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Authority NND 529477  
By [Signature] NARA Date 5-7-10

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
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TO RUSBAE/AMEMBASY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 5823  
INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 3370  
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 5121  
RUSBAY/AMCONSUL BOMBAY IMMEDIATE 9371  
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 1356  
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E.O. 12065 RDS - 1/26/85 (OES/NET - LOUIS V. NOSENZO)O

TAGS:TECH, IN, PK

SUBJECT:(S) AD HOC SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE AND RELATED TOPICS

REF: NEW DELHI 1322

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WITH REGARD TO YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH SHANKAR REPORTED REFTTEL, WE APPRECIATE YOUR SKILLFUL HANDLING OF THE CASTRO MADERO SITUATION. IF INDIANS ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT EITHER EFFAT OR CARVALHO, YOU SHOULD, OF COURSE, INDICATE US AGREEMENT TO THIS CHOICE.
3. WITH RESPECT TO HANDLING OF SUBSTITUTE FOR EKLUND, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD AWAIT HIS DECISION BEFORE PURSUING MATTER FURTHER. IF HE DECLINES, YOU SHOULD SEEK INDICATION OF WHETHER HE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES TO GOI AND, IF SO, GOI RECEPTIVENESS TO HIS SUGGESTIONS. (FYI. IN EARLIER CONVERSATIONS WITH US, EKLUND HAD SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF KOCH OF DENMARK, WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US. AS FOR DEPUTY DG'S, WE COULD AGREE TO GRUEMM (AUSTRIAN IN CHARGE OF SAFE-GUARDS) OR ZHELUDEV (RUSSIAN IN CHARGE OF TECHNICAL OPERATIONS), BUT ASSUME GOI COULD HAVE PROBLEMS WITH ZHELUDEV. WE DO NOT BELIEVE OTHERS ARE PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE:

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NAMELY, HALL (AMERICAN, ADMINISTRATION), KAKIHANA (JAPANESE, RESEARCH AND ISOTOPES), OR BITTENCORT (BRAZILIAN, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PUBLICATIONS). THUS, AMONG THE DEPUTY DG'S, GRUEMM APPEARS TO BE MOST APPROPRIATE AND FREE OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS. END FYI)

4. WE ASSUME THAT GOI IS HOLDING BACK ON EXPLICIT CONFIRMATION OF KURIHARA PENDING COMPLETION OF CONSULTATIONS ON GOI SELECTION. WE HAVE NOT YET MADE ANY APPROACH SEEKING KURIHARA'S PARTICIPATION AND WILL AWAIT A "GO AHEAD" FROM YOU BEFORE APPROACHING JAPANESE ON THIS.

5. ON PAK NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, YOU SHOULD TAKE NEXT OPPORTUNITY WITH SHANKAR TO INFORM HIM THAT WE ARE WATCHING THE PAK SITUATION VERY CLOSELY; THAT OUR READING OF THE SITUATION IS THAT, EVEN WITH A PRIORITY EFFORT, IT WOULD TAKE THE PAKS A NUMBER OF YEARS; AND THAT WE ARE TAKING STEPS TO TRY TO DISSUADE THEM FROM ANY EFFORTS AT ACQUIRING SUCH CAPABILITIES. PAK ACTIVITIES WOULD EMPHASIZE, MORE THAN EVER, THE NEED FOR US TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF SAFEGUARDS ON THE INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THIS SHOULD SERVE TO HELP ASSURE THE PAKS OF THE PEACEFUL NATURE OF INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, REMOVE SOME OF THE INCENTIVE FOR THEM TO MOVE AHEAD ON EXPLOSIVES-RELATED ACTIVITIES, AND FACILITATE EFFORTS TO AVOID ANY UNSAFEGUARDED PAK FACILITIES. (FYI ONLY. WE ARE AT A LOSS AS TO THE ORIGIN OF THE THREE-MONTH ESTIMATE. IT DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH OUR CURRENT ESTIMATE OR WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE BRITISH ESTIMATE. OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT IT WOULD TAKE THE PAKS AT LEAST 3-5 YEARS TO PRODUCE A DEVICE. END FYI) VANCE  
RT

