The Dialectics of Supranational Unification

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The application of several European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries for membership in the Common Market (EEC) is viewed in Washington with great pleasure: the development of a United States of Europe is widely anticipated. Many observers have already calculated the combined manpower, economic resources, military power, etc. of the new union, and have pointed to the decisive advantage the United States, in coalition with this "third power," will have over the Soviet Union. Even the fact that the EEC and EFTA, if completely merged, would have 13 members is not considered unlucky: after all, the United States itself evolved out of a union of 13. It may however, be premature to prepare a celebration for the birthday of the United States of Europe. The following theoretical excursion suggests that leading the EEC with new members may well reduce it to the level of a glorified customs union rather than forward it to a political federation. Moreover, I shall argue, political communities often unity not by increasing their membership, but in a dialectic fashion: two or more groups form; they appear to be moving in opposite directions until each is well integrated, then they are "synthesized" (not merged) in a superior union. That is, they form one encompassing union without dissolving the bonds that held together the units that composed a group before the larger unification. The earlier autonomous groups become sub-groups in one union, adjusting to the new over-riding bond without being fused into one group that knows no internal divisions.

1. CONSENSUS FORMATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES

The political process is one in which groups of citizens who differ in belief and interest work out a shared policy. The larger the number of participants in a unit, the greater the differences of belief and interest among them, the more difficult such a consensus becomes, to form or keep.1 This holds for students in social relations laboratories, for executives in industrial conferences, and for politicians in national government. Increasing the number of participants in a group may cause it to become so heterogeneous that one of two things will happen: either the ability of the group to form consensus breaks down or a new structure for the formation of consensus is built. In this structure consensus is formed on two (or more) levels. On the first, participants are separated into sub-groups according to the relative affinity of their beliefs and interests. Each of these sub-groups forms consensus among its members, and sends a representative to the second level. The second level, composed of representatives only, establishes consensus for the whole unit. This differentiation can be extended to more than two levels.

Political systems differ in the way consensus formation is institutionalized. In some, the lower level is strictly informal, having no legal or organizational status, like the blocs in the United Nations. The recent Russian proposals, commonly referred to as the "troika" system, can be viewed as a suggestion to institutionalize a two-level structure in the UN. Three blocs would be recognized—a Communist, a Western, and a Neutral one. This would require each of the blocs to form consensus internally first, on a "lower" level.2 In other systems, two or more levels are formally recognized. In the United States, for example, the state primaries serve as one level, national party conventions as another, and interaction between the parties and between the President and Congress (see below) as still another level.

In some systems, policies formulated on the top level, the most encompassing level, are

1 Theoretically one can increase the number of participants without increasing heterogeneity by adding new participants who are just like the old ones; this is the common justification for immigration policies, e.g., that discriminate in favor of readily assimilable applicants for entry. In practice, I assume for the purpose of this discussion that heterogeneity increases with size. Note, though, that no one-to-one relationship is assumed. Actually, the marginal heterogeneity produced by increases in size probably declines.

2 The obvious disadvantage of this system for the UN are irrelevant to the present analysis.
brought before all the participants for final approval (e.g., the recent nomination of Burma's U Thant to be acting Secretary General of the UN was approved, but hardly worked out, by the plenum of the General Assembly). In other systems, approval by the representatives of the sub-groups is deemed satisfactory, as is the case in practically all bureaucratic structures.

II. ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL

All heterogeneous polities that effectively attain consensus have a multi-level consensus formation structure. The major national political systems differ greatly, however, in their specific structures. In multi-party systems, as long as they work—a problem to which we will return—consensus is first formed in each faction; then the factions contained by each party reach a compromise (which all consensus formation involves). Inter-party consensus is then worked out among representatives of the parties, not the factions. The general outline of the consensus is worked out during the negotiations over the formation of a coalition, which follows the elections; more specific consensus is worked out daily in the parliament, expressed in legislation and motions supported by votes of confidence.

In some instances, the minority party or parties (the opposition) may be left out of the process; quite often, though, they affect the policies formed, by reason of the fact that the coalition parties take their positions into account, in bi-partisan policy (especially foreign policy), as well as through participation in other "governments." Often parties that are in opposition in the national government nevertheless participate in the national consensus formation process by joining a coalition with government-parties on the city or municipal level. The effective operation of the multiparty system of consensus formation requires that the number of parties be limited, otherwise communication difficulties arise and the top level may become too heterogeneous for effective negotiations; it also requires that the parties be stable, at least to the degree that a consensus reached on the lower level will be maintained on higher levels. If members of parliament maintain only a limited loyalty to their party once the parliament is elected, party representatives cannot negotiate in the name of its factions, and we are back to the state of many participants on one level. The French parliaments of the Third and Fourth Republics were at various times confronted with this type of stalemate.4

In two-party countries, more consensus formation takes place on the lower levels than in multi-party countries, because only two positions can compete on the top level. So, for instance, there are only two presidential candidates for national elections, but often more than two for one party's nomination. The British system differs from the American in that the minority party tends to be excluded from the top consensus formation level, except in periods of national crises and infrequent instances of bi-partisan foreign policy. In the United States, such exclusion is rare because the Congress and the Presidency are frequently not held by the same party, and because party ties sit more lightly than in England: witness the conservative Republican southern Democratic coalition. Moreover, in the United States, instances of a bi-partisan foreign policy—e.g., on Castro's Cuba—are common.

Totalitarian societies are not exempted from the need to form consensus, though they can rely to a greater degree on coercion and downward-produced consensus through the manipulation of the mass media, rituals, etc. The major upward consensus formation takes place within extra-political structures; first, in each major bureaucracy (e.g., the military, the economic planning agency, the party); then, among the bureaucracies. One might even speak, with caution, about coalitions of some bureaucracies against others (e.g., Army and Party against the NKVD). In sum, while political systems differ in their consensus-formation structure, it is multi-level wherever it is effective.

III. IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

An examination of the international scene from this viewpoint shows first, that the hypothesis that the formation of consensus within and among heterogeneous units requires differentiation, holds here too, though several additional variables have to be taken into account.

The United Nations is probably best characterized by lack of consensus because of the deep cleavages in interests and beliefs among many of its members. But when we review

4 In Israel, many opposition parties share the leadership with the government leader, Mapai (Labor party), by joining the executive board of the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut, often referred to as the two other governments of Israel. On their functions and their effect on Israeli politics see my "Kulturkampf or Coalition: The Case of Israel" Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 8 (June, 1958), pp. 311-331.

those infrequent decisions—limited in importance, to be sure—where an overall consensus was reached we see the same multi-level structure in operation. Representatives of various groups of nations "caucus" to work out their shared position; then, their unofficial spokesmen negotiate with those of the other caucuses or blocs, to work out a general compromise which in turn is brought, for discussion or approval by acclamation, to the UN floor. Bloc decisions themselves are frequently reached in a two-level process of a similar sort. In this light one may wonder whether we do not exaggerate the monolithic nature of the Communist bloc. China seems to have "caucused" with Albanian, and evidently North Vietnamese and North Korean representatives also, before the Congress of Communist countries in Moscow, in October, 1961. Krushchev is reported to have conferred with East European Communist countries during his boat trip to New York in 1959. The 1961 conference of twenty-five unelected nations in Belgrade is reported to have comprised three factions: neutral-neutrals, pro-Western neutrals, and pro-Communist neutrals. The African "bloc" seems to have at least two groupings—though their degree of cohesion is as yet hard to assess—that of the Casablanca group and that of the Brazzaville group. Although the latter is reported to have taken a more moderate, pro-Western line on the Congo issue, the two groups frequently vote bloc in the UN.

While blocs in international organizations such as the UN, and in particular conferences such as the Belgrade Conference, are highly fluid, sub-groupings of potential supranational communities seem to have a somewhat higher degree of permanency. Thus, the Benelux countries constitute such a sub-grouping in the EEC, though by no means with regard to all or even most issues. Australia and New Zealand seem to constitute such a sub-group in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The EEC and the EFTA play such a part in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

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2 Private communication with UN officials, and participant-observation in a UNESCO Conference in Montreal, in 1959.
6 The EEC is represented in certain GATT negotiations by the Economic Commission as one.
7 So far, the process of forming consensus in international systems seems to be quite similar to the national one. Moreover, further examination of international consensus formation suggests that, there too, a multi-level structure is more effective than direct representation of all participants on the same level, and points to the process by which such a multi-level structure tends to emerge. First, the lower level of consensus is attained by grouping a few states at a time; once the union of such groups solidifies, a more encompassing union—and a higher level of consensus—is produced. In the initial stage of the formation of this multi-level structure, there are seldom harmonious relations between two groups of nations (or unions). In fact, intense rivalry among them is more frequent. Such rivalry seems to help the integration of each group, preparing it for the next step, i.e., the formation of higher level, more encompassing unions. Finally, to push an analogy further, if one group is seen as the thesis, the other as the anti-thesis, the emerging synthesis tends to include both unions. The original units are now permanent elements (though changed in character) of the union, acting as lower-level consensus formation units; the new union is not built on the atomization of the groups, but on their inclusion as "individual" members. The development of several unions will illustrate this hypothesis about the dialectics of unification.

The history of Benelux is enlightening from this viewpoint. Any historical development is affected by many factors; the degree to which a multi-level consensus-formation structure is erected is, of course, just one of them. Still, it is noteworthy that after centuries of shared rule under dukes of Burgundy and kings of Spain, the Low Countries—integrated into two groups, the northern and the southern provinces—were not ready when they tried to form one republic (1795-1814), or a United Kingdom (1814-1830). The effort failed, among other reasons, because all provinces were thrown together. The two unions of provinces were not recognized in the new structure; efforts were made to form all consensus on one level. In 1830, the southern provinces rebelled, and formed Belgium. The ensuing war between the north (the Netherlands) and the south (Belgium) helped the integration of each, but did not hinder the eventual union of the two, in a structure that does recognize the distinctive-polity rather than six national polities. See W. W. Kitzinger, The Challenge of the Common Market (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 3d ed., p. 27.
ness of the two regions, i.e., in Benelux. This analysis suggests that, if Benelux should ever
attain complete supranational integration, it would be functional to maintain some degree of
local governmental structure in units that are the present Belgium and the Netherlands.
The inclusion of small Luxembourg was also not simply a matter of adding a nation to an exist-
ing union; the way was prepared, as far back as 1921, by a customs union (BELU) with Bel-
gium, which is maintained as a sub-union of the present, larger union, just as Benelux itself is a
viable part of the EEC.16

The 13 colonies that formed the United States were more or less autonomous societal
units with internal consensus-formation mechanisms. These societal units were not abolished
with the federation, but found expression in the states' governments. They still have an impor-
tant influence on the Federal government, both by carrying out some functions on a state
level and through representation in the Senate. Moreover, groups of states—the South, East,
Midwest, and West (sometimes smaller groupings, e.g., the New England States or the South-
west) are still an important middle level of consensus formation informally recognized in
Congress and in party conventions. The union here, as in Benelux, was completed only after
a war between the South and the North, which did not eliminate either the South or the North
or the states, as meaningful intermediary units in American politics. A similar analysis could be
applied to the various Swiss cantons, and possibly even to their German and French-
Italian groupings. Here too, civil wars, one as late as the suppression of a rebellion of a
Roman Catholic canton in 1847, preceded but did not prevent federation in 1848.11 To return
to the contemporary scene, the Organization of American States, which has 21 members,
may well be too large for effective, one-level unification; recent efforts to form common
markets have been made between five Central American countries and seven South American
countries. The possibility of forming a more encompassing union later is explicitly recognized.19

The strains that have re-asserted themselves in the last two years in the relations between the
United States and western European powers, especially over the question of national nuclear
deterrents, advance rather than retard the political unification of France and West Ger-
many, and will not necessarily as often claimed, undermine the proposed Atlantic Union.12

It would be hasty, however, to conclude from the preceding discussion that the only or
the best way to form a European Community is to integrate the EEC and the EFTA—as they
are—in some super-system. Before the validity of other approaches can be assessed, some addi-
tional factors that affect supranational unification need to be examined. First, there is the
question of the degree of integration a union aims at and the scope desired.

IV. DEGREE OF INTEGRATION, AND SCOPE

Political communities of nations differ from other international systems—such as alliances,
blocks, international organizations—in having a "supranational" structure and not just an in-
tergovernmental one. By definition they have one center of government that legitimately de-
crees and enforces decisions within its jurisdiction on matters that affect the member nations
and their citizens; this requires a higher degree of consensus than the inter-governmental struc-
ture of other international systems. Since the decisions of inter-governmental bodies are not
binding and collective international actions are under national control, consensus can often be
worked out in an ad hoc manner, and on specific issues, even when general consensus is lacking.

In short, supranationalism is a politically more integrated structure which requires correspond-
ingly more consensus formation than typical inter-governmental organizations.14 This is,
though, a question of degree, not a "yes" or "no" proposition. NATO, for instance, has a
supranational SHAPE, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) its High Authority,
and the European Economic Community, the Economic Commission; but all have also supe-
rior inter-governmental bodies, the various Councils of Ministers. They are, thus, part
supranational, part inter-governmental.15 Since the Council of Ministers has both formal and
realistic superiority, these European bodies

14 Cf. Walter Lippmann, Western Unity and the Common Market (Boston, 1962), ch. 3.
15 For a keen analysis of the difference between inter-governmental and supranational structures, see Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe
16 This point is elaborated in my "A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification," World Politics, Vol. XV (October 1962), pp. 44.
should be regarded as predominantly intergovernmental.

We would expect that the smaller a union is, all other things equal, the more homogeneous it could be, and the more integrated and “supranational.” This is in fact the case since, while many international organizations include almost all the states there are, from five continents and from all blocs (e.g., 109 members of the UN), most supranational communities have less than ten members and are, comparatively homogeneous in their cultural, educational, economic, and political backgrounds. Hence, the question, whether the EEC and the EFTA should be merged and if merged should be preserved as sub-units, is in part dependent upon the degree of integration sought. A highly integrated union—a United States of Europe—is least likely to be formed by a large expansion of the membership of the EEC, while a customs union directed by an inter-governmental body can readily accommodate a membership larger than that of the EEC and the EFTA combined. This conclusion, reached on the basis of studying the relationship between integration, heterogeneity and size, is reinforced by an examination of the relationship between integration and scope.

International systems differ in the number of societal sectors they pervade. Some, especially international organizations, are strictly mono-sectoral; they deal only with labor issues, or health issues, or postal services, or aviation; and as a rule only with some activities in these sectors, and not necessarily the most central ones. Other international organizations penetrate into two or more sectors (as, for instance, the Nordic Council which serves political, economic, educational, and cultural needs of the member-nations). The larger the sectoral scope of a union, the more consensus is required, and hence the fewer the number of nations (or more precisely, the degree of heterogeneity) it can tolerate, and the more it will need two (or more) structural levels of consensus formation. Thus, it is not surprising that the typical mono-sectoral unions have many members, while typical multi-sectoral unions have only from 3 to 8 members: for instance, the Nordic Council has 5 members; the Eastern European Community (with two major organizations as tools, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid) has 8 members; the Conseil de l’Entente has 4, and Benelux has 3.

Even more important than the number of sectors encompassed is the nature of any particular sector to be integrated, in terms of its articulation with other sectors of the same society. Several authorities in the study of supranationalism have pointed out that integration in one sector tends to spill over into other sectors, i.e., tends to trigger integration in them as well. Haas’ study of the ECSC, for instance, shows how it spilled over into Euratom and the EEC. He has also suggested that various societal sectors differ in their spill-over function. On the basis of various sociological considerations that cannot be elaborated here, I would order international organizations in various sectors with respect to their spill-over tendencies—from low to high—as follows: (a) organizations that deal with services, such as postal services, allocation of radio frequencies, police cooperation, etc.; (b) organizations dealing with labor, health, and cultural exchange, i.e., services to which “human values” are attached; (c) tariff agreements and military organizations; (d) economic unions or common markets.

The spill-over phenomenon points to the fact that societal sectors differ in the degree to which they are inter-related. Integrating some of them triggers unification tendencies in many other sectors; while integrating some other sectors has comparatively small repercussions. The military sector, for instance, is highly segregated and autonomous, unless industrial mobilization is involved. Military units of two nations can be integrated, their war plans coordinated, their navies participate in combined maneuvers, military information extensively exchanged, etc., without this having much effect on other societal sectors. Only

8 See note 1, above, on the relationship between size and heterogeneity.

9 The union of the United States, well “prepared” by 1789, took a hundred years and a civil war before it solidified, and yet was one of a highly homogeneous group: “... Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs.” John Jay, The Federalist, No. 2, cited by Gerald J. Mangone, The Idea and Practice of World Government (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 26, fn. 10.

10 Uniting of Europe, op. cit.
when integration reaches the higher level of policy making is there a considerable spillover into the political sector, and this because integration here requires some governmental integration, e.g., of Defense Departments. Similarly, standardization of weapons and other equipment often has some repercussions on the economic sector. Economic integration, on the other hand, affects all societal groups—consumers, producers, management, labor, farmers, small business—and therefore tends to have extensive political repercussions. In contrast, tariff agreements, especially to the degree that they cover only some goods and concern only reduction but not abolition of tariffs, affect only some exporters and importers and a limited number of related industries. It is only as such unions become so broadly encompassing as to tend to affect the flow of capital, monetary policy, levels of employment, etc., in the countries involved, that they spill over into economic unions, i.e., that they trigger integration of many other spheres.

In cases where the unification of a high spillover sector has occurred and unification of other-related sectors is blocked, an unbalanced state is created which generates pressures to “solve” the imbalance, either by removing the blocks or by reducing the degree of unification in the sector in which it was initiated. For instance, if furnishing nuclear weapons to NATO would require NATO to create a joint political authority to command their use (there would hardly be time to consult 15 governments if NATO is attacked nuclearily, and contingent decisions are unsatisfactory), and if for some reason the 15 nations are not “ready” for the required political integration, these would be two factors working against the acceptance of such weapons by NATO. The prospect that spillover from the military into the political sector is blocked would work against military integration. [Integration, so to speak, proceeds in steps. There are several plateaus on which one can rest, but one cannot stand on two steps simultaneously; one has either to progress to more encompassing unification or retreat to a narrower one.]

What does the study of the scope of integration and spillover add to our understanding of EFTA-EEC relations? The EEC is continuously growing closer to an economic union, above and beyond a mere tariff agreement. Such unions have high spillover effects, as is evident in the EEC talks about federation and in increased public and private support for a strong, political EEC.

In short, by 1962, the Europe of the Six was on the verge of an increasing spillover into the political sector. Britain, on the other hand, though consistently interested in a European tariff agreement, or even in an economic one, was ambivalent if not negatively disposed toward a political union. This was one of the major reasons why England did not join the EEC in the first place and instead joined the EFTA, a free trade association with limited spillover potentialities. By 1961 Britain had changed its position. EFTA clearly failed. Some of its members traded more across the tariff wall with EEC countries than with each other. While customs reductions within the EEC seemed to trigger a rapid rate of economic growth—better than six per cent a year—economic stagnation in Britain continued. The prospect of a fully integrated Western Europe became more and more real. Hence Britain’s resolution, in the middle of 1961, to abandon EFTA, to weaken its ties to the Commonwealth if necessary, and to join the EEC on any reasonable conditions. Britain’s interest in the EEC is, though, almost completely economic. British feelings against political unification with the continent have deep roots which include a long history of hegemony; a self-image of a big power, or even more painful, of an ex-big power, jealous of its remaining privileges, sensitive about its status, anxious to preserve its strong ties to the Commonwealth and to the United States. Many of these roots will have to be considerably weakened before the United Kingdom can genuinely participate in a political integration of Western Europe.

Last but not least, is the question of hegemony in the EEC. International communities seem to function best when one nation has clear hegemony. Sometimes, two countries can share the leadership, especially when there is a third outside force against which they unite. This is the present situation in the EEC, where

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France and West Germany share the leadership. Systems with three leaders hardly ever stabilize. There are too many latent and tempting benefits to be derived from the collusion or coalition of two against the third partner. On all these counts, Britain’s entry into the EEC makes the completion of the spill-over from the economic to the political area quite unlikely. And this may mean that the EEC will not even remain an economic union, but instead will more likely regress to the level of a tariff agreement. This point requires some elaboration.

International unions of this type seem to have two stable stages: low integration with little or no spill-over, and high integration, where unification initiated in one sector spills over to many others, especially the political. Unions that try to maintain a medium-level integration, e.g., economic only, or economic with a minimum of political integration, are unstable, not because they are likely to disintegrate but because their capacity to form consensus is out of balance with the need for it: they are likely to become more integrated or regress to a lower level of integration. The chances, in case England joins the EEC, favor regression rather than progression.

The fact that England and other EFTA members apply for membership in the EEC as individual countries, not en bloc, makes high integration of the EEC less, not more, likely, for it produces a merger rather than a synthesis on a higher level. One might therefore be inclined to favor the formation of a super-system, to include both the EFTA and the EEC as sub-units. But this will not do because the units of an effective union, one that can maintain an adequate level of consensus, have to be fairly cohesive, stable units. One cannot build a second floor structure of consensus formation unless the first one has a firm foundation. While the EEC is already quite cohesive, and becoming more so, the EFTA is not. EFTA was formed, not out of any genuine commitment to a union, but to countervail the EEC; it was viewed as a temporary union, to be used to bargain with the EEC, hardly a morale-building feature. Austria and Switzerland, e.g., trade more with EEC countries than with EFTA countries. In addition, the EFTA membership is highly heterogeneous: it includes NATO and non-NATO members; democracies and Portugal; Protestant countries and Austria.

The preceding discussion suggests that western Europe includes too many countries, is too heterogeneous, to form one union. It follows that two or more unions are needed, to form the units of a larger system. But it does not follow that the unification of any specific group of countries would be more conducive to European integration than any other, as long as cohesive unions serve as building blocks. One course toward unification is the expansion of the EEC to include a few more countries (though not all the members of the EFTA), such as some that are contiguous to the EEC and less competitive for its leadership than Britain. Austria and Switzerland are natural candidates. The fact that they are not NATO countries, and in the past have taken a neutral position in the intra-bloc strife, is not necessarily a barrier to their inclusion, probably first as associate members; and later as full members, to be included also in the political union. The neutrality of these nations is quite pro-Western and both France (since De Gaulle) and West Germany (since the inclusion of the Free Democrats in the government) move in the direction of a somewhat more “independent” foreign policy. [It is hard to see how the USSR could stop a gradual integration of Austria into the EEC.]

Another European union, the Scandinavian community, forms a core for a larger union. It has already grown from three to five members, adding Iceland and Finland to Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Once European trade problems are solved in a large framework, as discussed below, Britain might find this union—which is democratic, Protestant and welfare-oriented—more appealing for political unification than the continental one. Portugal and Spain have been reported to have considered an Iberian union of their own. Once the major requirements of small size and cohesion are satisfied, other possible combinations might emerge; the major question that remains is the type of super-system to which these unions can belong.

V. KINDS OF SUPER-SYSTEMS

How encompassing could such a super-system be, in terms of the number of unions to be included? What could be the functions of the super-system, above and beyond those of the member unions? The major alternatives discussed seem to be a European super-system or an Atlantic one, the latter to include the United

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States and Canada in addition to the European countries (including either all western Europe or only NATO members).*8

The following analysis suggests that a European super-system*9 will be more integrated and stable than an Atlantic one, as long as it will itself be a part of a third-level organization. The main reason for this is that the United States, as the leading Western power, has many commitments and functions in other international communities than the European ones, especially in Latin America, but also in the Far East, South East Asia, the Middle East, and to an increasing degree in Africa. Strong integration of the United States in a European union would impose sharp strains on these other American ties.

The optimal participation for the United States is on the third level of consensus formation, a structural level where super-systems—of several European unions, of several African ones, and of several Latin American ones, etc.—are integrated in a single super-super-system, already vaguely recognized as the “Free World.” A three-level structure may perhaps seem too complicated to be attained, or if attained, to function effectively. It should therefore be pointed out that three-level structures are quite common. Most national governments and practically all large corporate enterprises have at least a three-level structure, and many of them are quite effective. Actually, the evolution of a third-level structure would not preclude active participation in the development of a fourth-level, that of the United Nations.

The main problem is not the number of levels but the distribution of functions, powers and political loyalties among the various levels. The formal, legal and institutional differences between unions whose members are nations, and super-systems whose members are unions, is that representation in super-systems is in the hands of those who speak in the name of the unions (e.g., the EEC), either in addition to or instead of national representatives. For the division of functions, we can consider two major possibilities: one is that the super-sys-

tems will be a replica of member-unions on a more encompassing level. Such a super-system is approximated (in limited spheres to be sure) in the relations between the EEC and the EFTA in the OEEC and in GATT. Each group, for instance, introduced some internal reductions of tariffs, then met in the wider arena of GATT to consider mutual tariff cuts—as well as small cuts for “third” countries, not members of either union. According to this plan the control of one specific function, in this case setting tariff rates, is divided between two levels beyond the national one: that of the unions and that of the super-system.

The second way to integrate unions into super-systems is to introduce a functional division of labor among the levels instead of a differentiation of authority. One such arrangement might take the form of leaving to the small, cohesive unions the economic and political functions: to the super-systems, the role of unitary integration; and to the third-level system (or bloc), the coordination of foreign policy, monetary policy (e.g., through a revised International Monetary Fund), and tariff agreements.*10 This might also be the best level on which to coordinate aid to underdeveloped countries.

This specific division only illustrates the nature of inter-level division of functions; of course other arrangements can be worked out. It should, though, be emphasized that the division outlined above takes into account the need to reserve to smaller, lower-level units those functions that require a high degree of consensus formation and hence of relatively strong supranationalism. The actual structure of the West approaches such a division with the smaller economic-political EEC and Nordic Council, the larger NATO, and the still more encompassing GATT, IMF, and OECD. The third-level system is still highly informal, and centered around trips of premiers to Washington, foreign tours of American representatives, and regional meetings—but no Free World ministerial conferences.

Which of the two types of inter-level division is optimal has yet to be determined. It seems that they differ in effectiveness with regard to different goals: functional division of labor seems better for short-run stability, and an inter-level division of control over each function the better for long-run integration of second- and third-level super-systems. This


*9 Not to be confused with a merger of nations as “individuals” in a European union, such as “revised” OEEC.

latter seems to be the case because here high spill-over functions are in part carried out by super-systems, and because the units which carry out high spill-over functions command more political loyalty than those which do not.

The long-run trend toward integration seems to be for functions, authority and loyalties to be transferred from smaller units to larger ones; from states to federations; from federations to supranational unions; and from these to supersystems. This transfer may progress without major upsets because a variety of processes tend to reduce the heterogeneity of the member-units—through industrialization, the spread of education, democratization, and the unification process—to lower-level units. Hence the transfer of additional powers of decision to higher levels—those encompassing more members—need not undermine stabilization as long as the pace of upgrading function or authority does not overtake that of decreasing heterogeneity. We close with the speculative, though not unimaginable possibility that eventually, in this way, the highest super-system, that of a global society, might develop.

This point is elaborated in my *The Hard Way to Peace* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), ch. 8.