Violence

AMITAI ETZIONI

VIOLENCE AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM

Throughout history, violence—killing, maiming, and the willful destruction of property—occurs in all societies. Violence is not only common during wars but is part of everyday life. One American is murdered every 39 minutes; one forcibly raped every 17 minutes; one subject to aggravated assault every two minutes; and one robbed every two minutes. Much of this daily violence is viewed as the result of deviant acts by criminals or the mentally ill, or of temporary escalations of conflicts among social groups, such as labor and management, blacks and whites.

Unlike this "routine" violence, there are periods in history and in contemporary societies in which violence rises sufficiently in scope and intensity to threaten the very organization of society. During the violencia in Colombia, for example, in the decade from 1949 to 1958, about 180,000 persons were killed out of a population of about 12 million. For a while, this situation

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prevented safe passage, let alone government control, through large sections of Colombia. The economy was disrupted and people were preoccupied with their security rather than other activities—that is, the normal functioning of social life in the areas affected was seriously undermined. Even more extreme are genocides, in which attempts are made to wipe out a whole people, like the Armenians in Turkey, or the Jews in Europe during the Nazi period.

In still other periods, a threat to social organization is perceived, but not necessarily because violence has reached an explosive level but because:

(1) It is perceived as rising to higher levels than previously, or
(2) the society has become aware that it is more violent than some other societies, or because
(3) the society seeks actively, as a matter of policy, to reduce the level of violence it is experiencing.

In the 1960's, the amount of all major forms of violence in the United States was high, rising, and perceived by many as threatening the social fabric. Riots in cities were common; campus unrest was unprecedentedly frequent; 588,840 violent crimes were reported in one year, 1968; serious crime was up about 100 percent from 1958. President John F. Kennedy, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Robert Kennedy were victims of political assassination. The United States was involved in a war. By 1970, 42,000 American servicemen had been killed, besides 107,000 South Vietnamese and 643,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong (these figures do not include civilians). Within the United States itself the rate of deaths by homicide was exceptionally high in comparison with other industrialized societies.

Deaths Due to Homicide (rate per 100,000 population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rate (year)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6.0 (1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.3 (1966)</td>
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<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>0.7 (1966)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.1 (1966)</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.5 (1966)</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>18.9 (1967)</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>21.3 (1966)</td>
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<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>4.0 (1966)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>4.5 (1966)</td>
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Sources: For data on developed countries see U. S. National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, To Establish Justice to Insure Domestic Tranquility (New York: Bantam Books, 1970); for data on underdeveloped countries, see U. N. Demographic Yearbook, 1968, 20th issue (New York: 1969), Table 79, p. 416-27. The data from this last source are defined as including deaths due to "operations of war" even though some of the countries cited were involved in such operations at the time. These data are intended to measure combat-related homicide. Data on underdeveloped countries are often quite unreliable and tend to underestimate the problem.
The perspective one takes in regard to violence largely determines whether or not one sees it as a social problem and how serious a problem it is thought to be. For instance, although the homicide rate in the United States was higher than in many other Western countries (a matter of great concern to Americans at the end of the sixties), the rate was lower than in many underdeveloped countries.

If we take a longer perspective, violence has been rampant throughout American history. A report prepared for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, itself a response to recent alarm, noted that:

The first and most obvious conclusion is that there has been a huge amount of it. It is not merely that violence has been mixed with the negative features of our history such as criminal activity, lynch mobs, and family feuds. On the contrary, violence has formed a seamless web with some of the noblest and most constructive chapters of American history: the birth of the nation (Revolutionary violence), the freeing of the slaves and the preservation of the Union (Civil War violence), the occupation of the land (Indian wars), the stabilization of frontier society (vigilante violence), the elevation of the farmer and the laborer (agrarian and labor violence), and the preservation of law and order (police violence).³

The 1970's began with widespread debate over the moral concepts and authority structures of the society. Part of the citizenry and the leadership felt it was a question of law and order. When a national sample of Americans were given a list of ten domestic problems in a 1970 Gallup survey and asked which three the government should concentrate on 56% of the respondents chose "reducing the amount of crime." A smaller number of Americans viewed the unresponsiveness of the societal structure to the needs and demands of the minorities, the young, and ultimately most Americans as inviting violent uprisings and crime.

Social thinkers and political philosophers tend to view violence as a social evil. Even when it is argued that violence is "justified," as when the oppressed rise against their violent oppressors, we usually mean that we are willing to accept the human sacrifice of an uprising to prevent further violence, and in order to advance other values such as social justice and freedom. And we see the "justified" violence in itself as demeaning, to both its victims

Violence and the executioners. To make a human being an object of violence brutalizes not only him but also the violent actor. Concentration camp guards, hangmen, or totalitarian elites are not free, happy people. Only a very few writers have depicted violent acts as indicating positive attributes such as virility or toughness, or being therapeutic and releasing inhibitions. Most students of violence ask how it can be minimized and how other means of advancing one’s goals can be followed instead.

THE CONCEPTS OF VIOLENCE

Without entering into a lengthy exposition of conceptual differences and definitions, two distinctions in the concept of violence ought to be noted because the terms used technically here differ significantly from some common usages.

First, we are dealing in this paper with physical violence, not with economic or psychic coercion. Some people argue that there is no difference between forcing a person to take a line he does not wish to by pointing a gun at him, by threatening the loss of his job, or by manipulating his symbols, such as those involved in excommunication. This view is especially argued by those who justify their acts of physical violence by the economic and psychic coercion of others. Social scientists must note the difference: While economic and psychic pressures can be very powerful indeed, except in limited conditions they leave the ultimate decision to the subject—the pressures reduce but do not eliminate his freedom. When physical force is used, however—when a person is jailed, gagged, or shot—under most conditions he has no choice left in the matter.

This difference may account for a corollary one. Most people find physical violence more alienating than economic or psychic pressures; they would rather be scolded or have their pay reduced than be beaten. Hence, it does matter to those subject to pressure which means of social control are em-

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*This point was eloquently made by Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 1955).


played, and it is not useful to cloud the issue semantically by referring to all acts of coercion as violence.

Second, violence and aggression are not to be confused. "Violence" is an act that causes damage, often to a person, sometimes only to property. "Aggression" refers to the entire range of "assertive, intrusive, and attacking behaviors. Aggression thus includes both overt and covert attacks, such defamatory acts as sarcasm, self-directed attacks, and dominance behavior."

Aggression may lead to violence, but it may also find an outlet in business competition, a lawyer's powerful brief, and sports—all legitimate modes of conduct. Those who seek peace do not want a world, a society, or even a family free of aggressive feelings or conflicts—which may well be impossible and even undesirable. Peace does not mean the tranquility of inaction; it requires the advancement of one's positions and the solution or curbing of conflict by nonviolent means. Actually, developing and maintaining a nonviolent system may well require providing sufficient room for legitimate forms of conflict, the way keeping a bicycle upright requires pushing the pedals. Standing still, passivity, is not a prerequisite of a nonviolent world.

THE FORMS OF VIOLENCE

Violence takes many forms: the assassination of presidents; the murder of mafiosi; riots in which city blocks are burned down and shops looted; bombs planted in mail boxes, police headquarters, department stores; lynching of blacks by whites; police or National Guardsmen using excessive force in their legal capacity, or running beserk; war; genocide.

For the social scientist, behind this plethora of concrete forms are a few analytic dimensions that allow an order to emerge from this chaos. Violence may be defined according to the kind of actor involved, whether individuals, small groups, or collectivities, such as classes or regions; how organized it is, whether spontaneous or planned; its legitimacy, whether it is authorized by the society's institutions and sanctioned by its values or is condemned for seeking to evade these controls and values, or whether it is revolutionary, seeking to redefine society, in which case the use of violence may be considered legitimate.

These distinctions express a general concern with consequences rather than with motives. Thus individual or small group deviant violence does not

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Violence tends to have societal consequences unless it rises to very high levels or is hysterically perceived, while violence by collectivities seeking to redefine the society tends to alter history, as civil wars and revolutions indicate. The form of violence, though, does not determine the consequences. These are more affected by the sources of violence and the ways they are faced.

**SOURCES OF VIOLENCE: ALTERNATE THEORIES AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

But why is there violence of any kind, personal or collective? What does an analysis of the sources of violence tell us about the opportunities to reduce or eliminate it?

There are competing answers, or at least theories, attempting to explain why man is violent. They are important for understanding the violence around and before us and for suggesting different policies to pursue if violence is to be curbed. Violence, say various schools of thought, is the result of man’s biological nature, of “normal” psychic predispositions: the result of successfully learning violent norms; or is caused by the social structure itself. Each of these views deserves attention not only because they are still subscribed to but also because each contains an element out of which a full theory of violence may evolve.

**Human Nature: The Biological Schools**

One major view of violence sees its sources in man’s biological, “animal,” or instinctual foundation. Social philosophers, especially Hobbes, held man to be violent in his original state of nature, acquiring the means to solve conflicts peacefully only through considerable effort devoted to developing and maintaining civilization’s constraints. The animal base, nevertheless, is constantly lurking in the background, threatening to break through in violent acts. Since man, in this view, is naturally violent, what requires explanation is not his violence but the conditions under which civil conduct (which some call a “social veneer,” to stress its fragility), arises and is sustained.

Many theoretical works in psychology are based on a variant of this assumption: Man is born an animal, is inclined to serve his own needs, and is capable of violent conduct. Through the processes of education (or socialization) he acquires a measure of self-regulation and an emotional commitment
to limit himself in conflicts with his fellow man to nonviolent means. He also learns to pursue shared and complementary goals and not only his immediate self-interest. The more salient these shared or complementary goals, the less likely they are to come into conflict, and conflicts that do occur are less likely to intensify to the point where men will fight. Citizens of one nation more often than not tend to share goals; citizens of different nations rarely do. This is one reason nations fight each other more often than do groups within a nation.

Recent works in psychology stress that socialization is not sufficient even when successfully completed. People must be continuously rewarded for their civilized conduct or punished for breaking the rules and using violence illegitimately. Moreover, even the combination of socialization and social control does not assure full adherence to the nonviolent procedures the society fosters.

Not all social philosophers or scientists share this view of man. Some, including Locke, saw the state of nature as peaceful, in which men had "perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other men." *This state of peace is undermined when a small minority of disruptive, rapacious men seeks to violate the rights of others and forces the majority to defend itself. From then on, conflict is endemic to society. Recently, students of animal societies report that such societies are more peaceful than human societies, and that intraspecies violence among animals is rare.* Violent intraspecies fights occur chiefly when one's turf (or domicile) is invaded or a territory becomes overcrowded. Animals prey on each other, but "predation should not come within the scope of aggressive activity ... a hawk swooping on a small bird is no more aggressive than the family butcher engaged in his livelihood." *Otherwise, aggression among animals is rare and tends to be playful (as among dogs) or ritualistic (as among cocks), but "fighting to the death very rarely occurs in vertebrates, and it is doubtful whether it ever occurs in mammals under natural conditions." *Because of the rapid development of his brain and weapons man is said to have lost the natural inhibitions against fratricide and genocide that even carnivorous animals have. Nikolaas Tinbergen sees the essence of the social life of animals as cooperation among members of a species. Mating, rearing offspring, association

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*Ibid., p. 2.
between individual animals outside the family, and intraspecific fighting constitute the four basic areas of intraspecific cooperation, which "although not of use to the individuals, is highly useful to the species, however paradoxical this may sound." 12 Most fighting occurs during the breeding season ("reproductive fighting"), and the two animals involved rarely try to kill each other. Most fights "take the form of bluff" or threat. The effect of threat is much the same as that of actual fighting; it tends to space individuals out because they mutually repel each other." 13 This reproductive fighting insures each member of the species the "possession of some object, or a territory, which is indispensable for reproduction. It thus prevents individuals sharing such objects, which would in many cases be disastrous, or at least inefficient." 14 And "stimuli from the territory to which the animal reacts either innately or as an added result of conditioning, makes the animal confine its fighting to the territory." 15

As men cannot return to their animal nature, reducing violence depends on providing alternative nondestructive outlets for man's aggression. Speaking of war, A. Storr calls for playing off aggression in alternative spheres: "There will always be plenty of ways in which countries can compete, whether it be in the space race, in education, in technology, or even in welfare. We ought to encourage competition in these fields as much as we possibly can." 16

**Frustration-Aggression Theory**

We have discussed theories that find the root of violence in man's nature, in his biological substructure, and in his psychic superstructure. A second set of theories sees the source of violence in a person's relationship to his social environment; the most popular of these is known as the "frustration-aggression theory." It states that aggressive behavior (of which violent conduct is a major form) results when purposeful activity is interrupted. The classical proponents of this theory often cite an example of a boy being

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14 *Ibid.,* p. 64.
prevented by his mother from getting an ice cream cone after the ice cream vendor's bell has been heard and the boy is on his way to buy it. The frustration-aggression theory is frequently criticized for not explaining under which circumstances frustration leads to aggression and under which it does not: Some children regress rather than aggress; for example, when toys are taken from them they wet their pants rather than attack other children. The theory does not differentiate between aggression that is violent and aggression that is not (which may take the form of personal insult rather than physical assault). And, it has been pointed out, aggression may be evoked other than by frustration, for example, by boredom or by disrupting physiological rather than purposeful activities, such as sleep.

Still, a considerable body of data in support of the theory has evolved. Studies do show which factors affect aggressive responses. For example, aggression is more likely to occur if frustration is arbitrary rather than explainable: A commuter is less likely to react aggressively if a bus passing him by displays a clear sign that it has broken down and is on its way to the garage. Previous exposures are also a factor; studies show that during World War II people nearly missed by a bomb reacted more severely to a new bombing than those without such previous experience. In an experiment measuring the effect of differing degrees of frustration, a five-month-old baby was deprived of his bottle at varying lengths of time after he had started feeding. When the length of time before he started crying was measured, it was found that the less milk the child had consumed before he was interrupted, the quicker he responded by crying. Thus the more frustrated (or less satiated) the child was, the greater the motivation for an aggressive response.

In a study investigating the differential effect of experiencing a series of frustrations rather than a single one, several pairs of college students exchanged written notes on two occasions arranged by the experimenters. The notes prepared by the students were intercepted and replaced with notes either friendly or hostile in tone. After two sessions, each student was asked to describe his partner, and these descriptions were scored according to the degree of hostility expressed. Students who received two unfriendly notes were found to be significantly more hostile in describing their partners than students who received only a single unfriendly note—indicating that

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13 The studies report almost exclusively on work with children or students.
The implications of this conception go far beyond the carefully designed experiments. This theory is often cited to suggest that if people's aspirations are kept from outpacing the opportunities available to them, violence will be less common than in our own frustrating world, where everyone is encouraged to strive for economic and social success but the avenues are not equally available to all.

The Learning Theories

While the frustration-aggression theory sees violence as the result of "social and psychic failure"—disruption of purposeful activity, the absence of expected rewards, and inadequate maturity and development of "safe" outlets—learning theory views violence as the result of successful socialization and social control. Aggressive behavior in general, and violent behavior in particular, is learned just like other behavior, and can be triggered where "expected," even without frustration. Middle-class people, especially intellectuals, it is said, tend to view bloodshed with horror, but in other subcultures some forms of violence are considered normal or acquire a positive evaluation. In the frontier society, a fast gun was a source of prestige. The lower classes often associate using force (e.g., in a fist fight) with masculinity. And the same educated people who abhor violence in abstraction frequently approve of using it for one's nation or for some other "just" cause.

Thus, under conditions in which violence is expected—soldiers at the front, teen-agers in a street gang—members of the subculture may learn to conform to the norms and behave violently because such conduct is presented to them as socially desirable. They may feel violence "is the thing to do," because they have been "brought up right," and they know they will win approval if they fight well and receive censure if they "chicken out."

What one learns is largely defined by one's culture and subculture. Hence one common explanation for why Americans are more violent than Europeans is that American culture is more approving of violence than most other Western cultures. Swedish movies set practically no limits on the sexual behavior filmed, but they censor violence; American movies used to be, and to some degree still are, sexually inhibited, but they are not violence-shy.

Not only does violence appear—in westerns and war movies—in gory detail, but it tends to be romanticized—the war hero gets the girl, the war makes a man out of a timid boy, and so on. Our frontier experiences and the mixing of immigrants from widely varied backgrounds, sharing few "ultimate" values or bonds, are believed to have shaped American culture in this regard.

The American character... was forged through an extraordinary 300-year process of settlement during which the Indians were driven back, the English, Spanish, and French were driven off, the Africans were involuntarily driven over, the Mexicans involuntarily annexed, and the immigrant minorities were thrust irrevocably into a vibrant competition both with a raw physical environment and with one another. That Americans often resorted to violence under such trying circumstances is no surprise. But more important today is the question of the pervasiveness of the legacy of nativism, vigilantism, and ethnic aggression that was an inevitable byproduct of the interaction of immigrant and open continent.²²

Very recently, efforts have been made to disarm American culture. Television networks have begun to limit violence, especially in children's programs. Mothers demonstrated against war toys. By and large, little was changed; the culture of a free society is not given to ready guidance. The profit from "violent" movies or toys is considerable, and the demand for either item does not seem to subside.

Social scientists disagree considerably on the effect of violent-cultural items. Research conducted by R. H. Walters and his associates from 1962 to 1966 seems to indicate that viewing filmed violence stimulates aggressive behavior. College students were chosen as subjects; they were instructed to act as "teachers" in a learning experiment in which they punished the "learner" for his mistakes. After viewing a knife fighting scene from a film, the test subjects "showed a significant increase in the level of shock delivered to the learner when errors were made."²² The authors conclude that:

The pattern of data is consistent with the interpretation that filmed violence stimulated aggressive motivations or aggressive response tendencies and that this aroused aggressiveness was manifested in permissive aggression against another person.²³

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²⁴Ibid.
The work of O. I. Lovaas seems also to demonstrate the aggression-stimulating effect of viewing filmed aggression. In a series of experiments, preschool children viewed cartoons with a very high content of violence; the children's observed aggressive behavior seems to have been stimulated by the aggressive cartoons. In contrast, other studies of the effects of media that convey violence (e.g., television, comic books) upon children frequently report the absence of a causal relationship between the amount of exposure to the media and antisocial behavior. One study of 263 New York City boys of average intelligence compared the behavior of the 25 boys most interested in comic books with the behavior of the 25 boys least interested in comic books. When the two groups were compared with regard to school attendance, school achievement, conduct, and tendencies toward delinquency, no significant differences were found. Another study of 626 fifth- and sixth-grade children in a Boston suburb investigated the relationship between their interpersonal behavior and their choice of aggressive or nonaggressive material in television, movies, and comic books. While boys who tended to have unusual problems with interpersonal relations and also were highly exposed to pictorial media had a "particular preference" for aggressive media content, it was suggested that interpersonal problems were more nearly a cause than a consequence of the boys' concern with violent media content.

An aggressive movie may release aggressive motivations rather than encourage hostile actions or violent behavior. It was found that preexposure psychological characteristics, such as a high number of interpersonal problems, affect the child's use of the mass media; they differentiate the content he prefers and how he perceives it and how this content influences him.

A boy with problems, extrapunitive leanings, and rebelliously independent tendencies who, mainly as a result of his social environment and his I.Q., is highly exposed, relies on the media for temporary solutions to difficulties; structures the content of the media in black-and-white terms around elements of aggression, threat, amoral views of crime and negative attitudes to existing law enforcement institutions; and draws on this structure in his judgments of people and in a projection of his own self-image.

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The Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence took a different position, referring to experimental studies showing that children exposed to filmed or televised violence may respond by imitating the aggressive behavior. In one study, nursery school children watched a film showing an adult striking an inflatable "knock-down" doll; later these children and others who had not seen the film were subjected to deliberate frustration and placed in a room with a "knock-down" doll and other toys. Children who had seen the film displayed significantly more hostility toward the doll than did the other children.24

In another study, one group of nursery school children saw a cartoon featuring aggressive action and a second group saw a cartoon containing relatively peaceful activity. Children from both groups were then permitted to play with two mechanical toys. Both were activated by a bar which, when pressed, in one toy caused a doll to strike another, and in the other toy led to more peaceful activity. While both groups made the same total number of responses to the toys, the children who had seen the violent cartoon used the aggressive toy significantly more frequently than the children who had seen the nonviolent cartoon.25

Possibly the issue is the difference between cultural items and contexts. If a war is reported in the news each day, and since killings occur often in the streets, and much violence is depicted in movies, novels, history books, and toys, removing a few such items will have little general effect and hence will not "show" in studies. Changing the whole context, however, disarming the culture, might well make a difference. While it is extremely difficult to disarm a culture, it might at least be possible to enrich it with strong antidotes—such as are now being provided against smoking—until slowly the violence-predisposing items are rendered less poisonous. The most important factor is probably not how much violence we see, but rather the framework in which it is reported and viewed—whether horrible or noble, a measure of last resort, or a shortcut to fame and fortune. Here is where "editing" and education may be comparatively useful.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF VIOLENCE

The three sources of violence we have identified may well appear jointly, making it difficult to tell which source is at work. When a criminal shoots a storekeeper, he is surely biologically capable of violence; he may also be frustrated—perhaps he has just lost his job—and may have learned that "it's all right" to behave that way. Analytically, however, these theories are not compatible, and the policy-implications are not identical. Nor do the theories have the same explanatory power.

Analogies to animal societies are of limited value, since man and his society differ in so many ways from animal societies, and each difference affects the issue at hand. Members of human societies respond to rich and complex sets of symbols (culture) which may serve to curb, or to generate, a level of violence very different from the one man is biologically capable of; in contrast, the role of symbols in most animal societies is extremely limited. A genetically set division of labor and reflexes are the marks of animal nature; man is not governed by these. Some say that we would be "better off," less violent, if we were more bound by our reflexes, but we are not and cannot be so reconstituted. Even if humans, who are often provoked to armed conflict by considerations of status and ideology, followed the examples of animals and fought only when their territories are threatened or their physical existence endangered, the level of warfare would still be high, as in Europe when the Nazis fought for Lebensraum (literally, "space to live").

Social scientists have been saying for years that man can find different outlets for his aggressive tendencies—the aggressive individual may become a lawyer, butcher, policeman, or criminal. But it is not clear why some people become one or the other, and even less clear to what extent we can redirect the factors that so assign people without radical transformation of the whole society. Human malleability may be smaller than had been expected. Aggressive children in kindergartens are given a doll to hit as a "substitute outlet" when they want to hit other children. But when a three-year-old in a nursery school says: "I want to hit something which makes... Ooh," he is saying, in effect, that substitutes have different attributes, are not so attractive, and hence do not replace the need for violent, antisocial behavior.

Both frustration and learning seem important factors in violent behavior. But these are not to be viewed as narrow personality concepts, determined merely by an individual's ability to learn, his maturity, or his previous
experience. These factors are significantly affected by societal forces, and societal forces work directly on the aspirations a person has and the actual opportunities available to him. Their balance versus discrepancy is one significant factor determining the level of violence in a society. If aspirations are escalated—by the movies, television, advertising, and modern secular education—while new jobs, income, and housing increase more slowly, violence will rise.

From a theoretical viewpoint, the societal aspects of learning and frustrations allow us to tie in these two distinct theories, and place the study of violence in a general framework that includes other deviant and innovative behavior. The point is that culture offers both the goals members of society aspire to (e.g., material success) and the means they are expected to use in reaching these goals (e.g., hard work, saving). When the legitimate means are not available and the goals are accepted, some members of society are frustrated and under pressure to resort to illegitimate means—of which violence, as applied by the criminal, is a major example.

Learning becomes a chief factor, once a deviant, violence-approving subculture has been established, but learning does not explain how and why such a culture came about. An individual may well be violent because he grew up in a frontier or gangster community where violence was an approved mode of conduct, and he was successfully socialized into it. But collectives, such as classes or races, do not pick up at random violent cultural patterns, which are then "learned" by their individual members. By and large the more violent cultures seem to be those that are located in relatively deprived areas, such as southern United States and southern Italy. In the United States, violence as "part of life" seems more acceptable in the South than in most other parts of the country, more common in the cities than in the suburbs and in the poorer areas of the cities than in the richer ones.

The concepts of learning and frustration, especially if enlarged to include sociological concepts such as the content of culture and subculture, and the structure of aspirations and opportunities, are helpful in understanding the factors that determine the forms and level of violence. In searching for a more comprehensive theory of violence, a process far from complete, we turn next to societal sources, which affect the level and modes of violence directly as well as the motivational and cognitive processes just explored.

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The single most significant insight for a sociopolitical theory of violence is, to paraphrase a famous saying, that violence is the continuation of normal societal processes by "other" means. To illustrate, workers may have grievances (a sign of social tension) and go on strike (by itself, a legitimate, nonviolent form of conflict), which may turn into a violent confrontation if demands are continually ignored or attempts are made to suppress the overt expression of the conflict (by use of police or strike breakers). Only if we understand the forces that cause tensions and conflicts in society will we ultimately be able to account for the level of violence. While these forces may be nonviolent, if they are ignored and not responded to, they will, under certain conditions, turn violent.

It is difficult to account fully for the level of tension and conflict in society and the conditions under which it escalates into violence, without going into considerable detail. Three central concepts, though, can be briefly introduced and their relationships to violence explored. These are "societal bonds" (or "systems"), which refer to the extent to which a society is glued together or integrated; "societal structures," which indicate the shapes or patterns of the relationships among those bound together into one societal grouping (e.g., is there one subgroup which subjugates the others or is there a more egalitarian distribution of opportunities?); and "societal processes," which are the mechanisms through which both societal bonds and societal structure can be changed. The processes may be effective and make structure and bonds responsive to the memberships, or ineffective and allow for great or growing discrepancies between the desires of the members and what the society provides for them. Major sociological conceptualizations of the societal sources of violence lie in these three concepts.

Societal Bonds (or Systems):
The Extent of Societal Integration

The intricate webs of social bonds that tie individuals and groups to each other are of three major kinds: One is the values the members share, which they acquire at home, in school, from peers, and in church. For instance, they may share a belief in the "American way of life" or in "individualism." Shared beliefs allow groups with conflicting interests and viewpoints to work

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them out and, hence, to curb conflict, limiting it to nonviolent means. It is as if each participant says to himself, "Well, I don't really like this ("this" being whatever the conflict is all about), but there is something more important and my adversary share; hence let me give in, at least part of the way, to keep the shared enterprise alive." When basic values are not shared by members of a society, as, for instance, among the tribes of some newborn nations such as Nigeria or in the United States before the Civil War, intergroup violence is more likely. This violence may take the form of tribal warfare, civil war, urban riot, or, most commonly, international war.

The second major societal bond is the economic exchanges that bind people and groups to each other not out of commitment to the same values but out of necessity. They trade with each other or use each other's facilities (e.g., ports) or own joint facilities (e.g., interstate railroads). The more exchanges occur, the more people or groups are bound to each other and the less likely are they to come into violent conflict.

A third bond, frequently not recognized as such, is the ability of an authority to speak for the unit (whatever unit is encompassed by the bonds) to keep the subunits "in line" (i.e., to continue within the system and not to threaten it) by disarming them, or at least by keeping their capacity to fight at clearly lower levels. It is something like a school yard: One reason the fourth graders do not fight each other, at least not much, is that some eighth graders (or teachers) are appointed to see that they do not. Both the superior power and the legitimacy of the "law and order" force are relevant: If the "peace-keeping" force is weak, it will invite a revolution; if it is itself unjust, not duly appointed, or discriminatory in its enforcement of nonviolence, it will encourage the "subjects" to seek means to rebel. In the process of nation-building, in which societal bonds are intensified, often the right to bear arms is shifted from individuals and local groups to a national authority such as the police or the army.

A brief look at the development of societal bonds in the United States is useful. Having grown out of colonies that were fairly separate entities, the United States only slowly evolved nationwide integrative forces of all three kinds, and this largely after the Civil War. Even today no nationwide school system teaches all children the same "civics" or otherwise introduces them to the same set of ultimate values, as in France or Israel. Even today segments of the country, especially the poorest ones, are left out of many of the economic exchanges. Even today the United States, unlike most Western countries, has no nationwide police force. These factors are a major reason the United States is more violent than most Western nations. They also help explain why in many underdeveloped nations, much less integrated than the United States, intergroup violence is considerably higher.
The three kinds of bonds are weakest among nations, and, hence, conflicts which arise among these entities are most likely to turn to violence that, once it erupts, is most difficult to curb. If one thinks about a nation divided by a civil war or large-scale intergroup violence, along racial or class lines, for example, as two or more "nations" not deeply bound together, we see how the same conception of bonds applies both to intra- and international conflicts.

So far, we have asked a "static" question: What bonds tie men together? Dynamically, we ask next: Under what conditions may groups heretofore not sufficiently tied to make a community that rules out large-scale intergroup violence come to fashion such bonds? We shall illustrate our answer by examples from situations in which bonds are weakest, among nations, but the same points apply to intra-national systems.

**SYSTEM-BUILDING: AN INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLE—Encapsulation, not conflict resolution:** Bonds provide a "capsule" that contains conflicts and prevents them from turning into violence. "Encapsulation" refers to the process by which conflicts are modified so that they become limited by rules (the "capsule"). The rules exclude some earlier modes of conflict, while they legitimate other modes. Encapsulated conflicts are not solved in the sense that the parties necessarily become pacified. But the use of arms, or at least some usage of some arms, is effectively ruled out. Where some observers may see only two alternatives—powers are basically either hostile or friendly—encapsulation points to a third kind of relationship. Here, some differences of belief or interests; even a mutually aggressive orientation, might well continue. But states agree to rule out some means and some modes of conflict, that is, armed ones, and set up the machinery necessary to enforce this agreement. Encapsulation is thus less demanding than pacification, since it does not require that the conflict be resolved or extinguished, only that the range of its expression be curbed.

**Propelling forces, the limits of communication:** How may bonds be built up to curb intergroup violence? Robert Ezra Park points out that conflict generates interaction between its parties (e.g., races); the parties come to know each other and communicate with each other, which in turn leads to the evolution of shared perspectives and relations, until the conflict turns into competition. (Park and many other sociologists use the term "competition" to refer to a conflict limited by a set of rules.) Daniel Lerner reports that French businessmen who travel, read foreign magazines, and meet foreign visitors are more likely to favor the formation of a European com-

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**Footnote:**

munity than those less exposed to foreigners. Among businessmen with much exposure, sentiment in favor of such a community is about six to one, while those who have had little contact with foreigners favor the community only by a ratio of two to one. The difference between these two groups might be related to factors other than exposure, but Lerner shows that variables such as age, birthplace, socioeconomic status, size of firm, and location of firm do not explain the difference.

The theorem that increased communication between parties is the mechanism through which conflicts are encapsulated, and violence thus reduced, seems to hold more for parties with similar values and sentiments to begin with. Communication may make the participants aware of a latent consensus upon which they may draw to build agreed-upon procedures to further limit conflicts and to legitimate accommodation. But when the basic values, sentiments, and interests of the parties are not compatible, increased communication may only stir this incompatibility into conflict, make the parties more conscious of the deep cleavages that separate them, and increase the likelihood of violence. The larger the differences between the parties to a conflict, the smaller the degree of encapsulation that can be attained through increased communication.

The effect of power constellations: To encapsulate conflicts between hostile parties who lack shared values, the number of members in the system and the distribution of power among them seems to be more important for the system's integration than communication. The balance-of-power system seems to require at least four or five participants. Systems with three participants tend to lead to coalitions, in which two gang up against the third. Bipolar systems (i.e., with two participants) have been shown to be particularly difficult to pacify. Encapsulation seems to be enhanced by the transition from a relatively duopolistic (two-party) system to a more pluralistic one.

International relations approximated a state of duopoly between 1946 and 1956. In this period, the height of the Cold War, there were two fairly monolithic camps, one directed from Moscow, the other from Washington. A number of countries were not aligned with either camp but their military and political weight was small. Such a duopolistic situation was highly unfavorable to encapsulation. The sides focused their attention on keeping their respective blocs integrated and trying to keep nonaligned countries from...
swelling the ranks of the opposite camp. Each block eyed the other, hoping for an opportunity to expand its respective area of influence while waiting for the other's collapse.

Between 1956 and 1964 a secondary power rebelled in each of the two major camps. Both France and China had been weak powers, forced to follow a foreign policy formulated in foreign capitals. Under reawakening nationalism and augmented national power, both, however, increasingly followed an independent foreign policy. The rebellion of the secondary powers in both camps pushed the two superpowers closer to each other. Seeking to maintain their superior status and fearing the consequences of conflicts generated by their rebelling client-states, the superpowers set out to formulate some rules binding on all parties. The treaty of the partial cessation of nuclear tests, which the United States and the Soviet Union tried to make binding on France and China as well, was a case in point. American-Russian efforts to stem proliferation of nuclear weapons was another. In this period Russia stopped whatever technical aid it was giving to Chinese nuclear research and development, and the United States refused to help France develop its nuclear force. American-Soviet negotiations to agree on inspection of atomic plants, aimed mainly at ensuring the use of atomic research for nonmilitary purposes in third countries, pointed in the same direction. The 1963–1964 detente, which isolated Communist China and France, and the Geneva disarmament negotiations in the same years, in which these two countries did not participate, were further reflections of this trend.

These measures have in common the important characteristic that they serve the more "narrow" needs of the superpowers while they advance the "general welfare" of the world; they can therefore be presented as universal values and implemented through world institutions (i.e., extend the "capsule"). For instance, the prime superpower motivation for the 1963 test treaty might well have been the desire of the United States and Russia to remain the only two great nuclear powers, but it also indirectly reduced the danger of nuclear war. It was presented as if the prime motive were to advance peace and disarmament and reduce fallout to protect human health. It is a familiar strategy of political interest groups to work out solutions among themselves and then clothe them in the values of the community at large. Indirectly, these values affect the course of action an interest group chooses to follow from among available alternatives and they provide a common basis upon which similar or compatible interests of divergent powers can be harmonized and the shared community broadened.

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Consensus formation and "intermediary" bodies: Sociopolitical processes that reduce the differences of interest and viewpoint and build ties are conflict-reducing, violence-curbing processes, as well as community-building processes. Communities, especially if they have a government, require consensus that needs to be developed. To form an effective consensus-forming structure, it is essential to divide the processes into several levels of representation. Rather than attempting to reach consensus among all parties in one general assembly, the parties are best divided into subgroups that are more homogeneous than the community as a whole. These subgroups work out a compromise and are represented as if they were a single unit on the next level of the structure in which consensus is formed. To be effective such divisions may have to be repeated several times. 37

Regional organizations, communities, and blocs might serve as "intermediary bodies" for the international community. It would, however, be a mistake to view every regional organization as a step toward a world community. Regional organizations that have only socially marginal roles, such as the European research organization on peaceful uses of nuclear energy (CERN), tend to have much less impact than those that pool the sovereignties of several nations, as the European Economic Community (EEC) has begun to do. Regional bodies intended to counteract other regional bodies, especially military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, often retard rather than advance encapsulation of conflict; they tend to reflect, on a large scale, the features of nationalism. Regional bodies aimed at internal improvement, such as "welfare" communities (a foundation of the EEC) or development associations (e.g., in Central America) that stress rapid economic growth, are more likely to serve as intermediary layers in the process of building a world community.

Above all, only regional bodies that allow the process of "upward transfer" of loyalties are helpful in building a world community. Studies of social structures as different as the American federal government and the Southern Baptist Association have shown that once a center of authority is established, it tends to grow in the power, rights, and command of loyalties earlier com-

37 In the American political system the primaries and the national conventions and, to a degree, postelection negotiations over participation in the cabinet provide such a multilayer consensus-formation structure. Thus, for instance, the struggle over the presidential and vice-presidential candidate is also a struggle over what policy the party is to face the electorate with. Once chosen, most segments of the party—liberal and conservative—tend, as a rule, to support the candidates and the policy. In the negotiations on participation in the cabinet, the party that lost the election is often given some indirect representation to enhance national support for what is a one-party administration.
manded by the units (as when states' rights declined and those of the federal government grew). But a social unit can, by the use of ideologically and political mechanisms, advance or retard this process. Only those units that encourage or at least allow the process to occur provide a sociopolitical foundation on which a world community might be erected.

**Rules and enforcement**: Another major process of community-building is the evolution of rules and of agencies for their enforcement. Here is much room for the application and further development of the sociology of law, which warns against relying excessively on legislation when there is only a narrow sociopolitical base. A premature and ineffectual world law might be worse than no law at all. Laws that are not backed by effective enforcement and adequate consensus, as illustrated by the abortive attempt to institute prohibition in the United States, breed contempt for the laws and their makers and nurture a whole range of previously unknown criminal interests. A premature world law on disarmament might well generate clandestine production of weapons and large profits to arms smugglers, and thereby lead to repeal of the law rather than to lasting disarmament.

The concern in the study of encapsulation is not so much with protecting the existing mechanism from erosion; it is, rather, with accelerating its extension and growth. Hence the importance of formalizing implicit and "understood" rules into explicit and enforced international laws becomes clear. This principle is neither obvious nor widely agreed upon. Many stress the value of implicit, unnegotiated understandings. For instance, after the Soviet Union removed its missiles from Cuba late in 1962, the United States removed its Thor and Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy in 1963, without such reciprocation ever being publicly discussed, let alone negotiated. (Even today, it is not clear that this was a deliberate act of reciprocation.)

There are several disadvantages in reaching agreement in this particular way, especially for community-building efforts. The danger of misunderstanding is larger, especially when matters are complex. When misunderstandings occur, they generate bitter feelings of betrayal and mistrust, which, in turn, stand in the way of future exchanges. Further, the community's institutions do not gain in experience and responsibility unless implicit understandings are codified and enforced by them. This is not to suggest that the path of implicit understanding should not be traveled, but only that unless an enlarging flow of such traffic is directed through world institutions, they will remain the dirt roads rather than the highways of international relations.

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When rules are formalized, effective verification and response machinery is necessary. The 1954 agreements to neutralize Laos and limit arms supplies for Vietnam were supervised by an understaffed, underfinanced, ill-equipped, and above all politically deadlocked commission. (Its members were India, Poland, and Canada.) In 1959 East and West accused each other of violating these agreements; the enforcement machinery provided neither a clear picture of who was the first to violate the agreements nor an appropriate response.

We have examined the ways societal bonds may be built up among previously less integrated societal units; we illustrated the factors by drawing upon the relations among nations, but similar statements about the role of increased communication, varying power constellations, the functions of intermediary bodies (or subgroupings) upon building consensus, and the role of developing shared laws all apply to the relations among the parts of an underdeveloped country or the races in one society. In all these systems, the more favorable these factors are, the more and stronger societal bonds we expect, and the more powerful these bonds—for reasons discussed earlier—the less intergroup violence is to be expected. But the potency of the societal bonds is not the only factor in determining the level of violence; the particular way members bound together relate to each other is another major factor in accounting both for group and personal violence.

Violence-Prone Structures

Each society can be viewed as a set of distributions. Society has economic assets, annual income, educational opportunities, prestige, power—but who gets what? Sociologists ask this question not in terms of individuals but for large groupings of people. For instance, the annual income of the United States is divided in such a way that the 20 percent of the population in the "lowest" end of the income distribution receives 5 percent of the total national income, while another 20 percent (the "highest") receives 45 percent. While the distributions of various assets are not the same, and all change over time, those at the top of one distribution tend to get a very disproportionate share of most of what is to be had. And those at the bottom of one distribution tend to be at the bottom of most other distributions. If you look at higher education as an asset, among those families whose income is $15,000 or more, 87 percent of the children attend college, compared with 41 percent

of the children in middle-income homes, and 20 percent in those earning less than $3,000 a year.**

Being given a disproportionately low share does not by itself cause much violence; it is a universal condition in which some groups in most, if not all, societies find themselves (although there are significant differences in degree). However, once a group—a class, a race, an age category—has become aware of its deprived status, and is mobilized to act on it, intergroup tension and conflicts mount. (Mobilization is frequently initiated by intellectuals and leaders who are not themselves members of the group, but anger soon is internalized and the conflict is taken over by those who are members.) The rise in tensions and conflicts may cause no violence if reallocation follows, or if some project that all groups will share in equally is advanced, such as opening up new territories or stimulating the economy into rapid growth.

But if the structure is rigid, and no reallocations occur after the society is faced with rising demands, tensions and conflicts are likely to escalate to a level where violence is highly probable. This does not mean that the demanded reallocations, or more generally, social justice, will follow. Those who have most of what there is may, despite the violence, use their power to keep the new demands at bay. Or some accommodations will be made to reduce, maybe only temporarily and partially, the new violence (say, riots in slums). Or those in power may be ousted in a revolution and a new disproportionate allocative pattern set up. Whatever the final accommodation, a rise in violence is the price of undue rigidity.

Processes: The Mechanisms of Change

The strength of the societal bonds and the "slant" of the societal structure affect the level of violence. So does the flexibility of the processes that allows for adaptation to changes in the environment and in the relations among the members constituting a society. Each society has a set of procedures and processes whose function is to keep adjusting the societal bonds and structure to the changing relations among the group members. These are mainly political processes, such as in lobbying, legislation, presidential action, and so on. Those processes differ in two ways: (1) their efficacy in keeping the societal bonds and structure responsive to new mobilized demands, even if it entails far-reaching transformation of both, and (2) the extent to which they themselves—by the way they operate—encourage or discourage escala-
tion of conflicts to a violent level. For instance, in some Latin American
societies the armed forces act like interest groups and the government is ad-
justed to reflect the changing relations among the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, and the social groups they are allied with. The procedures in such
adjustments are the renegotiation of cabinet membership and the marshaling
of divisions by each service. Often this is very peaceful; at one point, it is
told, the president of a Latin American republic sent a telegram to each of
six commanders who were marching on the capital to ask whom they favored,
and the future composition of the government was reflected in their answers.
But violent clashes among the armed services occasionally do erupt. The
ballot box is a less violence-prone mechanism, aside from the fact that it is
much more participatory.

But voting, petitions, and the other means of democratic adjustment may
not suffice for the vast social changes contemporary society must respond to.
To illustrate response-producing processes and their effects on the level of
violence, the author reports briefly one of his own studies of the newest one—
that of demonstrations.

DEMONSTRATION DEMOCRACY: AN EXAMPLE—Webster defines a demonstra-
tion as "the act of making known or evident by visible or tangible means... a
public display of group feeling." Demonstrations are thus public acts de-
signed to express or call attention to a position. The specific features of
demonstrations—from carrying placards to obstructionist acts—are inti-
mately tied to this wish to make a position "visible or tangible," and this
characteristic distinguishes demonstrations from more routine forms of ex-
pression, such as participation in a town meeting or party convention. In
this sense demonstrations are still an extraordinary, not entirely institu-
tionalized, means of political expression.

Each generation of Americans evolves its own procedures to sustain and
reinforce democracy. Our generation is characterized by the evolution of
new means of mass communication, notably television; by an increased
political mobilization of underprivileged groups; and by increasingly complex
bureaucratic structures—in government, education, religion, and other areas.
Demonstrations are a particularly effective means of political expression, in
an age of television, for underprivileged groups to advance their interests
and, more generally, to prod stalemated bureaucracies into taking necessary
actions. Indeed demonstrations are becoming part of the daily routine of
contemporary democracy and may be its most distinctive mark.

Today's American citizen has available a number of alternative forms of
political action during the long periods between elections and for dealing
with the numerous "private governments" not directly responsible to the
Violence

electorate, such as universities, hospitals, or churches. In addition to writing letters to his representatives, submitting petitions, advertising in the press, and supporting organized pressure groups, a citizen may demonstrate to make known his views when expression through other means has brought no, or only inadequate, redress. In this sense demonstrations are becoming for the citizen the avenue that strikes have become for the workers. Like strikes, demonstrations—especially in this early stage of their evolution—entail a danger: They may escalate into obstructionism or violence. For a democracy to function effectively, it is essential that the modes of political expression be both nonviolent and effective. That is, the inevitable differences of viewpoint, interest, and belief must be worked out peacefully and the legitimate needs of all the member groups of the society must be taken into account. To suppress all demonstrations because they are a volatile means of expression would be both impossible under our present form of government and inconsistent with the basic tenets of the democratic system, in that it would deprive the citizens—especially disadvantaged ones—of a political tool.

The number of participants in demonstrations seems to be increasing and includes an increasingly large proportion of the members of society. In one month chosen at random, 216 demonstrations were reported in the United States, or about seven per day. This figure is certainly an understatement of the actual number. It is very likely that many cases went unreported. Antiwar demonstrations in the United States, for example, have grown almost continuously since spring 1965, from approximately 100,000 participants in one-quarter of the year to about 280,000.44 Students produced at least 221 demonstrations in 101 colleges between January 1 and June 15, 1968, involving 38,911 participants, according to a study conducted by the National Student Association.

Demonstrations are often viewed as the political tool of only a few dissenting groups, such as students and blacks. Actually, the number and variety of social groups resorting to this mechanism, at least on occasion, seem to be increasing. This is not to suggest that all social groups demonstrate with equal frequency. Blacks and students do demonstrate much more often than other groups. But members of such professional groups as teachers and social workers, who rarely took part in demonstrations a decade ago, now do so fairly frequently. A very large number of the antiwar demonstrators are white, middle-class citizens, as well as "respectable" professionals. Three hundred doctors, nurses, researchers, and others from the medical profession demonstrated against the war in Vietnam outside the Bellevue Hospital compound. Several hundred clergymen held a silent vigil near the Pentagon

on May 12, 1965. Lawyers demonstrated against the invasion of Cambodia in May, 1970. Demonstrations have been extended to other issues also. On several Sundays in September and October, 1968, parishioners demonstrated near Catholic churches in Washington, D. C., to protest sanctions against priests who did not support the Pope's edict against artificial birth control. Even the staffs of law-enforcement agencies have not refrained from demonstrating; on October 1, 1968, about 100 "welfare patrolmen" picketed New York City's Social Services Department.

There are basically three kinds of demonstrations: Those which are entirely nonviolent and legal, such as a march following the issuance of a permit and in accord with its restrictions; obstructionist demonstrations, which entail, for example, blocking the traffic on a street, the entrance to a school, or the movement of construction equipment, and, as a rule, some degree of civil disobedience; and violent demonstrations, which may include the throwing of missiles, fist fights, beatings, arson, and even shooting—clearly illegal acts.

Contrary to the impression that seems to prevail in many quarters, the majority of demonstrations begin, are carried out, and end peacefully. Of the 216 incidents studied, 134 (or 62 percent) were reported to be peaceful, 7 (3 percent) involved an act of obstruction, and 75 (35 percent) were violent. Of the 75 incidents that included violence, the reporting of 11 incidents was not clear enough on this point to allow us to specify the initiator of the violence. The violence in 26 of the demonstrations was initiated not by the demonstrators but by other groups—either those opposed to the demonstrators or their cause (in 17 incidents) or the police (in nine cases). In 38 cases, violence seems to have been started by the demonstrators—in only 17.5 percent of the total number of demonstrations.

Wide segments of the public do not distinguish between peaceful demonstrations—which are a legal and constitutional means of political expression—and violent demonstrations or riots. And these segments of the public condemn demonstrations indiscriminately. For instance, 74 percent of the adults questioned in a poll in California expressed disapproval of the student demonstrations at Berkeley in 1964 although they were nonviolent up to that point. Asked explicitly about the right to engage in peaceful demonstrations—"against the war in Vietnam"—40 percent of the people sampled in both December, 1966, and July, 1967, felt that the citizenry had no such right. Fifty-eight percent were prepared to "accept" such demonstrations "as long as they are peaceful," showing a majority of the public to be unaware that such demonstrations have the same legal status as writing a letter to a congressman or participating in a town meeting.

The situation is somewhat similar to the first appearances of organized, peaceful labor strikes. Not only the owners and managers of industrial plants
but also broad segments of the public at the beginning of the century did not recognize the rights of workers to strike if their grievances were unheeded, and to picket factories peacefully if such actions did not involve violating the rights of others (e.g., occupying the plant or physically preventing people from coming or going). Strikes are widely accepted now. According to a Harris Poll of March 27, 1967, "the majority (77 percent of those sampled) feels that the refusal to work is the ultimate and legitimate recourse for union members engaged in the process of collective bargaining." Gradually the public is likely to accept the legitimacy of peaceful demonstrations more completely.

It should be noted in this context that as more of the public learned to accept strikes, violent strikes became less frequent. Of course, other factors are in part responsible for the decrease in labor-management violence, the most important of which seems to have been the increased readiness to respond to the issues raised by the strikers rather than responding merely to the act of striking. It is to be expected that reactions to peaceful demonstrations will undergo similar transformations both in the public mind and in the relevant institutions. Thus demonstrations, especially peaceful ones, are one major new way societal structure and bonds may be made more responsive or kept responsive.

The function of demonstrations is \textit{not} to "cool it," to provide an inauthentic solution, but to make the needed changes that will result in a reduction of tension. If the poor are rebelling because they are unable to earn a living, because welfare payments have been cut, because their schools do not educate, and their houses are falling apart, measures such as setting up a television set in public squares on hot nights and sending baseball heroes to tour the community do not constitute adaptive mechanisms. These measures may postpone the explosion, which may well be more violent when it finally erupts. Negotiating with the neighborhood about the construction of a housing project, which will employ men from the community, which will provide opportunities for training-on-the-job as well as an immediate rise in income and prestige, constitutes a much more meaningful and effective way of dealing with the tensions.

\textbf{THE TECHNOLOGY OF VIOLENCE: CAUSE OR SYMPTOM?}

We saw that man's nature permits violence and that his motivations and cognitions affect the level of violence he resorts to. We then enlarged our
canvas and took in the broader societal context: the cohesion of society; its shape and its flexibility are all closely related to the level of violence. We close by looking at the tools of man, the technologies of violence. Do "wars start in the minds of men"? Or does the technology of violence command a force of its own? Seeking to curb violence, should we deal with arms or the "deeper" causes of conflict? Interestingly, this question is debated upon both international and intranational levels.

International Arms Races

Some people see the main source of danger in the very existence of arms, especially the new thermonuclear weapons. In this view, man can regain control of his fate by reasserting his control over the development of weapons. Arms races follow their own "logic." "The increase of armaments that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear," wrote the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Gray, at the outbreak of World War I. Every nation that arms for its own security is simultaneously the "other nation." Arming for security often leads to arming for defense by the "other nation." The defensive intent of the arms built up by the other nation is rarely so regarded by the first nation. It rather sees in the other's new arms evidence of its hostile intent; the first nation often sees no alternative but a new rush of armaments—for security. Hence one major approach to the prevention of war is to reduce armaments. If the nuclear genie were somehow to be returned to the bottle, the main new danger of war would be erased. If military arms could be entirely eliminated, it is argued, there would be no war.

An opposing view suggests that arms are chiefly the symptoms of deep-seated conflicts. If there were no hostile motivations, people would not produce arms; even if there were triggers, they would not pull them. The people of Canada do not fear American nuclear bombardment. "War starts in the minds of men," says the charter of UNESCO. Curbing arms, it is said, is like treating only the symptoms of disease, without identifying and treating the illness. The treatment is unlikely to be successful, and if successful, other symptoms will soon break out elsewhere. Disarmament, if ever

achieved, will be followed not by peace, but by rearmament. What is needed is a treatment for the underlying conflicts of ideology and interest, the clash of powers.43

A third position seems more tenable. This one conceives of arms as both a symptom and a contributory cause that must be treated. The malaise that results in the arms race and war is a deep one; basically, it expresses man's willingness to treat his fellow man as an object rather than as an end in himself, to the point of turning him into a perishable utensil. The complete cure of this malaise requires providing the social foundations for a world community, since only members of a community treat each other as goals as well as means. If such a global community can be built at all, it will surely be a long process; meanwhile, mankind might destroy itself. The world society in the nuclear age is like a patient running a high fever: Until we determine and treat the sources of this fever, some measures must be taken to reduce the fever itself if the patient is to survive. But obviously, this treatment of the symptoms must be accompanied and followed by treatment of the disease itself.44

Furthermore, while the main causes of war seem to lie outside the propelling force and spell of armaments, the pressures of the military establishments are more than a symptom; they are a contributory cause. The military services, as a rule, demand larger defense budgets, not their curtailment44; the military's power, prestige, and—to a degree—income are affected by the size of these budgets. Most industries set up or extended to serve the military can turn elsewhere for their business, but the shift involves, at the least, the costs and pains of transition. Congressmen are known to lobby against closing military bases in their districts, and since each district has a congressman—and many at least one military installation—it is hard to sustain a broad reduction of arms without evoking some political resistance. This holds true not simply for missile sites or naval yards. The production of nuclear warheads in the United States was continued beyond the point of need, as estimated by most military experts, in part because congressmen whose states


44 For a good review article of various approaches to the "symptoms and disease" question, see Philip Green, "Alternatives to Overkill: Dream and Reality," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November, 1963), pp. 23-27.

had employment problems feared deeper unemployment. Added to these extrinsic interests in the production of arms come the intrinsic pressures to expand the military system continually, for building one component generates a call for others. Bombers are of little use without runways. Runways are of little value if they are not protected from bombardment. The commanders of the bomber fleets have to be sheltered. Thus armed systems tend to produce some extrinsic and intrinsic pressures for their expansion. When a point is reached where the original reason for building up armaments might have declined or disappeared, special efforts are still required if arms are to be reduced. Simply treating the original causes will not suffice.

Finally, armaments contribute to the potential of war through psychological consequences. Arms build-ups express and magnify hostilities; arms reductions tend to indicate efforts to move toward an accommodation. Russia's abrupt resumption of the testing of thermonuclear bombs in 1961, after a three-year moratorium, was taken by the United States as a hostile and aggressive act. The 1963 Soviet-American agreement on partial cessation of thermonuclear tests, though of limited disarmament value, was hailed as heralding a new period in East-West relations. In other words, arms reductions can be used to create the atmosphere in which the "treatment" of the deeper causes of war can be better achieved, in much the way that reducing the fever of the patient enables him to survive long enough for antibiotics to take effect.

National Arms

A surprisingly similar issue exists in domestic politics. On the one hand, there are those who hold that the prevalence of guns, pistols, and other arms—there are an estimated 100 million—is a major reason that the United States has a higher rate of homicides, suicides, and fatal firearms accidents than most other industrialized countries. On the other hand, there are those who hold that arms are only a symptom, that individuals intent on murder or suicide will simply adopt other means if weapons are not available. Most specialists in the area are in the first category. The National Rifle Association, gun collectors, sportsmen, and gun manufacturers tend to be in the second group. Illustrating his view that there is no relationship between the availability of firearms and the occurrence of homicides, the N.R.A.'s

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President told a visiting reporter that "there are twenty weapons in this office that I could use to kill you, and you won't find a single gun in the room. This dictating machine. The telephone. That picture frame—I could kill you with any of them if I wanted to badly enough." 47

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The same point holds in cross-nation comparisons. Firearms control is strict in other nations. Britain requires a certificate from local police before a long gun can be purchased. There, guns account for 10 percent of all homicides, compared to 60 percent in the United States. France requires police permits for handguns and military rifle purchases: Canada requires registration of all handguns; in Sweden a need must be proved before gun ownership is allowed. In these nations homicide with handguns or long guns seldom occurs as against the high rates in the United States. As a very high proportion of homicides in the United States involves guns, their elimination would sharply reduce the total homicide rate. Much of the killing is done "in hot blood." Of the 13,650 homicides committed in 1968 in the United States, roughly 65 percent were relatives and acquaintances. Were weapons not so readily available, people would have more chance to calm down. When a knife is used, studies show that in four out of five instances the wound is not fatal.

Because of the vocal and powerful opposition to domestic disarmament, the national policy tends to focus instead on arms limitation and reduction. Various gun control measures enacted and under consideration impose only a set of restrictions, most of them not very consequential in reducing the actual availability of guns to the criminals, relatives, and acquaintances who do most of the killing. In short, firearms have an effect of their own; if they were seriously restricted, or, still better, removed, there would be a lot less killing.

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Examples of such "fixes" include the administration of drugs that terminate the desire for heroin, alcohol, or cigarettes, and the use of teaching machines to promote learning. In light of these applications, the question arises: Can violent crime also be treated in this way?

The answer depends in part on a more precise formulation of the question. If "treated" is taken to mean "eliminated," the answer is definitely negative. However, the answer is quite likely to be affirmative if the question is reformulated to ask: Can violent crime be reduced very significantly, say by more than one-half? The level of violent crime depends on a complex interaction among personal and societal pressures and on the tools that are available. Curbing the available instruments will reduce the fatalities caused by criminals, even if the motivational and the structured predispositions to engage in crime will remain untouched by these efforts.

Ultimately, the level of violence is affected by the interaction of motivational and cognitive, "psychological," forces; societal bonds, structures, and procedures; and the technologies available to the violent. Hence there is no isolated, basic treatment of violence. Surely one can guard presidents better, put more locks on one's doors against criminals, and be more tolerant of peaceful demonstrations. But only a just and cohesive society, responsive to new demands, satisfying old ones, providing a meaningful life to its members, would sharply reduce violence, and even such a society would not eliminate it. The single most effective short-run cure is to remove the weapons. The single most important long-run cure is to supply the needs of those who have been excluded from most of what society offers.
electorate, such as universities, hospitals, or churches. In addition to writing letters to his representatives, submitting petitions, advertising in the press, and supporting organized pressure groups, a citizen may demonstrate to make known his views when expression through other means has brought no, or only inadequate, redress. In this sense demonstrations are becoming for the citizen the avenue that strikes have become for the workers. Like strikes, demonstrations—especially in this early stage of their evolution—entail a danger: They may escalate into obstructionism or violence. For a democracy to function effectively, it is essential that the modes of political expression be both nonviolent and effective. That is, the inevitable differences of viewpoint, interest, and belief must be worked out peacefully and the legitimate needs of all the member groups of the society must be taken into account. To suppress all demonstrations because they are a volatile means of expression would be both impossible under our present form of government and inconsistent with the basic tenets of the democratic system, in that it would deprive the citizens—especially disadvantaged ones—of a political tool.

The number of participants in demonstrations seems to be increasing and includes an increasingly large proportion of the members of society. In one month chosen at random, 216 demonstrations were reported in the United States, or about seven per day. This figure is certainly an understatement of the actual number. It is very likely that many cases went unreported. Anti-war demonstrations in the United States, for example, have grown almost continuously since spring 1965, from approximately 100,000 participants in one-quarter of the year to about 280,000.44 Students produced at least 221 demonstrations in 101 colleges between January 1 and June 15, 1968, involving 38,911 participants, according to a study conducted by the National Student Association.

Demonstrations are often viewed as the political tool of only a few dissenting groups, such as students and blacks. Actually, the number and variety of social groups resorting to this mechanism, at least on occasion, seem to be increasing. This is not to suggest that all social groups demonstrate with equal frequency. Blacks and students do demonstrate much more often than other groups. But members of such professional groups as teachers and social workers, who rarely took part in demonstrations a decade ago, now do so fairly frequently. A very large number of the antiwar demonstrators are white, middle-class citizens, as well as “respectable” professionals. Three hundred doctors, nurses, researchers, and others from the medical profession demonstrated against the war in Vietnam outside the Bellevue Hospital compound. Several hundred clergymen held a silent vigil near the Pentagon

on May 12, 1965. Lawyers demonstrated against the invasion of Cambodia in May, 1970. Demonstrations have been extended to other issues also. On several Sundays in September and October, 1968, parishioners demonstrated near Catholic churches in Washington, D. C., to protest sanctions against priests who did not support the Pope's edict against artificial birth control. Even the staffs of law-enforcement agencies have not refrained from demonstrating; on October 1, 1968, about 100 "welfare patrolmen" picketed New York City's Social Services Department.

There are basically three kinds of demonstrations: Those which are entirely nonviolent and legal, such as a march following the issuance of a permit and in accord with its restrictions; obstructionist demonstrations, which entail, for example, blocking the traffic on a street, the entrance to a school, or the movement of construction equipment, and, as a rule, some degree of civil disobedience; and violent demonstrations, which may include the throwing of missiles, fist fights, beatings, arson, and even shooting—clearly illegal acts.

Contrary to the impression that seems to prevail in many quarters, the majority of demonstrations begin, are carried out, and end peacefully. Of the 216 incidents studied, 134 (or 62 percent) were reported to be peaceful, 7 (3 percent) involved an act of obstruction, and 75 (35 percent) were violent. Of the 75 incidents that included violence, the reporting of 11 incidents was not clear enough on this point to allow us to specify the initiator of the violence. The violence in 26 of the demonstrations was initiated not by the demonstrators but by other groups—either those opposed to the demonstrators or their cause (in 17 incidents) or the police (in nine cases). In 38 cases, violence seems to have been started by the demonstrators—in only 17.5 percent of the total number of demonstrations.

Wide segments of the public do not distinguish between peaceful demonstrations—which are a legal and constitutional means of political expression—and violent demonstrations or riots. And these segments of the public condemn demonstrations indiscriminately. For instance, 74 percent of the adults questioned in a poll in California expressed disapproval of the student demonstrations at Berkeley in 1964 although they were nonviolent up to that point. Asked explicitly about the right to engage in peaceful demonstrations—"against the war in Vietnam"—40 percent of the people sampled in both December, 1966, and July, 1967, felt that the citizenry had no such right. Fifty-eight percent were prepared to "accept" such demonstrations "as long as they are peaceful," showing a majority of the public to be unaware that such demonstrations have the same legal status as writing a letter to a congressman or participating in a town meeting.

The situation is somewhat similar to the first appearances of organized, peaceful labor strikes. Not only the owners and managers of industrial plants
but also broad segments of the public at the beginning of the century did not recognize the rights of workers to strike if their grievances were unheeded, and to picket factories peacefully if such actions did not involve violating the rights of others (e.g., occupying the plant or physically preventing people from coming or going). Strikes are widely accepted now. According to a Harris Poll of March 27, 1967, "the majority (77 percent of those sampled) feels that the refusal to work is the ultimate and legitimate recourse for union members engaged in the process of collective bargaining." Gradually the public is likely to accept the legitimacy of peaceful demonstrations more completely.

It should be noted in this context that as more of the public learned to accept strikes, violent strikes became less frequent. Of course, other factors are in part responsible for the decrease in labor-management violence, the most important of which seems to have been the increased readiness to respond to the issues raised by the strikers rather than responding merely to the act of striking. It is to be expected that reactions to peaceful demonstrations will undergo similar transformations both in the public mind and in the relevant institutions. Thus demonstrations, especially peaceful ones, are one major new way societal structure and bonds may be made more responsive or kept responsive.

The function of demonstrations is not to "cool it," to provide an inauthentic solution, but to make the needed changes that will result in a reduction of tension. If the poor are rebelling because they are unable to earn a living, because welfare payments have been cut, because their schools do not educate, and their houses are falling apart, measures such as setting up a television set in public squares on hot nights and sending baseball heroes to tour the community do not constitute adaptive mechanisms. These measures may postpone the explosion, which may well be more violent when it finally erupts. Negotiating with the neighborhood about the construction of a housing project, which will employ men from the community, which will provide opportunities for training-on-the-job as well as an immediate rise in income and prestige, constitutes a much more meaningful and effective way of dealing with the tensions.

**THE TECHNOLOGY OF VIOLENCE: CAUSE OR SYMPTOM?**

We saw that man's nature permits violence and that his motivations and cognitions affect the level of violence he resorts to. We then enlarged our
canvas and took in the broader societal context: the cohesion of society; its shape and its flexibility are all closely related to the level of violence. We close by looking at the tools of man, the technologies of violence. Do "wars start in the minds of men"? Or does the technology of violence command a force of its own? Seeking to curb violence, should we deal with arms or the "deeper" causes of conflict? Interestingly, this question is debated upon both international and intranational levels.

**International Arms Races**

Some people see the main source of danger in the very existence of arms, especially the new thermonuclear weapons. In this view, man can regain control of his fate by reasserting his control over the development of weapons. Arms races follow their own "logic." "The increase of armaments that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear," wrote the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Gray, at the outbreak of World War I. Every nation that arms for its own security is simultaneously the "other nation." Arming for security often leads to arming for defense by the "other nation." The defensive intent of the arms built up by the other nation is rarely so regarded by the first nation. It rather sees in the other's new arms evidence of its hostile intent; the first nation often sees no alternative but a new rush of armaments— for security. Hence one major approach to the prevention of war is to reduce armaments. If the nuclear genie were somehow to be returned to the bottle, the main new danger of war would be erased. If military arms could be entirely eliminated, it is argued, there would be no war.

An opposing view suggests that arms are chiefly the symptoms of deep-seated conflicts. If there were no hostile motivations, people would not produce arms; even if there were triggers, they would not pull them. The people of Canada do not fear American nuclear bombardment. "War starts in the minds of men," says the charter of UNESCO. Curbing arms, it is said, is like treating only the symptoms of disease, without identifying and treating the illness. The treatment is unlikely to be successful, and if successful, other symptoms will soon break out elsewhere. Disarmament, if ever

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achieved, will be followed not by peace, but by rearmament. What is needed is a treatment for the underlying conflicts of ideology and interest, the clash of powers.43

A third position seems more tenable. This one conceives of arms as both a symptom and a contributory cause that must be treated. The malaise that results in the arms race and war is a deep one; basically, it expresses man's willingness to treat his fellow man as an object rather than as an end in himself, to the point of turning him into a perishable utensil. The complete cure of this malaise requires providing the social foundations for a world community, since only members of a community treat each other as goals as well as means. If such a global community can be built at all, it will surely be a long process; meanwhile, mankind might destroy itself. The world society in the nuclear age is like a patient running a high fever: Until we determine and treat the sources of this fever, some measures must be taken to reduce the fever itself if the patient is to survive. But obviously, this treatment of the symptoms must be accompanied and followed by treatment of the disease itself.44

Furthermore, while the main causes of war seem to lie outside the propelling force and spell of armaments, the pressures of the military establishments are more than a symptom; they are a contributory cause. The military services, as a rule, demand larger defense budgets, not their curtailment; the military's power, prestige, and—to a degree— income are affected by the size of these budgets. Most industries set up or extended to serve the military can turn elsewhere for their business, but the shift involves, at the least, the costs and pains of transition. Congressmen are known to lobby against closing military bases in their districts, and since each district has a congressman— and many at least one military installation—it is hard to sustain a broad reduction of arms without evoking some political resistance. This holds true not simply for missile sites or naval yards. The production of nuclear warheads in the United States was continued beyond the point of need, as estimated by most military experts, in part because congressmen whose states


44 For a good review article of various approaches to the "symptoms and disease" question, see Philip Green, "Alternatives to Overkill: Dream and Reality," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November, 1963), pp. 23-27.

Amitai Etzioni had employment problems feared deeper unemployment. Added to these extrinsic interests in the production of arms come the intrinsic pressures to expand the military system continually, for building one component generates a call for others. Bombers are of little use without runways. Runways are of little value if they are not protected from bombardment. The commanders of the bomber fleets have to be sheltered. Thus armed systems tend to produce some extrinsic and intrinsic pressures for their expansion. When a point is reached where the original reason for building up armaments might have declined or disappeared, special efforts are still required if arms are to be reduced. Simply treating the original causes will not suffice.

Finally, armaments contribute to the potential of war through psychological consequences. Arms build-ups express and magnify hostilities; arms reductions tend to indicate efforts to move toward an accommodation. Russia's abrupt resumption of the testing of thermonuclear bombs in 1961, after a three-year moratorium, was taken by the United States as a hostile and aggressive act. The 1963 Soviet-American agreement on partial cessation of thermonuclear tests, though of limited disarmament value, was hailed as heralding a new period in East-West relations. In other words, arms reductions can be used to create the atmosphere in which the "treatment" of the deeper causes of war can be better achieved, in much the way that reducing the fever of the patient enables him to survive long enough for antibiotics to take effect.

National Arms

A surprisingly similar issue exists in domestic politics. On the one hand, there are those who hold that the prevalence of guns, pistols, and other arms—there are an estimated 100 million—is a major reason that the United States has a higher rate of homicides, suicides, and fatal firearms accidents than most other industrialized countries. On the other hand, there are those who hold that arms are only a symptom, that individuals intent on murder or suicide will simply adopt other means if weapons are not available. Most specialists in the area are in the first category. The National Rifle Association, gun collectors, sportsmen, and gun manufacturers tend to be in the second group. Illustrating his view that there is no relationship between the availability of firearms and the occurrence of homicides, the N.R.A.'s

president told a visiting reporter that "there are twenty weapons in this office that I could use to kill you, and you won't find a single gun in the room. This dictating machine. The telephone. That picture frame — I could kill you with any of them if I wanted to badly enough." \(^{16}\)

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