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A PARADIGM FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL UNIFICATION

By AMITAI ETZIONI

A PARADIGM is more than a perspective but less than a theory. It provides a set of interrelated questions, but no hypothetical answers or account of validated propositions. It provides a "language," a net of variables, but it does not specify the relationships among the parameters of these variables. It is less vague than a mere perspective, providing an ordered, specific, and often logically exhaustive and tightly ordered focus for research and speculation. A paradigm is often a stage on the way from an old perspective to a new theory.¹

The test of a paradigm is not only the validity of the theories constructed with its help, but also its fruitfulness in terms of the spectrum of significant problems whose study benefits from it. First we turn to delineating the subject matter of our paradigm and then we present the paradigm itself. The major body of this article is devoted to an indication of the kinds of problems that can be handled by this instrument; at the same time, we hope to point out some of the issues that are essential to an understanding of political unification.

I. Delineation of the Subject and Concepts

Our paradigm provides a set of dimensions for the study of a process—specifically, the formation of political communities out of units that previously shared no or only a few political bonds. This process is referred to as unification. We are particularly interested in the unification of already existing nations. But the paradigm applies also to the formation of other political communities, such as national communities, out of tribal, village, or feudal societies.

A community is fully established only when it has self-sufficient integrative mechanisms—that is, the continuation of its existence and form² is provided by its own processes and not dependent upon those

* This article was written while I was a Research Associate at the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. I am indebted to Ernst B. Haas for valuable comments on an earlier version of it.

¹ Two paradigms that had a lasting impact on sociology have been constructed by Robert K. Merton, one for functional analysis and one for the study of sociology of knowledge. See his Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. ed., Glencoe, Ill., 1957).

² Most functional models deal only with the conditions under which a collectivity survives. I spelled out elsewhere the need to study the conditions under which a col-
of external systems or member-units. A political community is a community that possesses three kinds of integration: (a) it has a monopoly over the legitimate use of means of violence (though it may "delegate" some of this monopoly to member-units); (b) it has a center of decision-making that is able to affect the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and (c) it is the superior focus of political identification for the large majority of the politically aware citizens.

The degree of integration is the main characteristic that distinguishes political communities, whose member-units are nations, from other international systems. International system is the more encompassing concept, indicating that changes in the action of one nation affect actions in others and that these changes, in turn, have repercussions on the unit or units in which or from which the change was initiated. While the parts of a system are, by definition, interrelated, its level of integration—on each of the three counts specified above—may be high or low, and its interdependence may be self-maintained or sustained by the component units (e.g., nations), or be a product of the external environment (e.g., forced by a superior power, not a member of the system). One cannot, for instance, deduce from the fact that the USSR and the United States have become part of one global system—that they affect each other—anything about the integrative level of this relationship. Even countries engaged in war are parts of one system. In short, parts of systems are interdependent; members of communities are integrated.

Several of the most frequently used terms in international studies, usually defined inductively and eclectically, can be viewed as applying to international systems that differ consistently in their degree of integration. International organizations, blocs, and empires are all international systems that are more integrated than mere international systems but less integrated than political communities. They can be fruitfully ordered according to their relative position on the three dimensions of integration. First let us consider monopoly of the legitimate use of means of violence. International organizations command no

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lectivity maintains its form or structure (or, in the case of organization, its level of effectiveness). See Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and a Suggestion," Administrative Science Quarterly, v (September 1960), 257-78.


such means,\(^5\) let alone a monopoly over their legitimate use. Members of blocs (and alliances) often coordinate their military efforts (as did the Allied Forces in World War II) but the forces remain chiefly under the control of the member-units, the nations. Empires have armed forces of their own, but their claim to legitimate monopoly is frequently challenged by member-units. Only political communities are international systems that have well-established, legitimate monopolies.

All of these types of international systems have some common decision-making center, but they differ greatly in the capacity and scope of this center. International organizations are consultative bodies, whose decision-making scope is limited to one or a few spheres (e.g., postal services, or health, or labor, etc.), and to functions that are not essential to the survival of the member-units, nor do these functions have a significant bearing on their ability to pursue their national interests. The decision-making of blocs (and alliances) tends to be consultative, like that of international organizations, but their scope is larger. They are often multi-functional (e.g., political and military; cultural and economic), and the functions affected are more highly valued by the member-societies than those involved in typical international organizations. Empires have a considerable amount of decision-making power that binds member-units—i.e., their decisions are enforceable. Their scope is larger than that of blocs, frequently encompassing political, military, and economic functions as well as those of communication, culture, education, and the like. The decision-making centers of empires are not as encompassing as those of political communities, not in regard to their power but in the legitimation of the decisions made. Since membership in empires is not voluntary, and responsiveness to member-units is not high, it might well be said that empires have “supranational” power, but only limited “supranational” authority.\(^6\)

Finally, international organizations rarely serve as a focus of political identification. Blocs, historically, have been lacking in this value, though since World War I blocs have acquired some ideological meaning (as the contemporary “Free World” has). Empires, on the whole, are not much more integrated on this score than blocs, but they usually have at least one core unit (Rome, Britain) that strongly identifies with the empire, a commitment only approximated but not matched by bloc leaders. There was a paternalistic element in the orientation of the

\(^5\) The League of Nations and the UN differ from most international organizations on so many counts that they should be treated as a distinct category.

\(^6\) Following Max Weber, “authority” is defined as legitimate power.
core-country of empires to those subordinated to it; the orientation of bloc “superpowers” to other bloc members tends to be governed more by expediency. The core-countries used to view the empire as an extension of their own polities; they often attempted to assimilate the subordinate units into the superordinating one. They even granted citizenship to the indigenous populations. The bloc superpower, on the other hand, usually views the bloc as a limited partnership with outsiders. (The Soviet system comes closer to an empire than a bloc from this viewpoint.) At least some local elites in the subordinate countries responded by identifying with the empire, a phenomenon less intensively reproduced in the attitude of members of blocs to the superpower (e.g., it seems that there were more Romano-philes in Greece than there are U.S.-philes in England). In short, empires drew more identification than blocs but neither attracted the kind of encompassing and intensive identification that political communities command.

Thus, in sum, on these three counts, international organizations are less integrated than blocs, blocs less than empires, and empires less than political communities.

The concepts of international organization, bloc, empire, and political community are used in the literature of international relations only approximately as defined here. Since these concepts were originally employed by historians and journalists, they do not constitute part of a formal language or theory. Hence it is not surprising that when they are defined deductively and viewed as positions in a multi-dimensional space, some discrepancies between their definition and their traditional usage occur. By our definition the Soviet bloc, between 1945 and 1953—at least some parts of it—was not a “bloc,” but an empire; parts of the Roman Empire, at least in its heyday, were not an “empire,” but a political community. It would be futile to search for deductive definitions that will exactly fit concrete cases or inductive concepts. Actually it is a point in favor of our approach that it calls attention to the fact that behind the commonly used labels lie analytically different phenomena. We gain from this distinction by being able to note that since 1953 the Eastern European part of the Soviet system (with the exception of Albania) has changed from an empire system to a system somewhat closer to that of a political community, rather than stating

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8 An hypothesis emerges from this comparison: the broader the scope of an international system in terms of the number of sectors (e.g., economic, cultural) included, and the more significant they are to its survival and goals, the more integrated the system is on all three counts of integration (monopoly, decision-making, and focusing of identification). I return to this point below.
that the Soviet system—all of it—was and is a bloc, just as, let us say, the Free World is. Similarly, it might be useful to state that the Roman system, during its heyday, at least for the countries other than those at its periphery, came much closer to a political community than, let us say, the Ottoman system, which was chiefly an empire. Such statements require keeping our definition analytically pure, and viewing reality as being composed of various configurations of our analytical concepts.

Our paradigm serves not so much to study this or that state of integration but the process of unification, a process through which integration is increased. Since systems that are moving toward a community—that is, a high level of integration—are often confused with those that have reached such a state—as when one refers to the present European or Scandinavian system as a supranational community—we introduce a concept to avoid this ambiguity. We use the term “unions” to refer to potential political communities, systems that are in the process of increasing their integration. “Political communities” is used to refer strictly to highly integrated systems.

II. A Unification Paradigm

Four major questions have to be asked about every process: Under what conditions is it initiated? What forces direct its development? What path does it take? And, what is the state of the system affected by the process once that process is terminated? We use this paradigm of processes to construct one for the study of political unification, especially for the study of unification of nations. We ask first, what is the state of the international relations and the various political units when the increase in integration is initiated? Which factors enhance, and which hinder, unification? Once unification has been initiated, we ask what forces are applied to control the process, and how are these forces distributed among the various participants? What pattern does unification itself follow? Do all societal sectors unify simultaneously or successively and, if successively, in what order? Which sector comes first, which later? Finally, we ask, once unification is interrupted or has ceased, what degree of integration has the system reached, how encompassing has it become, and what function does it serve?

Whatever the independent variable—background conditions, integrating forces, retarding factors—we turn to the same dependent variables: the degree and scope of unification; that is, we wish to out-
line the problems involved in determining the effect these various factors have on the success or failure of unification.

More specifically, our paradigm includes the following dimensions:

1. The Pre-Unification State
   (i) Unit Properties
       a. Individual properties
       b. Analytical properties
   (ii) Environment Properties
       a. Non-social (ecological) properties
       b. Social properties
   (iii) System Properties
       a. Pre-unification integration and scope
       b. Shared properties (other than integration)

2. The Unification Process: A. Integrating Forces
   (i) Effective Configurations
   (ii) Effective Distributions
       a. Degree of elitism
       b. Degree of internalization

3. The Unification Process: B. Integrating Sectors
   (i) The First Stage: Take-off
       a. Determinants of take-off
       b. The take-off sector
   (ii) Expansion of the Union’s Scope
       a. A stable scope
       b. Sequences of unification

4. The Termination State
   (i) Degree and Scope
   (ii) The Dominant Function

In the following pages we briefly discuss some of the conceptual problems involved in applying our paradigm, devoting the main body of this article to a discussion of the specific researchable questions that the paradigm raises for those who study political unification.

III. THE PARADIGM: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND ILLUSTRATIONS

I. THE PRE-UNIFICATION STATE

The question of under what condition the process of unification is initiated must be answered from four viewpoints. First, what is the

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*This should not be viewed as a table of contents, since conceptual digressions are not included.*
state of each societal unit that is to become a member of a particular union? Is it likely to resist unification or is it willing and able? Second, what is the aggregate of these units like: are most or all units "ready" for unification, or only a few? Third, what are the units like that do not participate—that is, are environmental factors favorable for unification? Finally, to what degree was there international independence and integration before the process of unification (i.e., of build-up in the degree and scope of integration) had occurred? Many specific questions have to be answered before any such general questions can be tackled. In the following pages no attempt is made to examine specific problems or provide any inventory of all or most of the issues involved. We will only illustrate each of the four basic perspectives by discussing one or two of the questions raised by an effort to establish the conditions that existed before or during a unification process.

(i) Unit Properties

(a) Individual properties: Integration and resistance to unification. The unification process is one in which control of the means of violence, resources, and rewards and identification are transferred from member-units to the system in which they are members. This obviously involves at least some reduction of the integration of the member-units (they become more dependent on the system). It is, therefore, clear that the degree to which these units have been initially integrated greatly affects their potential resistance to unification. The question is, what level or levels of unit-integration are most conducive to unification? One possibility is low-level integration. Haas, for instance, showed that the internal fragmentation of European societies (e.g., sharp cleavages between labor and management) enhanced the development of the ECSC and the EEC.10 Another possibility is high integration. Countries that fall apart, like the Republic of the Congo, can hardly form a union with other countries. The efforts of Ghana to unify its tribes impede its effort to give substance to the Union of African States that it founded with Guinea and Mali. Actually, most developing countries are less integrated than developed ones, and less often engage in successful inter-country unifications.11 Thus lack of unit-integration might hinder super-unit integration.

Other possibilities also have to be entertained until research answers

10 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford 1958), passim.
these questions: A medium level of unit-integration might be optimal for unification. Or, medium unit-integration might be conducive to the first stage of unification; low unit-integration, to later stages. Or, unit-integration might be high in countries supporting unification, and low in those resisting it.

Further specification of the study of the effects of unit-integration might proceed by studying the effects of differences in the degree of integration on the three dimensions spelled out above. For instance, we may need to know how much control over means of violence the government of a member-nation has, how responsive the national center of decision-making is to various groups of the population, and how legitimate the government is. What is the nature of the unit-legitimation: is it chiefly religious or secular? In either case, is it national (like the tradition of the English Church or the American “heritage”) or cosmopolitan (as Catholicism and communism are)? What effect do these differences have on unification?

The reader may have noticed by now that we studiously avoid the term “supranational communities,” which is often used in referring to regional political communities. This term should be avoided because it turns one possible parameter of a variable into part of the definition of a concept. In supranational communities the legitimation of the unit-members is high, and it is of the secular-historical type called “nationalism.” But many historical and contemporary unions have been initiated among units that either were expressing their nationalism by creating the union (e.g., Germany, Italy) or took place before nationalism significantly affected either the units or the system (e.g., the federation of Nigeria). In short, unification might be initiated in a prenationalist period, in a post-nationalist one, or be, itself, an expression of nationalism. It would seem that post-nationalist unifications would be more difficult to attain than the other two kinds, and that unification that expresses nationalism would be the easiest to accomplish. But, so far, the fact is that the two most successful contemporary unions—the Scandinavian one and the EEC—are post-nationalist. Thus, this question, too, must be left open for further research.

(b) Analytical properties: Heterogeneity and unification. Analytical properties are not the property of any single unit but are derived from a study of the distribution of unit-attributes.\(^{12}\) Unlike unit-properties

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and relational properties, analytical properties cannot be observed. They are "second order" abstractions.

The most important analytical property for the study of prerequisites of unification seems to be the degree of heterogeneity of the merging units. It is commonly assumed that the less homogeneous a group, whether it is a small group, community, or nation, the less likely it is to be highly integrated. It would seem that this is also the case on the international level. Differences in income per capita (or, national wealth) have been one of the factors that hindered or undermined unions. The higher income per capita of Nigeria and of the Ivory Coast was one reason they did not join the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union; it affected Jamaica's vote against the constitution of the Federation of the West Indies (September 1961); it contributed to the secession of Syria from the UAR, and to the Katanga secession from the Republic of the Congo. Richer Senegal broke a union—the Federation of Mali—with poorer Mali. In all these cases, unification would or did entail some "leveling" before the citizens of the unit to be adversely affected were committed to the evolving union. In Syria, for instance, many army officers, politicians, and journalists lost their jobs as the result of the union, and foreign trade privileges, important to the large Syrian merchant class, were concentrated in Cairo.

Most contemporary unification efforts have been made among countries that have not only a similar level of income per capita but also a similar level of literacy, civilization, and culture, and a similar degree of industrialization. This holds for the Central American Union, the two West European unions, two West African unions, and the East European one (all to be discussed below).

Political homogeneity is given as one of the necessary prerequisites for unification, and as one of the reasons why the European Economic Community (EEC)—which includes only democratic countries—was more successful than the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and NATO, which include both democratic and nondemocratic countries (e.g., Portugal).

It would, however, not be safe to conclude that heterogeneity necessarily hinders unification. Because nationalism initially tended to unify people with a common ethnic background, a shared cultural tradition and language, the impression was created that these were necessary

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prerequisites for unification. Actually, an increasing number of nations, like Switzerland and Canada, are highly divergent on all these counts. Nigeria, for example, holds 250 different tribes. When the Nigerian government issued pamphlets to explain its new constitution to its citizens, it had to publish them in 12 languages in addition to English. Many nation-unions are multilingual, including Benelux, the EEC, the Scandinavian union, and the East European union.

Moreover, there is at least one major type of heterogeneity that enhances rather than hinders unification. Differences in economic specialization of countries, such as between agrarian and industrial countries, or light and heavy industrial concentrations, are supportive to unification. Thus, the question as to whether heterogeneity indeed hinders unification, or under what conditions it does or does not, has yet to be answered. Nor has the question been solved as to how various properties differ with regard to the degree of homogeneity necessary for unification: Is economic heterogeneity as detrimental as cultural heterogeneity? Is political homogeneity as necessary as similarity in income per capita?

While we are interested here only in these properties as prerequisites, it might be worth while to note in passing that, once unification is launched, it is not only affected by but also affects the degree of heterogeneity. For instance, linguistic heterogeneity is reduced when one language becomes the common second language of the participant countries (like Russian in East Europe, and English in those Commonwealth countries for which it is not the primary one). Cultural heterogeneity is somewhat reduced by developing shared educational institutions such as the Collège de l'Europe in Bruges, the new European University of Florence, the Scandinavian Academy (both now planned) as well as increased communication, tourism, and cultural exchange programs. Economic compatibility among the East European countries is promoted by a twenty-year plan of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. The Agreement on the Regime for Central American Integrated Industries and the Multilateral Treaty on Central American Free Trade Area and Economic Integration, both signed in June 1958 by the five Central American countries, spell out an inter-country specialization program, according to which new industry developed in one country will not be developed in the others. Finally, political

homogeneity was maintained in an earlier Central American union by dropping Guatemala during the period it was under the rule of the left-wing Arbenz government. Thus, the study of the effects of heterogeneity on the success of efforts to initiate unification has to take into account not only that heterogeneity may not necessarily hinder unification, but that when it does, part of the effort to initiate a union might be channeled toward a reduction of the heterogeneity. The degree to which such effort is successful depends, in part, like that of other unification efforts, on the environment in which the effort is made.

(ii) Environment Properties: Ecological and Social

Environmental properties include ecological factors, such as the physical environment in which the union is initiated and by which it is surrounded, and social factors—properties of nonmember units that affect unification.

(a) Nonsocial (ecological) properties: Union of nonadjacent territories. Many ecological factors affect the probability that a union will be initiated, including the morphology of the region, the distribution of natural resources in it, the existence (or nonexistence) of a natural border that marks the area. High mountain ranges, for example, have been an important barrier to unifications of Central America and South America; the recent development of a Pan-American Highway is reported to improve chances that the new unions will be successfully initiated.

Territorial unity of political communities seems to be so important that there is a question as to whether a union of nonadjacent territories—that is, one in which the ecological base of the union is broken up by a "no man's land" (e.g., seas) or by nonmember countries—can be successfully formed at all.

Lack of adjacency is an unsettling, tension-provoking factor even for national political communities. West Germany and West Berlin, and West and East Pakistan are two well-known cases. The separation of a small Israeli enclave on Mt. Scopus in the Palestinian part of Jordan is similarly a source of tension. Adjacency of all member countries seems to be one factor in favor of the EEC, and lack of it seems to be one factor undermining EFTA, in which Austria and Switzerland share a union with Portugal, Britain, and the Scandinavian countries. (Interestingly, the three adjacent members of the EFTA constitute a

stronger union, the Scandinavian community.) The United Arab Republic was adversely affected by the lack of a shared border between Syria and Egypt. Albania's low integration into the East European Communist union is in part explained by the lack of a shared border between it and other member countries. (It was much better integrated with the union as long as Yugoslavia was also a member.) Mexico is the only country of the seven members of the Latin American Free Trade Area that shares no borders with the others; it remains to be seen if Mexico will be a viable member. The nonadjacent Ghana-Guinea-Mali union has so far acquired little substance. The stretches of the Caribbean Sea that separate Jamaica from Trinidad and from other islands of the Federation of the West Indies certainly hinder the Federation's development. Rebellions against the national government of Indonesia invariably are initiated on another island than Java, the seat of the government.

It would be hasty, though, to conclude that political unification is impossible without territorial unity. The island groups of both Japan and New Zealand are well integrated; so seem the Philippines; the union of England with Eire disintegrated in 1949, but England maintained its ties with North Ireland; Canada's union with Newfoundland is viable. Denmark is an integral part of a union with Norway and Sweden. One might suspect that these unions maintain themselves because the water stretches that separate their parts are fairly small, but the United States seems to have no difficulties in bridging the 2,000 miles that separate Hawaii from the mainland. Moreover, the British Commonwealth includes countries on five continents, only two of which share a border, and the union now has lasted more than four decades.\(^{18}\)

The study of the effect of territorial contiguity on unification will have to proceed by examining the underlying sociological and political variables that are affected by lack of adjacency in order to determine what compensating mechanisms are used to overcome its negative impact. The most often cited of such factors is hindrance to transportation of goods and people, which in turn hinders the integration of the societal units and cultural interactions.

Second, integration is negatively affected by the lack of freedom of movement for military units. Nasser might have suppressed the 1961 Syrian secession, or it might not have occurred, if the Egyptian army had been free to interfere from its home bases, unhindered by the

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intervening states, Jordan and Israel. This seems also to account, in part, for the ability of small Albania to be the only pro-China country of the Eastern European Communist union.

Third, because of the long association with statehood and nationalism, territorial unity has become a symbol of political unity, and its lack has therefore become an expression and symbol of division, as is the case in the West Indies, where the islands, rather than their federation, are the major frame of political identification. It would be of interest to establish to what degree being on a separate island bolstered the distinct social identity of Ireland, or of the various islands of Indonesia. To what degree command over modern means of communication and transportation, which these countries are gradually acquiring, will allow them to overcome differences in cultural tradition, language, and historical experiences created by the lack of such means in earlier generations is a question that has to be answered before the impact of lack of adjacency on unification can be determined.

(b) Social properties: Enemies, partners, and diffusion. The threat of a common enemy is probably the factor most often credited with initiating a union of countries. But Deutsch and his associates have already pointed out that this is much less common than is believed, and when a union is initiated to counter an enemy, it tends to disintegrate as the threat passes. The question is, of course, why a defensive alliance sometimes does mature into a more encompassing and lasting union, while in other cases its life is as short, if not shorter, than that of a real or conceived threat. We will return to this question below when the development of unions is discussed; suffice it to say here that the study of "initiation under threat" will have to take account of the predisposition toward unification of sectors other than the military, to determine the chances for such a union to succeed.

While the importance of common enemies may well be overemphasized, the desire to unite in order to avail against an overwhelming partner is underplayed for obvious reasons. This seems to be a central factor in accelerated subregional unification. We find frequently that when a region is uniting, one subarea is uniting more rapidly than the rest, and that this subarea includes the weaker members of the region. This holds for the Scandinavian countries in the EFTA, for the Benelux countries in the EEC, and for the South in the United States.

19 Deutsch and others, 44-46.
20 On the pre-EFTA period, see Frantz Wendt, The Nordic Council and Co-operation in Scandinavia (Copenhagen 1959).
But since in each of these cases stronger ties already existed among the subarea units than among the others before regional unification was initiated, the desire to countervail an overwhelming partner—England in EFTA; West Germany and France in the EEC; and the Northeast in the United States—has yet to be established. This would require demonstrating that these subareas continue to maintain a higher level of integration than the rest of the union, and that they are more integrated, the more “overwhelming” the superior partner or partners are.

A third way in which social units that are not a member of a specific union (or subunion) can affect it is through diffusion or imitation, a process often studied by anthropologists but rarely by students of international relations. There seems to be such a thing as “fashion” in international relations, in which institutions that function in one region are transferred to another. The Marshall Plan directly affected the formulation of the Molotov Plan; the formation of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, in West Europe, under the initiative of the United States, affected the foundation of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), in East Europe, by the USSR. The EFTA, created three years after the EEC, often imitated it. For instance, when the EEC accelerated cuts in customs for its members, the EFTA did the same for its members. Even the rates of cuts were similar.28 While the formation of economic unions in Latin America and Africa was discussed and planned before the development of the EEC, the particular treaties finally signed by LAFTA, the Central American Union, and the Conseil de l’Entente were affected by the text of the Treaty of Rome, and the institutions created for its implementation.24

While the present vogue is for common markets, the earlier one was for regional commissions. The South Pacific Commission (est. 1947), for instance, “took its model” from the Caribbean Commission (est. 1946). An Economic Commission for Europe was founded in 1947, and one for Latin America in 1948.25

The question arises whenever social patterns or political institutions (e.g., the American Constitution) are transferred from one region to

28 Miriam Camps, Division in Europe, Policy Memorandum No. 21 (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1960), 50.
24 The Arab League was sufficiently affected by the vogue to review twice the suggestion to form an Arabic common market. New York Times, October 12, 1958; Arab News and Views, July 1, 1961.
25 This is not an instance of pure diffusion, since all commissions are UN organs, but without a “vogue”—based on diffusion—they would hardly be so acceptable to the various countries represented. For another instance of diffusion, see Padelford, 43.
another: Are the conditions that allowed for the functioning of the pattern in region X available or reproducible in region Y? When this is not the case, one of two things is bound to happen: (a) the vogue for unification, like other fashions, follows its own dynamics—a rapid rise in popularity is succeeded by an equally rapid extinction. The imitation fails because of the different conditions, and the new institutions are rejected. Or (b) the imported institutions survive, maintaining the same formal structure, but actually fulfilling different functions. For example, EEC-type institutions in Central America might enhance development by reducing inter-country competition and coordinating development plans without much increase in the small inter-country trade. Thus, while the EEC serves chiefly to enhance the welfare of the participant countries through large inter-country trade, the Latin American unions will enhance industrialization through inter-country cooperation and coordination. If implemented, they will form development alliances, while called, in deference to the source of the vogue, “common markets” or “free trade areas.”

To what degree these unions are hampered by the use of an instrument originally forged for different purposes and to what degree the same international treaty can be used without negative repercussions to serve different functions—and which functions—are further questions that this paradigm raises but cannot answer.

(iii) System properties

Theoretically a unification process might start among countries that have had no previous relationship or were not interdependent and did not constitute an international system. Actually all the unification movements that we are aware of were initiated among countries that were previously interdependent. In any case, the study of the pre-unification stage is not complete unless the relationships among the potential participants in a union are investigated, even if the finding is that no such relationships existed. Both the pre-unification level of integration and its scope have to be assessed and other relevant properties (see below) of the system have to be determined. These properties will be remeasured when the unification process is terminated, and a comparison of the two sets of measures will inform us of the extent of the process.

(a) Pre-unification integration and scope. Unification is a process in which the integration of a system is increased, a process that tends to

26 See Gordon, 245-50.
be accompanied by expansion in the scope of the system in terms of the sectors that are "internationalized." This means that pre-unification integration and scope can be very low (just sharing a few international organizations), low (sharing membership in a bloc), or medium (as in empires); it is pre-unification as long as both do not grow, whatever the parameters happen to be (unless, of course, they are already maximal).  

(b) Shared properties: The example of culture. The pre-unification system may have many shared properties; which one or ones we chose to study before and after unification depends on the specific problem at hand. Let us examine briefly the effect of culture\textsuperscript{28} shared by the participants upon the initiation of unification.

According to widely held opinion, shared culture is an essential prerequisite for unification. It is pointed out that, under the impact of nationalism, old political units broke up (especially empires) or formed larger unions (Germany, Italy) in an effort to bring units that shared a culture and political unions in balance. Deutsch, for instance, shows in his important study, Backgrounds for Community, that sharing cultural symbols, ethnic origin, a language, a religion, a sense of identity, etc., preceded the formation of a union in practically every case he studied.  

On the other hand, many unions do not have most or all of these elements of shared culture. This holds true for Canada, the Union of South Africa, Switzerland, Belgium, Nigeria, India, and, of course, for most of the supranational unions from the EEC to the Eastern European one and from the British Commonwealth to the Union of African States.

One might view these two positions as completely contradictory and await additional findings and reexamination of earlier ones to determine which position is valid. It is possible, however, to view this contradiction as more apparent than real. Each of the following interpretations could resolve the contradiction, but which one does, if any, has to be determined empirically.

First one might claim that most cultural values are politically irrelevant. Information can be exchanged, aesthetic values be held in common, religious beliefs draw similar commitments—and the countries

\textsuperscript{27} For additional comments on the integration of the international systems in this stage, see the delineation of the subject above.

\textsuperscript{28} Culture being viewed in the broadest sense of the term, including religion, secular ideologies, civilization, language, arts, etc.

\textsuperscript{29} Karl W. Deutsch and others, Backgrounds for Community (in progress).
so disposed still may not share a sense of political identity or have the necessary foundation for a shared legitimate government. All Russian scientists might subscribe to American journals and all American scholars read Russian ones, and all Russians see _My Fair Lady_ (and like it) and all Americans appreciate the Moscow ballet, etc., and the two countries might still go to war the next day, not to mention failing to form a union. After all, the European societies shared culture and civilization during many hundreds of years and scores of wars. This position suggests that sharing culture is not required for unification, nor does the lack of a shared culture prevent it; it simply has little effect on political unification.

True, there is a limited set of values and symbols directly related to all unification, including legitimation of the new power center, a sense of national or supranational identity, shared political rituals, and the like. But it is the emergence of these shared political values that the study of unification has to explain; their existence is part of our definition of integration. If we view the same factors as our dependent variable (integration) and as our independent one (culture), we are spinning tautologies.

Another possible way to resolve the apparent contradiction is to claim that unions whose members do not share a culture may be initiated but will not develop successfully, at least not until their culture becomes shared. Thus, the Union of African States may well have little shared culture, and the British Commonwealth come to have less and less as non-Western societies join it, but the first union has yet to become a political-social reality, and the Commonwealth shows a parallel decrease of integration as the degree to which culture is shared is declining. Similarly, the success of the union of Nigeria and India is certainly not guaranteed; and to the extent that they increase their integration, they also increase their shared culture.

This view suggests that shared culture is not a prerequisite for unification but a requirement that has to be fulfilled before the process can be completed. No union, one might suggest, is safely integrated unless a shared culture has evolved. This would also imply that while cultural exchange programs can hardly trigger a unification process when other factors are missing, once unification is progressing—let us say, owing to economic, military, or political factors—cultural integration fulfills an independent role in an “advanced” stage of the unification process.

We would like to point out in passing that there may well be other such solidifiers—that is, factors that can operate effectively only in a
later stage of a process. Shared scientific projects, international professional associations and conventions, increased tourism, international television networks, sister-cities movements, supranational holidays, and multicountry universities may all then be able to play a role in those unions where they originally seemed "unnecessary" or impossible.

2. THE UNIFICATION PROCESS: A. INTEGRATING FORCES

Socio-political processes such as unification do not proceed in a trial-and-error fashion. Once initiated, they tend to follow one of a limited number of patterns (to be discussed in the subsequent section), according to the direction given to them by the integrating forces. This raises the question as to what kinds of integrating forces are applied in the unification process and who is applying them.

A CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES:
A CONCEPTUAL DIGRESSION

To decide which integrating force is the most effective in launching a successful unification endeavor requires clear conception of the kinds of integrating forces that exist. The following threefold classification seems to be satisfactory; integrating forces, we suggest, are either coercive (e.g., military forces), or utilitarian (e.g., economic sanctions), or normative (e.g., propaganda). The classification is exhaustive; each concrete power is either one of the three or is composed of their various combinations. The classification covers both "real" (coercive and utilitarian) and "ideal" (normative) elements. It directly represents the three major sociological schools: the Italian school of Pareto and Mosca, which was especially concerned with force; the economic-Marxist one; and the Weber-Durkheim tradition, which emphasized sentiments and ideas. However, it avoids a flaw common to all three: their tendency to see one set of factors—means of violence, ownership, or sentiments and ideas—as the major determinant of history and hence also of international relations.

On the most general level, one might state that international relations are characterized by the frequent use of coercion by one unit against another as compared with the interaction of other social units, and by less frequent and less effective exercise of normative power. Utilitarian powers are frequently used in international as well as intranational relations. Unification processes are directed by all three kinds of powers. Some unions are largely forced, as is the Federation of Rho-

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80 This classification is extensively discussed in my Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (Glencoe, Ill., 1961).
desia and Nyasaland. Some are "encouraged" mainly by economic means, as European unification in the OEEC initially was. In order to receive American reconstruction funds under the Marshall Plan, a country had to commit itself to cooperate with other European countries. Still other unions are initiated chiefly by propaganda pressures, as was the United Arab Republic. Other unifications were directed initially by a more balanced combination of various powers: Prussia, for instance, used them all—in good measure—to force, bribe, and persuade the German states to unite. Nor are all "subordinate" countries necessarily treated in the same way. Certainly the larger and more powerful Chile is more coddled and less subjected to pressure by the Latin American leaders, Argentina and Brazil, than is the small, weak, and highly dependent Paraguay.

(i) Effective Configurations

The question of which configuration of forces is most effective for unification has no one answer. It is quite evident that different kinds of unions (e.g., military only, economic only) develop effectively when different kinds of forces are used. Each stage of unification, of the same kind of union, might well require also a change in the forces applied to maximize the development of the union. Does one, perhaps, best start with coercion and gradually increase normative pressures as the member-countries become more responsive to normative appeals, or does one best apply normative forces initially and resort to others only if the normative ones are not effective? What role do economic forces play in the different types of unions?

One question deserves special attention in view of its high political, ideological, and moral nature: does the use of coercion in the initial stage of unification necessarily undermine its long-run success? If this is not the case in general, under what conditions is coercion detrimental and under what conditions is it not? Is the extent of coercion a major determinant, so that limited coercion (as used by Prussia to unify Germany) will not undermine the emerging union, but extensive use of force (as in Hungary in 1956) will undermine it? Does extensive use of coercion become less ineffective when combined with extensive propaganda (normative) efforts? Is there a "cut-off" point at which reliance on extensive coercion can be stopped? Can, for in-

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51 Types of union are discussed in the last section of this article.
52 The answer depends in part on the criterion of success that one chooses to use. A union can be maintained, at least in the short run, by extensive use of force. How effective it is, in terms of the level of integration attained, the scope of the unification, or resistance to external hostile powers, are different questions altogether.
stance, the Soviet Union keep its Red Army out of Orthodox Communist Czechoslovakia without risking its loss to the union?

There could hardly be more significant questions to the architects of unions—or to those who wish to undermine them—but there are few systematic answers available.

(ii) *Effective Distributions*

Whatever the forces employed to initiate and bring about a union, the way these forces are distributed among various units—i.e., the relative power the units have over each other—is of much consequence to the unification process. Two major dimensions have to be taken into account: (a) the degree of elitism—that is, the degree to which power is concentrated in the hands of one or a few units, as against a more or less even distribution among many—and (b) the nature of the unit (or units) that have more power than others (if any), in terms of membership in the emerging union. Is the elite unit (the powerhouse) a member or does it impose unification from the outside?

(a) *Degree of elitism.* Many unification processes are carried out under the leadership of one elite. In most of the historical cases studied by Deutsch and his associates, one unit was by far superior to the others, both in its interest in and preparedness for unification, in terms of resources as well as communicative and administrative capacities, and thus was able to bring about a union.\(^8\) England played such a role in the union with Wales and with Scotland; Britain played this role in the formation of the EFTA as well as in its disbanding; Egypt was the dominant partner of the UAR; the USSR obviously has this position in Eastern Europe; Guatemala was the central force in first building and later disintegrating the Central American Federation (1823-1839). In several other cases, two countries appear to hold an elite position: Argentina and Brazil seem to be the two prime powers in the LAFTA; and West Germany and France seem to be the major powers in the EEC.\(^4\)

Other unification efforts, while not completely egalitarian, seem to come considerably closer to an even power distribution. The major participants of the Scandinavian union—Sweden, Norway, and Denmark—have similar power positions (though Sweden may have a little more than the others); the same holds for the members of the present Cen-


\(^4\) Up to now neither of these countries appears to have used its superior power to gain special concessions from the EEC authorities.
tral American Union, and the two main members of Benelux. It seems safe, however, to generalize that equalitarian or near-equalitarian unions are considerably less frequent than elitist ones.

The most frequently found pattern is not necessarily the most effective one, though when a process is at least partially planned, and effectiveness constantly assessed, frequency and effectiveness tend to be associated. The question is whether hegemony is a better way to unification than dual leadership, and dual leadership more effective than lack of any clearly superior unit. Is hegemony the most effective power-distribution when the member-countries are quite willing to unify, or is it effective only when some or most potential participants are unwilling or at least reluctant to join a union or stay in it?  

A closely related question concerns the association between the configuration of forces applied and the power distribution. It would seem that when power is relatively concentrated in the hands of one or two units, coercion is more likely to be used; when it is fairly evenly distributed, normative appeals are more common; and economic sanctions are frequently used in both elitist and comparatively egalitarian power-distributions, but are more frequent in the elitist type. Whether this is really the case or whether these are the most effective combinations are open questions.

(b) Degree of internalization. The second dimension for examination of the effect of various power-distributions on unification is the membership status of the elites (equalitarian unifications are of members only). Membership has to be viewed as a continuum; there are partial members in varying degrees, full-fledged members, and non-members. The United States, for instance, for a number of years has supported many unifications (and other forms of international cooperation) of non-Communist countries, participating in some (e.g., NATO, OAS), being an “informal member” in others (e.g., CENTO), and not a member in still others (EEC, EFTA). Similarly, Britain is a member of the Commonwealth but not of the Federation of Nigeria that it engineered and launched. France is a member of the EEC, but not of the Conseil de l’Entente, though it has much influence over each of the four members (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey) and their collective action. The question is, what difference does the

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85 The frequency of forced integrations as distinct from voluntary ones has been pointed out by Crane Brinton in From Many One (Cambridge, Mass., 1948). See also Harold D. Lasswell, “The Interrelations of World Organization and Society,” Yale Law Review, LV (August 1946), 889-909.

membership status of the elite make? Does effective leadership require membership? Do outside elites tend to be rejected after the initiation period, and to be replaced by member-elites—i.e., is the elite role internalized? Are outside elites limited in the kind of power they can effectively exercise; in particular, is effective use of normative power chiefly limited to member-elites?

An interesting phenomenon that deserves further exploration from this viewpoint is that some external elites become themselves “internalized,” to varying degrees, in the process of unification. The United States, for instance, had no intention of becoming involved in the Baghdad Pact when it was originally formed in 1955 (it became CENTO after Iraq’s withdrawal in 1959), but since then there has been a growing pressure on the United States to deepen its participation, a pressure it only partially resists. By 1960 the United States had signed bilateral agreements with each of the members—a procedure frequently used to join a union without formally joining—in which it pledged itself to take “appropriate action, including the use of armed forces,” to help each country to resist aggression. In 1961 it committed itself to appoint a permanent military staff commander for CENTO. 87 Similarly, France not only did not intend to become an informal leader of the Entente (Ivory Coast is the semi-official, on-the-scene leader), but resisted its original formation. 88 Finally, the United States—when it supported the formation of the EEC in 1957, and later the inclusion of the non-neutral EFTA countries—did not fully realize the heavy pressures that the success of this union would put on it to create a larger union—sometimes referred to as the Atlantic Community—in which the United States is expected to be a member. It is far from clear why this “sucking-in” process occurs, why it remains “unanticipated,” why elite countries become involved in more unions, and to a larger degree, than they intended to. The central question remains: does internalization of elites make them more responsive to non-elite members, and does this increased responsiveness enhance unification?

3. THE UNIFICATION PROCESS: B. INTEGRATING SECTORS

When the prerequisites are present and integrative forces are operative, and the level of integration of the international system grows, its scope tends also to expand. That is, more and more functional needs of the member-units are fulfilled through collective actions, more and

more sectors of the member-units are unified, and the process of unification develops momentum of its own. In the following section, problems concerned with how the process is initiated are outlined first, then various reasons why it picks up momentum and the directions in which it might continue to grow on its own are discussed; and finally, an exhaustive list of the functional spheres that can be shared is presented and questions are raised concerning the order in which unification spreads into these spheres.

(i) The First Stage: Take-Off

TAKE-OFF: A CONCEPTUAL DIGRESSION

Most social scientists, until recently, when studying the beginning of a process or the formation of a polity, focused on the initiation period. The granting of a charter, the signing or ratification of a treaty, the founding convention, and similar events were considered the birthday of organizations, societies, and political movements. The concept of take-off, first used by students of aerodynamics, then economics, and recently introduced into political sciences by Rostow, Deutsch, and Haas, calls attention to a second point in the "beginning" of a process that is in many ways more important than its formal initiation. Take-off occurs when a process has accumulated enough momentum to continue on its own, without support of non-system units. This is not to suggest that the initiation point is irrelevant; on the contrary, the virtue of the concept of take-off is that it calls attention to the fact that for many processes the initiation stage and the take-off stage are not identical. A plane starts rolling, but only after it accumulates a certain speed can it continue without the support of the runway. Economic development is often initiated by contacts with Western civilization, but it "takes off" only after the production capacity of a country has increased to a degree that it can answer the increasing current needs and still show a significant balance to be invested in the build-up of production means. In this way, self-sustained growth is ensured.

Unification at the initiation stage is dependent on external units or member-units; it has no momentum of its own. Any significant change in the position of these units can bring the initiated union to an abrupt end. We know that at some later stage elements of community-authority develop (e.g., the High Authority of ECSC; the Economic

Commission of the EEC), that the process gains speed (e.g., EEC cut tariffs ahead of schedule), and that unification seems to become a force in itself, one that counters attempts to halt the evolving union. It is then that unification has taken off.

(a) *Determinants of take-off.* What actually happens, what factors change, is far from clear. At least two changes in the nature of the process seem to occur that might account, at least in part, for the take-off phenomenon. One change is that the flow of people, goods, and communications across the national boundaries is increased. Some of such increases, though by no means all of them, require an increase in the amount of international decision-making. Increased *shared* activities—like running a common defense line—seems to increase the need for common decision-making even more than increases in intercountry flows. The intergovernmental procedure is cumbersome for a large volume of decisions. Hence the tendency is to form a "supranational" bureaucracy to make secondary decisions, leaving policy decisions to a superior, intergovernmental body. This was the case in the ECSC, EEC, LAFTA, NATO, and other unions. Once a supranational bureaucracy is formed, its evolution tends to follow that of other bureaucracies: it strives to increase its functions, power, and legitimation and to resist attempts to reduce them.

The other factor accounting for take-off is secondary priming; that is, unification in one sector of society tends to trigger unification in others.\(^{40}\) For instance, a steel and coal customs union (ECSC) created the need for supranational cooperation on matters concerning transportation of those goods and on sources of energy other than coal (which led, among other things, to the formation of the Western European atomic energy agency, Euratom).\(^{41}\)

Cooperation on these matters created the need for coordination on working conditions and finance in the affected industries. Cooperation on a large number of specific economic issues led to the Treaty of Rome, which covers the economies of the Six in general. Generalized economic unification, in turn, produced considerable pressure toward political unification, though up to date it has not gone much beyond electing a powerless but symbolically important European Parliament, holding frequent meetings of the Prime Ministers of the six countries, and attending talks about a European federation or confederation. Economic

\(^{40}\) See Rostow, 52, on "derived-growth sectors."

and political unifications have affected some cultural cooperation (e.g., the formation of a European University, to be opened in Florence, Italy). The main point about this expansion of the original unification effort, or "spill-over," as Haas called it, is that it is based on secondary priming. Unification in one sector triggers a similar process in others, rather than any external force doing the triggering. Hence, the significance of the study of secondary priming for take-off. Once secondary priming sets in, it might continue up to complete unification of the countries involved, even if the external powers that initiated the process have ceased to exist or are now trying to hinder its evolution.

In sum, the foundation of supranational bureaucracies and secondary priming accounts for the take-off of unions. This raises two questions: what patterns does unification follow once it has taken off; and what is the optimal sector in which to initiate unification?

(b) The take-off sector. Unions may be initiated in many ways, including military alliances, economic unions, political coalitions, and normative communities (sense of shared norms and values). The question is, which one of these unifications provides the optimal base for take-off? Almost all possible functional spheres have been considered as optimal from this viewpoint by one authority or another. Deutsch points to the importance of the existence of a community of consent (or normative union) at the first stage. Kissinger sees in military alliances an effective way of binding nations together; he believes, for instance, that NATO could serve as an effective base for unification of the fifteen member countries. Haas finds that economic unification (common markets) has the highest spill-over value, and therefore is obviously the best take-off base. "Functional" organizations, increases in tourism, and cultural exchange have been viewed as effective ways to increase international integration and unification. The effort to establish which sector (or sectors) is the optimal take-off base will have to draw on an analysis of the internal structure of the societies that participate in the unification process. Various societal sectors seem to differ in the degree that they are interrelated. The more articulated they are, obviously the more spill-over will occur. What is far from obvious is

42 Haas provides a most stimulating and insightful analysis of this process in Uniting of Europe, esp. chap. 8.
43 Deutsch and others, Political Community, 71.
45 "International Integration," 372ff.
whether there is one “most articulated” sector in each society, if it is the same in all societies, and which one (or ones) it is.

(ii) Expansion of the Union's Scope

(a) A stable scope: Alternative propositions. Once the first stage has been completed and a union has taken off, the question arises as to what elements are needed to form a stable union; more specifically, is high integration and unification of all sectors required, or will a lower level of integration and a less inclusive union be the most stable one (i.e., persist in time)?

A stable union is formed, we suggest, only when a full-fledged political community is established—that is, when integration on all three dimensions (monopoly of violence, center of decision-making, focus for identification) is high, and unification has penetrated all major societal sectors. Unification might stop short of high integration and full scope, and the resulting union might exist for considerable periods of time. Moreover, high integration and full scope might be more difficult to attain, and more risky to aim at, than some less integrated and less encompassing form of international association. All that we hypothetically suggest is that in the long run, once attained, unions that have become highly integrated and have a broad scope are more stable than those that are less integrated or less inclusive.

The opposite view is represented by Deutsch and his associates. They found that the less integrated “pluralistic security communities” were more stable than the “amalgamated” ones. Only one of the former failed, while seven of the latter did.47 Since the Princeton authors have a mountain of data to support their position, it is incumbent on us to explain why we hold to the alternative proposition. The reason lies in the different conceptions of integration. Deutsch and his associates see a union as amalgamated (integrated, in our terms)48 once a common government has been established. The United States in 1789 became an amalgamated community; the Hapsburg Empire—and, for that matter, all empires by the definition introduced above—was an amalgamated

47 Deutsch and others, Political Community, 30.
48 Deutsch and his associates use “integration” to refer to the relationship among countries that no longer consider engaging in war with each other (ibid., 31). This is of course a different definition, one that has a lower threshold, than ours. Haas uses “political integration” to refer to “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Uniting of Europe, 16). The threshold of this definition is much higher than that of Deutsch, almost as high as ours. Cf. Haas's discussion of “political community” in ibid., 4-11.
community. From our viewpoint, these are partially integrated unions. They lack at least one central element of integration, that of being the focus of political identification of the citizens. Second, their scope is rather limited. It seems to us, then, that what Deutsch and his colleagues are suggesting is that low-integration, low-scope unions are more stable than medium-integrated, low-scope ones; this does not preclude the possibility that highly integrated, broad-scope unions will be the most stable type. In other words, we suggest that future research will still have to decide which unions are more stable—low-integration, low-scope ones, or those that matured into political communities.49

(b) Sequences of unification. Naturally, the next question is: In what order, if any, are the various sectors unified? Do they have to be “assembled” in a specific order? If one is skipped, will this disintegrate the union, merely retard it, or allow it to continue in a limping way until the missing link is added (though in the “wrong” order)? Here, more than with any of the other questions raised, we are in the realm of speculation rather than knowledge. Following the Parsonian model, one would expect the more functional sequence to be the one that starts with military or economic unification and introduces political and normative unification later.50 It is of interest to note that the attempts to start with European unification politically, by electing a European Parliament and “government” in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, got virtually nowhere,51 while the economic unification of the ECSC “spilled over” effectively into the EEC, which in turn seems to point in the direction of political unification.

Deutsch and his associates present an alternative hypothesis. Discussing the “assembly line of history,” they state: “Generally speaking we found that substantial rewards for cooperation or progress toward amalgamation had to be timed so as to come before the imposition of burdens resulting from such progress towards amalgamation (union). We found that as with rewards before burdens, consent has to

49 We defined “political communities” above as systems that have reached a high level of integration on three dimensions (monopolization, decision-making, identification). Since the discussion suggests that such integration tends to exist in unions that penetrate all the major societal sectors, the question arises as to what these sectors are. Following Parsons, we suggest that a full collectivity is one that solves autonomously its four basic functional problems: it adapts to its ecological and social environment, allocates means and rewards among its subunits, integrates its subunits into one polity, and establishes as well as reinforces the normative commitments of its members. A union that matured into a political community would thus include “supranational” activities of all four types.

50 This point is considerably elaborated in my “Epigenesis of Nation-Unions,” American Journal of Sociology (forthcoming).

51 Goodspeed, 591.
come before compliance if amalgamation is to have lasting success."

If we may extend the right of interpretation to its limits, we would read the Princeton authors as suggesting, in Parsons' terms, that allocation (of rewards) ought to precede adaptation to the environment (burdens), and that normative unification (consent) ought to come before a political one (compliance).

This of course does not exhaust the possible sequences; the four sectors might be assembled in 24 different ways, and other scholars may find it fruitful to distinguish between more than four sectors. Moreover, we should be open to the possibility that there is, in fact, no one optimal sequence for unification but that each kind of union is "assembled" best in a different fashion. And this brings us to the last tier of our paradigm.

4. THE TERMINATION STATE

A union has "taken off," "spilled over," following one sequence or another, until it reaches a "termination" state. That is, for a period of time—before additional unification or regression sets in—the union remains basically unchanged.\(^5\) Unions differ greatly in the level of unification at which they stabilize—i.e., stop increasing their integration and expanding their scope. These "termination" states provide a fruitful base for the classification of unions not only because they provide a relatively fixed frame of reference (unlike the fluid state of the unions in other phases), but also because differences in termination states might associate significantly with variables examined so far; that is, unions that differ in the state at which they stabilize might differ also in the conditions under which they are initiated, in the forces that integrate them, in the sequence they develop, etc.\(^6\)

(i) Degree and Scope

The state at which unification is terminated or interrupted can be measured in terms of the closeness of such a state to that of a political community. The preceding discussion suggests the following criteria:

(a) The degree of integration is calculated on the basis of the degree of integration of each one of the three dimensions. Unions integrate gradually; hence, when unification stops, a union might be only par-

\(^5\) Political Community, 71.

\(^6\) The length of the period is, like all such "cut-off" points, largely an arbitrary decision of the researcher, affected more by the scope of his study and problem than by "reality."

\(^6\) One reason such a relation is expected is that actors in earlier stages sometimes view the termination stage as the goal toward which their efforts are directed.
tially integrated. Part of the means of violence, but not all, might be under the control of the new collectivity (as is the case in NATO); some, but not all, parts of the economy might be controlled by the supranational authority (agriculture was until 1962 largely exempted from the Treaty of Rome and hence the authority of the European Commission); and identification with the new collectivity might be partial, both in terms of the percentage of the citizens whose identification has been transferred to the new polity and the intensity of the identification of those who did make the transfer.

(b) The number of sectors in which unification has taken place and their nature in terms of the secondary priming potential of the sector. The higher the secondary priming potential, the more likely the union is to continue to grow or to regress after a period of stabilization; the lower this potential, the more likely the union will be to continue in its "stable" state, unless outside forces interfere.

(c) The degree of unification in each sector, e.g., the ratio of international versus intranational trade. It should be noted that even political communities whose scope of integration and unification is high—i.e., they possess all three kinds of integration and their unification has penetrated into all four sectors—may differ as to how high their integration is and how encompassing their scope. While all political communities have, by definition, a center of decision-making—i.e., "supranational" government—they differ in the scope of the decisions of their governments. In this connection, a distinction is sometimes made between communities with a federal government (high decision scope) and those which have a unitary government (even higher decision scope). Actually, federal structures may themselves become more centralized (as the United States has over the last three decades) or less centralized (as the Soviet Union has since 1953), and unitary governments may be either highly centralized (e.g., France) or comparatively less centralized (e.g., Britain). Similar, more "subtle" distinctions can be made on the other dimensions (subtle in the sense that high scopes are compared with very high ones instead of merely high to medium and low ones). While previously we advanced the hypothesis that highly integrated unions are more stable than ones with medium or low integration, this does not necessarily hold for the most highly integrated ones. It is quite possible that a less centralized structure will prove more stable, since it allows for more expression of the ex-national powers and loyalties. By the same token, though, it leaves more power in potentially secessionist units. An hypothesis suggests itself: namely, that the
more integrated a community is (by other standards), the more political decentralization it can tolerate.

(ii) The Dominant Function

Another major difference among various termination-states is the dominant function that the new collectivity serves. This criterion not only differentiates unions (e.g., military, economic, normative unions), but also political communities. True, a political community encompasses all major societal sectors and in this sense serves all major functions, but communities can be characterized according to the function in which they invest more resources, manpower, and energy, and which they value higher as compared with other communities. While this dominant function changes over time, it is usually possible to point to one that dominates a given historical period. Thus, it has been suggested that the United States, viewed as a model of a political community that emerged from earlier autonomous units, stressed adaptation in the industrialization period (1875-1930); that concern with welfare and consumption took the place of the production emphasis after 1930; and that this was superseded in the late 1940's and early 1950's by "other-directedness" and concern with ideological positions. At that same time, the cold war with communism intensified and the struggle with radicals at home reached a peak. Renewed emphasis on adaptation marked 1958, when the Russian space probes and long-range missiles provided a strong environmental challenge to the United States. Unlike the earlier production concern, the present one is focused on means of violence rather than on consumption, and on service to the national collectivity rather than directly to the individual. The scientist, the space-technologist, and to a degree the executive, but not the merchant or entrepreneur, are the new cultural heroes. Similar statements can be made about the changing focus of other unions. Yet many may have a "persistent" function that is stressed in the long run (though not

55 This is, of course, the central thesis of David Riesman and others, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven 1950).
56 Underlying this statement is the idea that, over the last 75 years, the United States moved from the adaptive to the allocative, social integrative, and normative integrative phase. It is derived from Talcott Parsons' treatment of the subject, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, eds., Class, Status, and Power (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), 92-129. See also Parsons, " McCartyism and American Social Tension: A Sociologist's View," Yale Review, xliv (December 1954), 226-45.
57 The stress on the need to shift resources from private to collective consumption is championed by J. K. Galbraith in American Capitalism (Boston 1952) and The Affluent Society (Boston 1958).
necessarily “forever”) despite short-run ups and downs—e.g., expansionism (adaptation) in the case of the Soviet Union.\footnote{This is a central thesis of George Kennan’s \textit{The Sources of Soviet Conduct: American Diplomacy, 1900-1950} (Chicago 1951).}

Before statements about the dominant function of a society or larger political collectivity at a given period can be formulated with proper precision and responsibility, much more theoretical work and empirical research are required. But it should be pointed out that it seems quite evident even now that the nature of the dominant function is an important variable for the study of unions and political communities. Some functions—especially the political, social, and ideological ones—require higher integration and broader scope than others (e.g., individual-oriented consumption). Hence, the level and scope at which the unification process terminates are crucial variables that both are affected by and affect the dominant function of the new political unions.

No paradigm is ever complete, in the sense that additional work in the area, whether theoretical or empirical, continues to add dimensions to its structure. It can be exhaustive only in the sense that all additional dimensions will find a place in one of the categories already included. The only way to assure this is by deriving the categories instead of inducing them. This we did when we used as our major three tiers the beginning (initiation state), middle (the process), and end (termination) states of unification. Similar procedures were used in arriving at the other dimensions—for instance, at the distinction between the take-off stage and expansion (i.e., between the first and later stages) of unification. Other distinctions—e.g., between integration and scope—are derived not from simple logic but from substantive sociological theories. Like all other distinctions that are derived, their test is in the fruitfulness of the questions raised. The major effort remains, of course, to determine through empirical research the validity of the various alternative answers that one could give to the questions raised by the paradigm.