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THE EPGENESIS OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL1

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ABSTRACT

A model for functional analysis of social change is provided to supplement the Parsons-Bales-Smelser differentiation model. Epigenesis deals with the formation of units that acquire functions not previously served by the unit. The development of international systems that become supranational communities is a major example of an epigenetic process. A model of epigenesis includes statements about the sector in which the process starts; the functional sequence in which other sectors are added; and the relationship between growth in performances, power, and communication capabilities.

I. A MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL UNIFICATION

A. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY UNIFICATIONS

So long as international relations are governed by highly calculative orientations, or by the exercise of force, there is relatively little that sociology can contribute to their study. However, during recent decades international relations seem to have changed: Ideology became a major force; non-rational ties among nations were more common; and, recently, institutional bridges became more numerous. Thus, international relations gradually have become more amenable to sociological analysis. Of these trends, probably the most interesting to the sociologist is the formation of new unions whose members are nations (e.g., the European Economic Community [EEC]).

The EEC is by no means an extreme case. There have been many "historical" unions in which units that were previously autonomous merged to such a degree that today they are considered as one unit (e.g., Switzerland, the United States, Italy, Germany); and there are quite a few contemporary unifications where the new community is just emerging and is far from complete (e.g., the Scandinavian community; East European one), exists as a treaty and formal organization rather than as a full-fledged sociological entity (e.g., the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union, the Latin American Free Trade Area), or is so tenuous that it is more likely to collapse than to reach fuller integration (e.g., the Federation of Nyasaland, Rhodesia).

The emerging communities are frequently referred to as supranational communities, a term that is misleading since it implies that the merging units are nations. Actually, many of the historical unifications occurred before the units were sanctified by nationalism (e.g., the Italian cities; the

1This article was written while the author was on the staff of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.
American colonies), and even contemporary unions are not necessarily unions of nations (e.g., the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, the formation of the Federation of Nigeria, and the merger of Southern Cameroons with the Cameroon Republic). Moreover, analytically the emergence of a nation state from several tribes, villages, or feudal states—let us say in contemporary Ghana, India, or late medieval France—is in many ways similar to supranational unification. Hence, our concern is with unification of political units that previously shared few or no political bonds. The degree to which these units have been foci of identification for their populations and the degree to which the normative substance of this identification was secular-historical of the kind that marks nationalism are two variables of our analysis, not part of the definition of the concept. Therefore, we refer to the emerging entities simply as political communities and to the process as one of unification. The term “unions” refers to entities that seem to develop in the direction of a political community but have not reached such a high level of integration.

B. EPIDEMIC versus PREFORMISM

A strategy often used in sociological studies of international relations is to draw on theories developed in the study of interaction among other social units, bearing in mind the special nature of the subject to which they are applied, and checking whether additional variables have to be introduced or whether the theories require revision in view of the new data. Here we draw on a sociological theory of change.

Most studies of social change presuppose the existence of a unit, and ask: How does it change, why, and in what direction? The analytical framework frequently used for this analysis of social dynamics is the differentiation model, which assumes that the "primitive" social unit contains, in embryonic form, fused together, all the basic modes of social relations that later become structurally differentiated. While relations originally fused gain their own subunits, no new functions are served or new modes of interaction are molded. There are, for instance, some universalistic relations in the most primitive tribe. According to this viewpoint, every social unit, if it is to exist, must fulfill a given set of functions, those of adaptation, allocation, social and normative integration. On the individual level, the evolution from infancy to maturity can be analyzed in terms of the differentiation of the personality. On the societal level, the evolution of a primitive society, from a traditional into a modern one, is also seen as a differentiation process. All societal functions are fulfilled by the primitive tribe; they merely become structurally differentiated; that is, they gain personnel, social units, and organizational structures of their own. Religious institutions gain churches, educational institutions gain schools, economic institutions gain corporations, and so forth.

Philosophers and biologists have long pointed out that there is an alternative model for the study of change. While Bonsnet, Haller, and Malpighi represented the differentiation (or preformism) approach.


b Family, Socialization . . . , op. cit., chap. iv.
according to which the first unit or seed possesses in miniature all the patterns of the mature plant, Harvey, Wolff, and Goethe advanced the accumulation (or epigenesis) approach, according to which "adult" units emerge through a process in which parts that carry out new functions are added to existing ones, until the entire unit is assembled. Earlier parts do not include the "representation" of later ones.

The two processes are mutually exclusive in the sense that new units are either institutional "embodiments" of old functions or serve new ones. They may occur at different times in the same social unit; for example, a unit may first follow a preformistic model of development, then shift to an epigenetic model (or the other way around); or it may simultaneously develop some subunits following one model and some following the other. But unlike the particle and wave theories, which are used to explain the same light phenomena, the change pattern of all sociological units of which we are aware follows at any given period either a differentiation or an accumulation model.

Until now sociology focused almost exclusively on differentiation models. There are, however, several social units whose development cannot be adequately accounted for by a preformistic model. This article presents an outline of an alternative model, drawing for illustration on the formation of various social units, in particular, international unions. The following questions are asked: (1) Where is the power located that controls the accumulation process? (2) What form does the process itself take? (3) What sector is introduced first? (4) How does this affect subsequent development of sectors? (5) What sequences does the entire process follow? (6) What kinds of "products" do different accumulation (or epigenesis) processes produce? It is essential to bear in mind constantly the peculiar system reference of this analysis; it is a system that does not exist but which the potential members are gradually building up. It is like studying the effect of social relations among students in their postgraduate life before they have graduated.

II. POWER AND EPIGENESIS

A. LOCUS OF POWER: ELITISM AND INTERNALIZATION

The main distinction between preformism and epigenesis is the function that new subunits serve; that is, old functions versus new ones. Determining the structural location of the power that controls the development of a social unit, especially that of new subunits, is essential both for distinguishing between units whose development follows one model and for differentiating between those of one model and those of the other. We need to know whether or not any one, two, or more elite units specialize in control functions; that is, whether or not control is equally distributed among all or most units. This will be called the degree of elitism. To the degree that there are elites, the question arises whether they operate from within or from without the emerging union. This dimension will be the degree of internalization (of control).^4

1. Degree of elitism.—Organizational analysis shows that there are two major ways of forming a new corporate body: An elite unit may construct the performance units, or several existing organizations that have both elite and performance units may merge. On the international level, a new community is formed in the first way when a nation more powerful than the other potential members "guides" the unification process. Prussia played such a role in the unification of Germany; Ghana, in the formation of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union; Egypt, in the late UAR. The cases in which one nation played a central role are so numerous that Deutsch et al. sug-

^4I found this dimension of much value in analyzing the relationship between specialized units and parent organizations (see "Authority Structure and Organizational Effectiveness," Administrative Science Quarterly, IV [1959], 62-67).
gest that unification requires the existence of one "core" unit.5

While many organizations and communities are established by one or a few elite units, the control center of others is formed through a merger of many units, each contributing a more or less equal part. The power center of the emerging community is a new unit rather than an existing unit subordinating the others. One might refer to the first as elitist, to the second as egalitarian, unification. A study of the Northern Baptist Convention in the United States provides a fine illustration of egalitarian unification.6 The development of the Scandinavian union appears to follow an egalitarian pattern also. While Norway was initially less supportive of the union than Sweden and Denmark, the differences in their support to, and in their control of, the emerging union (and the Nordic Council, its formal instrument) comes close to the egalitarian ideal type.7

The degree of elitism (or egalitarianism) should be treated as a continuum. In some nation unions one unit clearly plays a superior role (England in the early Commonwealth); in some, two or more countries are superior (Brazil, Argentina, and to a degree Chile, of the seven members in the Latin America Free Trade Area); in others, participation, contribution, and power are almost evenly distributed among all participants (as in the Scandinavian union).

The degree to which one or more units control the unification process versus the degree to which it is an effort of all participants is closely related to the means of control used. At the elitist end of this continuum we find mergers in which one country coerces the others to "unify." It seems that on the international level cases of elitist and coerced unification are much more frequent than egalitarian, voluntary unions, especially if we regard the extensive use of economic sanctions, not just military force, as resulting in a non-voluntary unification.8 At the egalitarian end, use of normative means, such as appeal to common sentiments, traditions, and symbols, plays a much more central role than coercive means or economic sanctions. Economic factors operate here more in the form of mutual benefits derived from increased intercountry trade than sanctions or rewards given by one country to the others.

This raises an empirical question: How effective are the various means of unification? One is inclined to expect that unification that begins with coercion ends with disintegration. But the Roman empire, despite its coercive techniques, lasted for about five centuries before it finally collapsed. Nor was the German union weak or ineffective because of the methods employed by Bismarck to bring it about. Quite possibly the line that distinguishes effective from ineffective unification efforts lies not between coercion and non-coercion but between high coercion (of the kind used to keep Hungary in the Communist bloc in 1956 or to hold the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland together in 1961) and lesser coercion.9 Effectiveness seems also to be highly determined by the degree to which coercion is coupled with other means—for instance, with propaganda.

2. Degree of internalization.—Collect-


8 The infrequency of voluntary unions is stressed in Crane Brinton, From Many to One (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 49 ff.

tivities whose developments follow an episogenesis model can be effectively ordered by a second dimension, namely, the degree to which the elite unit (or units, if they exist) controls the emerging union from the outside or from the inside. This is not a dichotomous variable, for there are various degrees to which an elite unit can be "in" or "out." An elite might be completely "out," encouraging or forcing the merger of two or more units into a union which it does not join, sometimes relinquishing control once unification is initiated. Colonial powers brought together, frequently unwittingly, subordinated units, only to have to withdraw once their union was cemented: For example, resisting the British control was a major force in bringing together the thirteen American colonies, the various tribes in the Gold Coast that became Ghana, and the Jewish colonies in Palestine that formed the Israeli society. On the international level, the United States required some degree of intra-European economic co-operation as a condition for receiving funds under the Marshall Plan; it encouraged the union of the six countries that formed the European Economic Community, and is now encouraging the EEC to include Britain, without having joined these unions. Britain was the major force behind the efforts to launch a Federation of the West Indies and the formation of the Federation of Nigeria. In all these cases the center of power was with a non-member, external unit.

In other cases, the elites that initiate and support unification do not stay entirely out of the emerging community; nor are they a fully integral part of it. The United States, for instance, is an "informal but powerful" member of CENTO. It signed bilateral pacts with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, the three members of CENTO, which in 1961 showed signs of becoming more than just a treaty. Similarly France, while not a member of the Conseil de l'Entente (a loose West African custom, communication, and, to a degree, military union of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey), still is an active participant in this union through various treaties.11

Finally, in still other cases, the elite is a full-fledged member of the union as Britain was in the European Free Trade Area and Prussia in the unification of Germany.

3. Power, capability, and responsiveness.
—The units that control the episogenesis of political communities differ not only in their degree of elitism and internalization but also in their communication capabilities and degree of responsiveness to the needs and demands of participant units.12 Deutsch pointed out that when all other conditions are satisfactory a unification process might fail because the communication capabilities of an elite are underdeveloped. This was probably a major reason why empires in medieval Europe were doomed to fail; they were too large and complex to be run from one center given the existing communication facilities.13 Sociologists have concerned themselves extensively with communication gaps, but studies frequently focus on the interpersonal and small-group level (even in many of the so-called organizational studies of communication). Sociologists are often concerned with the structure of communication

10 The Ministerial Council of CENTO decided in its meeting in Ankara in April, 1960, that a shared military command would be developed; intercountry roads and telecommunication improved; and economic and cultural ties increased (New York Times, April 29, 1961). Projects already completed include a new Turkish-Iranian railway, a new road linking the CENTO countries, as well as a microwave communication network (International Organization, XV [1961], 523).


networks (two-step communication systems,\textsuperscript{14} as against chain systems\textsuperscript{15}) rather than with the articulation of these networks with the power structure.\textsuperscript{16} For students of political systems and of complex organization, ideas such as "overloading" of the elite (presenting it with more communication than it is able to digest; requiring more decisions per time unit than it is able to make) is an interesting new perspective that connects communication studies with power analysis much more closely than the widespread human-relations type of communication analysis.

The concept of responsiveness further ties communication analysis to the study of power by asking to what degree does the power center act upon communication received and digested in terms of reallocating resources and rewarding the compliance of sectors.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus to analyze epigenesis effectively, we must know not only who has how much power over the process but also what are the communication capabilities and what is the degree of responsiveness of the various power centers.

B. PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL: A DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE

The performance, power, and communication elements of a social unit developing epigenetically do not always develop at the same rate. As the limbs of an infant develop before he has control over them so new performances might be taken over by the accumulating unit before its power center gains control over them. Frequently, part of the performances of an accumulating unit are controlled by another unit, at least temporarily. The industrial capacity of colonies often developed before they gained political control over industry.

New communities, whose development follows the pattern suggested by epigenesis rather than that of preformism, tend to develop new performance abilities first and to internalize control over these activities later.\textsuperscript{18} Just as a child first learns to walk, then gains the right to decide when and where to walk, or as military units in basic training first learn to act as units under the control of the training ("parent") unit's instructors and sanction system before acquiring their own command, so some countries engage in some collective activity under the control of a superior, non-member power.\textsuperscript{19} Later, control is internalized by the evolving supranational system, and a supranational authority is formed, which regulates collective activities previously controlled by the superior external power.

It is the existence of a supranational authority—at first limited, then more encompassing—that distinguishes unions of nations from international organizations. Unions have at least a limited power center of their own, whose decisions bind the members and are enforceable; they have internalized at least some control. International organizations, on the other hand, are run by intergovernmental bodies, whose "decisions" are merely recommendations to the members and are not enforceable.\textsuperscript{20} They

\textsuperscript{14} Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955).


\textsuperscript{16} For one of the few studies that successfully ties the two see R. H. McCleary, Policy Change in Prison Management (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1957).

\textsuperscript{17} Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 145 (see also his Political Community at the International Level, p. 37).

\textsuperscript{18} "Internalize" means here the transfer of power from external elites to internal elites.

\textsuperscript{19} It should be pointed out that on the international level the power of a new union is more often generalized from its constituent units—"pooling of sovereignty"—than internalized from superior power. From the present viewpoint this distinction is not relevant; the question is: Who controls the collective action—the unit itself or other units (without regard to whether they are outside or constituent units)?

\textsuperscript{20} For an outstanding discussion of the differences between intergovernment and supranational decision-making bodies, see Ernst B. Haas, Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
have, in this sense, no power of their own. The special importance of the High Authority, a governing body of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is that its decisions directly bind the steel and coal industries of the six member nations and it can levy fines on industries that do not conform to its rulings (though national police forces would have to collect the fines, if they were not paid). Moreover, individuals, corporations, and states have the same status before the Court of Justice of the ECSC; they all can sue each other, an individual suing a state, or the High Authority suing a member state.21

Until the ECSC was formed in 1952, almost all European cooperation, such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and NATO, was intergovernmental. In 1952 the High Authority was formed; this was the first major step toward self-control of the evolving supranational community. (Interestingly, this is also the year NATO developed a supranational authority with the formation of SHAPE, which provided a supranational headquarters for the multinational armies.)22

In the following years functions and powers of the High Authority gradually increased. In 1957 the more encompassing common market (EEC) was established, which has its equivalent of the High Authority, the Economic Commission, except that its supranational powers cover more “performances”—much of the intercountry economic actions—than does the High Authority, which is limited to matters related to steel and coal.23

Attempts to develop supranational control over shared political activities, in which the members of the EEC do engage, have not yet succeeded. Whatever collective political action the Six take is based on intergovernmental consultations of these countries, not supranational direction. Thus, in the development of this union of nations, as in the epigenesis of many other social units, collective performances expand more rapidly than collective control. (It should be noted that while frequently performance accumulation occurs before power internalization, the reversed sequence might occur, too. Power capabilities can be built up before performance. Modern armies, for instance, train groups of officers in headquarters work before they are given command of military units.)

We saw that communities are built up by accumulation of new performances (e.g., military ones) and control over them. We now turn to the dynamics of accumulation, recognizing three problems as basic to the analysis of all accumulation processes: (a) Under what conditions does the process start? (b) What factors contribute to its expansion and pace? (c) What is the sequence in which the functional sectors that make a complete community are assembled? The rest of this article is devoted to these problems.

III. INITIATION, TAKE-OFF, AND SPILL-OVER

A. BETWEEN INITIATION AND TAKE-OFF

The concept of take-off, borrowed from aerodynamics, is applied to the first stage of epigenesis to distinguish the initiation point from that where the continuation of the process becomes self-sustained. The image is one of a plane that first starts its engines and begins rolling, still supported

Press, 1958), chaps. xii, xiii. The following discussion of the High Authority draws on Hafner's work.

21 In March, 1961, the Economic Commission—which is roughly, to the EEC what the High Authority is to the ECSC—brought the Italian government before the court of the EEC for violation of an article of the Treaty of Rome concerning a ban on subsidies for trade in pork. This was the first such action taken since the formation of the EEC (New York Times, March 27, 1961).


by the runway, until it accumulates enough momentum to "take off," to continue in motion "on its own," generating the forces that carry it to higher altitudes and greater speeds. The analogue is that through accumulation, while relying on external support, the necessary condition for autonomous action is produced. Also during "take-off" the pilot, released from airport tower control, gains control of his plane. (This control take-off might occur before or after the performance take-off.)

Economists use this concept in the study of industrialization, especially in reference to foreign aid. An underdeveloped country requires a certain amount of investment before its economy reaches the level at which it produces a national income large enough to provide for current consumption and for increased investment which, in turn, provides for additional growth of the economy. An economy has taken off when additional growth is self-sustained; when no external investment or externally induced changes in saving, spending, or work habits are needed.

The concept of take-off can also be used in studying political, communication, and other social processes. A group of leaders, some labor unions, or "reform" clubs, join to initiate a new political party. Again, "to initiate" has two meanings, to which the concept of take-off calls attention: There is the day the leaders decide to launch the new party, a day that, if the launching is successful, will be known as the party's birthday. However, the new party initially draws its funds, staff, and political power from the founding leaders and groups. Gradually, as the party grows, it accumulates followers and contributors directly committed to it, and if it is successful, it eventually reaches the stage at which it can do without the support of its initiators and continue growing, "on its own." While this point is far from being sharply defined, obviously it rarely coincides with the actual birth date. Much insight can be gained by comparing different polities with regard to the lapse between their initiation and their take-off points. For instance, the greater the lapse the more difficult it is for small or new groups to gain political representation. On the other hand, if the lapse is very small, entering the political competition becomes too easy, and it will be difficult to find a majority to establish a stable government.

In many countries there is a formal barrier that has to be surmounted before political take-off. Parties that poll less than a certain percentage of the votes are denied parliamentary representation. Frequently founders' support is given until the election day; then the party either gains representation and becomes a political factor in its own right or it flounders; it either takes off or crashes. One of the special characteristics of the American political system is that the take-off point for participation in national politics is remote from the initiation point. Many "third-party" movements that polled many hundreds of thousands of votes still could not continue to grow and to become permanent participants on the federal level.

Take-off is especially important for the study of social units that are initiated by charter, enactment of a law, or signing of a treaty. While sometimes these "paper" units might be an expression of an already-existing social unit, often the formal structure precedes the development of a social one. While it has been often pointed out that an informal structure is likely to evolve, turning the formal one into a full-fledged social unit, we do not know under what conditions these informal processes take off, as against those conditions under which they never reach such a point. Clearly not all formal structures become functioning social units. This applies in particular to international relations where the supranational take-off, that is, the transition

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from a formal, intergovernmental structure to self-sustained growth toward a political community, is quite infrequent. 26 Under what conditions, then, does take-off occur?

While these problems still require much research, there appears to be one central factor bringing unification movements to take-off: the amount of decision-making called for by intercountry flows (e.g., of goods) and by shared performance (e.g., holding a common defense line) that, in turn, is determined by the scope of tasks carried out internationally. If the amount is large, intergovernmental decision-making will prove cumbersome and inadequate and pressure will be generated either to reduce the need for international decision-making—by reducing the international tasks—or to build a supranational decision-making structure, which is a more effective decision-making body than are intergovernmental ones.

The central variable for the “take-off” of supranational authority is the amount of international decision-making required. This, in turn, is determined largely by the amounts and kinds of flows that cross the international borders (e.g., tourists, mail) and the amounts and kinds of shared international activities (e.g., maintaining an early-warning system). It should be stressed, however, that each flow or shared activity has its own decision-making logarithm. Some flows can increase a great deal and still require only a little increase in international decision-making; others require much more. 27 Moreover, the relationship seems not to be linear; that is, some increases in a particular flow (or shared activity) can be handled by the old decision-making system, but once a certain threshold is passed, some supranational authority is almost inevitable.

It seems also that expanding the power and scope of a supranational authority is easier than to form the first element of such an authority. Initially a supranational authority is often accepted on the grounds that it will limit itself strictly to technical, bureaucratic, or secondary matters, and that the major policy decisions will be left in the hands of a superior, intergovernmental body. This was the initial relationship between the High Authority and the Council of Ministers of the ECSC; between the Economic Commission and the Council of Ministers of the EEC; and between NATO’s SHAPE and NATO’s conferences of ministers.

Once such a bureaucratic structure is established, a process often sets in whereby full-time, professional bureaucrats tend to usurp functions and authority from the part-time, political, “amateur” superior bodies, thereby expanding the scope of the supranational authority. At the same time, the very existence of supranational control in one area tends to promote such control in others. The concept of spill-over, or secondary priming, which is used here to study the epigenesis of nation unions, is applicable to the study of accumulation processes in general.

II. SECONDARY PRIMING OF CHANGE

“Spill-over” refers to expansion of supranational performances and control from one sphere of international behavior to another. It was introduced by Haas to refer to expansions within the sector in which unification originally started (e.g., from coal and steel industries to transportation) and from sector to sector (e.g., from the economic to the political). 28 Spill-over refers only to secondary priming; that is, to processes—in our case, unifications—that have been initiated or have taken off be-

26 See Deutsch et al., op. cit., pp. 85-87, on supranational take-off.

cause of epigenesis in other social sectors. NATO, for instance, unifies the military organizations of fifteen nations, and the EEC integrates the economies of six of the NATO countries. While these processes probably support each other, only a little spill-over has taken place. Basically the military unification did not initiate the economic one or vice versa.\(^9\) There was original priming in each area. Both unifications may have had certain common sources (e.g., the conflicts between the United States and Soviet Russia) and maybe mutually supportive, but they did not trigger each other. On the other hand, the integration of the economies of the Six generates pressures toward integration of their governments, though so far political unification is mainly a "grand design."\(^8\)

It follows that one can hardly understand supranational spill-over without studying the internal structure and dynamics of the participating societies. This must be done from a dynamic perspective, for spill-over raises the following questions: Under what conditions and at what level of change does unification of one sector lead to the exhausting of its "degrees of freedom" and trigger unification in other sectors?\(^2\) Which sector is likely to be affected first, second, and nth? Which sector will be affected most, second, and nth?

\(^{2}\) Diebold (op. cit.) points to the reasons why efforts to base economic integration on NATO have been unsuccessful. Kissinger, on the other hand, believes that NATO could serve as the basis of an Atlantic confederacy (Report, February 2, 1961, pp. 15-21). Deutsch et al. pointed out that where the initial unification efforts were based on military integration half of these efforts failed (op. cit., p. 28).

\(^{2}\) On spill-over from the economic to the political area see essays by Paul Delouvrier and by Pierre Uri in C. Grove Haines (ed.), European Integration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).

\(^{1}\) In other words, up to a point each institutional realm changes independently, but, once that point has been reached, further change affects another institutional realm.

IV. THE SEQUENCE OF EPIGENESIS

A. CLOCKWISE AND COUNTERCLOCKWISE SEQUENCES

The concept of take-off suggests that epigenesis has to gain a certain momentum before it becomes self-sustaining. However, it does not suggest in what sector accumulation takes off, or what the effects of the selection of a particular take-off sector are on the probability that general unification will ensue. Similarly, the study of spill-over traces the relation between sectors once take-off in one sector has occurred, but it does not specify either in which sector accumulation is likely to start or in what order other supranational sectors are likely to be built up (since it does not account for primary, simultaneous, or successive priming). To put it in terms of the accumulation model, we still have to determine: Which part is assembled first, which ones later?\(^3\)

A hypothesis defining the sequences most functional for the epigenesis of nation unions can be derived from an application of the Parsonian phase model.\(^4\) Parsons suggests that the most functional cyclical fluctuations in the investment of resources, personnel, and time follow one of two patterns: either a clockwise sequence (adaptive, allocative, socially integrative, and normative integrative), or a counterclockwise sequence.\(^5\) The two patterns can be applied to the study of epigenesis. They suggest that it is most functional for a new community to assemble its subunits and its

\(^{3}\) Note that though sector spill-over occurs in the member societies, it leads to expansion in the scope of the supranational community.


\(^{5}\) Here, as well as in an earlier work, I found it fruitful to apply Parsons' concepts with a certain amount of liberty. A long conceptual quibble seems unnecessary. The use of allocation instead of "goal attainment" and of normative integration instead of "pattern maintenance and tension-management" may serve as a reminder to the reader concerned with such conceptual subtleties that Parsons is not responsible for my way of using his scheme.
self-control from the adaptive to the normative, or the other way around; and that all other sequences are less functional. 35

Before we turn to express this hypothesis in more substantive terms the difference between the application of the Parsonian phase model to preformism and its application to epigenesis should be pointed out. The phase model, as such, concerns the movement of an existing system, not its pattern of growth or change in its structure. Unless other processes take place, after a full round of the phase movement the system is the same as it started. Moreover, while each system is once accumulated or differentiated, the phase movement can continue ad libitum. 36

Parsons also suggested a pattern for the analysis of social change, that of differentiation, according to which fused units bifurcate first into expressive and instrumental elements; then, each of these splits. Expressive elements are divided into social and normative ones; instrumental into adaptive and allocative ones. This, like all preformism models, is a pattern according to which functions that were served by one fused structure, become structurally differentiated; that is, they gain their own subunits. 37 The accumulation model, on the other hand, knows no bifurcation, but suggests an order in which new structures serving new functions are conjoined. For example, countries that shared only a common market also establish a common defense line; that is, the union acquires a new function, not just a structural wing. The order we expect to be functional for unification movements to follow is either from the adaptive to the normative or the other way around.

In more substantive terms, the major question raised by the hypothesis concerning the sequence of accumulation is this: Is unification initiated in a particular sector more likely to lead to complete unification (to a political community)? If so, which is it: the military, economic, political, or ideological? Is the probability of success higher if accumulation follows a certain sequence? Which sequence (if any)? And is the most effective sequence the same for all types of unifications? (See below.)

On the basis of the study of ten historical cases Deutsch and his associates reached the following conclusion:

It appears to us from our cases that they [conditions of integration] may be assembled in almost any sequence, so long as all of them come into being and take effect. Toward this end, almost any pathway will suffice. 38

They added, however, that:

In this assembly-line process of history, and particularly in the transition between background and process, timing is important. Generally speaking, we found that substantial rewards for cooperation or progress toward amalgamation had to be timed so as to come before the imposition of burdens resulting from such progress toward amalgamation (union). We found that, as with rewards before burdens, consent has to come before compliance if the amalgamation is to have lasting success. 39

Deutsch’s distinction between sequence and order in time seems unnecessary for our purposes. Especially after examining his important book, Backgrounds for Com-

35 This is one of those statements that sounds tautological but is not. Since there are four phases in the system, the statement suggests that two modes of movement are more functional than twenty-two possible other ones. The first pattern—adaptive to normative—is referred to as clockwise because the convention is to present the four phases in a fourfold table in which the adaptive is in the upper left-hand box, the allocative in the upper right-hand box, the social-integrative in the lower right-hand box, and the normative in the lower left-hand box.

36 Note also that there is no one-to-one relationship between the pattern in which a system is built up (whether accumulated or differentiated) and the pattern in which it is maintained; e.g., the epigenesis of a system might be counterclockwise and the system will “click” clockwise once its epigenesis is completed.

37 For a later development of this model see Talcott Parsons, “A Functional Theory of Change,” in Amitai and Eva Etzioni (eds.), op. cit.


39 Ibid., p. 71.
munificity, in which his historical material is analyzed in great detail and potency, we conclude that Deutsch suggests—if we push the freedom of interpretation to its limit—that the allocative phase tends to come before the adaptive one (rewards before burdens); and that the normative phase (consent) tends to come before the social-integrative phase (compliance). In other words, interpreting liberally, we find Deutsch suggesting that a counterclockwise sequence from normative to adaptive is most common.

Haas compares the findings of his study of a modern unification with the findings of Deutsch et al. on historical cases from this viewpoint. He distinguishes between identical expectations (or aims) and converging expectations that make actors co-operate in pursuing their non-identical aims. The distinction comes close to Durkheim’s dichotomy of mechanic and organic solidarity and is similar to the dichotomy of expressive and instrumental elements. Haas reports that the ECSC has followed a clockwise sequence in which convergent (or instrumental) expectations preceded the identical (or expressive) ones. Interpreting Haas liberally, one could state that in the case of the ECSC adaptive integration (custom union) came first, followed by allocative integration of economic policies (regarding coal and steel and later the formation of a common market). The union is now on the verge of political integration (election of a European parliament; planning group for federal or confederal institutions) and at the beginning of normative integration. Actually by the time Haas completed his study in 1957, there was hardly any supranational merger of normative institutions, and even attitudes only started to change from convergent to identical.

Any effort to codify Deutsch’s and Haas’s findings for the benefit of further research on the question of the relative effectiveness of various sequences will have to take into account (1) the nature of the merging units, (2) the nature of the emerging unit (i.e., the kind of union established), and (3) the nature of functional statements.

B. MERGING UNITS

One might expect that supranational unification of societies that differ in their internal structure will proceed in a different sequence. If, for instance, the merging units are three newly independent states such as Ghana, Guinea, and Mali—states that in themselves are still in the process of building up their “expressive” foundations—the emphasis on normative and social integration on the supranational level might well be higher than when long-established and well-integrated states unify, as in the Scandinavian union, where the instrumental elements of the unification are stressed. These observations support the far from earthshaking hypothesis that sector integration most responsive to the functional needs of the individual societies that are merging will come first in the unification sequence. After take-off, however, unification is expected to proceed more and more in accord with the intrinsic needs of the emerging political union, less and less in accord with the internal needs of the merging units.

The preceding statements should not be read to imply that “political communities develop differently in different historical context”; that, for instance, one can account for the difference between Deutsch’s findings and those of Haas by pointing to the fact that Deutsch deals with historical cases while Haas is concerned with a contemporary one. Such statements are frequently made by historians who believe that each context is unique, hence what

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50 Ibid., p. 230.
needs explanation is not diversity but uniformity—if ever found. For the sociologist the "historical context" is a shorthand phrase referring to the values of a myriad variable; unless these are specified, little is explained by the statement that "the context is different." In our case the question is: Which contextual variables account for the difference in sequences and for how much of the difference? (Often numerous factors have an effect but a small number accounts for most of the variance.)

"Historical cases," for instance, are often preindustrial societies; hence it comes to mind that the level of industrialization might account for part of the difference; industrialized societies might tend to merge in an adaptive-first, normative-last sequence; non-industrial ones, in a normative-first, adaptive-last sequence. This formulation seems suggestive because, if valid, it points to the direction in which these findings can be generalized. We would expect, for instance, contemporary non-industrialized societies to unify in the "historical," not in the "contemporary," fashion. The hypothesis also calls attention to the special importance of historical cases in which unification came after industrialization. If these unifications followed a "contemporary" sequence, the hypothesis on the relation of industrialization to the sequence of unification would be strengthened.

Another variable to be teased out of the undifferentiated phrase, "historical context," is the degree of nationalism. There seem to be three major kinds of unions: pre-nationalist (e.g., the Roman Empire); post-nationalist (e.g., the EEC); and unions that are themselves an expression of rising nationalism (e.g., the unification of Italy). All other things being equal, we would expect the initial phases of pre- and post-nationalist unions to stress the adaptive aspect and follow the clockwise pattern; and those unions that express nationalism to be initiated on the normative side, following the counterclockwise sequence.

C. KINDS OF UNION

The sequence of unification is determined not only by the initial needs of the merging units (e.g., industrialization) and the "period" (e.g., advent of nationalism) but also by the function the union fulfills for the various participant units as it is completed. Unions of nations differ greatly on this score. The most familiar type is that of custom unions, which keep up the level of international trade among member countries. The new Central American Union, formed in 1959, and the Latin America Free Trade Area, ratified in 1961, are actually oriented at economic development, international division of labor, sharing of information, and even of capital rather than increased regional trade.44 Wallerstein points to still a different function of unions: Some serve as instruments of subordination, while others serve to bolster independence.45 Thus the whites, who are stronger in Southern Rhodesia than in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, use the federation of the three regions to hold the regions in which they are weak.

Functional analysis of social units that develop epigenetically is more complex than such an analysis of existing social units, for here we deal with functional analysis of change where the system itself is changing. Thus, as unification evolves, it comes to fulfill different (either additional or substitute) functions for the participant units and the emerging union. The West European unification might have been initiated in 1947 as a way to gain capital aid from the United States to reconstruct the postwar economies; soon it acquired the additional function of countering Soviet


44 This point was made by Lincoln Gordon in "Economic Regionalism Reconsidered," World Politics, XIII (1961), 231–53.

military expansion; then it came to serve economic welfare and, with the “rebellion” of France since De Gaulle has returned to office, it even serves, to a degree, to counteract United States influence in the Western bloc. \(^\text{48}\) (It should be mentioned in passing that at a given stage of development the same union may have different functions for different participants. Thus, Germany supported the EEC partially to overcome its “second” citizen status in the community of nations; allied control of German steel industry, for instance, was abolished when Germany entered the ECSC. \(^\text{47}\) France supported the formation of NATO in part to gain some control over a rebuilt and rearmed Germany.)

All functional needs—those of individual members, those common to all members, and those of the evolving community—vary with the various stages of the unification process; and they all seem to affect the sequence in which the “parts” are assembled. It remains for future studies to relate differences in sequence to these functional variations, to validate two hypotheses: (a) the higher the degree of unification the more its pattern of accumulation can be accounted for by common (identical or complementary) needs, rather than by the individual needs of member states, and by needs of the union rather than by common needs of the members, (b) accumulation sequences, whatever their take-off sector, are most likely to complete the process of unification if they follow the clockwise or counterclockwise sequence than any other.

D. FUNCTIONAL AND “REAL” SEQUENCES

An important difference between the statements about sequences made, on the one hand, by Deutsch and by Haas and the statements made, on the other, by Parsons, his associates, and in the preceding discussion is that the former refer to actual occurrences (the ECSC followed this and that pattern) and empirical frequencies (nine out of ten historical cases followed this sequence), while the latter refer to functional sequences. Functional statements suggest that if epigenesis proceeds in a certain sequence, it will be most effectively completed; if it follows another sequence, certain dysfunctions will occur. The nature of the dysfunctions can be derived from the nature of the stages which are skipped (e.g., high social strain is expected if the expressive elements are not introduced), or incorporated in a “wrong” order (e.g., high strain is expected when allocation of resources is attempted before adaptation has been built up). The fact that a particular unification follows a sequence other than the one suggested by the epigenesis model does not invalidate the latter so long as it is demonstrated that the “deviation” from the model caused dysfunctions. In short, the test of the model lies in its ability to predict which course of action is functional and which one is not, rather than to predict the course of action likely to be followed. \(^\text{49}\)

In the construction of epigenesis models for the various kinds of nation unions, the use of two types of functional models must be distinguished: The crude survival model and the more sophisticated and demanding effectiveness model. The first specifies the conditions under which a structure exists or ceases to exist; the second also takes into account differences in the degree of success. In the case of nation unions, then, while many are likely to continue in existence, some will stagnate on a low level of integration while others will continue to grow in scope, function, and authority.


\(^{47}\) *Uniting of Europe*, op. cit., pp. 247-48.

\(^{49}\) Note that the system this statement refers to is not the existing one but a future state—that of a complete unification—of a community. The use of a future-system reference might prove useful for the general development of the functional analysis of change.
CONCLUSION

Sociological theories of change tend to be preformist; they provide differentiation models for the analysis of the structural development of existing social units. We presented some elements of an alternative, epigenesis model, which suggests that some social units acquire new subunits that fulfill new functions, do not just provide new subunits for functions served before in a less specialized manner. Since these new elements are incorporated from the environment, epigenesis (or accumulation) models are much more concerned with input from, and articulation with, external units than preformism (or differentiated) models. Hence the first question we asked was: Where does the power lie that controls the process—is it evenly distributed among the participant units or is it concentrated in the hands of elites? Are the power-holders members of the new emerging communities or outsiders? Does increase in self-control of the union precede, follow, or coincide with the growth in its performance?

Turning from the powers that control accumulation to the pattern of accumulation itself, we asked: Where does the process start, what subunit is built up first? Which follows? What effect does the construction of one part have on that of the others? The concepts of take-off and secondary priming proved to be useful in understanding the initiation and progress of accumulating processes. An application of Parsons' phase model served us in formulating a hypothesis concerning the functional sequence of accumulation.

The distinctness of accumulation models should be emphasized: While differentiation models focus our attention on internal processes, accumulation models are concerned with boundary processes; while differentiation models are interested in internal elites, accumulation models ask about the changing power distribution between external and internal ones and their respective impacts on accumulation. Analytically speaking, preformist models see their subject units—even when undifferentiated—as functionally complete, whereas epigenesis models view their units as either partial (to varying degrees) or complete.

We emphasized the need to treat social units and their change as multilayer phenomena, including at least a performance, a power (or control), and a communication layer. If we deal with a phase, differentiation, or accumulation model, we need not assume that changes on one layer are automatically concomitant with changes on the others.

Although the epigenesis model can be applied to many social phenomena, we are interested here primarily in using it to study international unification. There is hardly a subject less frequently studied by sociologists and more given to sociological analysis than the development of political communities whose members are nations. Since the evolution of these communities is likely to be supportive of both the short-run armed truce and the development of the social conditions for lasting peace, and since the processes of social change involved in forming supranational communities are comparatively highly planned, deliberately and frequently drawing on expert advice, the study of supranational unification carries the extra reward of not just better understanding of human society but also of understanding how to better it.

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60 See my A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961), chaps. v and vii.