"They write I'm the mafia's godfather. It was Vladimir Ilich Lenin who was the real organizer of the mafia and who set up the criminal state."

—Otari Kvantrishvili, Moscow organized crime leader.¹

"Criminals have already conquered the heights of the state—with the chief of the KGB as head of a mafia group."

—Former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin.²

**Introduction**

As the United States and Russia launch a Great Crusade against organized crime, questions emerge not only about the nature of joint cooperation, but about the nature of organized crime itself. In addition to narcotics trafficking, financial fraud and racketeering, Russian organized crime poses an even greater danger: the theft and trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.

To date, most of the discussion of organized crime based in Russia and other former Soviet republics has emphasized the need to combat conventional-style gangsters and high-tech terrorists. These forms of criminals are a pressing danger in and of themselves, but the problem is far more profound. Organized crime—and the rampant corruption that helps it flourish—presents a threat not only to the security of reforms in Russia, but to the United States as well. The need for cooperation is real. The question is, Who is there in Russia that the United States can find as an effective partner?

"Superpower of Crime"

One of the greatest mistakes the West can make in working with former Soviet republics to fight organized crime is to fall into the trap of mirror-imaging. As terrible a problem as hit men and Sicilian-style mobsters are today, they are merely the visible tip of a far larger galaxy of organized criminal networks. Excessive focus on the violent gangsters diverts attention away from a fundamental structural problem that is endemic to the very
institutions of the post-Soviet republics. Indeed, one can argue that without proceeding with extreme caution, the West inadvertently risks helping to entrench even more dangerous organized criminal forces that shun the publicity of high-profile kidnapings and slayings but wield enormous political, economic, and potential military power behind the scenes.

Some policy makers in Washington are aware of the situation. Congressman Ed Royce has noted the prevalence of the former Soviet secret police in control of key sectors of Russia’s financial, economic, political, and law-enforcement systems. While chairing a June 1994 hearing on Russian organized crime, Congressman Tom Lantos observed, “Until not long ago, the Soviet government was one gigantic criminal gang. It is very little surprise that as that particular criminal gang disappeared, other criminal gangs have taken its place in various activities. It would be naive for us to expect the workings of a Swiss-like governmental structure to take the place of the Soviet regime.”

Naivete, however, appears to be the driving force behind much of U.S. policy toward Russia and the other “New Independent States,” and the costs of years of wishful thinking in two successive administrations are staggering. “Westerners underestimate the extent to which organized crime and corruption have hampered Russian political and economic reforms,” observes Stephen Handelman, author of the forthcoming book, Comrade Criminal. “Organized crime has reinforced the old structures in their battle to retain control over key sectors of the economy and strengthened popular hostility toward the free-market democratic policies pursued by pro-Western reformers.”

One of the dangers of Western aid to Russia in helping fight organized crime is this massive corruption from the lowest to the uppermost echelons. Even one of Moscow’s most visible gangsters, Otari Kvantrishvili, believed that his large operation paled in comparison to those of the state. “They write that I’m the mafia’s godfather,” he commented in an interview, to which he responded, “It was Vladimir Ilich Lenin who was the real organizer of the mafia and who set up the criminal state.” That state did not collapse with the Communist Party. To the contrary: the functionaries, apparatchiks, security and police officials, and others who ran that state—as well as their children, the upper crust of the Soviet ruling class—took over the levers of power of post-Soviet society.

Post-Soviet organized crime is almost unique, but has close parallels in southern Italy and Sicily, and in Colombia. Handelman observes,
in the fierce struggle over the spoils of the former Soviet Union: the industries, banks, defense facilities, ports and factories once exclusively controlled by the Communist Party. . . . Crime in the post-Soviet era, in other words, is often a continuation of politics by other means.\(^7\)

In such a situation, mobsters such as Kvantrishvili used the state system to build their criminal empires, and the system used them in return. To ingratiate himself with the police, Kvantrishvili supported a fund to help disabled Moscow police officers and slain officers' widows and orphans. He had positioned himself so well that, in the words of Moscow News, he "could successfully settle conflicts between Moscow officials, financiers, and representatives of the underworld. Therefore, on the one hand, many criminal authorities were among his pals; on the other, top officials in the militsiya [police], actors, sportsmen [and] politicians."\(^8\) Investigative journalist Yuri Shchekochikhin reported that Kvantrishvili "was surrounded by people close to the president, famous writers, actors and police generals."\(^9\) The mobster boss was quite literally part of Russia's new ruling establishment.

Despite issuing numerous decrees, President Boris Yeltsin has not been part of the solution, but part of the problem. The West's reluctance to criticize his government or to condition assistance and cooperation seem to have encouraged criminal elements in the Russian leader's personal inner circle. Western fears of "undermining Yeltsin" by objecting to the presence of such people in power are having the opposite intended effect by playing into the hands of the extreme ultranationalists and Communists. Though never implicated personally in corrupt activity, the Russian leader appears to have protected criminal elements in the highest echelons of government. According to one report, when his first security chief, KGB Gen. Viktor Ivanenko, informed Yeltsin of criminal activity within the presidential inner circle, Ivanenko was fired.\(^10\) Ivanenko's replacement, MVD Gen. Viktor Barannikov, who happened to be a close personal friend of the president, made a show of fighting certain organized crime groups but did little in practice to clean out his own agency and prosecute the culprits.

In fact, Barannikov, like his predecessors, used corruption as an excuse to carry out political purges within the security apparat—in one case firing 80 senior officers in a single day—but tried none of them apparently in order to squelch embarrassing revelations that would discredit the entire bureaucracy.\(^11\) Only when Barannikov fell afoul of Yeltsin did he and his wife suddenly become implicated in corruption or criminal activity.\(^12\) Russia's security organs deliberately failed to enforce their own regulations, and in so doing tolerated and even promoted the continued criminalization of their ranks. Yeltsin fired Barannikov in July 1993 not for corruption (his
wife went on a much-publicized $300,000 shopping spree in Switzerland), but for a personal betrayal; the security chief had begun to side politically with Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice President Alexander Rutskoi.

Yeltsin's firing of his state inspector, Yuri Boldyrev, was different. Boldyrev, whom the president had appointed in March 1992 to lead the charge against government corruption, remained loyal. However he lasted only a year because, he said, his probes led to members of Yeltsin's inner circle. His replacement, Alexei Ilyushenko, directed attention away from the president's men to investigate political rivals such as Rutskoi, former MVD Minister Andrei Dunaev, and Barannikov.13

Not even President Yeltsin's most ardent, pro-Western reformers within the Supreme Soviet could probe official organized criminal activity. When a parliamentary commission led by Lev Ponomarev attempted to investigate the mass theft of a fortune in hard currency that had been deposited abroad illegally in Western banks for KGB and CPSU leaders and their families, it was obstructed by the former KGB First Chief Directorate, re-named the External Intelligence Service (SVR). The parliamentary probe focused on the KGB station chief in Switzerland, who happened to be the son of former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov; and the son of former Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, who worked at a bank in Luxembourg. Even as the Russian government hired an American investigative firm to track down the lost millions, SVR chief Yevgeny Primakov blocked the parliamentary commission from looking further. The matter was closed.14

The difference between government corruption and organized crime in Russia is so blurred that the two are often undistinguishable from one another. Furthermore, as Kvantrishvili's friendship with top officials shows, certain mafiosi have been allowed to prosper. This raises the question, Could the Russian government's fight against organized crime merely be a factional war among organized criminals, whereby certain ones are eliminated to protect the turf of those in power? Could it also be an attempt by the institutional hard core of the former Soviet state—the nomenklatura, bureaucracy, military, and former KGB—to perpetuate themselves in power at the expense of legitimate entrepreneurs and democrats? The evidence strongly suggests an affirmative answer to both questions.

Defining Organized Crime

Definition of organized crime in any society is difficult and contentious, just as it is in Russia today. In an article for the Organization of International Criminal Justice, Joseph Serio lays out the logic of defining Soviet/post-Soviet organized crime by building on the definitions of American criminologist Howard Abadinsky, former Soviet police analyst Anatoly Volubev, and the prominent Russian sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya.15

Abadinsky defines organized crime as fitting most of the following eight criteria: a non-ideological nature, a hierarchical structure, a limited or exclusive membership, a perpetual existence, employment of illegal violence
and bribery, specialization and division of labor, monopolism, and an organization run by strict rules and regulations. Serio’s research finds Russian organized crime fitting most of Abadinsky’s criteria.

Former USSR MVD researcher Anatoly Volubev, a pioneer in the study of Soviet organized crime, defined the problem in 1989 thusly:

the unification of a criminal group on a regional or national basis with a division on hierarchical levels and with selection of leaders, having organizational, administrative and ideological functions; use of corruption, attracting into criminal activity state officials (including law-enforcement officials) for maintaining security for the participants in the criminal community; monopolization and widening of spheres of illegal activity with the goal of achieving maximum material income while maintaining maximum protection of the highest echelons from prosecution.

Zaslavskaya refines the definition to the Soviet and post-Soviet context by emphasizing the political power structure. The common bond, Serio notes, is membership in the Communist Party and Komsomol, and especially in the Party nomenklatura. Political motivations, though not necessarily part of the equation, are clearly implied, in contrast to Abadinsky’s approach. According to Zaslavskaya,

The first element of the mafia is corrupt Party and government officials. The second part is the workers and employees of the retail trade, at every level, who are obliged to pay money to the chain that kicks back the apparat. It is impossible to work within this branch if you don’t go along with the program. You will be disposed of very cruelly. . . . But there’s a third element of the mafia, without which it could not operate. The militsiya, prosecutors, courts, judges—all the law-enforcement people are bought by the trade people. So it is quite impossible to get social justice by appealing to the courts.

Zaslavskaya’s analysis found legal status in a Constitutional Court decision in November 1992 which determined the Communist Party and the institutions it controlled to have been highly organized, “criminal” entities. Therefore, Russia has a legal precedent that appears to enable lawmakers to classify property, enterprises and institutions run today by the Party and nomenklatura “mafia” as organized criminal entities. Serio observes, “Development of close relations among the criminal world, the political regime, and the economic system occurred almost naturally. For these reasons, organized crime has exploded in virtually every corner of the former Soviet Union.”

Louise I. Shelley of The American University illustrates that organized crime is infiltrating the new democratic electoral process and political system:

Post-Soviet organized crime’s influence on politics exists at the municipal, regional and national level. Although its power is not as entrenched as in Italy, it has benefitted from the power vacuum at all political levels to expand its influence at an unprecedented rate. Capitalizing on the political and economic collapse of the
Soviet state, it has become an alternative power poised for future growth as it has the resources to fund candidates in forthcoming elections at the local and national levels.\(^{21}\)

Sadly, Russia’s institutions for fighting organized crime have no track record on which they can convincingly rest to show their reliability as entities to be entrusted for the job, either by domestic civil authorities or by Western countries whose cooperation and intelligence support is being enlisted. Honest officers exist, and many have paid with their careers or their lives. Institutionally, however, and for various reasons, Russia’s law-enforcement organs are rotten to the core and enjoy little public confidence.

**Russia’s Mechanisms for Fighting Organized Crime**

The Russian Federation, like other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, maintains several law-enforcement and security services based on those inherited from the Soviet Union. For a long time, Moscow refused to recognize the official existence of organized crime. The standing national police force, or *militsiya*, is a militarized army of police, internal troops, and elite shock troops under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Ministerstvo vnuchennikh del*—MVD). Largely because it was the most visible “law-enforcement” service in the public eye and was responsible for fighting common crime, its institutionalized corruption—from petty bribery and shakedowns at the street level to criminal activity near the top—was particularly recognizable to most citizens.

Until the late 1980s, the MVD was primarily responsible for combating organized crime and had the largest caseload of any agency in the Soviet Union—far larger than the mightier Committee for State Security (*Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti*—KGB). The most authoritative individual to have seen the situation firsthand was Vadim Bakatin, the reform Communist who headed the USSR MVD from 1988 to late 1990, and who was tapped to lead the USSR KGB and dismantle it after the 1991 putsch. Bakatin noted in retrospect that the lavishly funded and bloated KGB system was often a “waste of time and personnel” while the poorly supplied MVD was severely overburdened.\(^ {22}\) He found that in the KGB Investigation Department, each investigator had a caseload of 0.5 cases per year, while the average investigator in the analogous MVD department had more than 60 cases annually.\(^ {23}\) In his words, “The KGB grew fat and its staffs were artificially swollen, which in no way positively influenced the quality of its work.”\(^ {24}\)

Yet it was the MVD that bore the brunt of the attack for its inability to fight crime. In contrast, the KGB suffered from no such image problem. As one of the main pillars of the Communist Party nomenklatura and the Soviet state, the KGB protected itself from negative publicity due to its indispensability to the ruling class and its pervasive networks of informants, provocateurs, “citizen agents,” reservists, and uniformed officers. The KGB had sole authority to police the MVD and the military through a network of agents and officers in its Third Chief Directorate, a power that could
either end the careers of police and military officers, or enhance them in exchange for cooperation, thus co-opting them forever. Because of the inherent corruption of the regime, which relied on payment of tribute from bottom to top, the Party leadership and KGB were unwilling to root out corruption within the MVD, but blamed the MVD nevertheless. Furthermore, there was no counterbalance to the KGB. No one, not even the Party, had independent authority or structures to monitor and police the organization.

Until the 1991 putsch, never in Soviet history did the KGB or its predecessors come under official criticism. To the contrary, the KGB, especially under the “reform” regimes of Nikita Khrushchev, Yuri Andropov, and Mikhail Gorbachev, was the subject of image-making campaigns to portray the organization as pursuing the loftiest of patriotic goals and employing men of the most sterling moral fiber.25 “Despite the fact that it is actually empowered by law to conduct investigations into certain types of economic crime, in particular misappropriation of state property,” noted Amy W. Knight during the Gorbachev period, “the KGB was not held responsible for having allowed white-collar crime to become so pervasive.”26

The MVD lost an important part of its authority late in the perestroika sexenium when Gorbachev, prodded by KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, transferred MVD organized crime-fighting functions to the KGB. This move coincided with the growth of unauthorized as well as unofficially sanctioned mafiya activity that took advantage of the political and economic opening. The new political pluralism and free speech privileges subjected the KGB to unprecedented public attacks. The KGB needed, after the abolition of the Communist Party’s monopoly of power, to find a new raison d’etre, responding with an aggressive public relations campaign intended to show just why it was needed in a democratic society.27

After the Soviet collapse, President Yeltsin tried briefly to bring the KGB to heel by placing most of its internal security functions under the control of MVD General Barannikov. Most domestic security organs were physically merged, at least on paper, with the MVD as a giant Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs. Upon assuming his newly created post as minister of the huge armed bureaucracy, Barannikov criticized the KGB’s self-appointed role as organized crime fighter. He remarked as he took over the apparatus in late 1991, “Why did the KGB get involved in [fighting crime] at all? Its leaders simply felt that sooner or later they would be asked for concrete results, for something real done in the state’s interests. . . . and so crime was needed.”28

Universal political opposition, a Constitutional Court decision, and strong resistance by the KGB men to being controlled by the militsiya forced Yeltsin to restore the autonomy of both services. Most KGB internal security components were then bureaucratically called the Ministry of Security, which Barannikov chose to lead. Only after taking the reins of the former KGB apparatus did Barannikov see the “need” for the former KGB units to fight crime.
Chekist Heritage

The mere reorganization, dismemberment, and renaming of the KGB after the 1991 coup attempt did nothing to change the agency's institutional culture and traditions that made it so different from the law-enforcement, security, and intelligence services of the West. Far from finding their origins in defense of democratic and market principles, the services of Russia today maintain a profound and emotional identity with the original Bolshevik political police known as Cheka. Abandonment of Communist ideology notwithstanding, the Russian security organs have preserved the symbols of the Cheka.

The symbolism is visible to any tourist who stops at the Lubyanka metro station in Moscow. Across the street, around the perimeter of state security headquarters at 2 Lubyanka Square, the Cheka's emblem of a hammer-and-sickle superimposed over a sword and shield festoons all four sides of the yellow brick façade of the main building. The two symbols now missing were removed not by the central government but by demonstrators after the 1991 putsch. A rectangular space in the black granite blocks at street level marks where protesters tore down the plaque of KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov. An earthen mound at the traffic circle is all that remains of the once-towering statue of Cheka founder Felix Dzerzhinsky, which was taken down by crane as crowds attempted to topple it from its dark pedestal. The stump itself was razed after Christian activists kept topping it with a large wooden cross to memorialize the victims.

Inside the Lubyanka complex, however, the icons of chekism remain: portraits of Dzerzhinsky hang seemingly in every office; busts of the Cheka chief can be found in alcoves, book cases, and even the nightclub in the renovated facilities; a large red marble wall is embedded with the names cast in brass of chekists slain in the line of duty since Stalin's time. Dzerzhinsky's birthday is still dutifully celebrated every September 11, as is the founding anniversary of the Cheka on December 20. So closely identified are the modern Russian security services with Dzerzhinsky that they continue to pay their officers on the 20th of the month, a tradition begun in 1918.

From the very beginning the Cheka and its successors acted as agents of corruption for the country's nomenklatura ruling class. Here are the criminal roots of today's chekists. Prior to the 1917 revolution, Lenin and his Bolshevik cadres had organized their Party cell structures after those of Russian criminal groups, with rituals and discipline to root out police infiltrators. Common criminals were the Bolsheviks' main fundraisers, robbing banks and businesses, and kidnaping for ransom money. Dzerzhinsky recruited his earliest cadres, including hardened criminals, from tsarist prisons, where he himself had been confined for seven years. These elements were vital to the Cheka's ability to commit the deeds necessary to impose Bolshevik rule by force as instruments of a machinery of mass murder that exterminated hundreds of thousands of civilians. In its own newspaper Yezhenedel'nik, the Cheka openly acknowledged its recruitment of criminal and sadistic elements. As the Bolsheviks consolidated power,
the chekists made house-to-house searches, stealing everything of value and stockpiling them in warehouses where they were catalogued and ultimately distributed for use of the nomenklatura, or sold abroad for hard currency. Some top chekists, Dzerzhinsky an exception, complained to Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders. Said Martin Latsis, himself an advocate and practitioner of mass violence against the civilian population:

Work in the Cheka, conducted in an atmosphere of physical coercion, attracts corrupt and outright criminal elements which, profiting from their position as Cheka agents, blackmail and extort, filling their own pockets. . . . However honest a man is, however crystal clear his heart, work in the Cheka, which is carried on with almost unlimited rights and under conditions greatly affecting the nervous system, begins to tell. Few escape the effect of the conditions under which they work.34

Lenin made no attempt to deny these complaints among the Party leadership. However, he urged the cadres not to let it bother them because the ends justified the means. At a November 1918 Cheka conference, Lenin referred to “strange elements” among the chekists, but said that they were vital to “putting into practice the dictatorship of the proletariat.”35 The Cheka was, in the most literal sense of the term, Soviet Russia’s first organized criminal syndicate. It operated with the blessing of the Bolshevik leadership, and its reputation in Russia today remains virtually untarnished, its incriminating archives under lock and key, and its name revered by the men in uniform who still call themselves “chekists.”

Many Russians today, including leading reformers who were raised through the Soviet system, consider chekism as something normal, and are genuinely perplexed by a Westerner’s strong criticism of the Bolshevik organs and their successors.36 All but the newest recruits of Russia’s chekist organs are veterans of the KGB. They include those who procured contraband for the ruling elites while persecuting their opponents, spied on “enemies” of the Party elites, laundered Communist Party funds through investments in the West, ran or exploited organized criminal syndicates in the West, smuggled narcotics from Central Asia to Europe, trafficked in weapons large and small, assassinated opponents around the world, and engaged in repression, bribery, blackmail, and extortion at home and abroad. Collectively as the KGB, they had vast banks of information at their disposal: files on millions of individuals, political and financial data, a global information-gathering and analysis operation staffed by some of the world’s brightest minds, and a network of specialists in “wet affairs” to match.37 The mission was not to protect the nation as a whole, but to protect the power and privilege of the Party’s ruling class. With the full backing of the Soviet superstate and enjoying branch offices in every town of the USSR and nearly every country in the world, the KGB was the ultimate mafia.

As the Soviet Union collapsed, that mafia went through its own metamorphosis. It unshackled itself from the few civilian controls over it, while continuing to act as a major channel for both the Communist Party’s financial activities and for the emerging privatization and market processes.
As such, it buttressed its political independence with the unmatched power to move money in and out of the country. Russia inherited the chekist system nearly intact and uncontrolled by civilian authorities.38

Corruption of Reform
The KGB, like much of the ruling class, took full advantage of the economic and political reform processes during perestroika and following the Soviet collapse. Its officers and resources were used to move cash, strategic minerals, weapons, and virtually anything that could be traded or sold. In an unofficial partnership with elements of the Komsomol, the KGB became a major part of the emerging private sector. Conveniently, the law at the time required all foreigners doing business in Russia to have a Russian joint partner; by 1992, approximately 80 percent of all Russian joint ventures reportedly involved KGB officers.39 As under the Soviet system, active duty chekists occupy top positions in nearly all state and semi-state enterprises in Russia, where a deputy director’s position traditionally has been reserved for a ranking KGB official.

With so much money being made in the new market and government salaries falling far behind inflation, it no longer was financially worthwhile for a state security officer to remain on active duty. So many security officers were moving to the private sector that the government expressed official alarm. In response, President Yeltsin issued a decree in October 1992 creating a new official status called “active reserve.”40 Officers in the active reserve can maintain their active duty rank and privileges while working in their civilian sector jobs on a daily basis. The quid pro quo is that they continue to serve the secret services from their places in business, at times becoming part of the new economic and industrial espionage offensive against the West.

The arrangement invited further institutionalized corruption. With no conflict of interest or ethics laws to constrain them, the chekists expanded their existing mafia-like structures, enriching themselves while on government service and making it impossible for civilian leaders to determine what activities were being carried out in the interests of the country, and what were being conducted for pure financial or political gain. Any distinction between intelligence, private business, and organized crime were erased. Outside funding of the of the security organs by these means helped to ensure that their budgets would never be subject to control of the president or Supreme Soviet. Indeed, Security Minister Barannikov supervised the authorship of the 1992 Law on Security passed by the Supreme Soviet that specifically permits the security organs to be financed by “extrabudgetary funds.”41 The lawmaker who shepherded the bill through Parliament was Committee on Defense and Security Chairman Sergei Stepashin, who was also one of Barannikov’s deputies in the Ministry of Security. In early 1994,
Stepashin took over the ministry after its name was changed to Federal Counterintelligence Service (Federalnaya služba kontrrazvedki—FSK).

Far from protecting new free markets, units of the security services sought to manipulate them. The Ministry of Security "economic counterintelligence" unit, formerly the KGB Sixth Directorate, conducted operations "aimed at influencing the exchange rate," according to a former KGB colonel who was pressured out of the service for trying to clean up internal corruption. Journalist Claire Sterling independently found a KGB link with massive ruble and dollar laundering operations in the early 1990s intended to manipulate the rates of exchange.

"Former KGB officials are spreading all over the place, taking over entire companies and organizations," observes Sergei Grigoryants, a former prisoner of conscience who served two sentences in the gulag and who now leads a civic movement to establish civil controls over the security organs. "Giving them a golden handshake didn’t keep them at bay. This was not a good idea. Their influence has increased."

Old Guard in the New Russia
The chekists, in partnership with elements of the old Party nomenklatura and Komsomol, dominate the new Russia by working through market structures. Entry into the new electoral system was a top KGB priority in anticipation of the 1990 elections to local and regional legislatures, and to the supreme soviets in the 15 Union republics. The KGB infiltrated the new political establishment with its own officers, agents and informers. Prior to the 1990 elections, the KGB set up a special task force to organize and manipulate the electoral processes. It held political organization training courses for favored candidates, arming them with privileged information about their constituencies' problems, needs, and desires. Open KGB officers, some 2,756 in all, ran in races for local, regional, and federal legislatures across the USSR; 86 percent won in the first round, according to a KGB internal newsletter. These figures do not include the clandestine "citizen agents" and other co-optees, whose numbers are unknown.

Nor is the extent of interference in the December 1993 elections known. Although much has been made of KGB support for ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, few seemed to notice when a spokesman for the FSK remarked weeks after the vote, "A number of the present democratic leaders were KGB agents, too."

The FSK maintains the ability to blackmail or otherwise coerce members of Parliament and other elected officials, journalists, jurists, and the rest of society by virtue of the fact that it controls the old KGB agent and informant networks and files on millions of citizens. Not even lawmakers have the right to examine their files. Thus severe constraints are maintained on those with skeletons in their closets who might seek to reform the system. Should unscrupulous businesses, private intelligence services, and organized criminals gain access to the files, the effects would be devastating to the emerging political and economic structures. The presence of top veterans from the KGB Fifth Chief Directorate—which carried out political
spying and repression—in several large companies has led to conjecture that those firms already may have tapped KGB files for their own commercial or political use.

**Russian Security Services Today**

Not a single institution in the Russian Federation stands as a credible force against organized crime. With the exception of the MVD, all government organs that would be natural elements of a war on criminal syndicates are former components of the KGB: the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (Federalnoye agentstvo pravitelstvennoi sviazi i informatsii—FAPSI), comprised mainly of the KGB Eighth Chief Directorate for signals intelligence and the Sixteenth Directorate for internal electronic intelligence; the Main Guard Directorate (Glavnoye upravleniye okhrany—GUO), dominated by the former KGB Ninth Directorate; the Federal Border Service, formerly known as the KGB Border Guards Chief Directorate; and the FSK, comprised of most of the internal security organs of the KGB.

FAPSI poses a new threat to legitimate businesses in Russia and the West, and is a potential window for the secret police and organized crime to enter the information highway on an unprecedented scale. Responsible for most forms of electronic spying, FAPSI is on the verge of taking control of Russia's telecommunications lines, if it has not done so already. A recent decree by deputy counterintelligence director Andrei Bykov, a 20-year veteran of the laboratories of the KGB Technical Operations Department, placed all telephone switchboards and their electronic equivalents at the disposal of the security services. The decree ordered that each telecommunications transit point be equipped with eavesdropping devices. No credible safeguards exist to check abuses. CIA Director R. James Woolsey confirmed to Congress in June that the newly installed "electronic fund transfer networks for banks in Russia" are under heavy chekist influence if not control. FAPSI also dabbles in internal politics, operating a hospitality suite on the 10th floor of the mafia-ridden Rossiya Hotel across from the Kremlin, a room considered neutral ground for politicians of opposing factions to discuss issues.

Installation of new fiber optic networks by Western firms will make FAPSI's job all the easier. Soon, in digital form, all communications on these networks can be intercepted, stored, and retrieved electronically in much greater volume than before. FAPSI also leases "secure" lines to Western businesses in the CIS. Business communications transmitted by microwave and satellite around the world are also targets of FAPSI. When Russia in 1992 renewed an agreement with the Cuban government to maintain a huge signals intelligence facility on the Caribbean island, it indicated a main purpose by sending not an intelligence official to sign the
accord in Havana, but Alexander Shokhin, the deputy prime minister for foreign economic relations.\textsuperscript{50} Such an arrangement is likely to benefit only chosen companies owned by or in league with the state, nomenklatura, armed forces, and the chekists, while independent entrepreneurs can safely presume that they will be excluded.

The FSK now has the main organized crime-fighting role in Russia, after the function was briefly returned to the MVD earlier in 1994. The first FSK chief, who headed its cosmetic metamorphosis from the discredited Ministry of Security, was Nikolai Golushko, a 30-year veteran of the KGB's dissident-hunting Fifth Chief Directorate. Golushko specialized in repressing ethnic and nationalist sentiment, particularly Russian nationalism. When MVD veteran Sergei Stepashin was appointed to succeed Golushko in January 1994, some saw it as a sign that the FSK might liberalize somewhat, and that the MVD would be given greater crime-fighting abilities. That was not to be. Stepashin's handpicked deputies include Alexander Strelkov, who was chief of a department responsible for the gulag system in Russia until its formal demise in 1992; Valery Timofeev, former KGB chief of the city of Gorky; and Igor Mezhakov, previously of the KGB Fifth Chief Directorate. Mezhakov is now in charge of personnel.\textsuperscript{51}

Stepashin openly challenged the plans to deprive the FSK of its crime-fighting and economic capabilities. He quickly stripped the MVD of its briefly restored authority to combat organized crime. Stepashin said on national television, “I’ll tell you straight that the special services will not go through another such perestroika or katastroika,” making a pun on the catastrophic effects that restructuring was having on them. “I would like to stress once again—this is very important for those who hear me, for our colleagues—there will be no such perestroikas.” He promised a domestic propaganda blitz to help the chekists block further reorganization: “Clearly, we should try and improve our importance and constantly say that we’re necessary and important, not only and perhaps not so much by public statements, but by concrete actions and putting things into effect.”\textsuperscript{52}

Stepashin affirmed that the FSK “most certainly” would keep the old agent networks, and was adamant that the identities of past KGB collaborators never be made public. He also said that his apparatus would continue to conduct domestic spying operations against Russian citizens based on their political views.\textsuperscript{53} and lashed out at critics like Sergei Grigoryants and Oleg Kalugin, who were demanding civilian controls over the chekists, as “enemies.”\textsuperscript{54} The FSK reportedly helped supervise the drafting of the June 1994 presidential decree allowing authorities to arrest and imprison citizens for up to 30 days without charges, a measure denounced by the president’s own human rights commissioner Sergei Kovalev as “dangerous” and “serving to undermine respect for the law and faith in the Constitution we have just
adopted."

Other law-enforcement units similarly have the chekist taint. The Federal Customs Service, though not formally part of the old KGB, is headed by a presidentially appointed KGB man, Anatoly Kruglov. The new Department of Tax Police, staffed by officers of the KGB Fifth Chief Directorate, is headed by KGB Maj. Gen. Sergei Almasov, another former security chief for the closed city of Gorky. Former dissidents now in business report being singled out and harassed by the tax police, and say that they identified some of the harassing officers as the same individuals who, as KGB Fifth Chief Directorate officers, persecuted them during the 1970s. Under Boris Yeltsin, the chekists have been placed in control of the services that inspect everything that enters and exits the country, and investigate all taxable financial transactions. They also have the power to confiscate private property, while the affected parties have little or no recourse and no independent oversight processes exist to monitor storage or disposal of property seized.

**A Strategic Approach**

The West should take a strategic approach to cooperate with Russia and other CIS countries to combat organized crime, acting as much to help political reformers as being teammates in a war on crime. In the context of formerly Communist societies in transition, crime-fighting is more than a law-enforcement problem; it is a political, economic, and human rights problem as well. The first objective is to focus on driving organized crime and corruption out of the government structures. Without this first step, everything else is lost. Many lessons can be learned from the experiences of Italy and Colombia. As Louise Shelley notes,

Both Colombia and Italy have discovered that once organized crime penetrates the state, [the state] cannot disassociate itself from organized crime even with the investment of significant manpower and economic resources, and the application of intense repression and the sacrifice of many well-meaning individuals.

At the same time, one must avoid the temptation to mirror-image Russian organized crime with the gangsters familiar to Italy, the United States, and other established democracies because of its unique roots in the ancien régime that the Russian Constitutional Court itself recognizes as a criminal entity. This leads to the second component of a strategic approach: the West should define the post-Soviet model of organized crime and corrup-
tion clearly and honestly, without worrying about offending officials in Moscow who are part of the problem. This diplomatic failure has served only to buy time for the criminals to hijack the reform processes.

Third, the chekist institutions—the FSK, FAPSI, SVR, and the like—should be anathematized completely and not be accorded the coveted prestige of acceptance as Western-style secret services. Isolation of the chekists, especially the most noxious elements thereof, is a first step toward encouraging Russian authorities to do away with them as institutions, bury their legacies, and replace them with services more befitting of a democratic society, as some of President Yeltsin’s top aides have argued.

Parallels with denazification, made by such leading reformers as Galina Starovoitova, should be a constant policy of the West. It makes little sense for the United States and its allies to make common cause with those who committed crimes against humanity. Prior to engaging in meaningful cooperation and assistance, the West should encourage Russia and other republics to adopt a process such as lustration or screening of security units, officers, and personnel and barring individuals who served in certain posts from holding political or financial positions for a given period of time, recognizing that not all KGB officers were criminals and that some have talents and skills needed to help build a completely new security service. Starovoitova has proposed a moderate and judicious lustration program that deserves careful attention. It would be instructive to view the successes and failures of the Czech experiment, which was the only country aside from eastern Germany that dismantled its old Communist security and police services and started out with a clean slate.

Fourth, assistance with implementation of strict executive, parliamentary, judicial, and other civil controls and oversight of the law-enforcement and security services should be a priority at the U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Justice, and other organizations that provide assistance and cooperation. The battle for freedom is lost without strong, intrusive civil controls and oversight that allow the people through their elected representatives, and individuals through the courts, non-governmental organizations, and the press, to impose strict limits and redress grievances. Extraordinarily broad support for legislative and judicial checks and balances exists in the Russian Parliament today. Efforts should be stepped up to cooperate with Russian lawmakers, prosecutors, and jurists in developing and ensuring enforcement of laws consistent with international standards. A free press and strong non-governmental organizations to protect civil liberties must go hand-in-hand with fighting crime, yet these sectors are far from secure.

Fifth, meaningful U.S. cooperation is useless if offenders go unpunished. If Russia and the other former Soviet republics are unwilling to prosecute
and punish politicians, bureaucrats, judges, and police from the lowliest to the most powerful, then everything else is a waste of time and effort. Robber barons and corruption must not be accepted as necessary evils in the transition to democracy and a market economy, especially when the governments and societies that tolerate such behavior are asking for Western understanding and assistance.

In sum, U.S. organized crime-fighting assistance and cooperation should be linked with a general strategy toward promoting irreversible reform. It is a defeatist proposition to reinforce the existing criminal structures of the Russian government at the expense of legitimate entrepreneurs and others with an instinctive sympathy toward the West. What greater blow to a long abused people's faith in free markets and democratic principles than seeing the FBI and CIA team up with the KGB to fight violent gangsterism but preserve, as Congressman Lantos put it, a "gigantic criminal gang"?  

The U.S. government has formulated no visible strategic plan. CIA Director Woolsey notes that working with the Russian security and intelligence services is nothing like collaborating with what he terms the "honest" services of Hong Kong, Britain, Italy, or Germany. The chekists are not in that league. "This is a very different kind of problem," he said. "It means that special burdens attach to the way in which we collect intelligence on these issues, the way in which we interact with our law-enforcement colleagues, and the way in which they conduct liaison with some portions of the Russian government that are honestly involved in law enforcement." Yet the CIA bureaucracy seems ill-prepared to confront the organized crime threat within the former Soviet security services. If its public documents are an indication of its institutional thinking, the CIA does not think of the Russian security organs as part of the problem.

Sensing the policy vacuum, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh embarked on a high-profile effort to build ties with Russian services fighting organized crime. In an unfortunate choice of cautiously worded statements, Freeh endorsed President Yeltsin's draconian "anti-crime" decree of June. This misstep, however, has been partially compensated by the FBI's receptiveness not only to private sector specialists, but to Russian lawmakers of all parties, many of whom wish to develop a strict oversight process and look to the United States for technical cooperation.

This receptiveness has had an impact. In an important September 1994 policy speech Freeh changed course, arguing that the FBI will be choosy about working with individuals and institutions that have been involved in human rights abuses:

We must remember that law-enforcement officials in Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union are grappling with historical problems that will directly affect their ability to fight the criminals and crime groups currently operating in their midst. It will also affect our ability to work with those law-enforcement officials. We are all familiar with the Communist regimes that ruled these nations with an oppressive hand for many decades. In light of their newly won liberty, we can easily understand the peoples' desire to cast off that yoke forever. In
these countries, there is a lingering perception of law enforcement as the enemy.

Freeh continued,

It is our responsibility to seek out people of integrity, who are committed to
democratic law enforcement. The alternative—walking away and ignoring the
mounting crime problems—is simply no alternative at all. There remains, thus, a
tension within these countries. On the one hand, there is an admitted need to stem
the sweeping tide of crime. On the other hand, there is the concern about providing
the police with too much power. The skill with which these nations resolve this
tension will directly affect their ability to function as democracies. It will also have
a direct impact upon our willingness to forge law-enforcement alliances with them.65

Freeh has thus framed the issue beyond mere law enforcement to include
democratization in his international crime-fighting agenda. His words seem
to preclude significant long-term cooperation with Russia’s Federal
Counterintelligence Service and other unreformed ex-KGB components.

Nevertheless, crime-fighting cooperation cannot be limited to the FBI, nor
can it take place in the current strategic policy vacuum. American coopera-
tion must not be unconditional. Nor should it impinge on Russian
sovereignty. However, it must be accompanied by clearly established rules
with a defined strategic objective. That objective must be the irreversibility
of democratic and free market reforms, something that, three years after the
Soviet collapse, remains elusive.

Notes

1 Otari Kvantrishvili, taped transcript in Komsomolskaya Pravda, cited by Steven Erlanger,
“In Moscow, the High Life Flowers at Gangland Funeral,” International Herald Tribune, 15
April 1994.
2 Oleg Kalugin, statement at a Glasnost Foundation seminar on civil control of the
Russian security services, Moscow, 9 April 1994, in notes taken by author.
3 Rep. Ed Royce, statement during hearings of the International Organizations,
International Security and Human Rights Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
4 Rep. Tom Lantos, ibid.
5 Stephen Handelman, “The Russian ‘Mafiya’,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, March-April
1994, pp. 93-94. Also see Handelman, Comrade Criminal: The Theft of the Second Russian
6 Otari Kvantrishvili, taped transcript in Komsomolskaya Pravda, cited by Steven Erlanger,
“In Moscow, the High Life Flowers at Gangland Funeral,” International Herald Tribune, 15
April 1994.
7 Handelman, pp. 84-85.
8 Igor Baranovsky, “Several Versions of an Assassination,” Moscow News, No. 15, 15-21
April 1994, p. 15.
9 Candice Hughes, “Yeltsin: Russia a ‘Superpower of Crime,’” Associated Press dispatch,
10 Former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin, to author, at a seminar on the “KGB Yesterday,
11 Komsomolskaya Pravda reported the personnel shakeup on 12 June. See FBIS-SOV-92-
12 The author was one of the first publicly to accuse Barannikov of failing to fight
corruption in a presentation at the First International Conference on the “KGB Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow,” sponsored by the Glasnost Foundation, Moscow, February 1993. For
a written record, see J. Michael Waller, “K problemye obobshcheniya nekotorykh zakonodatel-
One of those who called on Khasbulatov to shut down the Ponomarev Commission was Moscow Patriarch Aleksi, who served the KGB under the cryptonym Drozdov. For a discussion of KGB co-optation of the Russian Orthodox Church, see Keith Armes, “Chekists in Cassocks: The Orthodox Church and the KGB,” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 1, No. 4, Fall 1993-1994, pp. 72-83.
20 Serio, p. 16.
23 Ibid., p. 46.
24 Ibid., pp. 46-47; and Bakatin, interview with author.
27 See Popplewell, pp. 513-547.
29 Author’s observations inside buildings at the Lubyanka complex.
31 Handelman, p. 86.
32 For estimates on the numbers of people killed by the Cheka in Lenin’s early years as Bolshevik leader, see John Dziak, Chekisty: A History of the KGB (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988), pp. 174-175.
35 Ibid.
36 The author found this impression during three years of conversations and interviews with Russians about the state security organs. As an example of the cultural gap between Russia and the United States, one may contrast the backgrounds of two leaders from the same generation, FSK chief Sergei Stepashin and FBI Director Louis Freeh. Stepashin was educated under official atheism and Marxism-Leninism, and wrote his thesis on the role of Communist Party cells in fighting fires. By contrast, FBI Director Freeh’s keen sense of social justice was forged by the nuns and priests who taught him in parochial school.
with Russian state security officers.


44 Sergei Grigoryants, chairman, Glasnost Foundation, at Glasnost Foundation seminar on civil oversight of the security organs, Moscow, 9 April 1994, from author's notes.


47 Author's interview with Russian lawmakers and state security officers, Moscow, April 1994.


49 Author's personal information.


54 Author's interviews with Sergei Grigoryants and Oleg Kalugin, Moscow, April 1994.


57 Author's interviews with a St. Petersburg group of former dissidents, September 1993.

58 Shelley, p. 15.


63 For an example of the pitiful and naive CIA analysis of the Russian security and intelligence services, see Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, The Russian Security Services: Sorting Out the Pieces (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, LDA 92-14029, September 1992), in which chekist leaders are portrayed benignly, without a hint of the abuses they committed under the Soviet regime.