouses, blocked marriages, dual nationals, and divided families (those applying to join close relatives in the U.S.).
- o A significant number of cases have been resolved in the past year, but too many remain.
- o Several marriage cases were resolved last fall, including the 31-year Michelson case and the Braun and Balovlenkov cases.
 - There are currently three divided-spouse cases: Vileshina/Pakenas, Johnson/Petrov, and Goscilo/Kostin. (The last two couples have become divorced; the Soviets may not be aware of this.)
 - There are now 5 blocked marriages: Bohonovsky/Grigorishin, Petrone/Alexandrovich, Nudel/Shteynberg, Guillet/Peregudova, and Gureckas/Paulionis.
- o There are currently 16 "dual-nationals," U.S. citizens who are not allowed to leave the Soviet Union because they are also considered Soviet citizens.
 - The Stolar dual-national case remains unresolved, despite Soviets' December invitation to Abe Stolar's daughter-in-law to reapply; she was since refused again.
- o Total for divided families list is about 50. Still 6 cases remaining which were promised resolution in 1986 in Washington and Bern.

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 - There are now 5 blocked marriages, cases in which the Soviets have never permitted a couple to marry: Bohonovsky/Grigorishin, Petrone/Alexandrovich, Nudel/Shteynberg, Guillet/Peregudova, and Gureckas/Paulionis.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 BRIEFING PAPER
POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE SOVIET UNION

CONFIDENTIAL
 89

I. HOW MANY PRISONERS REMAIN

- o After denying for many years that they held any political prisoners, in 1986 the Soviet Union began to release such prisoners. Since that time, more than 300 people have been released.
- o More than 300 individuals remain incarcerated, however, merely for freely expressing themselves, publishing their views or practising their faith.
- o At the request of Shevardnadze, we presented a detailed list of these cases. Although he committed himself to review each case, he has yet to respond in detail.

II. SIGNIFICANT ISSUE FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND AS SYMBOL

- o We have stressed to Soviets the importance of freeing those who have suffered unjustly and the signal it would send:
 - Soviet people will not speak and write freely until those who have been punished in the past for this are released. Andrei Sakharov has placed the highest priority on this issue.
 - Western observers will remain skeptical of Soviet reform until all prisoners are released. This is one of our conditions for considering the proposed Moscow Human Rights Conference.
 - One activist who helped publicize the demonstrations in Armenia, Paruyr Ayrikyan, was arrested on a political charge on March 25. First such arrest in more than a year and a half.

III. U.S. AGENDA

- o Release of all political prisoners. We express particular concern for the former Helsinki monitors who remain incarcerated. Continue to urge the Soviets to account for honorary American citizen Raoul Wallenberg and to release the results of the reported review of his case in 1986.
- o Rehabilitation of the released prisoners and an end to harassment and discrimination in employment.
- o Repeal of the laws that put these prisoners behind bars merely for exercising their rights.

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POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE SOVIET UNION

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- o Release of all political prisoners, which Western observers suggest range from 1,000 to 10,000. We express particular concern for the former Helsinki monitors who remain incarcerated. Continue to urge the Soviets to account for honorary American citizen Raoul Wallenberg and to release the results of the reported review of his case in 1986.
- o Rehabilitation of the released prisoners and an end to harassment and discrimination in employment.
- o Repeal of the laws that put these prisoners behind bars merely for their political and religious activities.

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BRIEFING PAPER
FACT SHEET: EMIGRATION AND FAMILY VISITS

o Since early 1987, Soviet emigration levels have been rising.

-- In 1986, 914 Soviet Jews emigrated. Total for 1987 was 8,115. Levels rose slightly at start of 1988; about 1,000 a month now getting exit permission.

-- In 1986, 247 Soviet Armenians emigrated. In 1987, estimated that about 8,000 received exit permission. About 1,000 now emigrating each month.

-- 1987 was a record year for the only other group ever permitted to emigrate in large numbers, ethnic Germans. 14,488 emigrated to the FRG, compared with 783 in 1986.

Many long-time refuseniks still denied permission to emigrate. There are still divided families, and U.S.-Soviet dual nationals who cannot leave.

Legal and procedural barriers to emigration remain:

- Arbitrary use of "state security" to deny emigration, even when the applicant had no contact with sensitive information, or had contact many years before.
- Adult applicants must have parents' permission to emigrate.
- Applicant must have an invitation from an immediate relative who lives abroad. Soviets have been willing to be flexible on this, but it remains on the books and is a deterrent to new applications.

o Visits by Soviets to relatives in the U.S. have increased five-fold since 1986 to approximately 1,000 per month, and Soviet emigres may now return to the Soviet Union on visits. Problems remain, however:

- Some Soviets still denied family visits to U.S.
- U.S. visitors to the Soviet Union cannot stay with relatives, and are barred from "sensitive" cities.
- Although Soviet regulations provide for visa issuance within 72 hours in case of family illness or death, Soviets frequently fail to comply.

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BRIEFING PAPER
POLITICAL DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

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I. EASING UNDER GORBACHEV OF TRADITIONAL REPRESSION OF DISSENT

- o Repression of dissent has been a traditional feature of Soviet system.
- o Under Gorbachev, there has been a liberalization, albeit one that is tightly controlled.
 - Some tolerance of demonstrations and unofficial publications, which include articles on controversial topics.
 - Tolerance of "unofficial" groups. Soviet officials estimate that 30,000 groups meeting around the country on issues ranging from environment to nationalism.
 - Release of more than 350 political prisoners. Releases seem to have ended, however, and most had to sign statements of guilt.
 - Announced Criminal Code review that may include repeal of articles used against political dissenters. Thus far, no changes announced.

II. HARDENING OF APPROACH ON DISSENT SINCE LAST SUMMER

- o Most active dissidents consistently harassed - detained, phones are disconnected etc.
- o In March, first arrest (of Paruyr Ayrikyah) on a political charge ("anti-Soviet slander") in almost 2 years.
- o Demonstrations have been forcibly broken up and the participants subsequently harassed.

III. U.S. AGENDA

- o We should press the Soviets to release all remaining political prisoners, known to be at least 350, especially the 14 Helsinki monitors who remain incarcerated. We should also continue to urge the Soviets to account for honorary American citizen Raoul Wallenberg and to release the results of last year's reported review of his case.
- o We should express our concern about the March arrest of Paruyr Ayrikyan on political charges.
- o We should press the Soviets to repeal the laws that facilitate the suppression of political dissent.

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POLITICAL DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN THE MILLENNIAL YEAR

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I. SOVIET REGIME HOSTILE TO RELIGION

- o The Soviet Union is an atheist state which has long subjected religious believers to the harshest forms of persecution.
- o The Soviet Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice one's religion, but religious groups are required by law to register with the state and teaching is forbidden.
- o Repression continues against religious groups which have not been allowed to register, such as Ukrainian Catholics, and denominations that consider it against their beliefs to register with the state.
- o Believers suffer discrimination in employment and education.

II. SOFTENING OF RHETORIC IN MILLENNIAL YEAR

- o In April, Gorbachev said that past Soviet regimes had mistaken policies on religion and promised new laws.
- o Soviet officials suggest opportunities for adult religious education will be expanded and that laws on import of religious books will be more flexible.
- o Reports of recent encouragement of "charitable" church activities, such as hospital service.

III. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA IS MIXED

- o More than 100 religious prisoners have been released, but more than 150 are still incarcerated.
- o Laws impeding religious practice remain on the books although there have been virtually no arrests on such charges in more than a year.
- o Soviets have given public assurances at home, but they reject further commitments at Vienna CSCE Meeting.

IV. U.S. AGENDA

- o Unconditional release of all remaining religious prisoners and repeal of religious control laws.
- o Legalization of unregistered churches, including the Ukrainian Catholic Church, importation of religious books and materials and increased contacts with West.
- o Legalization of the teaching of religion to children, including the Hebrew language.

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BRIEFING PAPER
CSCE/Moscow Human Rights Meeting

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I. Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

- o Third follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Vienna in Nov. 1986; 35 East, West, and neutral/non-aligned participating states reviewing implementation of 1975 Helsinki Final Act and considering improvements to compliance in human, security, and economic dimensions.
- o Key issues for the U.S. are:
 - keeping the new conventional stability talks among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact autonomous (but within the framework of the CSCE process); some neutral/non-aligned states and France seek unacceptable link to CSCE.
 - balance between security and human rights results, including: improved Eastern human rights practices; strengthening of previous CSCE commitments; and significant human rights follow-on activity.
- o Soviets are stonewalling on human rights.
- o Vital to convince Soviets that West is ready to stay as long as it takes to get satisfactory result.


II. Proposed Moscow Human Rights Conference

- o At opening of Vienna Meeting, Shevardnadze proposed a human rights meeting for Moscow; Soviets seeking Western endorsement of glasnost.
- o NATO has said neither yes nor no; U.S. has made clear that Soviets must meet two criteria:
 - guarantees of openness and access to anyone who wants to attend (e.g., Helsinki Monitors, the media, and non-governmental organizations).
 - Significantly improved human rights situation, including: increased Jewish emigration; release of political/religious prisoners; resolution of bilateral family reunification cases; continued cessation of jamming; institutionalization of human rights reforms (e.g., permit religious teaching, regularize emigration procedures, repeal "political/religious" articles in criminal code).
- o Current Soviet human rights record not sufficient to warrant consideration of their proposal.

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SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA

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I. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR "COOPERATION" IN HUMAN RIGHTS

- o Soviets have urged that we move from "confrontation" to "cooperation" in our human rights dialogue.
- o Their principal goal seems to be to get us to stop raising specific human rights issues and cases with them.
- o We have made it clear that we are not going to stop talking about the specific problems of concern to us. But, in response to their suggestions, we have said we are willing to engage in "cooperative talks" with them in addition.
- o We held such talks in March and April on how we deal with specific issues, such as capital punishment, involuntary commitments to psychiatric hospitals, religious freedom, etc., in our respective countries.

II. SOVIET ALLEGATIONS OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE

- o They usually raise a host of U.S. "violations", from persecution of anti-war activists to the plight of the homeless, which do not seem genuinely to concern them.
- o They often raise specific issues, such as war criminal investigations, technology transfer and our human rights activities in the Soviet Union, about which they are genuinely concerned.
- o They frequently raise social and economic problems, such as unemployment, but do not seem serious about seeking resolution.

III. SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR MOSCOW HUMANITARIAN CONFERENCE

- o Soviets no longer seem to be pressing us to accept their proposal for a CSCE conference on human rights in Moscow.
- o We have continued to say neither yes or no, linking our consideration of the proposal to improved Soviet performance on human rights and credible guarantees of openness and access.

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II. SOVIET ALLEGATIONS OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE

- o The Soviets have made clear that if we are not prepared to "cooperate", then they will revert to confrontation, raising what they consider U.S. violations of human rights.
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REGIONAL DIALOGUE

FBI

I. STATE OF PLAY

- o Improving dialogue since 1985; latest cycle of experts talks completed in March-April. Recent exchanges on Africa, Middle East peace process particularly vigorous.
- o Afghan settlement tangible proof U.S.-Soviet dialogue can contribute to conflict resolution. U.S. plans to push for similar progress in other areas.

II. U.S. POSITION

- o President's October, 1985 speech laid out framework based on national reconciliation, direct talks between regional parties, U.S.-Soviet dialogue to contribute to process.
- o Soviets have increasingly borrowed rhetoric of this plan, without acknowledging source.
- o In ongoing regional dialogue with Moscow, U.S. seeks practical solutions to regional conflicts based on withdrawal of foreign troops, genuine self-determination.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Gorbachev and others have pointed to Afghan settlement as "model" for Middle East, southern Africa, Cambodia, Central America.
- o Practical meaning of this analogy still unclear.
- o Four elements in recent Soviet rhetoric about regional conflict resolution:
 - National reconciliation between warring parties;
 - Greater role for UN, international organizations;
 - More involvement by regional organizations, i.e. OAS, OAU, ASEAN, Arab League;
 - U.S.-Soviet cooperation can facilitate conflict resolution by political means.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

AFGHANISTAN

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SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

- Soviets are committed to removing half of their 120,000 troops by August 15 and remainder by Feb. 15, 1989.
 - o Soviets hinted they may remove up to 20,000 by Summit; also indications withdrawal would be completed in 1988.
 - o Fifty-man UN observer force to be deployed. We'll rely primarily on national technical means to monitor withdrawal.
 - o Four regime/Soviet garrisons have fallen in recent weeks; may herald beginning of regime's collapse.
- Soviets agreed to symmetry in military aid; MFA recently repudiated spokesman's allegation of U.S violation; some indications Moscow may stop arms aid to Kabul after May 15.

INTERIM GOVERNMENT

- UN mediator has agreed to pursue interim arrangements with all Afghan factions; but no initiatives yet.
 - o Will be very difficult. Resistance refuses to share power with Kabul regime, criticizes Geneva settlement, but now seems reconciled to it.
 - o We estimate Kabul regime will fall within months. Resistance may set up provisional government inside Afghanistan.

AFGHAN RELIEF

- Needs for resettling up to 5 million refugees will be great. UN plans to name relief coordinator.
 - o We are urging potential donor countries to contribute generously to multilateral, UN-led effort;
 - o To be effective and credible with refugees and to avoid bolstering discredited government, aid must not be channeled through the Kabul regime;
 - o Key UN agencies have indicated they will deal with de facto authorities in resistance-controlled areas.

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AFGHANISTAN

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BRIEFING PAPER
IRAN-IRAQ WAR

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THE U.N. PROCESS

- Fundamental U.S. goal is to end the war through diplomacy. Represents major cause of instability in region.
- United Nations Security Council action on second resolution -- e.g. arms embargo against Iran -- long overdue.
- U.S. fully supports UN Secretary General's mediation efforts but Iranian intransigence stymies progress.

THE U.S. AND IRAN

- Deliberate mining of the Gulf by Iran, causing damage to J.S. vessel, led to limited, proportionate U.S. response April 18 against Iran.
- U.S. also extending assistance to some neutral ships in distress in the Persian Gulf; further demonstrates our willingness to uphold freedom of navigation.

THE SITUATION FACING IRAN

- Tehran currently on defensive along several fronts:
 - o In Lebanon, Iran's agent, Hizballah, recently routed by more moderate elements. Blow to export of fundamentalism.
 - o Iraq scored major victory in recovering Faw Peninsula.
 - o Iraqi attacks on Iranian cities with modified Soviet missiles; Moscow unwilling/unable to force Iraqis to stop.
 - o Evidence of Iranian complicity in Kuwaiti plane hijacking has further blackened Iran's image.

THE SOVIETS AND THE WAR

- Following support for Resolution 598 last July, Moscow has dragged feet on follow-up action in New York.
- Soviets reluctant to anger Iran in view of possible Iranian spoiler role in Afghan settlement.

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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

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I. U.S. PLAN

- U.S. goal is comprehensive peace ensuring security of all states in region, legitimate rights of Palestinians.
- Key elements of plan:
 - o International conference gives framework for bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbors;
 - o Palestinian representation as part of joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation;
 - o All parties accept UNSC Resolution 242/338, renounce terrorism and violence.
 - o Integrated package; cannot be significantly changed.

II. SOVIET POSITION

- Despite some encouraging signs -- e.g. Gorbachev statement to Arafat on need to respect Israeli security concerns -- Soviets remain reluctant to use influence with Syria, PLO to urge constructive approach.
- Mosow seems content merely to follow events from sidelines, ensure that any future progress requires its approval.
- Major differences remain in our approaches to process, e.g. on role of conference, Palestinian representation.
 - o Soviets still envision conference with authority to impose solutions; unacceptable to us, Israel.
 - o Moscow also argues for PLO role in process as equal partner, but doesn't completely reject Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
- Absence of relations with Israel a further block to increased Soviet role.

III. STATE OF PLAY

- During Secretary's most recent trip to the region, all parties urged him to continue his efforts.
- We intend to remain active: the Secretary is going to the region following the Summit.

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CENTRAL AMERICA

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I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- Sandinista/Resistance Cease-Fire Talks: Talks continuing; truce in effect until June 1.
 - o Sandinistas hope to divide the Resistance, block humanitarian resupply of Resistance forces in Nicaragua.
 - o Resistance outside Nicaragua receiving humanitarian aid through U.S.-administered program, monitored by Honduran Catholic Church.
 - o Sandinistas refuse to democratize before Resistance disarms.
 - o Central American foreign ministers review compliance monthly.
- Arms Shipments: Soviets have shipped \$200 million in arms to Nicaragua since peace agreement signed in August. Rate of supply dropped off in March, not clear whether this reflects shift in Soviet policy, or merely availability of transport.
- U.S. Actions: First shipments of Congressionally-approved humanitarian aid delivered to Resistance in Honduras. U.S. trade embargo against Nicaragua extended through October 1988.

II. CONDITIONS INSIDE NICARAGUA

- Despite nominal end to state of emergency and reopening of La Prensa, Sandinistas retain firm control over society.
- Opposition part es subject to continuous harassment.
- Economy in shambles due to mismanagment, and effects of war.
- Widespread labor unrest including work stoppages, hunger strike, and two major anti-Sandinista May Day demonstrations.

III. U.S. POSITION

- U.S. supports regional efforts for peace and democracy.
- U.S. prepared to engage in regional negotiations -- which could include Sandinistas -- at the appropriate time.
 - o We do not contemplate bilateral talks with Sandinistas. We will do nothing to undermine the Resistance.
- We have called on the Soviets to end arms shipments to the Sandinistas, as we have done to the Resistance. We have told them their demand that U.S. stop all aid to region in exchange for an end to their military aid to Sandinistas is unacceptable.
 - o Costa Rican President Arias, other democratic leaders, have joined us in calling for Soviets to halt military aid.

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AFRICA

ETHIOPIA FAMINE RELIEF EFFORTS


- Ethiopia's Marxist government engaged in bitter, decades-long war with secessionist groups that are also generally Marxist.
- War, and misguided government policies have devastated the economy; hindered agricultural activity; displaced millions of people, invited famine and disrupted relief efforts.
- Government has forced most foreign relief workers out of contested areas; turned their food and equipment (trucks, fuel, etc.) over to local relief agencies.
- There is no shortage of food. U.S. has donated 271,000 tons; USSR 250,000 tons. Problem is getting the food to the people.
- We want Soviets to pressure Ethiopian government to help, not hinder, movements of food convoys and to allow relief workers to return to hardest-hit regions.
- Soviets have indicated they are sensitive to the humanitarian issue, but think U.S. is exaggerating the problem.
- With war going poorly for the regime, Soviets showing more interest in internal Ethiopian settlement. Neighboring Somalia and Sudan (both pro-U.S.) may find opportunities opening to reduce tensions with Ethiopia.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

- U.S. goal is to get South African and Cuban troops (now 46,000) out of Marxist Angola; and while troops are pulling back, begin to implement UN plan for independence of neighboring Namibia (UN Security Council resolution 435) which South Africa now controls in defiance of UN demands.
- Angolan regime has fought 13-year war with UNITA forces under Jonas Savimbi. His troops control about 40% of territory; receive backing from South Africa, other western sources. Recently, African leaders have quietly urged Angolan regime to come to terms with Savimbi.
- U.S. has insisted that independence for Namibia be linked to Cuban withdrawal. This has now been accepted by all parties.
- On May 3-4, U.S. mediated historic talks involving Cuba, Angola and South Africa. Little substantive progress, but tone was constructive, professional. All agreed to meet again. Soviets not a participant but are meeting with U.S., Angolans and Cubans separately and claim to want to play a constructive role.

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TERRORISM

I. STATE OF PLAY

- Recent Soviet performance on terrorism mixed but has shown some improvement in past two years.
- On the pro side:
 - o Moscow has publicly condemned international terrorism since Gorbachev February 1986 speech at party congress.
 - o The Soviet Foreign Ministry "strongly and resolutely condemned" the recent hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner.
 - o Soviets have supported new legal instruments to facilitate prosecution of terrorists who attack airports or shipping.
- On the negative side:
 - o The Soviets shielded North Korean from UN condemnation over Korean airline bombing, publicly repeated countercharges that U.S. engaged in "state terrorism."
 - o Moscow is presumably privy to East European tolerance, support, training of Middle East terrorist groups.

II. FUTURE MOVES

- U.S. will continue to urge Soviet opposition to terrorism by Middle East states, Afghan terrorism in Pakistan.
- Bilaterally, U.S. would like to focus on practical matters:
 - o Restricting movement and activities of known terrorists, especially in Eastern Europe;
 - o Exchanging information on specific terrorist threats.
 - o The ball, however, is in the Soviet court.
- Multilaterally, we will work with allies to oppose Soviet attempts to politicize debate on terrorism.
 - o We will continue to oppose Soviet bilateral or multilateral proposals requiring mandatory extradition of hijackers. We prefer to "extradite or prosecute."

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THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON BERLIN

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I. ORIGINS OF THE INITIATIVE

-- During your speech at the Brandenburg Gate on June 12, 1987, you called on General Secretary Gorbachev to back up his talk of "openness" with deeds by working with the U.S., U.K. and France to improve the situation in Berlin by:

- o expanding air access to and from Berlin;
- o bringing more international conferences to the city;
- o fostering East/West Berlin youth exchanges;
- o staging more major sports events in both East and West Berlin, including an Olympics.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Following your speech, U.S., British, French and West German experts in the Bonn Group worked out a "Concept Paper" further refining your proposals. This Concept Paper was endorsed by our four Foreign Ministers at their NATO ministerial last December.

At your December Summit, you urged General Secretary Gorbachev to consider improvements in the Berlin situation. You indicated our specific proposals would be put forward soon.

U.S., British and French representatives in Moscow formally presented your proposals to the Soviets on December 29.

III. CURRENT STATUS

- The Soviets consulted the East Germans immediately and continue to consider our Berlin proposals. The Soviets have now publicly stated they hope to respond to your Initiative by summer.
- The U.S., British, French and West German representatives in the Bonn Group continue their work to refine tactics and Allied positions on specific aspects of the Initiative in advance of possible talks with the Soviets.
- Public and political reaction in West Berlin has been highly favorable; Governing Mayor Diepgen underlined this support during his meeting with you on April 28.

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EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

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I. OVERVIEW

- Primary focus of our dialogue with Soviets has been on Cambodia, Korea, Asian security situation.
- Despite Soviet hints that Afghan settlement would facilitate progress in these areas, little new has emerged.
- The Soviets continue to push asymmetrical proposals aimed at limiting U.S. military activity, particularly naval, in Pacific. We're not interested.

II. CAMBODIA

- Vietnamese troop withdrawal, direct negotiations are key to settlement; Moscow should push Vietnam toward these steps.
- Recent Soviet reference to Afghan "model" lacks specifics; Moscow remains unwilling to twist Vietnam's arm to settle.
- Hanoi nervous about Soviet references to Afghan analogy, reluctant to talk directly with Prince Sihanouk.
- Limited convergence of U.S.-Soviet policies: need for political settlement, central role for Prince Sihanouk.

III. KOREAN PENINSULA

- Our concern over possible North Korean disruption of Olympics heightened by Korean airplane bombing.
- Limited indications Soviets too are concerned over their ally's dangerous and unpredictable policies.
- But Moscow determined to maintain good relations with Pyongyang, despite going to Seoul for Olympics.
- o Both U.S. and Soviets agree on need to resume North-South dialogue. President Roh likely to have new proposals once he settles in; North's proposals continue to be unrealistic.

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SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

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I. CAPABILITIES AND CURRENT ACTIVITY

- India tested a nuclear device in 1974; has capability for an active nuclear explosives program. Gandhi seems not to want to proceed forward.
 - o India has stockpiled unsafeguarded plutonium, has rejected Pakistan's non-proliferation proposals.
 - o Opposes equation with Pakistan, citing its concerns about Chinese/superpower nuclear capabilities.
- Pakistan has an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility.
 - o It has the design of a nuclear explosive device but has not manufactured, tested, or assembled a device. This appears to be a political decision.
 - o U.S. pressure has helped, as has uncertainty about Indian reaction.
 - o Pakistan has proposed comprehensive non-proliferation measures on a reciprocal basis with India.
- Under U.S. law (the Symington and Solarz amendments), Pakistan's nuclear activities preclude most U.S. assistance.
 - o January 15, 1988 the President waived these sanctions for Pakistan on national security grounds. The Symington waiver runs until mid-1990.

II. U.S. GOALS

- U.S.-Soviet arms control progress, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan create a positive environment for mutual restraint in nuclear development.
- We want to urge adoption of confidence-building measures by both India and Pakistan to bolster restraint and stability.
- U.S. assistance to Pakistan plays a key role in deterring Pakistan from making the decision to produce nuclear arms.
- We want to explore ways to overcome the regional parties' mutually exclusive preconditions, possibly by creating a negotiating process that includes China and the superpowers.

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SUMMIT BILATERAL CHECKLIST

Global Climate and Environmental Change

-- Progress made under Environmental and Space Agreements since December Summit announcement. Want to note progress, call for strengthened cooperation at Moscow Summit.

Cultural/People-to-People Exchanges

-- General Exchanges 3-year program to be negotiated in May; will also discuss reciprocal culture/information centers, with desire to note agreement in principle at summit.

Basic Sciences

-- If May 4-12 negotiations are successful, Agreement could be ready for signing at Summit.

Transportation

-- Early April talks resulted in near agreement on text with difference in approach to intellectual property rights. Should be able to resolve problem by Summit.

Atomic Energy

-- At April US-USSR Joint Committee Meeting agreed to one year extension to allow for conclusion of needed amendments to Agreement. Exchange of notes to extend planned for Summit.

Nuclear Reactor Safety

-- April 26 signing of Nuclear Reactor Safety MOU (under the Atomic Energy Agreement) could be noted at the Summit.

New Space Cooperation Initiative

-- Initiative accepted by Soviets; calls for modest expansion of space exchanges; Summit announcement recommended.

Maritime Search and Rescue

-- Agreement concluded March 25 in Washington: Ready for signature at Summit at appropriate level.

Radionavigation

-- Coast Guard met Soviets in Leningrad in late April and concluded agreement; could be signed at Summit.

Comprehensive Fisheries Agreement

-- Meeting in Moscow May 18 to try to reach final agreement. Could be ready for signature at Summit.

Marine Pollution Contingency Plan for Bering/Chukchi Seas

-- Coast Guard finalizing agreement and contingency plan during May visit. If complete agreement could be signed at Summit.

Fusion

-- US, USSR, Japan and EC began three-year conceptual design in May of fusion test reactor (ITER) under auspices of IAEA.

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CULTURAL AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES

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I. BACKGROUND

- o Negotiations for second 3-year program period (1989-1991) under General Exchange Agreement in Washington May 10-17.
- o Negotiations moved up to test Soviet readiness to accept important U.S. concerns for agreement before Moscow Summit.
- o If Soviets agree to key points, USIA hopes to have Program ready for signing at Summit.
- o USIA also provided Soviets draft MOU to establish culture and information centers in each national capital; if Soviets agree in principle, Summit signing could follow.
- o USIA's "Information USA" exhibit successful; millionth visitor greeted in March in Tashkent; exhibit now in Irkutsk.
- o Plans underway for next US-USSR Chautauqua conference in Tbilisi in September.
- o Steady progress in people-to-people and youth exchanges, but much more needs to be done.

II. SOVIET POSITION

- o Soviets reluctant to agree to an American Center in Moscow before they have granted them to other socialist nations.
- o Some exchanges, particularly youth sports and student language study, threatened by Soviets treating such programs as commercial, currency-earning ventures rather than cultural exchanges.

III. U.S. POSITION

- o Pleased with progress to implement General Exchanges Agreement and hope for agreement on new 1989-1991 Program.
- o Favor agreement at Summit to establish reciprocal culture and information centers.
- o Would like to see continued efforts to expand the numbers and diversity of people-to-people exchanges, especially youth exchanges.

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US-USSR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGES

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Health and Medical Science Agreements

HHS delegation in May explored potential in new areas of alcohol/drug abuse; July trip planned to discuss possible cooperation in AIDS, if no new Soviet disinformation.

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Agreement

Joint Committee Meeting here in May agreed to new accord in nuclear reactor safety and to extend Agreement 1 year to allow for conclusion of necessary amendments.

Housing and Other Construction Agreement

Proceeding normally; conclusion of new protocol in April with US Army Corps of Engineers will enhance cooperation in construction research in permafrost.

Environmental Protection Agreement

At February Joint Committee Meeting in Moscow EPA's Lee Thomas explored global climate/environmental change and Arctic projects.

Civil Space Cooperation Agreement

Soviets accepted invitation for new space summit initiative calling for modest expansion of space exchanges; new activities also in global climate/environmental change.

World Ocean Agreement

One-year renewal agreed at Washington Summit to revive cooperation; talks here March 2-4 explored possible projects which could be agreed later this summer.

Agriculture Agreement

September meetings in Washington called for revitalization of projects, including Arctic activity, after year of little movement.

Fusion

US, USSR, Japan and EC began three-year conceptual design in May of fusion test reactor (ITER) under auspices of IAEA.

Arctic Contacts and Cooperation

Expansion of scientific cooperation under existing bilateral agreements and regional arrangements; plans for increased people-to-people contacts between Alaska and Soviet Far East.

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GLOBAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE INITIATIVE

EAO

I. BACKGROUND

- o U.S. proposed before Washington summit new initiative in global climate and environmental change under bilateral Environmental Agreement and new Space Agreement.
- o Soviets agreed to proposal, and language was inserted in joint summit statement to promote broad international and bilateral cooperation in this increasingly important area.
- o Initiative called specifically for joint studies in areas of mutual concern, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone and for increased data exchanges, as well as a detailed study on the climate of the future.
- o In February EPA Administrator Lee Thomas led a delegation under the Environmental Agreement to Moscow for a Joint Committee Meeting where concrete programs were identified for implementation of the initiative.
- o A Joint Working Group on Earth Sciences under Space Agreement met in Moscow May 10-17 to discuss joint projects for monitoring global climate change from space.
- o Congressional and NGO interest in ozone and global warming issues high. Forty-two Senators and many concerned groups have urged this issue be addressed at Moscow summit.

II. U.S. POSITION

- o New Space Initiative for expanded data and scientist exchanges, as well as exchanges of instrumentation on each other's spacecraft, will make possible new projects in global change area.
- o In response to Washington summit initiative, new joint working group being formed under Environmental Agreement to consider policy strategies.
- o U.S. wants to record progress and call for strengthened cooperation in this important area at Moscow summit.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Increased Soviet interest in environmental issues evidenced by creation after summit of new State Committee for Protection of the Environment.

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EMBASSY MANAGEMENT ISSUES

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I. EXISTING OFFICE BUILDING (EOB)

- o EOB being thoroughly rehabilitated to be made as secure, safe and habitable as possible.
- o Likely to be in EOB at least 3 to 5 years. Have told Soviets we may use it even after we move into new chancery.
- o New secure communications center began operations in March.
- o New heating and fire safety systems to be fully operational by October.
- o EOB project scheduled for completion by end of next year.

II. NEW OFFICE BUILDING (NOB)

- o Technical investigation of Soviet bugging will enter new phase this spring with large shipments of NOB masonry back to the U.S.
- o Major dismantling and rebuilding will be necessary before we can move into NOB.
 - Congressional ban on FY 88 NOB spending except for feasibility survey of deconstruction/reconstruction options.
 - Contract awarded in April; study to be complete in August.
 - Final decision on future of NOB must take results of this technical engineering and security survey into account.
- o Indications are that Soviets are prepared to cooperate and want to get NOB problem behind them.

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KIEV-NEW YORK CONSULATE EXCHANGE

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I. ORIGINAL PLANS FOR KIEV STILL ON HOLD

- o For the foreseeable future, commitments in Moscow preclude costly and complex project required to make Kiev consulate building secure, permanent facility for classified use.
- o At same time, reasons for wanting people on the ground in Kiev are more compelling than ever.
 - Monitoring changes in the Soviet Union is one of Foreign Service's highest reporting priorities.
- o A window of opportunity now exists to open a third listening post in the Soviet Union.

II. NEW APPROACH

- o Secretary Shultz has approved concept of 5-6 person post in Kiev without classified communications or document storage.
 - Without classified communications or storage, much of security superstructure required in Moscow will be unnecessary, keeping costs and reconstruction to a minimum.
 - Classified reporting can still be done from Moscow during regular trips to the Embassy.
- o We are consulting with Congress to ensure that new proposal complies with legislation concerning Kiev consulate.
- o Once Congress has been adequately consulted and we are confident of our ground as regards the legislation, we will see if Soviets are interested in project on our terms:
 - Soviets cannot use the permanent consulate building they own in New York for consular functions;
 - They must operate from office space and living quarters leased through OFM.

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INFORMATION AND MEDIA ISSUES - DISINFORMATION

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I. U.S. Goals

- o Media Reciprocity: Increase Soviet public's exposure to American values, policies, officials, through Soviet print and electronic media.
- o Free Flow of Information: Increase availability of American periodicals and newspapers to the Soviet public.
- o Disinformation: End to Soviet disinformation campaigns directed against the U.S.
- o Jamming: End to Soviet jamming of all VOA language service broadcasts, as well as Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, and other Western radios.

II. U.S.-Soviet Information Talks

- o At Washington summit, USIA Director Wick proposed, Gorbachev accepted, idea of regular meetings of officials and media experts to promote freer exchange of views on information issues.
- o First round of Information Talks held between Wick and Novosti Chairman Falin April 20-22 in Washington.
 - Talks unprecedented in level, comprehensiveness of representation: U.S. delegation included private media as well as government officials; Soviet side included state, party and media officials.
 - Both sides agreed talks were useful, should continue. No new dates set.

III. Disinformation

- o At December summit, Gorbachev informed Director Wick he had given instructions that Soviet disinformation should end.
- o Soviet charges that U.S. is responsible for creating the AIDS virus have dropped off markedly. Soviet media have repeatedly acknowledged the natural origins of AIDS.
- o However, Soviets continue to disseminate false charges that the U.S. is involved in creation of an "ethnic weapon," and to publish virulent anti-U.S. tracts such as Army of the Night accusing the CIA of such "crimes" as the assassination of Olof Palme, Indira Gandhi and the attempted assassination of the Pope.

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ARCTIC CONTACTS AND COOPERATION

I. BACKGROUND

- o President and Gorbachev agreed at Washington summit to encourage expanded contacts and cooperation on issues relating to the Arctic.
- o They also expressed support for the development of bilateral and regional cooperation, including coordination of scientific research and protection of the region's environment.
- o Agreement has since been reached on expanding Arctic cooperation under Environmental and World Ocean Agreements, as well as other bilateral agreements.
- o Stockholm scientific conference on Arctic came close to agreement on creation of International Arctic Scientific Committee.
- o U.S. has rejected Soviet attempt to insert unacceptable Murmansk security proposals under rubric of Arctic initiative.
- o Possibilities for expansion of cultural, people-to-people, and humanitarian contacts between Alaska and Soviet Far East currently being pursued, including airflights and cruise ship visits.
- o Alaskan Congressional delegation and Governor interested in summit mention of expanded Alaskan-Soviet contacts.

II. U.S. POSITION

- o U.S. unwilling to pursue new bilateral "Arctic initiative" with Soviets where security issues could be inserted into dialogue.
- o Will continue to coordinate closely with allies and other Arctic partners on approaches to both bilateral and regional cooperation.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Gorbachev Murmansk speech of October 1987 an attempt to give momentum to unacceptable Soviet regional security proposals, take credit for ongoing multilateral cooperation.
- o Giving modest response of governments to Murmansk, Soviets pushing Arctic proposals through parliamentary contacts.

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SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

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- o Economic turmoil slowed growth in 1987. GNP (preliminary CIA estimate) rose only 0.5%, less than the pre-Gorbachev average and far below the strong 3.9% pace of 1986. Turmoil resulted from harsh winter weather, new inspection procedures for industrial output, new managerial and financial arrangements, and massive industrial retooling.
- o Industrial performance was poor. Overall output rose about 1.5%, versus 2.5% in 1986. Energy sector did well, but output of other basic materials slowed. Machine-building sector -- top-priority focus of Gorbachev's modernization drive -- was far below plan in both quantity and quality.
- o Agricultural performance was mixed. Good forage crop and 211-million-ton grain harvest boosted meat, milk and egg output to new records. Fruit, vegetable, and cotton crops declined. Overall output fell 3% from record 1986 level.
- o Soviet consumers have little to cheer about. Growth in state retail sales fell short of the 3.5% annual average for 1981-1986, partly due to drastic reduction in legal vodka sales. Stagnant living standards discourage public support for economic reform. Soviet leaders are trying to improve supply and distribution of food and durable goods, and promising more attention to consumers this year. Nascent coop sector is still too small to have an impact.
- o Soviet trade balance improved but along traditional lines. Hard currency trade surplus doubled to \$4.6 billion in 1987. Nominal earnings rose 10% thanks to higher value and volume of oil exports and continued arms sales (on credit) to Third World. Spending was level in current dollars but bought about 15% less in real terms: industrial imports fell sharply. Soviet gross external debt rose about \$5.0 billion in 1987 compared to \$7.2 billion increase in 1986.
- o Annual plan for 1988 keeps targets unrealistically high: GNP and industrial output are to rise 4% and 4.5% respectively over planned, but unachieved, 1987 levels. Such targets fit the 1986-1990 Five Year Plan mold, but don't allow for the inevitable disruptions of implementing the comprehensive economic reform program announced in 1987. June Party Congress may debate the trade-off between short-term growth and long-term reform.

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- o Designed to assert international economic role commensurate with superpower status, give Moscow more say in development of international economic system, buttress domestic reforms, improve the balance of payments, and reduce technological lag.

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GATT Membership

- o Stated goal is to participate in formulation of international trade policy, expand trade with GATT members, acquire experience for possible eventual full membership.
- o Soviet bid for GATT observer status in 1986 failed as most GATT members reacted negatively. But Soviet interest in participation persists, ranks high on their agenda with us.
- o The US strongly opposes Soviet participation in GATT fora:
 - Soviet centralized economy and non-market trade system are incompatible with GATT's market-oriented philosophy.
 - Without substantial changes in Soviet economic and trade systems, Soviet participation offers little to GATT members. The Soviets could not fulfill GATT's membership commitments.

--Some changes pursued by Gorbachev suggest Soviet practices might eventually move in direction of greater compatibility with GATT norms. But it is too soon to draw any conclusions: we should await outcome of these changes.

--We also share concern of other GATT members that Soviet participation could politicize and undermine efficacy of an economic forum that plays a central role in world trade.

Foreign Trade Sector Reorganization

- o Goal is to increase and diversify exports, improve access to Western capital and high technology, improve quality and mix of imports from East Europe.
- o In 1986 Foreign Economic Commission (under Council of Ministers) was created to oversee changes and coordinate activities of trade entities; selected ministries and enterprises were given legal right to engage directly in foreign trade. In 1988 Ministry of Foreign Trade was shaken up, pared down, and renamed Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations; many of its traditional trade functions passed directly to branch ministries.

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Joint Ventures with Western Firms

- o Goal is to tap Western capital and management, marketing, and quality control methods, broaden access to Western technology, increase exports and substitute for imports.
- o Legal framework was promulgated in January 1987. Law has flexibility to tailor regulations to a given project, but restrictions and lack of clarity prompt Western concern over transfer of profits, management control, protection of their legal and commercial rights.
- o Western firms interested but skeptical. Most firms discussing joint ventures with Soviets already do business there. Many see joint ventures as entrée into Soviet domestic market, few interested in promoting Soviet exports to compete with their own products in third countries.
 - Soviets have signed about 24 joint venture agreements, of which three with US firms: Combustion Engineering, Occidental Petroleum, and Honeywell. Dozens of others are under discussion, but fruition is the exception.
 - An "American Trade Consortium" (ATC) involving ADM, Chevron, Nabisco, Ford, & Kodak has high-level Soviet attention, is discussing a broad range of projects with counterpart Soviet consortium which could lead to more joint ventures in months ahead. ATC went public during mid-April US/USSR Trade and Economic Council session in Moscow: Soviets applauded, USG kept its distance.
- o To create attractive conditions for Western investment, Soviets are being pressed to reduce barriers against outside world and central political controls over economic decision-makers.
- o USG neither encourages nor discourages joint ventures. Any joint venture must comply with US and COCOM export controls. The commercial and political risk is borne by the private sector.

United Nations Activism

- o Each year since 1985, in context of their proposed "Comprehensive System of International Security", Soviets have won UN General Assembly support for resolutions on "International Economic Security". These advance Soviet and Third World rhetoric along "New International Economic Order" lines.
- o The US opposes such Soviet resolutions as extremely vague, duplicative of the purpose and role of the UN Charter, and wasteful of the UN's scarce time and resources.

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US-SOVIET TRADE

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- o Soviets showing new interest in Jackson-Vanik. May believe have done enough on emigration to warrant movement on our part. Most Favored Nation (MFN) raised in Verity-Gorbachev meeting at Joint Commercial Commission; Stevenson raised between Shifter and Adamishin.
- o Timing not yet right. Jewish groups are split, no consensus on the Hill. We have said we will respond to pressures for change in Jackson-Vanik, but not initiate.
- o Administration's policy is to favor expansion of peaceful, non-strategic commerce with Soviets within existing legal framework. Substantial increase in trade depends on progress in other areas of political relationship and on emigration.
 - Recent Soviet steps on emigration encouraging, but more needs to be done.
- o Sustained performance on emigration, assurances that practices have changed, not declarations and words are required. Important constituencies in U.S. and Congress must be convinced before Administration will move on Jackson-Vanik waiver.
- o US-Soviet trade small -- less than 1% of total US trade, 2% of Soviet trade. Nevertheless, Soviets want increased economic cooperation, joint ventures with West, US.
- o Tight hard currency, reluctance to borrow, low quality of exports are substantive obstacles to expansion of Soviet trade.
- o MFN may become increasingly important factor for Soviets when/if joint ventures with US firms ever get off ground.

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AGRICULTURE: LONG TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT (LTA)

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I. BACKGROUND

- o Two rounds of negotiations on new LTA held, March 19 and May 3-4. Differences over pricing, min/max purchase levels and product mix are main points of contention. Dates for next round not yet set, but probably late June.
- o This year, USDA has offered the Soviets EEPs for 8.75 million metric tons (mmt) of wheat; Soviets have taken up most of it (expected to complete purchases very soon), relatively large amounts of soybeans/meal and about 4 mmt corn.

II. SOVIET VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o Soviets seek guaranteed access to grain supplies at minimum cost while they try to improve own agriculture to eliminate import needs.
- o They are also seeking to tie other trade issues to the LTA, such as port access and imbalances in bilateral trade.
- o Will not purchase U.S. wheat at uncompetitive prices. Recent problems of grain quality/insect infestation now seem resolved, but quality remains an issue.

III. U.S. VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o The U.S. goal is twofold: To promote and stabilize U.S. grain exports; and to exclude non-grain issues from the LTA.

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I. BACKGROUND

- o Dip notes on arrangement for access by U.S. industry to resources in Soviet EEZ signed at February ministerial. Implementing technical annexes being put together.
- o Secretary Verity announced resolution of whaling certification issue April 14 following exchange of letters with Ambassador Dubinin with assurances on Soviet whaling practices.
- o We are now seeking to complete negotiations on a Comprehensive Fisheries Agreement (CFA) to replace the current Governing International Fisheries Agreement and the February (interim) access agreement. Meetings with Soviet Deputy Minister of Fisheries in Washington in late April went well.

-- We tabled draft CFA and are awaiting Soviet response. More talks begin in Moscow May 18.

II. SOVIET VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o To earn hard currency from fisheries.
- o To ensure access to U.S. fisheries resources.

III. U.S. VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o To maximize access for U.S. fishermen to resources in the Soviet EEZ.

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US-USSR Cooperation Against Narcotics Trafficking

Background

- o On basis of agreement at December 1987 summit to develop bilateral cooperation to combat international narcotics trafficking, Assistant Secretary Wroblewski led State/DEA delegation to Moscow April 28-29 for initial consultations.
- o Bilateral cooperation to interdict narcotics transiting the USSR from Southeast and Southwest Asia can bolster overall US interdiction efforts. Soviet interest in cooperation reflects their growing concern and openness about domestic drug abuse.
- o Working-level cooperation will begin with projected visit of Vienna DEA representative to Moscow in June; next round of government-to-government consultations is projected for Washington later this year, could produce a formal MOU on cooperation.

Soviet Views & Objectives

- o Initial consultations indicate Soviets are ready for practical cooperation against trafficking, but also seek broader "framework" agreement covering drug abuse as well.

U.S. Views and Objectives

- o We seek practical mechanism to gain information about, and to better interdict, narcotics transiting the USSR towards the US. We defer consideration of potential cooperation against drug abuse to existing HHS/Soviet Ministry of Health venue.

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SOVIET COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

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- o The Soviets are promoting use of their launch vehicles, particularly the Proton, by US and other commercial satellite industries and by the international satellite communication organizations INTELSAT and INMARSAT.
- o Support for use of Soviet launchers is growing among satellite operators in US, abroad, and in INMARSAT.
 - INMARSAT Director General Lundberg has called Proton financially and commercially attractive, blamed US export controls for preventing INMARSAT's use of it.
 - INMARSAT members increasingly willing to consider using Soviet launchers because they are much cheaper and to avoid politicization of INMARSAT.
 - Space Commerce Corp. (US firm) stated publicly in 1987 that it will seek a license to export a US satellite to the USSR for launch on a Soviet vehicle; has not done so yet.
- o Lack of Western boosters, US refusal to permit US satellite technology to be launched by Soviets, has created a serious backlog of Western satellites waiting for launch.
- o At US initiative, non-use of Soviet launch services will be discussed at COCOM in early June. We seek to formalize and ensure uniform compliance with denial policies.

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SOVIET VIEWS & OBJECTIVES

- o Offer heavily subsidized launch services to exploit the backlog of commercial payloads resulting from the Challenger loss and failures of other Western boosters.
- o Enhance image of Soviet space achievements and technology.

US VIEWS & OBJECTIVES

- o US export control laws (the ITAR) require a license for transfer to the USSR of US satellite technology: US policy is to deny such licenses - with no exceptions - for national security, foreign policy and commercial reasons:
 - lack of adequate assurance that US technology can be safeguarded while being processed for a Soviet launch;
 - use of Soviet launchers, if only to meet the current shortage of Western launchers, could leave the US (and the West) dependent on the USSR for access to space.
 - US (and Western) use of Soviet launchers would undermine the commercialization of the nascent US (and international) launch industry.

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GORBACHEV'S LEADERSHIP AND THE OPPOSITION

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I. "SECOND SECRETARY" LIGACHEV AT CENTER OF CONTROVERSY

- o Gorbachev has faced public challenges from both supporters and opponents of reform.
- o Boris Yel'tsin, outspoken reform advocate, was ousted as Moscow party leader last fall.
- o Moscow now swirling with rumors that conservative Yegor Ligachev will be removed from Politburo or moved to ceremonial position.
- o Either would be major victory for Gorbachev.
- o Ligachev has long been a rallying point for opponents of change.
- o In March Ligachev reportedly approved publishing a letter sharply critical of reform in a Soviet newspaper.
- o Gorbachev and his allies responded with an authoritative Politburo statement in Pravda.
- o -- It reasserted Gorbachev's central theme that economic reform is impossible without greater openness and more democratic decision-making.
- o Officially, the Soviets deny that there is a rift between Gorbachev and Ligachev, and Ligachev continues to appear next to Gorbachev in public ceremonies.

II. JUNE PARTY CONFERENCE COULD BE IMPORTANT MILESTONE

- o Provides an opportunity to review party rules and make personnel changes
- o Letters in Soviet press have called for consideration of a maximum of two five-year terms and a mandatory retirement age for party officials.

III. ETHNIC TENSIONS POSE MAJOR CHALLENGE TO REFORM

- o Ethnic discontent has always been a fact of Soviet life.
- o With glasnost, however, traditional restraints on the expression of discontent have loosened.
- o Massive demonstrations in Armenia in February and March highlighted the scope of the problem.

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PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM

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- o The goal: Gorbachev describes revitalization of the Soviet economy as his top priority. The Soviets want to reverse a decade of economic slowdown which has produced a "pre-crisis" stagnation and malaise and threatens to bring the USSR into the 21st century well behind the West.
 - Annual Soviet GNP growth averaged 4% in 1960-1975 but only about 2% between 1975-1985. Soviet GNP was 60% of U.S. GNP in 1975, but declined to 55% by 1985. Gorbachev aims to restore 4% annual growth rates for the current 12th Five Year Plan (1986-90) and to the year 2000.
- o The means: two-track policy of industrial modernization and structural reform.
 - Investment in the machine-building sector is to rise 80% for 1986-90 compared to 1981-85, to retool Soviet industry with more productive capital.
 - Structural reforms embodied in the comprehensive set of laws and decrees approved at the 1987 June Party Plenum are to introduce a streamlined "New Economic Mechanism" by 1991, in time for the next Five Year Plan. Decentralizing measures cover planning, pricing, supply, finance and credit, and reduction of central bureaucracy, but leave basic pillars of Soviet socialism in place.
- o Where things stand on revitalization:
 - The modernization effort has been underway since 1986; open question whether faster retooling is achievable and if so, whether it will really put more modern equipment onto shop floors. Systemic disincentives to innovation persist.
 - Partial structural reforms have been underway since 1985, with specific measures like enterprise self-financing and tougher quality control being gradually applied to specific sectors. Comprehensive structural reform - the application across the economy of the decentralizing measures approved last June - began only in 1988. But crucial, painful price reforms have been put off for later.
- o Where things stand on economic performance:
 - Economic turmoil slowed growth in 1987. GNP rose only 0.5%, less than the pre-Gorbachev average and well below the strong 3.9% pace of 1986.

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- It is probably impossible to restructure the economy and boost growth simultaneously. Economic performance in 1987 suggests reform got precedence over growth. But the annual plan for 1988 keeps targets unrealistically high: GNP and industrial output are to rise 4% and 4.5% respectively over planned - but unachieved - 1987 levels.

- o Prospects: many unanswered questions:

- How will Soviets manage trade-off between reform and short-term growth?
- How will Soviets tackle the toughest reform measures, e.g., the traditional but inefficient "social contract" of consumer goods subsidies and guaranteed employment?
- How will the non-Russian nationalities respond to "decentralization"?
- Does economic reform have enough of an elite and mass constituency to overcome the stiff resistance that remains?

- o Prospects: some early answers:

- Ambitious growth targets for 1986-90 Five Year Plan are unlikely to be met; average 2% growth is likely.
- If current disruptions pay off in successful implementation of retooling and reform, growth rates could improve a bit in the 1990s.
- But Gorbachev's reform perpetuates a goal which has stymied Soviet leaders since Stalin: finding a viable non-market alternative to a command economy which both ensures central control and promotes efficiency. This goal will remain elusive, and the Soviet economy will either settle back into familiar patterns, or be pushed to further reform. Upcoming June Party Conference should give signs of which way things are heading.

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS

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-- Gorbachev's primary foreign policy objective has been to achieve stability and predictability in foreign relations in order to create breathing room for domestic reforms.

- o Stress on cooperation with the world community to resolve "global problems."
- o Soviet diplomacy pursues parallel private and public tracks. Soviet sensitivity to public opinion abroad has sharply increased, with positive results.

Primary focus has continued to be directed toward U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly arms control.

- o Gorbachev has muted the portrayal of an external threat in shifting resources to domestic programs.
- o INF portrayed as reducing U.S. missile threat; an agreement on strategic arms -- both offensive and defensive -- remains the top priority.

-- At the same time, Gorbachev has devoted more attention to rest of the world, particularly Europe, Middle East, Asia.

- o Soviets have sought to retain close ties to traditional friends and allies like India, Vietnam, Angola, Cuba, Syria.
- o But Moscow has also actively courted new relationships with countries like China, Indonesia, Egypt, Mexico.
- o Soviets working to revive the prestige of the UN and other international bodies to enhance their own diplomatic leverage at the West's expense.

-- Soviet regional policies under Gorbachev have sought to discourage local adventurism and hold down costs.

- o Clients have been signalled that greater cost accountability will be applied to aid grants.
- o Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan signals Moscow's intention to limit involvements abroad.
- o In regional dialogue, as elsewhere, Soviets pursue equal status with U.S. as a world power.

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o Glasnost, perestroika and democratization have brought into the open long-standing tensions in the non-Russian regions of the USSR. Since Gorbachev came to power, protests and demonstrations have become more frequent, larger and encompassed a broader range of issues.

- This increase actually reflects the new opportunities provided by the regime's greater tolerance of dissent-- rather than a rise in popular anger.
- Except for those in the Baltic republics, few protest actions could be described as anti-Soviet; in Armenia, for example, protesters carried pictures of Gorbachev and slogans backing his program.
- In fact, most non-Russians appear to be Gorbachev supporters. There is widespread belief that his program will benefit them and that the available alternatives--particularly Ligachev--would be much worse.

Despite the tough stance Moscow adopted in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, the Armenians achieved some of their goal, e.g., the survival of the Demirchyan leadership and expanded benefits for Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, more protests are likely both there and elsewhere in the coming months.

- Elsewhere in the USSR, other republics have more than three dozen claims analogous to the American one, and similar demonstrations about language, environmental and cultural issues are likely.
- Some demonstrations are already scheduled: Ukrainian Catholics plan to protest the Moscow-based celebration of the millenium of Christianity in Kievan Rus'; all three Baltic nationalities have a full slate of national anniversaries to commemorate.

o Such protest actions are not Gorbachev's main national problem; the multinational make-up of the population is.

- Every policy he adopts has ethnic consequences, and each national group will consequently have its own distinct views on every policy.
- Gorbachev has recently established a special commission to prepare "ethnic impact statements" for all policies under consideration; as a result of its deliberations, Gorbachev and the rest of the leadership are likely to proceed more cautiously in many areas.

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SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE DEBATE

- o Gorbachev has been touting the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" in military affairs since late 1985.
 - Abroad, the theme plays a major role in Soviet peace diplomacy. At home, it has helped to justify compromises in arms control and efforts to shift resources from defense to civilian modernization.
 - "Sufficiency," however, is not a new concept. Both Khrushchev (1960) and Brezhnev (1977) used it, and the military have traditionally described their doctrine as "defensive."
 - Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's earlier invocations of "sufficiency" coincided with the demobilization of over one million troops and the having of defense spending growth, respectively.
- o Given the precedents, the military has naturally been uneasy over the implications of "reasonable sufficiency," but there is no simplistic civilian/military split.
 - Some civilian analysts have praised Khrushchev's manpower cuts and urged similar reductions now; some military spokesmen, while not rejecting cuts, warn against drastic measures.
 - There are unconfirmed reports that Defense Minister Yazov has already approved a 25 percent reduction in manpower--perhaps to be achieved through a major force restructuring along lines already tested in Hungary.
- o As yet there is no consensus on the implications of "reasonable sufficiency" for military operations.
 - While more attention is now paid to defensive operations, this is a military response to new NATO doctrines.
 - As such, it preceded Gorbachev's pronouncements on "reasonable sufficiency" and supports the military's traditional emphasis on "active defense."
 - In his meeting in March with Secretary Carlucci, Yazov was vague about the practical impact of "new" doctrine on Soviet forces and operations. He suggested, however, that reductions in Soviet forces are more likely to come through arms control agreements than through unilateral cutbacks.

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