

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

ACDA/IR: SDePalma:cs  
6/16/64

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: June 16, 1964

**SUBJECT:** UK Requests Delay in Submission US Paper on Verification of Cutoff in Production Fissionable Material for Weapons Use

**PARTICIPANTS:** Mr. M. Faber, First Secretary, British Embassy  
Mr. S. DePalma, ACDA/IR

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Mr. Faber called at 5:30 PM, June 15, to convey the UK reaction to Annex A of the US paper for the ENDC on the verification of a cutoff agreement. (This paper had been made available to the British Embassy for comment on June 10.) Mr. Faber stated that the UK could not now support a cutoff in the production of fissionable materials as a measure which would take effect prior to Stage I of a GCD agreement and there was no guarantee it would be able to do so in the immediate future. His instructions did not elaborate the "well known reasons" for this reaction, but Mr. Faber assumed the reasons had to do with the UK dependence for certain fissionable materials on a barter arrangement with the US and the uncertainty as to the effect of a cutoff agreement on that arrangement.

Even though it could not support a cutoff agreement, the UK nevertheless hoped we could allow more time for study of our verification scheme since it would have implications for verification in general in which the UK is much interested. The UK wanted an opportunity to raise certain questions before the verification scheme is presented to the ENDC. Two preliminary comments which the UK could pass on now were as follows:

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"At first sight the arrangements for inspection of declared facilities should be good enough to ensure the sort of not too precise control that appears to be the aim of the paper. As regards 'undeclared', i.e. clandestine facilities, the paper only states the most general principles. The difficulties would, of course arise over the details.

"Fissile material for peaceful explosions (paragraph II A) may cause difficulties. Assuming the quantities are likely to be relatively small, could this not be provided for from stockpiles?"

I told Mr. Faber I doubted there was much we could do to delay the submission of our verification paper to the ENDC since, as I had explained to him on June 10, the idea of a cutoff was not a new US proposal (it has been reiterated many times during the last year or more) and we were anxious to submit our verification ideas for discussion as soon as possible. However, I promised to report his government's views and to inform him of our reaction as soon as possible.

At 7:30 that evening I called Mr. Faber to inform him we were considering the possibility of authorizing USRO to proceed with the planned discussion of this matter in POLAD on June 16 or NAC on the 17th, as USRO deemed advisable, while suggesting to our delegation in Geneva that it would be advisable to delay the actual tabling of our verification paper until June 25 at the latest in order to allow the UK more time for comment. If that were done, the US Delegation would limit itself on June 18 to a statement covering the essence of our verification paper, without tabling any document.

Mr. Faber called again at 11:00 AM, June 16, when I confirmed that we had sent instructions along the above lines to USRO and our Geneva Delegation. He appeared to regard these as an acceptable compromise, but hoped we would in fact agree to allow the UK at least one more week to comment on the verification scheme.