

On 12 February 2004, a panel of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

COL [REDACTED] IP, CFLCC – PMO, **Interviewer**  
LTC [REDACTED] JA, CFLCC – SJA, **Interviewer**  
LTC [REDACTED], 705th MP Battalion, **Interviewer**  
2LT [REDACTED] 320th MP Battalion, **Respondent**

The interview is summarized as follows:

My full name is [REDACTED]. My social security number is [REDACTED]. My current rank is 2LT, branch, Military Intelligence. I'm currently assigned to the 320th Military Police Battalion, at Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, Abu Gharib Prison near Baghdad, Iraq. I am Army Reservist. I've been assigned to the 320th MP Battalion, since October 2001.

My duty is to brief the Battalion Commander's staff of any potential threats, both inside and outside the facility. At present, I work for LTC [REDACTED]. Before him, I worked for LTC [REDACTED]. I often times seek initial guidance from the acting XO, or S3 Officer, MAJ [REDACTED]. Matters most pressing I take directly to the Battalion Commander. Up until recently, the XO was MAJ [REDACTED]. He re-deployed.

I'm the primary liaison officer with the tactical HUMINT team we have on the ground, and, from time to time, I talk with other personnel in the 504th, which replaced the 202nd MI Brigade, and the 202nd MI Battalion, which replaced 165th MI Battalion. So, I've worked with all 3, in addition to another MI Company, that was initially on the ground.

Any other reports would be coming down from higher headquarters, through our Brigade, that were possibly created from the other tenant MI units at Baghdad Correction Facility. I communicate with the 16th MP Brigade S2, daily. With the 800th MP Brigade, I communicated with CPT [REDACTED] the S2 Officer, at least, daily. They were located at Camp Victory. Their visits varied. Sometimes, they would come to see our facilities, only once or twice a month. Other times it would be a couple times a week.

The 372nd MP Company was the unit that provided the soldiers, to control the prisoners, and to coordinate with the Iraqi Corrections Officers.

I'm not certain, whether or not it was directly connected to the prison, but the MI had the interrogation centers, and the place where they conducted most of their administrative analysis work was in the same vicinity as the hard site prison. The population was mostly under the control of the MPs.

I've heard that any alterations that they have from the standard rules of engagement, what the MI does, when they have prisoners in their custody, if they need to interrogate them, or put pressure on them, it needs to be authorized in writing. I don't know if those documents are on file.

I think the CPA would be the final over-arching authority. As soon as we started taking prisoners, it was known as a CPA prison. On the U.S. Military side, 372nd MP Company is in charge of the hard site. They report to the Battalion Commander of the 320th MP Battalion.

I had daily interaction with LTC [REDACTED]. When I reported Intel to him, he would first check the source for credibility. Then, he would take appropriate action, such as notifying tower positions, entry control point positions, QRF, IRF, and have them prepared to react.

The primary threat was we didn't have enough MPs to adequately guard the population that we had. We were well over capacity, since November 22nd. What the presiding commander did to mitigate that threat was work with our S3, who does the Task Organization, to break down the companies, and allocate resources from other places, such as from non-MOS qualified personnel, to help fill in and do some of the compound guard duties that didn't require MP-specific training, while MPs in the compound were doing MP-specific duties.

We've captured many smuggled notes, and weapons, mostly knives or cooking utensils, and on one occasion a pistol was smuggled into the CPA prison in with the food, and it actually got into an detainees hands, and he actually fired it on an MP. Other firearms and weapons could always potentially come in, because of the number of food contractors were coming in.

I did attend the daily staff briefing.

The MI would coordinate with the Military Police or Iraqi Corrections Officers, if they were going to be working in the area, so they would be aware of their presence. I believe the MI escorted the inmates to the interrogation cells. Realizing I wasn't getting the support, that I should have, doctrinally, I took initiative, and got that information from the THT. For some time now, I was providing some of the personnel that were working with and on the THT.

My promotion is 2 months late, Sir. Our S1 is doing all she can to support that.

I believe we had a briefing on the Geneva Convention, Sir. Everyone should be aware of it. It would be a good idea to have more of that at the facility.

I am aware, to some extent, of the allegations of detainee abuse. I heard that there were some soldiers, possibly in the 372nd MP Company, that were forcing detainees to do things of a lewd or sexual nature, while photographing or video taping it. It sounds like these were soldiers, who don't have a good head on them. They don't know what's right from wrong. I don't think it's a leadership failure, or a broken chain of command. Our Battalion Commander is one of the few people that held our unit together, through some very difficult, overwhelming, and seemingly impossible parts of the mission, that we've had over the last year. I think there are just a couple sick soldiers out there, that made some very poor and stupid decisions, and now some people that had nothing to do with it have to pay for it.

I received my commission through ROTC, Sir. Penn State, Sir.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave 2LT [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.