

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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June 30, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: FRANK PRESS  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB.*  
SUBJECT: "Fact of" Reconnaissance from Space

As part of your Policy Review Committee exercise on behalf of the National Security Council you are requested to undertake an analysis of the subject, presenting appropriate options for consideration to the President by September 1, 1978.

While I recognize the timing is short, I believe this effort consistent with the task force you have already set up regarding data, technology and hardware interchange--which most certainly must also address similar implications.

There is no question that now is the time to move with this project to determine if the benefits to be derived in defense of our foreign and defense policies sufficiently outweigh the potential risks. While advantages to a change in our current policy are substantial, the potential problem areas are of sufficient concern to merit critical study to assure that a change will not constitute an ultimate threat to national security. The key may be in the methodology selected, adequate planning and carefully controlled implementation. This could be the first in a "stepular" approach to a more "open skies" policy but one which would serve to optimize national resources as well as benefits to the rest of the world while minimizing potential risks to national security.

The thrust of your effort should be to focus on the following issue: Is a change in current U.S. policy beyond PD/NSC-37 concerning utilization of information derived from remote sensing systems in the ultimate national interest, and, if so, to what extent and in what manner should such a change be made, beginning with the acknowledgement of the "fact of" reconnaissance? Your effort should address the needs for a careful implementation plan to assure potentially negative impacts of such action are solved. Some include:

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under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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- consultation with Congress, Allies (to gain support for legitimacy of reconnaissance) and the Soviets (to advise them we are doing so and expect no reaction from them);

- international legal considerations; and

- security plan to assure that public Government exposure does not result in wholesale breakdown of existing codeword security system to protect technology, operations and product.

This list, of course, should be amplified as you deem appropriate.

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