

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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ADDENDUM

INR CONTRIBUTION TO

NIE 4-65

Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation

November 4, 1965

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.

(X) Release () Excise () Deny (X) Declassify

Date 11/14/02 Exemption _____

JP Sulzer

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

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IPS by *JP Sulzer* Date 10/15/02

Pakistan

The Government of Pakistan remains concerned over the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation, principally as it refers to its neighbor, India. However, there is no sign that Pakistan has abandoned its policy of support for nuclear disarmament and inspection agreements. Nor are there any indications that Pakistan is developing a program to produce weapons grade fissionable material.

Should India develop a nuclear weapons capability, Pakistan would probably feel obliged to chart a new course of action. The Pakistani reaction to a real or imagined Indian nuclear weapons capability might take one of several directions.

If the state of Pakistani-Indian relations does not improve, it is doubtful that the GOP would adopt a passive policy in the face of a nuclear threat from India. Pakistan might embark on an accelerated program of its own to develop nuclear weapons utilizing whatever outside assistance might be made available. Should the GOP feel that a purely domestic program would not be adequate or rapid enough, the present bent of Pakistani foreign relations appears to indicate that Communist China would be the most likely candidate to be called on for assistance. However, courses of action involving Chinese participation are highly speculative because of the existence of two imponderables: (1) Chinese ability to supply what the GOP might request, and (2) uncertainty as to whether the Chinese would be willing to satisfy Pakistani

requests. Nevertheless, should the GOP decide to approach the Chinese the following might constitute possible Pakistani approaches. The Government of Pakistan might request tangible assistance from China in the form of already fabricated nuclear weapons or possibly a supply of fissionable material and technical assistance which would enable Pakistanis themselves to make nuclear weapons. Equally possible, but less complicated and providing a more rapid response to a nuclear threat, would be a Government of Pakistan request to the Chinese for nuclear protection. Such an arrangement might involve a Chinese commitment to retaliate on behalf of Pakistan should Pakistan be subjected to nuclear attack.

For the present, Pakistan, with its own very limited nuclear facilities and without an external stimulus, will not on its own initiative attempt to develop a nuclear weapons capability. However, an attempt to become a beneficiary of Chinese nuclear weapon capability, if pursued, would most likely be accompanied by an increased Pakistani effort to develop their own nuclear capability.