Takashi Itoh, ed., *Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho* [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 923-924

Wednesday, August 8 [, 1945]

Iwao Yamazaki, Nobuyoshi Saka and Ryunosuke Goto came to visit us.

The political situation became even more critical.

Pessimistic mood prevailed because there is no response from the Soviet Union.

(A Supreme War Council meeting on 8th – Our reaction to the Tripartite Potsdam Declaration was discussed. The Army and the Navy General Staff took a hard line.)

Discussion with Navy Minister Yonai

[Yonai:] "I met with Foreign Minister Togo on August 1, but he said he wanted me to ask the Prime Minister for his opinion."

[Takagi:] "Is he still talking about such a thing at this very moment?"

[Yonai:] "The Prime Minister's words are also difficult to understand. When he speaks, he still tries to sound tough by mentioning [the battle of] Komaki-yama, the Winter Siege of Osaka, and such. The other day as well, at a Cabinet meeting, he started to argue that to talk about ending the war would be almost as if we were encouraging frontline soldiers to start a riot and that it had been common knowledge for a long time that commanders abroad would not obey their master's orders. It was almost like sending a wrong signal that could instigate a riot. So I called [Seizo] Sakonji and told him to tell the Prime Minister that such a comment was not appropriate at a Cabinet meeting."

[Takagi:] "How does the Prime Minister assess the situation inside the country?"

[Yonai:] "It seems he hasn't heard anything about it. And no one knows [the real situation]."

[Takagi:] "In my opinion, someone like the Interior Minister should have a straight talk with the Prime Minister about domestic conditions. I used to think that by September or October the domestic situation would rapidly deteriorate while you said it would start deteriorating in mid-August. Actually, the situation is getting steadily worse in many respects during these couple of days, especially after Hiroshima (August 6)."

[Yonai:] "Bad news continues and the ration of rice in Tokyo will be reduced by ten percent after 11th of this month. The Army Minister still sounds aggressive all the time, but I am worried that you may

end up in a situation where you will realize, when you look back after vigorously moving forward assuming that others are following, that no one is actually following you. The Foreign Minister has an appointment with the Army Minister today. The independence of East India will be on the agenda at the Supreme War Council tomorrow. I have doubts about such a plan (a farce?), but I can't say so in public."

[Takagi:] "There is a rumor that the Prime Minister has said that [Koichi] Kido, taking advantage of his position as an aide to His Majesty, is trying to influence His Majesty's opinion. Did you hear that?"

[Yonai:] "I heard that the Prime Minister complained what the point of being a prime minister [in this kind of situation]."

[Takagi:] "I think the real problem is not whether the enemy will invade our mainland and when it will be if they do so, but rather the diminishing spirit of the people. Therefore, it will be a big mistake if the Foreign Minister is thinking that we can spend more time on diplomacy if invasion comes later." [Yonai:] "I met the Foreign Minister yesterday and he told me that no telegram [from the Soviet Union] had come. But it was on 5th that Stalin returned home from Potsdam and it takes a few days for a telegram to arrive, so we will probably get some response either today or tomorrow. I will ask him tomorrow since I have a meeting. Perhaps we may also have to be ready for a situation where we won't receive any response from Russia."

[Original editor's note:] (The above portion is from the index card note dated August 8. There is also a two-page typed memorandum with the same content.)