



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

12542

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

- Retain classification Reclassify to Secret
 - Declassify with concurrence of _____ TOP SECRET/NODIS
- EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by HLS Date: 4/11/96

JUL 28 1969

JUL 28 1969 ...

~~Withdrawal No.~~
MEMORANDUM

TO : The Acting Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *JPW*

FROM : NEA - Joseph J. Sisco *JJS (SWR)*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Initial Meeting with
Israelis on Nuclear and SSM Issue July 29 --
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

You and Deputy Secretary Packard have called in Israeli Ambassador Rabin to meet with you at 11:30 July 29 to initiate a dialogue on Israel's intentions concerning nuclear weapons and strategic missiles. Our objective is to persuade Israel to:

- (a) Sign the NPT by the end of the year.
- (b) Reaffirm to the U.S. in writing the assurance that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East, specifying that "introduction" shall mean possession of nuclear explosive devices.
- (c) Give us assurances in writing that it will stop production and will not deploy "Jericho" missiles or any other nuclear-capable strategic missile.

X N DEF 12-5 JSR

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

NODIS REVIEW	
Cat. A -	Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B -	Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C -	Caption and custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, J	
Date:	<u>7/2</u> 19 <u>69</u>

Talking Points

A. The NPT

-- You have asked the Ambassador to call today to discuss a subject to which the U.S. attaches great importance -- the possibility that nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems will be introduced into the Middle East.

-- The U.S. would regard such a development not only as a tragedy for the Middle East but as a direct threat to U.S. national security. Our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide would be dealt a severe blow.

-- For this reason, Israel's nuclear policy is a subject of great importance to us. It transcends considerations of purely bilateral significance to our two nations.

-- We are aware of Israel's assurances -- made publicly at the highest level of its government as well as to us privately -- that Israel will not be the first area state to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. We attach great weight to these assurances. But with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in existence, unilateral assurances are no longer sufficient in themselves to give the world confidence that Israel does not intend to manufacture nuclear weapons.

-- We are particularly troubled by Israel's continued delay in signing the NPT because of Israel's potential for nuclear weapons production. Israel is not just another state that for one reason or another is delaying its adherence to the Treaty. The world knows that unlike most other states Israel has the technical capability to build nuclear weapons. It knows that Israel has a megawatt 26 megawatt nuclear reactor capable of producing fissionable material in sufficient quantity to build bombs. It is also becoming aware that Israel has had developed and is acquiring surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

-- Because of this proximity to the nuclear weapons threshold, Israel's attitude toward the NPT is being closely

watched by other small and medium-sized states who are waiting to see whether nuclear weapons non-proliferation can be made to prevail as a global principle.

-- We therefore attach utmost importance to Israel's early signature and ratification of the NPT. Last December, Prime Minister Eshkol wrote to President Johnson (Tab A) that Israel was studying the implications of Israel's adherence to the NPT. We would welcome the Ambassador's comments concerning the conclusions the GOI has reached.

(If Rabin says the GOI has not completed the study, I suggest that you respond by asking what aspects of adherence to the NPT create special problems for Israel. The USG would be happy to discuss them with the GOI's experts. You may wish to cite Foreign Minister Eban's press interview statement on February 7, "Israel would like to exchange ideas on this problem [signing the NPT] with the U.S.")

B. Bilateral Assurances

-- Upon reviewing the Ambassador's conversations with Assistant Secretary Warnke last November (Tab B), we were struck by what appears to be a difference between our two governments over what constitutes "introduction" of nuclear weapons. The Ambassador argued, as we understand it, that a state could possess a nuclear explosive device but so long as that device was "unadvertised" and "untested" it could not be considered as having been "introduced".

-- The U.S. Government cannot accept this interpretation of "introduction", as was made clear in Secretary Warnke's letter to the Ambassador concerning the F-4 sale. We would like to have Israel's assurance that when it says it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area it means that it will not possess nuclear weapons.

C. Strategic Missiles

-- Israel has had developed and tested in France the so-called MD-620 or "Jericho" strategic missile which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Some of the missiles remaining after tests are already in Israel.

-- We are disturbed at Israel's acquisition of this missile because it makes sense only as a nuclear weapons carrier. We recognize that Israel claims that it can be used with other warheads; this is not, however, the way the world will see it. Whatever assurances Israel extends with respect to nuclear weapons will be seriously weakened by deployment of strategic nuclear-capable missiles.

-- For this reason, we hope Israel will agree not to produce or deploy the "Jericho" missile. There is no sign of an active SSM program in any Arab country and no sign of Soviet interest in providing any of their Arab friends with assistance in either this or the nuclear weapons field.

Rabin's Probable Response

The GOI has traditionally been very reluctant to be drawn out on their nuclear weapons and strategic missile intentions. If Rabin takes a negative and uncommunicative line, as he may well, I suggest you tell him that while we recognize this is an area of sensitivity for Israel, the GOI must equally recognize that it is one of great importance to the U.S. We cannot regard Israel's unwillingness to enter into meaningful discussions with us on the nuclear and missile questions as consistent either with the high level of confidence that has prevailed between our two governments or the support for Israel's security that Israel expects from the U.S. We recognize that this is a subject on which the Ambassador may wish to seek instructions from Jerusalem. We would therefore like to talk with him again in about a week's time.

If Rabin asks about early deliveries of the F-4's, I suggest you say that it has proven impossible to move the initial delivery dates forward. If he asks if Israel may expect the first delivery in September, I suggest you and Mr. Packard confirm that September remains the month when the first deliveries are scheduled to begin.

Enclosures:

1. Tab A -- Eshkol-Johnson letter
2. Tab B -- Correspondence between Ambassador Rabin and Assistant Secretary Warnke

CLEARANCES: NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton J/PM - Mr. Lehmann
INR - Mr. Hughes

NEA/IAI:MSterner:plz:slh

cc:J
C

White House-Mr. Saund
DOD/ISA