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PAGE 01 OF 03 KIGALI 00750 00 OF 05 171332Z 0066 AF6615  
ACTION AF-00

KIGALI 00750 00 OF 05 171332Z 0066 AF6615  
THEIR CLOSETS AND FEAR PROSECUTION FOR PAST CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCE WITH THE RPF JOINING THEIR RANKS.

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ACTION OFFICE **RY-01**  
INFO AS-01 AFRA-01 PMA-01 DASD-01 ZF-03 DED-01 CG-01 BY-01  
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5. AMONG THE MID-LEVEL OFFICERS, THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT CAMPS. THERE ARE THE MRMO LOYALISTS WHO BELIEVE THE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE IN CARROTS WITH THE RPF, WORKING FOR THE OUSTER OF THE PRESIDENT. THE CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE FOR THEM ONLY REFLECTS THE RPF AND OPPOSITION EFFORTS TO ENSURE A MAJORITY IN THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT TO IMPLAC HABYARIMANA. THE OTHER CAMP WITHIN THE MID LEVELS SEEMS TO REALIZE THAT CHANGE IS INEVITABLE AND SUPPORTS THE MOVE TOWARD MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY.

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OAS-00 DOEE-00 EUR-00  
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AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 00750

DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PHD

NEWPORT FOR ASELTIME, HINKLEY, O'HARE AND DONL

VAHINGEN FOR LT. COL JEAMES

E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL.  
TAGS: MOPS, KSPR, PGOV, PREL, PINS, RW  
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE TRANSITION TO PEACE

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

Mandatory Exemption  
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1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS CABLE FULFILLS A DESIRABLESREPRINTING REQUIREMENT.

3. SUMMARY. MILITARY ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TRANSITION PROCESS AND DEMOCRACY VARY THROUGH THE RANKS; MID-LEVEL OFFICERS' SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IS STRONGEST. BOTH THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT ARMY (RPA) BLAME POLITICIANS FOR THE CURRENT IMPASSE. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE UPCOMING TRANSITION INCLUDING COMMANDS/JRD CONTROL ISSUES REMAIN UNDEFINED FOR BOTH THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENT. ETHNIC PREJUDICES ON BOTH SIDES PERSIST AND WILL HAVE TO BE OVERCOME DURING INTEGRATED TRAINING. PROPER HANDLING OF FORCE INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION IS THE KEY TO SECURING MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE TRANSITION TO PEACE. END SUMMARY.

MILITARY ATTITUDES VARY ON THE TRANSITION PROCESS

4. THE MILITARY IS NO LONGER A MONOLITHIC ONE PARTY INSTITUTION, WITH CONSISTENT ATTITUDES THROUGHOUT THE RANKS ON THE TRANSITION PROCESS. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME SENIOR OFFICERS STILL SEE THEIR DESTINY TIED TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY. MANY HAVE NOISY SKELETONS IN

6. AT THE ENLISTED LEVEL, MANY EQUATE MULTIPARTYISM AND THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WITH THEIR IMMEDIATE DEMOBILIZATION SINCE MOST OF THE DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS WILL COME FROM THE ENLISTED RANKS. THEIR BIGGEST CONCERN ARE GETTING ADEQUATE TRAINING AND COMPENSATION ONCE THEY LEAVE THE MILITARY.

BOTH THE RPF AND RPA FRUSTRATED BY THE CURRENT IMPASSE

7. AT A RECENT NAVAL SCHOOL OF JUSTICE (NSJ) CONFERENCE HELD IN KIGALI IN JANUARY 1994 ON THE ROLE OF THE

MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY, MILITARY PARTICIPANTS FROM BOTH THE RPA AND RGF EXPRESSED THEIR FRUSTRATION WITH THE CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE. RPF AND RGF OFFICERS BELIEVED THAT THE POLITICIANS WERE HOLDING UP THE PEACE PROCESS FOR SELF-INTERESTED REASONS AND IGNORING THE NEEDS OF THE NATION.

8. THE MILITARY ON BOTH SIDES BOASTED ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO RESOLVE DIFFICULTIES QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY,

UNLIKE THEIR POLITICAL COUNTERPARTS, CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS POINTED AS AN EXAMPLE TO THE EASE WITH WHICH THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, THE GENDARMERIE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND THE RPF FORCE COMMANDER AGREED ON THE MODE OF OPERATION WITHIN THE KIGALI WEAPONS SAFE AREA ESTABLISHED BY UNAHIR (UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA).

9. ALTHOUGH, THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR OBSTACLES PUT UP BY EITHER THE RGF OR RPF IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE PEACE PROCESS, COL. KARENZI, THE RPF LIAISON OFFICER TO UNAHIR, BELIEVES THAT THE MILITARY'S WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS HAS NOT REALLY BEEN TESTED. THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS INVOLVING FORCE INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION HAVE YET TO BE DISCUSSED AND MAY RESULT IN SOME OF THE SAME TYPES OF IMPASSES CURRENTLY SEEN ON THE POLITICAL FRONT.

CHANGING ROLES, UNCERTAIN IDENTITY FOR THE MILITARY

10. THE PRINCIPAL AIM OF THE JANUARY NSJ CONFERENCE WAS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AUGUSTIN BIZIMANA, THE RPA COMMANDER GENERAL KAGAME AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER ANASTASE GASANA ALL EXPRESSED THEIR GRATITUDE FOR THE EMBASSY'S SPONSORSHIP OF THIS CONFERENCE. ALL FELT THAT IT CREATED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING AMONG BOTH CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY AS TO THE ROLE THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD PLAY DURING THIS TRANSITION PERIOD AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD. THE LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE CONFERENCE WERE IMPORTANT IN MAKING

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R. MELONE  
DATE/CASE ID: 14 APR 2000 199403871

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THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MILITARY'S PAST ROLE  
AND ITS CURRENT ONE.

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KIGALI 08750 00 OF 05 171332Z  
MILITARY VIEWS ON ETHNICITY AND FORCE INTEGRATION

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11. DURING THE PERIOD 1973-1990, THE ARMED FORCES WERE AN ORGAN OF THE ONE-PARTY STATE. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY WAS TO PROTECT THAT STATE, THE MRND PARTY AND ITS PRESIDENT, MAJOR GENERAL JUVENAL HABYARIMANA. THE PRESIDENT ALSO HELD THE FUNCTIONS OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE. DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS WERE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF. ARMY OFFICERS HELD MINISTERIAL POSITIONS, WERE ELECTED AS DEPUTIES, AND WERE APPOINTED TO OTHER CIVILIAN JOBS.

12. WITH THE JUNE 1991 CONSTITUTION, POLITICAL PARTIES WERE LEGALIZED. AN IMPORTANT CAVEAT IN THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAW MADE PARTY MEMBERSHIP ILLEGAL FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES. LATER, A CIVILIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE WAS APPOINTED BY THE FIRST MULTIPARTY TRANSITION

GOVERNMENT IN APRIL 1992. WITH THE ACCEPTANCE OF MULTIPARTYISM IN GOVERNMENT, THE ARMY'S ROLE CHANGED FROM THAT OF SUPPORT AND PROTECTION OF HABYARIMANA AND THE MRND TO APOLITICAL PROTECTOR OF A MULTIPARTY STATE. YET AS THE NSJ CONFERENCE SHOWED THIS NEW ROLE WAS NEVER WELL DEFINED FOR THE MILITARY OR ITS CIVILIAN MASTERS.

COMMAND AND CONTROL QUESTIONS AT ISSUE FOR THE MILITARY

13. DURING THE NSJ CONFERENCE, BOTH RGF AND RPA OFFICERS ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT IT MEANT FOR THE ARMY TO

SUPPORT DEMOCRACY AND BE UNDER CIVILIAN CONTROL. RGF OFFICERS SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF DEMOCRACY EQUALLED THE GOVERNMENT, AND IF SO DID THEY GIVE THEIR LOYALTY AND FOLLOW ORDERS FROM THE PRESIDENT, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OR THE PEOPLE. RGF

OFFICERS IN DEFENSE OF THE MILITARY CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD FOUGHT IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS AND HAD BEEN UNDER CIVILIAN/DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AT LEAST SINCE 1991 WITH THE NEW CONSTITUTION, TAKING ORDERS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE CIVILIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

14. THE RPF AS WELL AS SOME OF THE CIVILIAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE BEGGED TO DIFFER WITH THIS INTERPRETATION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMY. THE RPF POINTED TO THE NUMEROUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

COMMITTED BY THE MILITARY, ALLEGEDLY UNDER ORDERS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND SOME OF HIS CIVILIAN PREFETS. ACTIONS SUCH AS THESE, SAID THE RPF, WERE CLEARLY NOT ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY.

15. THIS DISCUSSION LED TO QUESTIONS SUCH AS WHAT ACTIONS WERE PROPER AND IMPROPER FOR THE ARMY TO TAKE IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY? THE NSJ TRAINERS RESPONDED THAT THE ARMY WAS TASKED TO UPHOLD THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. BOTH RGF AND RPF OFFICERS AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE THEIR TASK IN RWANDA'S NEW MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY. THE RPF'S LINGERING CONCERN, THOUGH, IS THAT BOTH THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS RECEIVE SUFFICIENT POLITICAL/CIVIC EDUCATION TO BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HOW THIS APPLIES TO THE MINORITY.

16. INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES (ESSENTIALLY INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT HUTU AND RPF TUTSI FORCES) IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN 90 DAYS AFTER A BROAD BASED TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED. SINCE INDEPENDENCE, THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN DOMINATED BY THE HUTU ETHNIC GROUP. WHILE SOME TUTSIS DID ENTER THE MILITARY, AND A FEW MADE IT INTO THE OFFICER CORPS, THE OUTBREAK OF WAR SAW MANY OF THEM ARRESTED AS COLLABORATORS OR FORCED INTO RESERVE STATUS. THE WAR ITSELF FOR MOST MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES WAS

A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE HUTU ARMY AND THE TUTSI INVADERS. RGF OFFICERS BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT ETHNICITY MAY INITIALLY POSE A PROBBVDUFRHINOGRAYION.

17. FOR EXAMPLE, ECONOFF SPOKE TO RGF HIGH COMMAND OFFICERS WHO ARE STILL WARY OF THE "TUTSI RPF". IN PARTICULAR, ~~THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, MAJOR GENERAL MSABIMANA~~ STILL THINKS THAT THE TUTSI AIM REMAINS UNCHANGED -- TOTAL POWER. ACCORDING TO ~~MSABIMANA~~ RPF OFFICERS IN THE HIGH COMMAND WILL ACT AS INFILTRATORS, ASSISTING THE RPF POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE PLANNING OF A COUP FROM WITHIN, AND THUS ACCOMPLISHING THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF TOTAL POWER. IN HIS ASSESSMENT, THE TIMING FOR SUCH A COUP WILL COME AFTER AN RPF LOSS IN THE ELECTIONS AFTER THE UN MANDATE IS OVER AND UN TROOPS HAVE WITHDRAWN. ~~NOTE: MSABIMANA HAS BEEN NAMED BY THE GOVERNMENT SIDE TO CONTINUE IN HIS ROLE AS ARMY CHIEF OF~~

~~STAFF OF THE INTEGRATED FORCES.~~

18. FOR OFFICERS AT THE MID LEVEL, HOWEVER, THE ETHNIC TENSIONS ARE NOT SO PRONOUNCED. THE GOODWILL DISPLAYED AT THE NSJ CONFERENCE BETWEEN RGF AND RPA OFFICERS SUGGESTED THAT ANIMOSITY BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES COULD BE SHORT LIVED IN THE NEWLY INTEGRATED ARMY. BY THE SECOND DAY OF THE CONFERENCE, RGF AND RPF OFFICERS WERE TALKING AMONG THEMSELVES LIKE LONG-LOST BROTHERS. ONE REMARKABLE INCIDENT DURING THE CONFERENCE WAS SEEING AN RPF AND AN RGF OFFICER LEAVING THE MESS HALL TOGETHER HAND-IN-HAND. (HAND HOLDING AMONG MEN IN RWANDA IS AN ACCEPTABLE

CUSTOM, DENOTING FRIENDSHIP.)

19. IN THE ENLISTED RANKS, THE RPF SOLDIERS WERE PROVIDED POLITICAL EDUCATION IN THE FIELD. ALL WERE TAUGHT THE RPF POLITICAL PROGRAMME THAT THE NATURE OF THE THREE YEAR CONFLICT WAS NOT ETHNIC BUT RATHER ONE OF FIGHTING AGAINST A DICTATORIAL REGIME FOR THE RIGHTS OF ALL RWANDANS. BY COMPARISON, MOST OF THE RGF ENLISTED WERE GIVEN VERY LITTLE TRAINING AND TAUGHT THAT TUTSIS WERE THEIR ENEMY. INTEGRATED TRAINING OF THE ENLISTED WILL HAVE TO FOCUS ON THE ETHNIC PREJUDICES MANY WILL BRING TO THEIR PLATOONS. "ENEMY" WILL HAVE TO BE REDEFINED AND DISSOCIATED FROM "TUTSI" OR "HUTU".

SCENARIOS FOR UPCOMING DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION

20. ENTERING INTO THE THIRD PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN WHICH UNAMIR WILL OVERSEE DISARMAMENT, FORCE INTEGRATION, AND DEMOBILIZATION, THE MILITARY COULD RESPOND TO THESE CHANGES IN THREE POSSIBLE WAYS. FIRST IS THAT WHICH ALL WOULD HOPE FOR: THAT THE MILITARY ADJUSTS TO AND ACCEPTS ITS NEW ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE PROCESS, THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, AND THE

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INTEGRATION COULD BE THE WILD CARDS IN THE TRANSITION TO

PEACE IN RWANDA. RAWSON

21. A SECOND POSSIBLE RESPONSE COULD BE A MUTINY AMONG LOWER-LEVEL OFFICERS, WITHOUT THE OBJECTIVE OF TAKING POLITICAL POWER, IN WHICH UNDISCIPLINED SOLDIERS TAKE MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT LEADERSHIP FROM THE OFFICER CORPS. SUCH A MUTINY COULD

BE TRIGGERED BY FEARS OF DEMOBILIZATION WITHOUT SUFFICIENT COMPENSATION OR TRAINING OR BY THE ERUPTION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN INTEGRATED RGF AND RPF UNITS.

22. A THIRD POSSIBILITY IS A COUP EITHER BY THOSE IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT SHOULD THERE BE AN IMPEACHMENT ATTEMPT OR IN THE NEAR TERM BY THOSE FROM THE OPPOSITION INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY WHO WANT CHANGE AND ARE FRUSTRATED WITH THE POLITICAL IMPASSE (WHICH THEY BLAME ON THE PRESIDENT). AN RPF COUP, USED AS A TACTIC TO SHIFT THE POLITICAL BALANCE, STRATEGICALLY SIMILAR TO THE FEBRUARY 1993 OFFENSIVE, IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY RAISED BY THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.

23. GENERAL DALLAIRE, THE UN FORCE COMMANDER HAS CONSIDERED EACH OF THESE SCENARIOS, AND ADJUSTED HIS FORCE STRATEGY AND DEPLOYMENT TO COVER "WEAK FLANKS IN THE SOUTHERN SECTORS. FEARS OF A COUP FROM THE PRO-HUTU RIGHT CONTINUE WITH RUMORS OF INTERHAMWE (RWANDAN, PRO-HUTU EXTREMISTS) AND PALIPEHUTU (BURUNDI, PRO-HUTU EXTREMISTS) TRAINING IN BURUNDI REFUGEE CAMPS ALONG THE

SOUTHERN BORDER. CONCERNS ABOUT A PRO-RPF COUP FROM THE LEFT STILL LINGER WITH THE UNEASE IN BURUNDI AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE BURUNDI TUTSI-DOMINATED ARMY COULD TURN TO THE NORTH TO HELP ITS RPF BROTHERN SEIZE POWER.

THE RESULTS OF ANY COUP WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC AND COULD RESULT IN ETHNIC BACKLASH THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE SIMILAR TO THAT WITNESSED IN BURUNDI.

24. AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SERIOUS EVIDENCE THAT A COUP D'ETAT OF ANY KIND IS IN THE CARD

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FROM BURUNDI WOULD COUNSEL AGAINST SUCH ACTIONS. LEADERSHIP FOR A COUP IS LACKING AS WELL. AND GIVEN THE DIVISIONS ALREADY IN THE MILITARY, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE WHOLE OF THE ARMED FORCES COULD BE COUNTED ON TO SUPPORT SUCH ACTIONS NO MATTER WHO THE LEADER OR WHAT THE OBJECTIVES WERE.

COMMENT:  
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25. WHETHER THERE IS A CRITICAL MASS IN THE ARMED FORCES FOR POSITIVE CHANGE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRANSITION TO PEACE IS UNCERTAIN.

~~(RPF AND RGF LEADERSHIP OFFICERS TO UNITS)~~ BOTH CONTEND THAT THE LEADERS AT THE TOP ARE ONLY PAYING LIP SERVICE TO THE PROCESS BUT DON'T REALLY SUPPORT ITS IMPLEMENTATION IF IT AFFECTS THEIR POWER BASE. IF THIS IS TRUE, DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES WILL BE CRITICAL TO MILITARY SUPPORT (OUTSIDE THE HIGH COMMAND) FOR THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN GENERAL. IMPROPERLY HANDLED, DEMOBILIZATION AND FORCE

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