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Sub BQD-Military 29

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.

International Security Affairs
Refer to: I-25840/62

30 July 1962

MEETING OF MILITARY SUBGROUP, WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP
3:00 P.M., July 30, 1962

Participants

United States

- Mr. Nitze, Chairman
- Admiral Lee, ISA
- Colonel Spragins, JCS
- Colonel Armstrong, ISA
- Captain Cotten, ISA
- Colonel Meacham, ISA
- Dr. Schick, ISA
- Mr. Ausland, State
- Mr. Blitgen, State
- Mr. Kranich, State
- Mr. Weiss, State
- Mr. Klein, White House

United Kingdom

- Lord Hood
- General West
- Admiral Greig
- Mr. Thomson
- Mr. Brooke
- Commander Homan

France

- M. Lebel
- General Ezanno
- M. Fayard
- M. Boidevaix

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- Retain class'n Change / classify to _____
- With concurrence of OSD
- Declassify In part and excise as shown
- EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)
- FPC/HDR by WTC 5-1-95
- Withdrawal No. 5-21

Germany

- Dr. Wieck
- General Steinhoff
- Colonel Schwerdtfeger
- Mr. Von Magnus

Discussion of the UK Working Paper on Phasing

Mr. Nitze opened the meeting by suggesting that the discussion continue on Lord Hood's paper.

Dr. Wieck announced that the FRG was prepared to make a contribution to the phasing discussion by submitting a paper on Phase I which he distributed.

Mr. Nitze, after reading the paper, asked if it was the German intention to make a contribution to Phase II, III and IV.

Dr. Wieck said the FRG version of Phase II is identical to that of the UK, but he had alternative versions of Phase III and IV.

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Page 1 of 7 Pages

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Lord Hood asked what the alternatives were.

Dr. Wiecek said what he had in mind was the suggestion in Lord Hood's paper that the larger ground operations should be relegated to the bottom of the list where they might be considered as an alternative to nuclear actions in Phase IV. The FRG preferred a shorter Phase III relying upon CHARLIE ONE. In Phase IV, all plans that border on general war should be put together, i.e., ALPHA TWO, BRAVO, CHARLIE TWO and FOUR with nuclear annexes.

Mr. Nitze asked how, with this arrangement, we would initiate expanded military operations after Soviet resistance had been established. He then turned to Lord Hood's paper and asked if there were any further comments on Phase III. He questioned the last sentence in paragraph 15 which reads: "Alternatively, the Russians might challenge the blockade and this would be likely to lead to limited war at sea which the Allies would have to wage under very unfavorable circumstances, since they would not be able to attack the Soviet submarine bases." He noted that Allied bases would not be under attack either and expressed the view that the circumstances of a limited war at sea would favor us in military action. Undoubtedly, we would have to sustain shipping losses but the over-all result would not necessarily be unfavorable to the West.

Lord Hood thought the idea of a limited war at sea was contrary to NATO doctrine. Moreover, it is a great problem to convoy and protect shipping on a world-wide basis.

Admiral Lee pointed out that the Soviets are at a geographical disadvantage for attacking shipping on a world-wide basis.

Mr. Nitze noted that a recent wargame on this problem indicated that over one-half of the Soviet submarine forces were destroyed in three months of a limited war at sea. This result was not with nuclear depth charges, but with MK 44 torpedoes. Our losses were not excessive.

Admiral Greig said this was not the British view. In a limited war we could not attack Soviet submarines until they attacked our ships. The damage to our trade over the short term would be substantial, ships will refuse to sail, and great fiscal difficulties will arise. In a limited war at sea, we will suffer more than the adversary particularly in sporadic combat. He did not doubt, however, that we could prevail over the long term.

Mr. Nitze said in assessing the sequence of actions, the US prefers naval measures to come early.

Admiral Lee thought we should take the initiative in maritime measures.

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Authority NO 959193
By AS NARA Date 4/17/01

~~TOP SECRET~~

Admiral Greig observed that it takes a long time to bring a submarine war under control.

Admiral Lee thought the ratio of submarines afloat to those sunk would not favor the Soviets.

Admiral Greig agreed to this assessment of Soviet losses, but was concerned about Allied losses.

Lord Hood asked for clarification as to what naval measures will actually be used.

Mr. Nitze thought this was a planning gap that should be filled. In Phase II, what we mean by mobilization should also be clarified. He then turned to discuss Phase IV.

Dr. Wieck wondered if the Subgroup intended to discuss the types of ways for using nuclears. BQD 28 envisaged further consideration by the Four. He referred to paragraph 5, first sentence, of the UK paper, in saying that not every use means a "quantum jump." Non-nuclear operations and certain nuclear operations should be weighed against each other.

Mr. Nitze said the US concern is that BRAVO as an isolated operation will not have much effect against the USSR. How will it restore our vital interests in Berlin? He did not see how the Russians would feel BRAVO was anything more than a demonstration. He thought Khrushchev would not be frightened and would counter-demonstrate.

Dr. Wieck thought BRAVO would be isolated only in theory, but not in fact. The situation at the time would be tense because other operations would already be under way. BRAVO would be connected in a timely fashion with other measures and its significance could hardly be overlooked by the adversary. To change Soviet policy we will have to challenge the nuclear integrity of the USSR and the territorial integrity of the GDR.

Mr. Nitze asked Dr. Wieck if he had in mind that the CHARLIE operations would be underway when we would resort to BRAVO.

Dr. Wieck thought they would be because Phase III should initially be non-nuclear. Once they fail, however, then we have to weigh an increase in non-nuclear operations against the timely message of BRAVO.

Mr. Nitze thought this point was similar to paragraph 4 of Lord Hood's paper. He asked if BRAVO should be used in support of CHARLIE FOUR.

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Dr. Wieck said he needed clarification as to how to channel the selected use of nuclears.

M. Lebel said it was his personal view not to reserve nuclear action until Phase IV. He thought there would already be an exceedingly tense situation brought about in Phase III. If we find it necessary to enter Phase IV, it would only be because we were unsuccessful in Phase III. If we wait until Phase IV, the use of nuclears could set off an all-out war. If we combine with Phase III, certain elements of Phase II, then, the situation will be less tense. At that point the demonstrative use of nuclears would tell the Soviets that, if we begin land operations, such operations will have nuclear support.

Mr. Nitze asked M. Lebel if he would favor the use of nuclears prior to TRADE WIND. *1 div*

M. Lebel said that he would. When we are visibly ready for land operations, a demonstration will manifest at a time when tension has not gotten out of hand that we are willing to use nuclears. *N/B*

Mr. Nitze asked if the Soviets just respond to our use of one or two nuclears with three or four of their own without relieving Berlin, what do we do next? Do we proceed slowly with TRADE WIND and CHARLIE ONE as non-nuclear operations or do we use the CHARLIE nuclear annexes? If nuclear action were to follow, would it not be better to make a larger strategic strike.

Lord Hood thought if the Soviets respond with four nuclears of their own, they signify their acceptance of the risks of general war. During Phase II, we have attempted by all means short of aggressive action to change Soviet policy and have girded ourselves for military action. The hope is that we will be successful in Phase II. If not, the severing of peacetime relations and massing of large forces that follow will produce a very critical situation. Operations in Phase III should initially be non-nuclear and he thought the Subgroup was agreed on this point. Contrary to what M. Lebel had said, he thought the first "demonstration" should be non-nuclear. Only if that fails should we consider the initial use of nuclears. It is conceivable, however, that our first non-nuclear actions may lead us into a situation where self-defense requires nuclears. The CHARLIE plans might very rapidly lead us into this situation. *Phase III*

M. Lebel thought his position was not far apart from Lord Hood's. It would be Phase III when the first use of nuclears occurs. If you use nuclears before the Phase III operations have run their course, the situation will be less tense than it would be later on.

Mr. Nitze asked how the situation would be more under control in Phase III than later on.

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M. Lebel thought the non-nuclear war at sea, for example, would be relatively easier to control than Phase IV operations. The use of nuclears at sea would be easier to control than their use on land.

Mr. Nitze thought all this would do little to relieve Berlin.

M. Lebel objected, for he thought it would bring to bear in Moscow the idea that their next move may be their last. They will get this message if a nuclear weapon has been exploded somewhere.

Lord Hood agreed in that it seemed to him that the initial measures taken in Phase III are likely to be more readily controllable at sea than on land.

Mr. Nitze concurred that measures at sea and in the air are more controllable, except for ALPHA TWO. But limited nuclear action at sea is political action, not military. The question is what counter political action will the Soviets take? Perhaps, they will back off under cover of a conference. Or, they might respond with an eye for an eye or an eye and a half. But it is difficult to envisage reopening of access as a result of our using nuclears. What happens then? We cannot simply return to non-nuclear operations. We will have to begin nuclear bargaining in which the dangers of preemption will multiply. We are on very unpredictable ground when we have come this far.

M. Lebel asked Mr. Nitze if the US could distinguish at all between a really destructive use of nuclears and their political usage. The Ambassadors in the countries will be able to tell the difference.

Mr. Nitze agreed that the demonstrative use of nuclears is of some importance.

M. Lebel thought a way out should be left open for the Soviets. It will be easier for them to find a pretext if nuclears have been used. They will see the demonstration as the warning that it is.

Mr. Nitze said he reserved great skepticism for an exchange of nuclear demonstrations.

M. Lebel agreed skepticism would be warranted if there were just an exchange, but he did not think the Soviets were accustomed to a mere exchange.

Mr. Nitze pointed out that a mere exchange will leave us in a more dangerous position having cut off other options. He agreed with Dr. Wieck that the weight of nuclears should be added at some point in the sequence of action, but the question is where to add it. There are several ways of adding it.

Authority 100 959193
By NARA Date 1/17/01

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Dr. Wieck thought we should be prepared to select a moment for the political use of nuclears. After having tried to change Soviet policy by engaging in a buildup in West Germany, we should conduct another autobahn probe to ascertain if Phase II has brought results. In the event that they do not blunt the probe immediately, it would indicate they had made a decision to negotiate. If they do blunt it, should we, at this point, add the weight of nuclears for political purposes? Or should we wait for the outcome of non-nuclear air and ground action? Although he considered it urgent to reopen access, he thought that probes of various sorts should not be repeated. He preferred a shorter Phase III, an enlarged Phase IV.

Mr. Nitze said he would prefer to implement TRADE WIND, CHARLIE ONE and THREE including their air annexes in Phase III. These operations would be commensurate with diplomatic activity at the time. They would also give you time for deciding on the use of nuclears. Once nuclears have been used, however, the opportunity for diplomatic action can be lost.

Lord Hood thought there would be time for diplomacy. He asked what the objective of TRADE WIND would be. *babble on*

Mr. Nitze thought its objective would be to assert tripartite legal rights. The hope is that it will not be resisted since the Soviets will observe the buildup behind it. The TRADE WIND objective is to test our access, to see if we can get through to Berlin. It should be supplemented by CHARLIE ONE, backed up by CHARLIE THREE.

Lord Hood thought we would not need greater operations, once we have seized a portion of GDR territory. He asked further if we would need CHARLIE THREE if CHARLIE ONE were thrown back.

Mr. Nitze assumed we would in order to have time for diplomacy. TRADE WIND might only take a few hours, but a three division attack would take longer.

Lord Hood asked if we would reinforce TRADE WIND.

Mr. Nitze said yes.

Lord Hood asked if we would then throw in more troops.

Mr. Nitze said yes, but added that if this process does not become successful, we will have to resort to nuclear operations. But, then, there will be little time for diplomacy.

M. Lebel said this was his reason for suggesting an earlier warning shot before we get stuck in a ground operation.

Lord Hood thought what was said today confirmed his view that the ground operations are very questionable.

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Mr. Nitze objected, for he said if we have read the balance and restraints/nuclear war correctly, the rational course for the Soviets would be to get out of the CHARLIE chain of operations. They can trump our nuclear demonstration with one of their own. The next step would be an extensive nuclear war beyond anyone's control.

Lord Hood reiterated that he thought ground action in itself is questionable.

Mr. Nitze thought ground action must be viewed in its context.

Lord Hood thought the Soviets could respond to our non-nuclear operations by seizing Berlin. When we put our fingers into the GDR, they will grab hold. When we put in our whole hand, they will drag the rest of us in. In the air, we would have much more freedom of maneuver. When the air corridors are menaced, that is where we should respond.

Mr. Nitze thought a reliance on air action for success would involve us in ALPHA TWO. ALPHA ONE is not far removed from JACK PINE with ground site attacks added. Perhaps a JACK PINE plus would be more reasonable where we would be taking risks earlier. He then suggested the Subgroup devote itself to discussing two specific tasks: the kind of mobilization to be undertaken in Phase II and the kind of expanding naval actions to be taken throughout the phasing. After these tasks are discussed, we would suggest preparing a paper for the NAC.

M. Label suggested a further discussion of the phasing question before submitting a paper on it to the NAC.

Mr. Nitze pointed out in MBQD 28 that the Four have already stated what is in dispute between them.

Lord Hood suggested that the Subgroup study the FRG paper Dr. Wieck had distributed.

Mr. Nitze adjourned the meeting at 4:20 P. M.

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