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"German Methods of Combating the Soviet Intelligence Services," 3 June 1946

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CI CONSOLIDATED INTERROGATION REPORT (CI-CIR) No. 16

SUBJECT: German Methods of Combating the Soviet Intelligence Services

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The sources of this report were members of Front Aufklärung III on the Eastern Front. Their extensive experiences in this field have qualified them for the rendering of a detailed account of counter-intelligence methods employed by the Germans against Soviet intelligence agencies.

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By            NARS, Date 11/1/78



FAK III exploited this situation by using the...  
Estonians, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, and...  
political means...  
civil war...  
ups, who...  
this aim...  
principle of nationalism and the autonomy of nations...  
to their failure...

(3) Success

Despite their numerical inferiority...  
point of view of the...  
GAENZER said...  
intentions of the Russians...  
strength, composition, and the intended...  
siang won their riches not by surprise...  
strength.

c. Agents

(1) Problems of Recruiting

The Germans attempted to recruit most of the...  
sons whose motives were idealistic...  
from that given to agents who put themselves at the disposal...  
on a business basis.

In dealing with Russia many difficulties were shown...  
of basic differences in the character of the...  
sider the Russian generally as...  
friendships and...  
had to be practiced...  
tice and national pride...

Orders were given...  
security by preventing...  
agency for which...  
Russia it was...  
small villages...  
that this policy was impractical.

Early German success in Russia...  
to Front...  
as long as the...  
however, the Germans...  
was to stick...  
when intelligence was most vitally needed...

(2) Hiring of Russian Traitors

For their...  
exclusively Russian agents who had been captured...  
turn against the Red Army...  
propaganda was never used to...  
assumed to be a Russian...  
would lead to Russia...  
a Russian patriot...  
on a personal and friendly basis...

Other Russian agents, who had previously had personal experience in the field, were recruited by the Russian Intelligence Service in Russia or by other means, and were offered themselves for business reasons, were the main

(3) Inducements

A certain amount of money was used to insure their cooperation. The agents were well in goods and money, and were not missed when they could no longer be used.

Payments generally took the form of goods, such as vodka, and cigarettes. Even while Germany was under the yoke, the agents expected that there would be differences in compensation, depending on the country in which they were accepted without protest and actually began their work.

(4) Regt. 100

To give Russian agents a military background, a "Regiment 100" was created and supplied with a number of personnel, clerks, and a few agents. Former members of the Regt. 100 Agents could be paid, promoted, and given furloughs, family allowances, and cost of living allowances for agents and their families were planned. The Regt. 100 was under the command of Obst. Fritz NAUMANN (see Intelligence Report No. 35, dated 29 Aug 46).

(5) Training

While espionage and sabotage agents had to be given thorough training in special training camps, Russian agents had already received intelligence training in their own countries, and this required training in special camps. The training was not instruction, rather than training camps, and the subject matter could be continued in the field. Emphasis was placed on working out cover stories. It was believed that in all missions, success depends on the agents. For the same reason, the work of the agents became an exact science.

One special difficulty for the Germans in training agents was the tendency of Russian agents to be frequently a trained German would approach them in occupied territory, prevent them from carrying out their fake espionage missions, and reveal the identity of his newly won agents. This was one of his excellent

During the training, emphasis was also placed on a definition of the mission as possible and in getting himself to its execution. This agents were not to be of less-experienced or less-reliable personnel.

(5) Security Agents

could too easily be influenced... was impaired... only in special cases...

(7) Informants

In addition to the regular... Personnel (informants)... social circles... one field... occasionally... comers who might be suspect.

d. Combatting Russian Agents

(1) Conditions of Security

German measures... dominated territory... military security... the development of partisan bands... that the partisan units possessed not only considerable... also dominated the major part of the German-controlled...

These conditions were exploited by the Soviets... which launched its agents out of partisan-held areas... where by far too weak to undertake large-scale actions... and the severe security divisions garrisons throughout... not numerous enough or sufficiently equipped... It was therefore quite common for the Germans to know... location of agents or agent groups in partisan country... heavy radio traffic without being able to intercept it.

(a) Heeres-Gruppen Nord & Mitte

Approximately three-quarters of... and Mitte from the Baltic to the Northern... of constantly endangered by their bands... the immediate fighting zone... could be considered... destination was limited... continually defended... only points... garrisons were maintained... intelligence activities were directed...

(b) Heeres-Gruppe Sud

Conditions differed in the area of... enlisted the anti-Soviet... extent the Germans had no... the war... Ukrainian partisan bands began...



ultimately dominated by the Germans. The German bands had their bases in the area approximately between Lithuania, Poland, Estonia and Latvia and were free from partisans.

(2) German OE Measures

(a) The Card Index

Personality information on Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Belorussian agents was maintained in a card index. The index was maintained in a copy of each agent's personnel file. A central card index was maintained in the L/Stelle. The card index contained the names of 20,000 trained Russian agents.

Source agreed that the card index for a number of years was only in a minimum of cases. Recognized agents would appear on it, certainly not under the same name or alias. Also, 20,000 cards for the Eastern Front were not very significant in the face of an allotment of approximately 10,000 agents every three months. A brief review of personality data would forward pertinent information to the L/Stelle. As this material had to be checked and the results reported, procedure was generally considered a nuisance rather than a help.

(b) Education of Troops

Occupation troops were enlisted to the largest possible extent in the search for Soviet agents. For the purpose of filtering troops from operations of the Soviet Intelligence Service, the German Army issued handouts (pointers) for the whole Eastern Front. The handouts contained accounts of recent espionage cases and pointed out ways in which a soldier could recognize a Soviet agent. The material was presented in an interesting manner. German mistakes were exposed and the material led to an increased degree of suspicion toward strangers. This orientation contributed considerably to German security.

At the above mentioned time, the four main groups of German and GPP officials of the Eastern Front were involved in the use of the methods and intentions of informants do not override the results of meetings.

(c) OE Supervision of German Agencies

When a PAK II unit was committed to an area, it was required to rise itself thoroughly with local conditions and personnel. This was required with German military establishments, especially those employing Russian civilians, and with the use of Hilfswillige (Hiwis) in German agencies. The use of identity document control had disclosed that the use of these agencies as legal cover. The use of these agencies by German civilian or military Dienststellen was a major factor of the agencies into their activities by threat.

PAK III realized that the only effective approach was to place its own agents in vulnerable German establishments. This system proved highly successful.

16. (Continued)

(d) Signal Work

In view of the all-Russian announcement of the new code dealing with partisan-held areas, supervision of the code was of increasing importance. Nachrichten Aufklarung, which was the concern of Funk Abwehr, Military Signals, was dealt with by Nachrichten Aufklarung, the northern sector of the Russian front. Russian lines in partisan-held territory was handled by Nachrichten Aufklarung, Chief of Staff for the whole Eastern Front, to Chief of Staff Nachrichtenwesen in the OKH, Staff III (Fahrmacht, Nachrichten) and Staff III (Fahrmacht, Nachrichten).

Nachrichten Aufklarung

Most successful in monitoring and decoding was Nachrichten Aufklarung, 6, who furnished FAK III daily with intercepted messages. A part of the W/T traffic between partisan and German stations. Traffic remained a secret to the Germans after Autumn 1942. The following are typical intercepted messages, which I/Staff III, OKH, decided upon relayed to FAK and PATs for counter-measures.

"To NKGB detachment NIKITIN observe traffic on road into B... especially tank traffic. Your work has recently deteriorated. Your assistant agents should be better organized and supervised. MAKAROV."

"To ZENTREL, we have discovered that Ivan OSASHOV and Andrey DREYEV, placed in the POLOSK city administration and German double agents. On 4 July we shall send a group led by Gennadi IVANOV to liquidate the traitors. NIKITIN."

Funk Abwehr

Funk Abwehr, whose task it was to monitor the traffic of Soviet agents with their home stations, was less successful in decoding. The German code was primarily used by agents as a coding system, according to which the code remained unbroken. Funk Abwehr's main function was to determine the location of agents' W/T stations by direction finding. This was of no value if the agent's stations were in partisan-held areas, since only in German-garrisoned towns could the agents be apprehended.

(e) General Control Measures

Other measures used by FAK III to control communications and traffic control were coordinated with home defense forces. Unannounced checks on German occupational agencies, shops, and public houses and visitors' their desks, belonging papers, etc., were conducted. These controls, however, proved inadequate since agents could pass papers of unlimited validity. Even limiting the validity of papers to two months, the Soviet services ample time to equip their agents with the required papers.

The Germans then started to copy a Soviet identity card, a secret mark on identity documents. This would consist, for example, of a placard in front of the signing official's name, which would contain the name of the agent, since such complicated measures were difficult to put into effect in the areas, the secret mark procedure was adopted only locally in the less dangerous areas.

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Local agents report that the identification of work pass or identification cards employed by the enemy is not working. These papers were stamped with the name of the agent as frequently as practicable. Persons found without work passes were under close scrutiny.

The introduction of the photo in every German soldier's kit on the Eastern front as a CE measure. The Russians had been using such photos of dead or captured soldiers to equip their agents with information. The new German regulation did not, however, prevent the introduction of tinting photographs.

c. Interrogation

(1) Purpose

Interrogations conducted by PAK III units had a twofold purpose. The obvious aim was to secure as much information as possible on the operations of fellow agents. However, the Soviet system of mass commitment made it possible to attempt a roundup of all agents. Therefore, a secondary and important aim of interrogation to ascertain the scope and nature of Soviet operations in order to obtain a general view of operative intentions of the Soviet Intelligence Service.

(2) Methods

Sources revealed that they were greatly handicapped by an order from Adm CANARIS for bidding physical pressure as a method of interrogation. They explained that Russians generally fear pain but not death, so that the so-called "Schmerzhaftes Verfahren" would probably have led to earlier success. Although several severe court-martial sentences were administered for mistreatment of agents under interrogation, sources admitted that employed Russian agents often mistreated their compatriots from the Bolshevik camps. On many occasions, Russian anti-Communists working for PAK III were given an "honorary" status and "up" captured agents before turning them over to German officials. The use of feigned kindness and persuasion thus became doubly effective.

One method of "breaking" a man was through a continuous interrogation until fatigue would cause the agent to reveal his identity. Another popular method was that of political persuasion and manipulation. Agents in the anti-Communist camp on an "idealistic" basis would frequently double back and likely candidates received the most favorable treatment.

In the experience of the sources, the use of the "Schmerzhaftes Verfahren" in the factory as monitoring devices and in the field was not particularly effective. Agents resisted the temptation to confide in the German officials during interrogation. Monitoring devices were available in the field and had application to the nearest signal depot.

PAK III units had orders to deliver captured agents to the nearest interrogation. It was therefore difficult to promise a man a safe passage to the Traeger Lager (special camps for persons who know for sure they are not going to be turned over to the SH). Soviet agents who upon capture were turned over to German CE authorities were also sent to a German camp. There were three on the Eastern front. The German record books show that the "frustrated agent deserter" - the man who was caught and turned over to surrender. If his information checked, he was also sent to the Traeger Lager.



(3) Briefs:

Information to be gained from FAK III interrogations included the dispatcher, route of commitment, mission and target, manner of reporting and the extent to which the mission had been fulfilled at the time of capture.

Briefs for all Leit Stellen were issued regularly by O. West and the Fremde Heere Ost. On the basis of their intelligence requirements, the Leit Stellen worked out their own questionnaires. These issued by the FAK III Ost usually concerned the agent, his mission and general information. Data sought about the agent and his mission included the prisoner's military history, how he was recruited into the Soviet intelligence service, training site, instructors at his school, fellow students (including eyes, ears, and information), details of the curriculum, which portion of the site controlled the school, dispatcher, mission, manner of reporting, members of the group, and equipment.

General information included any knowledge about airfields, tanks, plane commitments, locations of airfields, troop concentrations and movements, morale of the Red Army and the civilian population, preparations for gas warfare, state of food supplies for Red Army and civilian, knowledge of possible new weapons, and commitment of NKVD blocking units (employed to prevent regular Red Army units from retreating). Industrial intelligence was also collected whenever available but was not greatly stressed by the FAKs.

Special questionnaires were employed in the interrogations of W/T personnel. Experts from the nearest unit of Nachrichten Aufklärung Officers were consulted in these interrogations.

(It is evident that questions under general information needed the CE task of the FAK III units. All positive intelligence obtained in this manner was immediately transmitted to the unit concerned.)

Sources stated that when information from agents was incomplete, conclusions could often be drawn from certain habits and abilities and formed in equipping their agents. For instance, the FAK III Ost in Elva equipped his agents with the Kamalov 1.500 and a very distinctive NKVD always forged his agents identity documents on the same German banknote number.

(4) Reports

Originally no special form was required for the reports written by FAK III units, but this method resulted in incomplete and unessential information. An order was given to arrange the material in the following manner: The report was to be preceded by a preamble in which all essential data was to be given in a three or four sentence summary. Then followed the personalities involved, group members, dispatcher, and fellow co-students, etc. A presentation of the facts of the case, case history, measures taken and evaluation concluding the report.

16. (Continued)

Spot reports were radiated from all important bases for the attack on every Funk-GV Spiel, and for the enemy target reports (Zentrale Aufklungen). The latter consisted of information regarding the objectives of the mission, the dispatch number, of agents in the field, and communication and report channels. It was to enable the Russians to form an opinion of Russian intentions by their attempts to gather intelligence.

All reports were distributed to the IC to which the unit was attached and to the next higher Front Aufklerung unit.

f. Double agents and W/T Play-backs

(1) Purpose

Part of the mission of FAK III consisted of enemy deception, the penetration of enemy intelligence services, and the gathering of intelligence on enemy operational intentions. GV (Gesetzlich) Agents (Funk) and Funk GV Spiels were the primary tools of deception in training these ends.

(2) GV Spiel

(a) Definition

A GV Spiel is the continued deception of the enemy means of a double agent who penetrates the enemy intelligence services, beyond the MLR or in partisan territory. Missions of these agents consisted of gathering information on the enemy intelligence services, training schools, agencies, personnel and intended missions, the training of operating enemy resident agents or agent groups.

(b) Difficulties and Risks

Most important prerequisite for the turning of an agent was his personal reliability and his subjective conviction of the necessity and justification of his mission. His reports had to be impeccable and conform to the real circumstances. The original mission for the Soviets had a time limit, and this time limit was not exceeded. Channels of communication through which reports were necessary had to be securely established. Where necessary, precautionary measures had been taken, the German resident agent had to divulge the knowledge gained during training and operations in a reliable material. As a consequence, there were considerable risks incurred against the urgency of the intentions of the enemy.

(c) Controlling Factors

As a result of lax security measures in the work of agents, the Germans suffered a considerable number of losses during the Russian war. With greater experience and a more careful selection, as well for Germany, GV Spiels were successful. The reliability of turned agents constantly varied, in fact, with the progress and, especially, the misfortune of war. From the beginning of the war, the Russians had been using double agents to report on German operations in partisan territory and for the uncovering of established communication lines.

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(d) Training

Intensive training was needed to fit a double agent for his individual commitment. If at all possible, he was never allowed to have contacts with other agents or his German dispatching organization. Without giving him any hints regarding the German agency responsible for the mission, the instructor discussed all details with the agent, taking advantage of the agent's knowledge of local conditions in the area in which he was to operate. The cover story was rehearsed and committed to memory. To lend the training some realism, the dispatcher often assumed the role of a Russian commissar to test the agent's steadfastness under interrogation and protect him against later surprises.

(e) Examples of Successful Operations

As a typical example of the use of GV Spiele in operations against the Russians, sources cited a deception resorted to by the Germans when they were forced to evacuate large numbers of troops encircled in the DEMYANSK area early in 1943. Fake orders were to make Soviet intelligence believe that the Germans were sending reinforcements into DEMYANSK in preparation for offensive action. Since a narrow supply corridor existed, the orders sounded quite plausible. A number of agents were turned and sent to the Red Army with the story that they had observed considerable troop movements into the encircled area. In addition, agents were placed in the prisons where they spread the same story. Soon afterwards, the prisoners were given a chance to escape. Sources say that this deceptive maneuver succeeded, and that the Russians hesitated in pressing the area, which was evacuated with few losses.

As an example of the use of GV Spiele in the rear areas, sources offered the following: In Summer 1943 two Soviet agents were caught in Northern Estonia. Interrogation disclosed information that led to the liquidation of the whole group with which they were committed. At the same time it was learned that a second group was to be dropped from the same plane in an area about 300 km away. One of the captured agents was successfully converted to the German side, and after a short time was led to the edge of the second group's area. In ragged condition and without adequate clothing and money, he sought admission to this group as the last survivor of his own group, from which he said he escaped after the others had been annihilated in a fire fight. He gained the confidence of the group leader, and reported regularly on the group's activities until the Germans decided to liquidate it too.

(3) Funk GV Spiele

Eastern FAK III personnel had much success with their R/T play-back methods. It was faster than GV Spiele and a better means of enemy deception and of gaining knowledge of enemy operational intentions.

(a) Definition and Purposes

A Funk GV Spiel is the contacting of the enemy with the aid of turned enemy R/T agents and in accordance with their missions. Its purposes are to open a channel for enemy deception, to gain knowledge of enemy intention by obtaining new missions from the opponent, to gain con-

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tact with operating resident agencies, to prevent, if so desired, the commitment of other agents in the same area, or to induce the opponent to commit further agent personnel and supplies where they could most easily be captured.

(b) Prerequisites and Procedure

The same personal qualifications of the converted agent were required for a Funk GV Spiel as for a GV Spiel. In addition, the following practical rules had to be strictly observed:

1. The Russians usually fixed a very brief time limit in which the agent, after having been dropped, was to transmit his first procedure call. He then informed his home station that he had landed safely and was taking up contact on the basis of his cipher. If this time limit for the first message was exceeded, the Russians invariably assumed that the agent was operating under restraint.
2. The same rule applied if the Germans intervened while regular contact between the agent and his home station was in progress. The proper timing between the last genuine and the first German-inspired message had to be observed.
3. The agent, while transmitting his first procedure call, had to be prevented from giving his prearranged warning signal. This could consist of a period at a certain point in the message, a certain type of phrasing, or some way of tapping his message which would warn the home station that he was operating under restraint.
4. The agent's personalized manner and speed of transmission was always well-known to his home station. All messages, therefore, had to be tapped out by the agent himself.
5. If it was the agent's mission to take up contact from a forest area, he could not be placed in the vicinity of power or telephone lines which might disturb the connection.
6. A possible direction-finder check by the Russians on the agent was taken into account. The turned agent therefore had to be placed in the vicinity of his original target.
7. Coding and decoding had to be performed by German personnel and all ciphers had to remain in their possession. The agent could participate in the phrasing of the message to insure that it corresponded to his mission and his own type of wording.

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8. The agent had to be under constant surveillance during W/T contact by a German operator, who would immediately take over incoming messages for decoding.

(c) Consequences of Faulty Security

Informants offered the following instances as proof of the absolute necessity of strict adherence to the aforementioned security rules. FAT 311, then under the leadership of O/LY DASEL, conducted a Funk GV Spiel in Spring 1943 in the KALININ area. Deceptive tactics were used and the Russians had been induced to drop an agent to replace another agent who, unknown to the Russians, had been converted to the German side. The new man was immediately captured and allowed to meet the W/T double agent. The latter, who had so far operated reliably, was now persuaded by the newly-captured man to participate in a plot to kill the Trupp leader and several other personnel, capture secret documents and return to the Red Army. It became the double agent's job to inform the Russian home station of the plan. Contrary to good procedure, he had access to the cipher and in the course of the Spiel substituted his own coded message for a tactical deception message the Germans had given him. The plot never materialized as it was accidentally discovered by DASEL (who was later killed), but the Funk GV Spiel was also spoiled.

(d) Conducting the Spiel

No special HQ authority was required for PAK III units to start a Funk GV Spiel. To obtain such authority would have delayed the all-important initial procedure calls. First messages had to be non-tactical, giving the impression that the agent had not as yet had an opportunity to approach his target. Meanwhile, the response of the home station was carefully observed. If it hesitated to send tactical messages, the Germans assumed that the Russians had recognized the deception attempt.

Starting with the first German tactical message the Funk Spiel was subject to HQ authority. All Spiel material was released by the Chief of Staff of the Heeres Gruppe and contained a mixture of truth and deception in order to strengthen the home station's impression that its agent was working successfully. The element of truth was important because the Russians had ways of checking their agents against each other. It also prevented the Russians from getting intelligence by reversing false information in the messages if they recognized the German game.

The only certain way of knowing that the Russians were not suspicious of the German-conducted traffic with the converted W/T agent was to induce them to drop further personnel and supplies. A less certain measure of success were Russian messages containing congratulations and decorations for the W/T agent and his group. However, the Germans always had to be on the alert against surprises. For instance, in July 1944 FAT 326 conducted a Funk Spiel in the area of Heeres Gruppe Nord in the course of which the Russians were successfully induced to drop supplies. After some time, further supplies were requested by the double agent and promised by the Russians. The load was dropped according to plan, but when it was opened it exploded, killing or injuring several Trupp members.

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It was a mistake to hurry the Russians into resupplying their agent groups, dropping reinforcements, or revealing contact addresses of resident agents. The Russians often became suspicious on the basis of such requests and broke off contact. Special light signals were arranged for the dropping of agents and supplies. When personnel were involved, the Germans had to take strict precautions so that none of the group could escape capture and reveal the plot to the home station. Moreover, the Russians developed the habit of having other agents check on supply and personnel drops and even of assigning the same targets and missions independently to separate agent groups.

Sources claim that an average of ten to twelve Funk GV Spiels, extending over an average period of three to six months each, were conducted monthly over the whole Eastern front. They do not credit great significance to this figure, however, since several of the Spiels were undoubtedly played by the Russians and not the Germans.

(a) Examples of Successful Operations

As examples of their success with h/T deception methods, sources offered the following:

FAT 326 conducted a Funk Spiel in Autumn 1943 with the partisan Central Staff in the course of which the Russians dropped eight agent groups in addition to considerable amounts of supplies. Out of 35 agents dropped in this manner upon German request, 34 were captured. The Spiel lasted eight months.

In the Spring of 1944 the FAT 326 radio liaison officer at Heeres Gruppe Nord started a Funk Spiel with the FO of the Baltic Fleet. It was the FO's intention to obtain information on German traffic in REVAL harbor, and the Russians committed two independent agent groups for the mission. Both were secured by the Germans, and the Funk Spiel was conducted in such a manner as to make the Russians believe that they were working independently and successfully. While this Spiel was in progress, the first abortive peace negotiations took place between Finland and the USSR. When they failed, the Russians started a surprise offensive on the Finnish front, making necessary the shipment of German reinforcements there. These German troops were shipped via REVAL, and thus information on movements in that area became of increasing importance to the Russians. By means of the Spiel the Germans succeeded, according to sources, in deceiving Russian intelligence for a considerable period of time.

The most successful operation, however, was a Funk Spiel developed by Ast GRACO. It began in the WARSZAWA area in Summer 1943 and lasted for more than a year. In the course of the Spiel the Russians were induced to drop approximately 50 two-man (or woman) agent teams, all of which the Germans captured without difficulty. Sources stated that the Spiel enabled the Germans to recognize Russian operative intentions in the Polish Czech and Upper Silesia areas for a whole year.

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g. Exploitation and Evaluation of Intelligence Material

(1) Function at Leit Stelle Level

That German Front Aufklärung III services did not confine their activities to the purely police activity of searching out enemy agents is the main basis for the claim made by sources to distinction from the SD. GAENZER, whose whole Abwehr history was connected with Auswertung (exploitation and evaluation), said that this actually was the main function of Front Aufklärung III, that closest coordination with the Io's was therefore imperative, and that the whole RSHA vs. Front Aufklärung tussle has to be seen in this light.

L/Stelle III Ost conducted Auswertung for the Eastern Front. It collected the reports from FAKs and FAKs subordinated to it and disseminated its digests of the big picture to higher staffs, especially Fremde Heere Ost.

(2) Types of Material

L/Stelle III Ost performed Auswertung on the following types of material:

(a) Card Index of Agents

(See para 2d(2)(a) this report).

(b) Enemy Intelligence OB Card Index and Map

The card index contained all known details about enemy intelligence units, sub-agencies, personnel, HQs, OKR Squads, training schools, personal data on some 12,000 members of these organizations, and enemy military personnel, excluding agents. The map showed the enemy situation, location and type of intelligence agencies, training schools and agent's camps. These various points on the map were indicated by a number which referred to the card index.

(c) Special Reports and Hinweise

Reports of interest to special German agencies were published at the Leit Stelle. As examples, sources mentioned reports concerning the effect of German propaganda, the character of Soviet propaganda, political developments in occupied territory, church developments in the USSR, industrial data, and new equipment of sabotage groups, such as the portable printing press or the W/T set carried in a gas mask canister. (For Hinweise, see para 2d (2)(b) this report).

(d) Enemy Target Reports and Map

The compiled enemy target reports were submitted every ten days to the Io of the Eastern Theater of War, Feind Ziel Karten (enemy target maps) showing commitments of enemy agents, their dispatchers, targets and channels of communication accompanied the reports. To compile this material, the Leit Stelle received not only the reports from its own subordinate units but also from the rear area Aets such as Ostland, KOBENIGSBERG, POSEN (POZNAN), and CRACOV, as well as the RSHA-controlled OB agencies.

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(e) Main Effort Maps

The Schwer Punkt Karte (main effort map) showed on a monthly basis what the Feind Ziel Karte demonstrated every ten days. Tactical symbols on these maps illustrated graphically the mass of committed agents during the month, their routes of commitment, targets, and types of missions. The Germans knew from experience that the Russians invariably increased their commitments of agents in areas selected for future operations. In using the Schwer Punkt Karte the IC had to take into account that not all agents were caught and that deception by the enemy was possible. However, according to sources, enemy intentions as recognized from these maps were usually proven accurate.

(f) IC Daily Reports

Daily reports on important events were submitted to the IC, implemented by bi-weekly conferences in which enemy intentions and possible deception were given primary attention.

(g) Partisan Situation and Map

The close connection between partisan movements and intelligence gathering made it necessary for the FAK III services to perform duties--such as partisan O4 and armament--which were normally considered T (espionage) work in the German setup. GAENZER stated that intelligence on partisan developments was of great importance but was consistently ignored by the high strategists. Reports on the partisan situation, illustrated by maps showing partisan-dominated and endangered territory, remained academic as the German leadership never committed adequate security forces to combat the partisans effectively.

(h) Training Material

Systematic intelligence training was not conducted for FAK III personnel in the East until 1945. The L/Stelle then began to supply training material on the enemy intelligence services which was used as the basis for courses held periodically by the L/Stelle for old and new personnel. A counter-espionage school dealing with all enemy intelligence services was in the planning stage in February 1945 and was to be operated by Chef Front.Aufklaerung.

Courses prepared for presentation by the L/Stelle primarily covered interrogation technique, report writing, GV and Funk GV Spiele, and original reports of incidents and interrogations concerning the Soviet Intelligence Service, its working methods, agent nets and commitments. The course, taught by specialists in the fields mentioned, lasted an average of three weeks.

(i) Enemy Documents

All captured documents were routed through the enemy documents section at L/Stelle III Ost, which in turn distributed the material to the interested agencies. Only material concerning the Soviet Intelligence Service was retained. This section practically closed down in 1944 for lack of material with which to work.

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(j) Statistics and Monthly Reports

Monthly statistics indicated the degree of Soviet Intelligence Service activity and gave concise information on enemy intelligence targets, types of missions (as espionage, sabotage, insurrection, deception, mixed missions), and the dispatching agencies. Agents were classified by sex, age, occupation, party membership, and manner of recruitment. The statistics aimed at showing proportional successes of the Soviet Intelligence Service and the German CE Services. Routes of commitment (line-crossing, parachutes, submarines) were distinguished and individual PAKs and PATs were represented by success curves on captured and recognized agents.

The monthly reports implemented the statistics and added a tactical evaluation of the intelligence situation on both sides to complete the large picture. The IG, however, was cautioned not to value these comprehensive reports too highly as the statistics were subject to errors and incompleteness and the reports dealt with the past month's activities only.

4. CONCLUSIONS

None.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None.

WJ:HCB/hb

For the Commanding Officer

*George Wenzel*  
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