STRATEGIC MODELS FOR A POLICENTRIC WORLD

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It is becoming commonplace to state that a Western strategy that assumes or seeks to foster a bi-polar world is obsolescent. The four models upon which the combination of containment and deterrence which characterize the prevailing Western strategy, and upon which this strategy itself, draws, are increasingly viewed as inadequate. The two integrated camps, which the bi-polar balance-of-power concept underlying containment assumes, are disappearing from international reality; the balance of terror image, which underlies deterrence, according to which two nuclear giants check each other, is facing the proliferation of nuclear dwarfs; the zero-sum notions, borrowed from game-theory, are seen as having declining relevance by more and more strategists; and the psychology of frustration, on which containment draws, has been shown to be too narrow. To put it differently, every component of the Western strategic formula has changed since it was formed in the late Forties—the technology of weapons, the cohesion of the super-blocs, the nature of the USSR, and the composition of the UN.

While the need for a basic strategic revision is recognized, actual policies are slow to change, and postures implemented after years of staff work, production of the necessary hardware, and negotiations with allies are not readily replaced like numbers in a mathematics model. A few measures taken indicate experimentation with new conceptions—such as the emergency communication link between the White House and the Kremlin, the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, simultaneous US and USSR assistance to India under Chinese attack, and the unanimous General Assembly resolution condemning the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction. But, by and large, the policies of the United States (and, for the most part, those of the USSR) are still under the spell of old conceptions. Instead of ac-
cepting polycentrism in the West as a fact of the next decade, the US is engaged in a maneuver to restore unity to the Western alliance by offering the Europeans a joint nuclear force and by playing up West Germany to exert pressure on de Gaulle’s France. The full import of the Sino-Soviet rift is only slowly becoming recognized, and policies that take the split into account are only gradually evolving. Arms control, not to mention arms reduction, is still a goal not actively pursued, in part because the USSR keeps insisting that it is interested only in more radical measures than the US is willing to discuss, and in part because some of the most effective steps which could be taken would upset America’s ally, Germany, and hence are not advanced in this period in which efforts to cement NATO are of primary importance.

While many strategic writings are long on criticisms of the present models, conceptions and policies, they are short on spelled-out alternative conceptions. The importance of formulating alternatives should not be underestimated. At best, changing one’s strategy is psychologically and politically strenuous, and economically costly. Without a clear conception of what might follow such a shift in outlook, continued adherence to obsolescent conceptions, patching-up rather than re-designing, is almost inevitable.

The alternative model we seek to explore is one that substitutes a dynamic peaceful competition for static peaceful coexistence. The most basic tenet of this model is that the time is now ripe for the institutionalization of a set of rules that would effectively curb the use of arms, while accepting a continued, even intensified, contest among the world powers, but with non-military means, such as aid, trade and propaganda. This strategy advocates a more free use of power to stimulate development of a global institutional framework, without, however, providing an opening for other contestants to advance their military blocs, and without weakening the Western position. It aims, on the one hand, at building up the rules of the competition and the machinery necessary to enforce these rules, and, on the
other, at maintaining, if not strengthening, the West in that very competition. More specifically, we examine a balance-of-power model that is multi-polar and which has “N” nuclear countries rather than two, which borrows notions from non-zero-sum “games,” and from the psychology of sublimation rather than extinction.

I. The Multi-Polar World

The parallelism between the Sino-Soviet and American-French rifts an be readily overdrawn. The West has not been as monolithic as the East, nor did American hegemony remotely approach the iron fist with which Stalin ran the Soviet bloc. The ideological rifts of the East are unmatched in the West, while China’s rivalry with Russia cannot compare with the economic competition the European Common Market poses for the US. But there are two critically important parallels: whatever ups and downs the two grand alliances experience over the next decade, neither a return to the state of the higher bloc unity of the early Fifties, nor the revival of even a semblance of a bi-polar world, is at all likely. The underlying reason is that in addition to ideological splits, differences of economic interests, differences in diplomatic style, etc., nationalism is too strong and the danger of nuclear war too great for these blocs to be as united as they were, and to act as well-coordinated international actors.

With the mass deployment of invulnerable long range missiles in the USSR, which is expected in the next few years, the US might have to put all its major cities on the line for the defense of every slice of Western Europe the Soviets might try for. The US might be willing to take such a risk, but the Europeans simply cannot be expected to rely upon it. This is not merely a question of credibility of the American promise to commit suicide for Europe’s defense, which is not beyond doubt, but the need to agree on the conditions under which the US would push what button. True, if Western Europe and the US were so integrated as
to obliterate the difference between New Jersey and Denmark or Greece, this problem would be solved; but none of the devices advanced so far—be it the Multi Lateral Force, the "Kennedy round" of tariff negotiations, or instant-federation designs—can even so much as initiate such a socio-political revolution.

Similarly, a full reconciliation between the USSR and Communist China would involve finding a formula to determine which advances in the non-Communist world are "too risky" and which would not seriously risk triggering a nuclear war. Such an agreement would require either that China toe the line pronounced in Moscow or that Russia allow, at least under some conditions, China to trigger Russia's involvement in a world war. Neither of these Sino-Soviet accommodations seems even remotely likely, aside from all the forces that divide the two Communist powers, which seem hard to reverse.

The world, it is often stressed, is moving toward a multipolar situation. Attempts to patch up the existing alliances will, I believe, ultimately fail. Yet, to a large degree, American strategy still assumes bi-polarity, if not in the underdeveloped world, at least among the big powers. Cooperation among the Western allies is taken for granted in containing Communist expansion. Conversely, it is assumed that the US cannot count on members of the opposite bloc for help in this task; it is incompatible with this rigid two-camp outlook to imagine some Communists helping the West to contain other Communists. Yet in the real world of many centers of power there are many new possibilities—including that seemingly absurd one; for while bi-polar blinders still hide them from American eyes, the US's allies are becoming increasingly aware of them.

Developments in Southeast Asia illustrate this point. The US does not recognize Communist China, and expects no help from the USSR in stemming Chinese aggression within this area. Actually, there is no evidence that the USSR provided arms to the Communist forces either in Laos or South Vietnam (although the North Vietnamese
are reported to have used some old transport planes that
the USSR sold China during the Korean War); in fact,
there is reason to believe that the USSR is interested in the
neutralization of the region, as a counter to expanding
Chinese influence. Moreover, a strong case can be made
that the Russians would be as concerned as the West if
India should fall under Chinese control, following a Chi-
inese takeover of Southeast Asia. The US did not try to
maintain neutrality in the region in collaboration with the
USSR; actually, it was the first to upset the 1954 accom-

Similarly, still looking at the world through bi-polar
glasses, the US tends to assume that France can at least be
relied upon to contain the Communist bloc; de Gaulle, it is
said, has often favored a "tougher" line toward Moscow
that the US. But de Gaulle proposed neutralization of Indo-
china, in effect calling for the removal of US military forces,
and offered to substitute French economic, cultural and
diplomatic aid, if the South Vietnamese, Laotians, and
Cambodians would drop US aid (though he hardly has
sufficient forces to prevent a Chinese takeover after neu-
tralization). To illustrate further the wide range of new
combinations that emerge in the new pluralistic era, the
French neutralization plan, if underwritten by the US mili-
tary force (on the model of Austrian neutrality), would
help the Russian efforts to contain Communist China!

Similarly, the US should expect cross-bloc "deals" in
Europe and not be fooled by the "tougher" line either
Bonn or Paris demands of the US in its negotiations with
the Russians. The French have already indicated their
willingness to recognize the Oder-Neisse line between East
Germany and Poland, which helps them score points in
Poland (points which the US gave up to please the Ger-
mans). The West Germans, who denounced the US for
slightly increasing its trade with the USSR in 1963, in-
creased their trade in the same year to a much larger de-
gree.

The lessons that emerge are many. First of all, in a multi-
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polar world—which I expect will continue to develop—American diplomacy will be more difficult than in the bipolar world, as there will be many more possible combinations, trade-offs, and avenues of maneuver. Above all, the Western flank is no longer "safe," nor is that of the other side impregnable except to the extent of US inability to see that it is no longer so.

Second, those matters that can be settled through direct American-Russian negotiations can be agreed upon without the need for either side to fear that the "thaws" in the Cold War, which such accommodations will bring about, will break the ideological glue that holds the blocs together; this glue, which presumably held by defining one side as virtuous and the other as evil, is already shattered. For the US to inhibit inter-bloc accommodations because of the fear of weakening bonds that have already been badly damaged seems less than effective policy-making.

Third, universal arrangements—to bind all the big powers—can no longer be decided in Moscow and Washington; it is necessary to win the consent of Paris and Peking, and soon Bonn and London, if the arrangements are to be heeded. The American-Russian attempt to draft a test ban treaty that would bind all the bloc members illustrates this new situation. The treaty binds the US and the USSR, but neither China nor France. (Germany finally acceded to it, but only after much American pressure.)

"But are we not consulting our allies all the time?" many an American will ask. The answer lies in part in the politics of alliances in the nuclear age and in part in clarifying the semantics. First, the US often does not consult its allies, or even inform them ahead of time of planned moves. For instance, if the Cuban blockade had triggered a nuclear war, Western Europe might well have been wiped out (the majority of the Soviet missiles are aimed at Western Europe because the US is beyond their range; Western Europe thus serves as a hostage). Still, the US established the blockade without consulting or informing (before the act) its NATO allies, as Britain and France failed to inform the
US in 1956 when their national interests were at stake in the Suez crisis.

In other cases, US consultation is largely perfunctory. The Europeans are free to advise, and their advice is taken into account, but frequently only as long as they agree with US policy. This is not due to some arbitrary desire to have the last word, but because the US believes that it understands nuclear strategy and the Communist danger better than do its European allies. Also, the US pays for most of the global Western commitments and has more military power than all the European allies combined.

One reason the US does not fully realize the limitations of maintaining a united bloc front through consultation is that it is reluctant to acknowledge the genuine differences between American and European interests—for instance, that a limited nuclear war, as defined by the US, might be a total war as viewed by West Germany (because all of Germany might be wiped out). Similarly, the Europeans have fewer interests in Asia and Latin America than does the US, and are less willing to risk their cities for the defense of Laos or Quemoy and Matsu. As the Europeans’ power continues to grow, and their estimates of the Soviet danger to decline, these allies will act more and more as independent centers of power—without necessarily dropping their NATO affiliations. They will have to be genuinely consulted, that is, their consent must be won through give and take compromises, as if they were not bloc-members, and often the US will have to go it alone. Having fewer commitments to allies might be less damaging to US interests than is often assumed; it certainly seems less dangerous than to expect that sooner or later America’s allies will see the light and fall in line, when actually they might soon strike out more and more on their own.

While it appears likely that the world of tomorrow will see an increased importance of capitals other than Washington and Moscow, it does not follow that there will be four or more big powers whereas yesterday there were two, as is implied in many statements about the shift from a bi-
polar to a multi-polar world. For at least the next ten years there will be considerable differences in the power of the various big powers. There will be only two super-powers (or nuclear giants) and several big powers (or nuclear dwarfs). Thus, what is emerging is not a multi-polar world of equal powers, but one in which there will be two grades of big powers. Nuclear protection from one of the nuclear giants will continue to affect the relations of all big powers with the other nuclear giant. Thus, France would be most adventurous to allow its defense bond with the US (via NATO) to lapse, or China, to renounce its defense alliance with the USSR. The US and the USSR, on the other hand, will seek to use this residue of power-superiority to gain support for policies they favor, especially to prevent their allies from pursuing policies that might engulf them in nuclear war with each other.

Power is thus “sliced” in the following way: each big power can follow a foreign policy of its own on any matter except the most important ones. China can refuse to follow Soviet policy in Laos, threaten Formosa, perhaps even split the Communist movement, but if it were to attack Formosa, or invade India proper, without prior Russian consent, the Kremlin might use the “hot-line” to inform the US that it is folding the nuclear umbrella—i.e., withdrawing the nuclear protection—under which Chinese conventional forces are advancing. While the US might still not bomb the Chinese forces, China cannot but find it too risky to rely on such US self-restraint.

Similarly, if France were to use its nuclear sting to annoy Russia, or West Germany were to rush with its growing militia to help an uprising in East Germany in an effort to reunify Germany by force, counting on American nuclear protection, the same “hot-line” might carry the same message in the opposite direction.

“Folding the nuclear umbrella” is an exercise of power that can be used only sparingly. It cannot even be threatened too often, because it is not credible for less than crucial issues and would be detrimental to the interests of the su-
per powers, as over-use of this threat would tend to encourage big powers to build their own nuclear forces. Thus, the edge of super-over big powers is not large, and the residue of bi-polarity limited.

This residue would further shrink for any big power that does not believe that the USSR has aggressive military intentions toward it (let us say, France), or that a small number of nuclear weapons will suffice to deter whatever aggressive intentions the USSR still might have, or that the USSR will respect neutrality (as Britain might hope, or that West Germany will one day trade neutrality for reunification). Or, if China has decided to rely on indigenous uprisings in neighboring countries rather than outright invasion (despite pronouncements to the contrary, which are useful propaganda in the Communist movement), it might feel that it does not need the protection of the Soviet umbrella.

If this situation should develop, it is not inconceivable that the super-powers will become more assertive in their policies toward each others' allies, to demonstrate the need for their respective nuclear umbrellas and to maintain whatever remains of the bi-polar world and the special status they once enjoyed (American war-like acts against North Vietnam would be a case in point). Or, surely safer for mankind, the super-powers, each too weak on its own, might collaborate in imposing "rules" on third countries. Neutralization pacts underwritten by the US and USSR (perhaps using the UN machinery) in areas where China and France have interests would be a case in point. An USSR-US agreement to limit arms in Central Europe is another possibility.

Further decline in the superiority of the two nuclear giants seems hard to prevent—that is, it seems impossible to imagine a way to stop the spread of nuclear arms, short of general and complete disarmament and the founding of a world government, two developments that cannot be expected in the practicable future. At best, after the present attempts to patch up alliances have proven futile, the US
and the USSR might agree that neither will provide nuclear arms or technical knowhow to any third country. Such an agreement would not prevent these countries from gaining nuclear arms, but would slow down the process, keeping them, at least for the next decade, as nuclear dwarfs among nuclear giants, rather than helping them to become giants in short order. If these countries themselves would become parties to the test ban treaty, this might slow down the birth of additional nuclear dwarfs and avert future nuclear chaos. (We do not favor even the limited spread of nuclear arms, but to refrain from cooperating with France to halt further proliferation because the French already have nuclear weapons is an unfortunate line of policy, which ignores the feasible in favor of the unattainable.)

The bi-polar model is to be replaced by a multi-polar one that recognizes gradations of power. The stalemate conception that underlies the division of the world into two spheres of influence, the basis of containment, is to be replaced by a much more complicated conception, one of a new world which contains many new dangers as well as opportunities. At worst, the more aggressive big powers will make the deals while the US and USSR will seek vainly to make reality conform to a bi-polar image: at best, the US and the USSR—sometimes bi-laterally, hopefully often in cooperation with all the big powers—will advance a new world order, through neutralized zones, limitations on the spread of nuclear arms, arms reduction and strengthening the UN. To put it even more formally, as pluralism increases, the interests of the super-powers, and to a somewhat lesser degree of all the powers, might well become clad in universal rules, backed up by a growingly effective international machinery aimed above all at limiting the multi-faceted competition to non-military means.

II. Beyond the Balance of Terror

The traditional balance-of-power image appears twice in the strategic thinking that governs current American
policy: first in the concept of \textit{containment}, according to which the West is to "balance" the East and ensure peaceful coexistence by generating a global stalemate; and second, in the concept of strategic \textit{deterrence} (or "balance of terror") according to which the threat implicit in the military power of each nuclear giant does not so much prevent the gradual expansion of the other side (against which counter-subversion measures, conventional forces, and political and economic stabilization are used more than the threat of nuclear arms), as deter the sides from a major war which would risk mutual annihilation. In addition to containment, at the line separating the blocs, the present strategy sets a nuclear ceiling that prevents the sides from leaping at each other. It is widely believed that this balance-of-terror can be stabilized.

But authorities as different as C. P. Snow and Herman Kahn, Bertrand Russell and John F. Kennedy, have repeatedly pointed out that this balance \textit{might} be upset, unintentionally, because of a technological breakdown or a miscalculation. The probable spread of nuclear weapons to more countries will impose additional strains, by making it difficult to identify an aggressor and by providing third countries with matches that could light doomsday-sized powder kegs. No rational policy maker can be expected to favor relying, in the long run, on such a system for national security. All previous balance-of-power systems, it must be emphasized, have occasionally been unbalanced and led to war. Even if the probability of a major blow-up in the balance-of-terror is slight, the scope of disaster in the event of such an occurrence is so large as to make the system most unsatisfactory.

The present strategy does not completely avoid this question. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the "hot-line", the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, electronic locks on ICBM’s, improved screening of personnel who have access to nuclear weapons, and other measures all aim at further reducing the probability of a blow-up and at limiting the disaster if it does occur. These arms-control measures, how-
ever, are limited in scope compared to the problem with which they attempt to cope.

The major argument of the supporters of arms control is that more comprehensive measures would involve prerequisites that, they believe, cannot be met. The question is whether there are any circumstances under which the implementation of more far-reaching measures of arms reduction can be attained. It seems to me that, while a world government cannot be established just because it is needed, and universal disarmament cannot be brought about because there is a danger of nuclear war, under the changed circumstances the hope for some progress beyond arms-control is not utopian, and the probability that it will come about can be increased if it is more thoroughly pursued.

Part of the problem is psychological. As long as either the West or the Communist bloc maintains that it is involved in a holy war to eradicate evil (i.e., the other side) from the earth, little progress toward a safer world can be expected. But the situation eases a little with the appearance of grey shades in an otherwise black-and-white conception. The decline of bi-polarity as a conception generates a considerable degree of psychological disarmament in the Cold War and creates the domestic backdrop for the acceptance of many international accommodations that only yesterday would have been considered heresy.

Second, the evolution of large, invulnerable second-strike forces allows the arrest of the strategic arms race for the first time since the Cold War began. Whatever the outcome of the numerical build-up of long range bombers and missiles, most experts agree that the US and the USSR are moving rapidly toward strategic parity in nuclear weapons. For the next decade whatever France and China build could hardly compete with the more than 40,000 owned by the US and whatever the Russians have amassed. If the arms race could be kept from outer space, the anti-missile and civil defense race from taking off, the domestic forces that wish to order more hardware because of irrational fears or the economic and political hay they expect to make
could be curbed, and the Russian government could keep tab on its military establishment, the main US-USSR strategic arms race might be brought to a halt.

This might be followed by considerable bi-lateral US-USSR arms reductions, since the two nuclear giants are so much ahead of everybody else that even if they cut their nuclear forces by 50% they still would command ten times more strategic forces than all other countries combined. Such reductions, especially if the numerical differences were adjusted in the process so as to cement the strategic parity, would make a first strike by either side much less feared. And whatever the saved funds would be used for—be it improving the standard of living, education or foreign aid—they would contribute more toward a safer and better world than their investment in an upward spiralling arms race.

Reductions of these magnitudes, which still leave the US and the USSR with fully effective retaliatory forces, could, as many studies have shown, be safely undertaken without inspection through various other verification devices such as the destruction of missiles in neutral spots and the turning over of fissionable material to atoms-for-peace programs. Further reduction could be attained through reciprocal inspection of limited parts of the USSR and the US, thus delaying the difficult problems raised by plans to form an international inspection authority and international police force, approximating the conditions general and complete disarmament would entail.

Many of these ideas, which yesterday seemed not much more realistic than general and complete disarmament, are today supported by studies by federal agencies, such as the Institute of Defense Analysis, and key men in the Pentagon and the Department of Defense (see Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on January 30, 1963). If the world continues to evolve along the pluralistic lines suggested above, and American and Soviet strategies evolve to favor peaceful competition, the interests of the super-powers
might be increasingly expressed through the development of international machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes, prevention of armed intervention in third countries and pacification of wars among them. Soviet spokesmen early in 1964 stated, for the first time, that they saw the need for a global authority if disarmament were to be implemented; this is a point the US has insisted on, but which many observers believed the USSR would not concede. Similarly, the State Department is reported to be planning several moves to involve the USSR more deeply in the UN (speech of Dean Rusk before Columbia University, January 1964), although the US still has a long way to go before all the potential service the UN could render in peaceful engagement of the USSR in the world community is exhausted.

The assumption many Americans made in 1945, that the UN will provide “collective security,” was rather illusory. But the change in the composition of the UN, with the admission of many non-aligned countries, and the loosening of the blocs, as well as the search of the super-powers—and some big powers—for universal institutions to facilitate their accommodations, might bring a new reality to the UN and provide for the first time a power-politics basis for the noble ideas expressed in its Charter. This firm basis is required if there is to be world peace under world law.

III. Non Zero-Sum “Games”

The USSR, it is said, might temporarily agree to worldwide peaceful competition, especially as its influence in East Europe is large enough to make defections from the Soviet bloc unlikely (the USSR has already removed the Red Army from most “satellites”), and as countries in the Soviet sphere of influence are several times fewer than those in America’s. But once the Soviets discover that the US is doing better in the peaceful competition, would they not, long before such options disappear, choose to revive the old mixed armed and non-armed efforts at expansion? Others ask, if the US found that it was doing poorly in the
peaceful competition, would the US not resort to force rather than lose out?

Underlying these criticisms is the notion of a zero-sum relationship, wherein Western success spells Soviet loss, and *vice versa*. Actually, peaceful competition, under effectively enforced rules, brings into focus some shared and some compatible interests which the US and the USSR do have. The list of these interests is hardly new, but their significance for the stabilization of peaceful competition, once it is established, has not been fully recognized. Avoiding nuclear war, and conventional wars that might escalate into nuclear wars, is a shared interest that has already limited the use of arms by both sides in numerous confrontations, from Berlin in 1948 to South Vietnam in 1964. Many situations that might have generated major wars in the pre-nuclear age have resulted, at most, in limited conventional clashes, and more commonly in the exchange of bitter diplomatic notes. Ruling out arms altogether in such confrontations—let us say through an effectively guarded neutralization of areas of contention—would be only one step removed from the present situation. Once the rule of "non-armed contests only" had been established, it would not readily be reversed, because a reversal might escalate further than either side desires, and because experience has shown to the USSR since 1949 that no more gains are to be had through use of military force. In short, the factors which deter both nuclear war and conventional aggression are effective forces which would support peaceful competition once established.

But what about Soviet insistence that they will support "wars of national liberation"? The main question is not whether they will or will not support indigenous uprisings, but by what means support will be granted. Armed support could lead to the subjugation of a country and must be ruled out. Statements made by the Soviet Premier at the beginning of 1964 would suggest that he might be willing to limit himself to non-armed support, if the US would also limit itself to non-armed support of the governments of
these countries. This is an accommodation the West ought to accept, not only because this is a way of preventing dangerous armed confrontations between USSR and US in third countries, but because, if forces of social change in third countries are allowed to run their course, these countries would be more likely to move toward development and to evolve responsive governments. This would constitute another gain for both the US and the USSR.

The division of the world into “have” and “have-not” countries—with the USSR and the US classed as “have” countries—endangers the world order. A country with nothing to lose but its chains of misery might be so desperate as to push the brinkmanship of nuclear blackmail to the point where it will either trigger a pre-emptive strike or wipe out some cities in the Western sphere of influence (e.g., Saigon) to demonstrate its resolve, thus unleashing an international disaster. Hence, all “have” powers, while they quarrel among themselves over the global distribution of spheres of influence, will recognize—as the Cold War dust settles—that increasing the stakes of “have-not” countries in the world order, by assisting them to meet their most basic needs, is in the deepest interest of all “have” countries. The US-USSR competition, which is largely geared to advancing their positions vis-à-vis each other, has a most productive “side-effect” which benefits both powers: it is the major lever that shifts some resources from the rich to the poor countries. Under conditions of peaceful competition the importance of this “side effect” will grow and will encourage the continuation of the competition, even if the primary goals of advancing the position of one’s bloc were to be curtailed.

Finally, the game theoreticians emphasize that there are not just win-lose or lose-win situations, but also win-win or lose-lose ones. But they often fail to mention those outcomes in which none of the “players” gains or loses, a state which peaceful competition might approximate. The USSR and the US were seeking, for a while, to “attach” countries; the USSR, to expand the Communist bloc, and
the US, to attract countries to its counter-alliances—to SEATO, CENTO, and NATO. But both sides have already lost most of their taste for these kinds of pay-offs as they have found the “game” costly, frustrating and dangerous. Increasingly, both super-powers seek to maintain the non-alignment of third countries rather than to induce them to join their respective blocs, which means no-gains and no-losses of members, but still a state of affairs which can satisfy—or at least be “lived with”—by both sides simultaneously.

Surprisingly, in the nuclear age, this point might be applied not only to third countries but also to allies. The image of a bi-polar world is defunct not only because the third countries cannot be nicely “divided” as Africa was in the late 19th century among the European powers, but also because those already in the two super-blocs cannot be tied to the super-powers’ apron strings; nor are the “losses” incurred when an ally breaks away even remotely as detrimental as the super-powers make it sound, in this “the alliance must be saved” stage. To take a rather extreme example: if France, West Germany, and Britain should suddenly become non-aligned and their non-alignment maintained, US security in this age of inter-continental missiles would not be much affected, and the breaking away of China probably improves rather than undermines the security of the USSR, whatever other status and “political” setbacks it might create. In short, there is nothing in game theory to suggest that peaceful competition is not as acceptable a strategy as the conception of bi-polarity which underlies the strategies of yesterday. Nor is the distribution of power in the world which this conception assumes available.

IV. The Psychology of Competition

Psychologically, peaceful competition adds “do’s” to “don’ts,” and rewards to sanctions. While it does state that the US will not tolerate the expansion of the Communist bloc by armed subversion of third countries, it also wel-
comes the Soviet-led camp to participation in the world community by peaceful means such as foreign aid, technical assistance, and trade concessions. As long as effective procedures ensure that peaceful contacts are not used for armed expansion—e.g., that technicians are really working at development and not military training—no efforts are made to keep Communist countries out of the competition; on the contrary, pains are taken to draw them in. Thus, under a strategy of peaceful competition, the US would cease the pressure now put on Latin American countries not to trade with Russia, on the assumptions 1) that trade accelerates the development of Latin America, which is desirable; 2) that trade provides a test of quality and of prices of products—and by implication, of technological and economic systems—which America has no reason to fear; and 3) that if the USSR attempted to use its trade for political blackmail the US could step in and provide—at world market prices—whatever Russia is threatening to cut off. Similarly, the US would cease to object to any country—be it Ghana, Egypt, or Indonesia—receiving Soviet foreign aid, since, as has been seen time and time again, aid cannot be used to subvert a country. None of the 22 countries that received Soviet aid over the last decade has been converted to Communism, and the 23rd—Cuba—received Soviet aid only after it had turned Communist.

The model of peaceful competition draws on sublimation psychology, which suggests that it is much easier for an expansionist power to accept a half-blocked, half-open passage—where competition by some means is permitted although other means are disallowed—than to accept complete frustration of its deep-seated drive to bring its way of life to other people. Since the USSR recognizes the increased dangers of escalation involved in even small-scale use of arms and firmly believes in the efficacy of its economic and ideological appeal, there seems to be reason to believe the USSR might agree to limit its expansionist ambitions to peaceful contests, and to the procedures that would ensure that these contests remain limited. (To push
the psychological analogy a step further, one might suggest that containment seeks *suppression* of a drive, while peaceful competition seeks its *sublimation*, the transfer of part of the energy to "control-functions," to international equivalents of ego and super-ego functions.)

Positive rewards can be generated on the international level to the degree the disposition of countries toward global welfare will be measured by the amount of genuine foreign aid they grant, the interest rate they charge on loans they extend, the number of technical assistants they send, etc. There should be some accepted patterns of international conduct which, if adhered to by the USSR, would meet America's full approval, other than the complete passivity involved in accepting the *status quo*.

Nor will the West continue to be limited by the bars of containments. The containment stalemate, it should be stressed, frustrates not only the USSR but also the keen desire of the West to spread the values it believes in to all people, including those behind the Iron Curtain. In line with a newly invigorated endeavor to build a world community, which would be signalled by the new strategy of peaceful competition, the US would renounce any tacit or implicit recognition of the limitation of our peaceful contacts with members of the Communist bloc. The US should favor Western trade with Poland, Rumania, Outer Mongolia and any other Communist country, rather than put dampers on trade with all Communist countries by granting special tariff concessions to allies. While the US should not call for the overthrow of any government by force, it should absolutely refuse to limit broadcasts of ideas and information to countries of the Communist bloc.

In short, psychologically speaking, peaceful competition allows for more legitimate assertion of both sides, involves less supression and frustration, and hence provides healthier foundations for the patterns of conduct advocated.

There is one other model, not explicitly discussed here, which underlies much of this analysis: the assumption that when competition is effectively limited to peaceful means,
more than favoring any one participant, it advances values the competition supports and binds them closer together. This is just another way of saying that it advances social justice and political freedom (e.g., by favoring development and keeping armed intervention out of the third world) and stabilizes peace by peaceful engagement of the sides in a world community.