


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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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2. USSR: Marshal Chuykov's recent statement suggests resurgence of ground forces proponents. (Page 5)

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
5. Notes: [redacted] Do- 25X6  
minican Republic; Belgium-Congo. (Page 8)

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# NORTH VIETNAM



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

7 August 1965

\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Air Strikes in North Vietnam: Three primary targets were scheduled for air strikes in North Vietnam on 6 August. The Ban Nuoc Chieu ammunition depot was struck by US Navy aircraft. Three buildings were destroyed and three damaged. US aircraft were diverted from a strike on the Dien Bien Phu barracks because of weather. No results have been received from the strike on the Vinh Thy highway bridge, approximately 35 miles south of the Chinese border and the northernmost target to date.

Fifty-six armed reconnaissance sorties were flown over North Vietnam by USAF and US Navy aircraft. Thirteen trucks, two bridges, and a staging area were damaged. A training center was hit, with five buildings destroyed and several damaged.

Communist Political Developments: A Liberation Front statement of 3 August, broadcast by NFLSV and Hanoi radio on 6 August, called on "our South Vietnamese compatriots and army men who regrouped in the north" to organize and prepare to return to the South when so ordered. This new threat to bring in outside manpower definitely sharpens previous Viet Cong warnings about volunteers made during the past few weeks. For the first time, it introduces an element of imminence to their arrival. However, the contingency factor remains in that the volunteers are to wait for "orders."

Recent Viet Cong threats to call in volunteers have come as close as possible to a flat call for their entry without actually making the request. The threats suggest that the Vietnamese Communists are still trying

to get the maximum possible deterrent value out of their warnings on volunteers without playing until absolutely necessary what they apparently feel is a psychological trump card.

The Liberation Front statement also called on the North Vietnamese to assist the South Vietnamese people "in all fields to increase our forces and step up the resistance war," called on "the Indochinese people to unite and assist one another to resist barbarous aggression by the US imperialists and their henchmen," and called on all "friendly countries" to step up both moral and material assistance.

A leading member of the recent Ghanaian delegation to Hanoi stated on 6 August that the mission accomplished nothing and that the DRV position remains unchanged. In his judgment, Hanoi has no intention of negotiating at this point and is convinced it is winning the war.


Hanoi has used the first anniversary of the initial US air strike against North Vietnam (5 August 1964) as a basis for a new round of propaganda denouncing US policy in Vietnam and pledging the Vietnamese Communists to continue the fight. One statement issued by the "high command" of the DRV army, although quite oblique, contains the strongest hint yet by the DRV military of possible PAVN involvement in South Vietnam. In this statement the "high command" pledged "not to spare even our blood in carrying out our firm resolve to defend North Vietnam, liberate South Vietnam and reunify the country."

The hint is probably intended in part as a response to Liberation Front threats to call in personnel from the "army" of the DRV. Hanoi has rebroadcast these threats, but has been cautious in commenting on them. DRV caution in this respect is probably indicative chiefly of a desire to avoid, before absolutely necessary, publicly fueling US and South Vietnamese charges that the DRV is the real fountainhead of the insurgency.

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A Soviet TASS statement on 6 August denounced "new acts" of US "aggression" in Vietnam in the first authoritative Soviet reaction to President Johnson's 28 July press conference. Although this was the first such public Soviet "statement" since the beginning of May, it did not go beyond standard expressions of Soviet support for North Vietnam.

TASS declared that it was authorized to point out that US policy makers should not delude themselves into thinking that US "aggression" would go unpunished. Routine expressions of Soviet determination to supply the DRV with "all necessary" defensive assistance were repeated.

[Other Developments: Secretary General Thant is apparently very dubious about any formal United Nations involvement in Vietnam at this time. In his 3 August conversation with the UK delegate, Thant said that he cannot see how the UN could play a constructive role for at least two months--until the monsoon season is over. Thereafter, he thought that the military situation might induce Hanoi to review its position and allow the UN to play an active role.]

[In this event, he believed that a meeting of the General Assembly might be more fruitful than a Security Council meeting since the pressure of international opinion expressed through the Assembly would have a greater effect on Hanoi than opinion expressed through the Council.]

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Following a Viet Cong mortar and small arms attack during the night of 5-6 August, heavy fighting was reported yesterday between two Vietnamese airborne battalions and Viet Cong forces near the government's paramilitary camp at Duc Co, located along Route 19 in Pleiku Province. The government battalions, flown in on 2 August to eliminate the almost daily Viet Cong harassment of the camp since early June, have thus far killed 67 Viet Cong, while sustaining moderate to heavy casualties.

Elsewhere, government forces have inflicted significant losses on Viet Cong units in three large-scale ground operations. A road clearing operation along Route 1 in Phu Yen Province has thus far resulted in 37 Viet Cong killed and 67 weapons captured, while enemy casualties in two recently

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terminated search and destroy operations in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces totaled 60 killed and 14 captured. Government losses in all three operations were one killed and 14 wounded. [redacted] 25X1

Political Developments in South Vietnam: South Vietnam's ruling military Directory met on 5 August, apparently discussing chiefly the status of various officers who formerly held high positions but who have now fallen into disfavor. [redacted] 25X1

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USSR: [A recent statement by Marshal Chuykov suggests a resurgence of the influence of ground forces proponents in the Soviet military establishment.]

[Chuykov told the US Army attaché that "some people thought they could do away with the ground forces, but they found out they couldn't do this." In conjunction with this Chuykov also stated that the Soviet Union has "re-established" its Ground Forces Headquarters during the past month and he is once again commander in chief of ground forces.]

[During the series of changes in July 1964, the Ground Forces Headquarters was reorganized and some of its functions were parceled out to ground elements of the General Staff and the newly created Main Directorate of Combat Training. Chuykov was left holding only the post of chief of civil defense, a job which he retains now in addition to heading the ground forces again.]

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Dominican Republic: The Moscow-oriented Dominican Popular Socialist Party continues to press for a popular front through which it expects to exert influence after settlement of the current impasse. The newspaper Patria, in which "soft-line" Communist influence has become apparent in recent weeks, claimed in an editorial on 5 August that unity of purpose already exists among the Communists, the leftist revolutionary and democratic liberal parties, and the "good" elements of the military. Elements of Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party may be drawn into the incipient United Front if that party continues to break up into factions. The extremist faction of the small Revolutionary Social Christian Party may also feel that it is in its interest to join.

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Belgium: Brussels' role in the training of the Congolese Army may soon be strengthened. It has acceded to a request by General Mobutu that it assign one of its ablest officers to serve as his chief of staff as well as chief of the Belgian military mission in the Congo. Belgium has also suggested negotiation of a new military assistance agreement and is sending the new appointee to Leopoldville on 9 August to discuss its terms.

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THE PRESIDENT  
The Vice President  
Executive Offices of the White House  
Special Counsel to the President  
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
The Scientific Adviser to the President  
The Director of the Budget  
The Department of State  
The Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council  
The Director of Intelligence and Research  
The Treasury Department  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Under Secretary of the Treasury  
The Department of Defense  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
The Secretary of the Army  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Secretary of the Air Force  
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)  
The Assistant Secretary of Defense  
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
Chief of Staff, United States Army  
Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO  
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
Commander in Chief, Pacific  
Commander in Chief, Atlantic  
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
The Director, The Joint Staff  
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
The Department of Justice  
The Attorney General  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation  
The Director  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
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