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TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC, FRG

SUBJECT: BILATERAL WITH THE FRG ON TNF ISSUES

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1. BILATERAL WITH THE FRG ON TNF ISSUES TOOK PLACE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON OCTOBER 11. FRG SIDE WAS REPRESENTED BY MESSRS. BLECH, RUTH, STUTZLE, ROSSBACH, TANDECKI,

VOLLSTEDT, DAERR, HANSEN, SCHAUER, KELLEIN. THE US SIDE WAS REPRESENTED BY MESSRS. GELB, BARTHOLOMEW, VEST, NEWHOUSE, SLOCOMBE, GOODBY, GOMPERT, WELCH, VESSER, AND MS. DAVIS.

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2. ORDER OF PRESENTATION AND STRUCTURE OF DISCUSSION WAS ESSENTIALLY SAME AS AT BILATERALS WITH THE UK (REFTEL), AS WAS DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG US PARTICIPANTS. FRG SIDE STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING OF LAST WEEK HAD COMMISSIONED TEAM TO "TRY OUT" AND TO "CHECK" SOME IDEAS WITH THE US AT THE BILATERALS, AND NOT, RPT, NOT TO NEGOTIATE A POSITION.

3. FOLLOWING BRIEFINGS ON BALANCE AT MORNING SESSION, STUTZLE, BLECH AND TANDECKI EVINced CONCERN THAT US PROJECTIONS OF OVERALL LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN INVENTORIES OF NATO AND PACT FORCES BY 1985 TENDED TO EMPHASIZE CONTINUATION OF PARITY, BUT TO DOWNPLAY CONTINUED HEAVY NATO DEPENDENCE ON US CENTRAL SYSTEMS AS COMPARED TO RAPID INCREASE IN PACT RV'S DELIVERABLE BY NEW SYSTEMS OF THEATER RANGE. THEY ARGUED THAT -- APART FROM GROSS NUMBERS -- COMPOSITION OF NATO'S INVENTORY COULD BECOME A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE PRESERVATION OF DETERRENCE. AS AN EXAMPLE, BLECH SUGGESTED A SCENARIO IN WHICH, WITH NUCLEAR WAR HAVING COMMENCED AT THEATER LEVEL, THE WEST WOULD RUN OUT OF THEATER-RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND OPTIONS FIRST, AND BE FORCED TO CONFRONT THE JUMP TO CENTRAL SYSTEMS WELL BEFORE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE A SIMILAR CHOICE.

4. THERE ALSO APPEARED TO BE SOME FRG APPREHENSION ABOUT SECRET

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US VIEWS CONCERNING THE EARLY AVAILABILITY OF POSEIDON RV'S RESERVED FOR SACEUR. QUESTIONING BROUGHT OUT THAT THIS CONCERN DERIVED FROM READING OF PAGE 12 OF THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION PAPER, WHICH IN DESCRIBING CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES OF EXISTING NATO LONG- AND MEDIUM-RANGE TNF, STATED THAT THE POSEIDON/POLARIS FORCES "ARE GENERALLY REGARDED AS "STRATEGIC" SYSTEMS WHOSE USE PRIOR TO GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE MIGHT CONVEY AN OVERLY ESCALATORY SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION." US SIDE EXPLAINED THIS WAS SIMPLY ATTEMPT TO CHARACTERIZE HOW SOVIETS MIGHT PERCEIVE THESE SYSTEMS, AND NOT A REFLECTION OF US POLICY ON USE OF THESE SYSTEMS. FRG EXPRESSED INTEREST IN CONVENTIONAL CRUISE MISSILES, AND VOICED CONCERNS RE CRUISE MISSILE PENETRATIVITY.

5. IN RESPONSE TO US INVITATION TO PRESENT COMPLETE EXPO-

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SITION OF THE PROBLEM FROM GERMAN PERSPECTIVE, BLECH MADE AN INFORMAL STATEMENT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

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6. BASED ON DISCUSSION IN FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL, FRG SAW PROBLEM NOT AS NEAR-TERM ONE, BUT AS ONE FOR THE 1980'S. CORE OF PROBLEM WAS THAT, IF WEST'S RELATIVE WEAKNESS IN THEATER-RANGE SYSTEMS FORCED NATO TO CONFRONT DECISION TO USE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS BEFORE SOVIETS, THERE COULD BE A CHANGE IN PERCEPTIONS REGARDING CREDIBILITY OF NATO DETERRENT. BLECH ADMITTED THIS WAS HIGHLY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL QUESTION, AND THAT ANSWER TO IT DID NOT REQUIRE ANYTHING LIKE COMPLETE PARITY IN THEATER-RANGE SYSTEMS. ON OTHER HAND, HE OBSERVED THAT IF THE "SCISSORS" (PRESUMABLY, ON A CHART SHOWING TRENDS IN DEPLOYMENTS OF NATO AND PACT THEATER-RANGE SYSTEMS) WERE TO OPEN "TOO WIDE," THERE COULD BE A PROBLEM. MILITARILY, DUE TO INCREASES IN SOVIET MID-RANGE CAPABILITIES (SS-20, BACKFIRE), CAPABILITY OF ALLIANCE TO ESCALATE MAY BE IMPAIRED.

7. BLECH STRESSED THAT BONN HAD NO CRITICISM OF SALT PROCESS AS SUCH, AND WANTED IT TO CONTINUE. HOWEVER HE  
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SAID SALT TENDED TO ACCENTUATE DISPARITIES IN MID-RANGE SYSTEMS, AND REGISTERED AWARENESS THAT SALT HAD ALREADY BEGUN TO ENGAGE MID-RANGE SYSTEMS THROUGH PROTOCOL AND PLANNED US STATEMENT RE FUTURE LIMITS ON THEATER SYSTEMS.

8. BONN'S OBJECTIVE, BLECH SAID, WAS TO FIND SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD TREAT GRAY AREA ISSUE AS ONE OF "STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE, AFFECTING THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE." BONN WANTED SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD PROMOTE A STABLE OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE. IN FRG VIEW, STABILITY OF SUCH A BALANCE SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY OVER ARMS CONTROL CONCERNS: THAT WE NEED TO DECIDE ON FORCE POSTURE BEFORE MOVING TO ARMS CONTROL. FRG, HE ADDED, DID NOT FORESEE ANY SINGLE OVERALL SOLUTION; RATHER, ALLIANCE MUST PROCEED ON PRAGMATIC, STEP-BY-STEP BASIS.

9. FRG DID NOT WISH TO SUGGEST THAT ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE SLIGHTED, BUT BLECH EMPHASIZED THAT PRIORITY OF BALANCE AND STABILITY IN THE 1980'S WAS A KEY ELEMENT FOR BONN.

10. BLECH ALSO IDENTIFIED CERTAIN POINTS WITH WHICH BONN EMPHATICALLY DID NOT WISH TO BE ASSOCIATED: ANY COMPART-

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MENTALIZATION OF EUROPE BASED ON THE IDEA OF A EUROSTRATEGIC  
BALANCE; AND ANY LOOSENING OF THE TRIAD CONTINUUM.

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11. FRG WAS NOT THINKING, BLECH SAID, IN TERMS OF AN  
INDEPENDENT, SELF-RELIANT EUROPEAN (AND STILL LESS AN  
FRG) NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. FRG WANTED SOLUTION WHICH TOOK  
ACCOUNT OF NEEDS OF ALL (WITH SPECIAL STRESS ON WORD "ALL")  
ALLIANCE MEMBERS, BUT WHICH GAVE PLACE TO "PECULIARITIES"  
OF FRG'S SITUATION. IN ELLIPTICAL REFERENCE TO QUESTION OF  
FRG PARTICIPATION IN ALLIANCE NUCLEAR MISSION, BLECH

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STRESSED PRINCIPLE OF RISK SHARING, NOTING THAT ROUGHLY  
HALF OF NATO TNF IS NOW BASED ON FRG TERRITORY. BLECH STAT-  
ED THAT IF STATUS OF FRG IN ALLIANCE WERE TO UNDERGO A  
CHANGE, THERE WOULD BE IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS  
AND THE POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL BALANCE IN THE ALLIANCE.  
IT WAS ETERNAL PROBLEM: FRG HAD TO BE STRONG ENOUGH TO BEAT  
RUSSIANS, BUT WEAKER THAN LUXEMBOURG. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY  
TO WEIGH POLITICALLY WHETHER A CHANGE IN FRG STATUS WOULD  
LOSE MORE POLITICALLY THAN IT WOULD GAIN IN  
INCREASED MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE ALLIANCE.

12. BLECH THEN OUTLINED THE FRG CONCEPTION OF AN "OVERALL  
STRATEGIC APPROACH," GIVING AS ITS MAIN PRINCIPLES THAT:  
(1) OVERALL STRATEGIC PARITY IS THE LONG-TERM AIM; (2)  
PARITY OF MID-RANGE SYSTEMS IS NOT NEEDED FOR OVERALL  
STRATEGIC PARITY; (3) DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL MEASURES  
SHOULD BE MESHED; AND (4) THE DEFINITION OF "STRATEGIC  
SHOULD BE ALTERED FOR PURPOSES OF THE FRG CONCEPT TO INCLUDE  
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 1000 KM. THIS,  
HE SAID, WOULD FACILITATE A CALCULATION OF THE RELATIVE  
SIGNIFICANCE FOR NATO OF SYSTEMS OF DIFFERENT KINDS, AND  
WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO USE SALT III AS A MEANS TO SEEK  
A REDUCTION OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN  
MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS.

13. SPELLING OUT DETAILS, BLECH SAID THAT:

--IN SUCH AN APPROACH, WEST WOULD AIM TO AVOID UNILATERAL  
LIMITS ON WESTERN POTENTIAL, AND TO START ENGAGING SOVIETS  
IN TERMS OF PRESENT DISPARITIES IN THE MID-RANGE AREA.

--FRENCH AND UK FORCES MUST BE LEFT OUT "FOR THE TIME BE-  
ING." BUT, BLECH SAID, THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE EXAMINED  
FURTHER IN THE ALLIANCE, "ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH

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--IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KEEP OPEN CRUISE MISSILE OPTIONS, (BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL) WITH RANGES IN EXCESS OF 600 KM, BOTH FROM A DEFENSE AND AN ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVE.

14. BLECH SAID THAT SUCH NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE IN SALT. IT OUGHT NOT -- IN FRG VIEW -- REQUIRE CREATION OF NEW COORDINATING OR CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS IN THE ALLIANCE. ON OTHER HAND, INTENSIFIED CONTACTS WITH FRANCE, UK AND FRG WOULD CERTAINLY BE NEEDED ON A BILATERAL BASIS, AS WELL AS MORE INTENSIFIED CONSULTATIONS WITHIN NATO.

15. AS TO SPECIFICS OF A FORCE DEPLOYMENT PACKAGE, BLECH SAID HE COULD NOT SAY MUCH BEYOND WHAT ALREADY APPEARS IN THE HLG REPORT. HE REEMPHASIZED FRG'S CONTRIBUTION TO NATO TNF POSTURE, BOTH AS HOST TO WEAPONS STORED ON GERMAN TERRITORY, AND IN "MAKING AVAILABLE NUCLEAR CARRIERS." IN THIS CONNECTION, BLECH SAID HE RECOGNIZED THERE EXISTED A QUESTION OF WHETHER ANY FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF FRG'S ROLE IN THE NUCLEAR AREA, OR A QUALITATIVE SHIFT IN THE NATURE OF ITS ROLE, WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. THE FRG, HE SAID, IS OPEN TO PROPOSALS COVERING THE QUESTION OF GERMAN PARTICIPATION. HOWEVER, BLECH THEN LAID DOWN AN IMPORTANT MARKER: DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUND-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD POSE TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE FRG IF LIMITED TO FRG TERRITORY SINCE, HE SUGGESTED, POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ISOLATION SINCE, HE SUGGESTED, POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ISOLATION COULD RESULT-- BOTH FROM THE EAST AND FROM THE WEST. A SPECIFIC NUCLEAR ROLE FOR FRG COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS IN FRG RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS WHICH MIGHT INDICATE THIS WOULD NOT BE WORTHWHILE FROM STANDPOINT OF OVERALL ALLIANCE INTERESTS.

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16. SUMMING UP FRG CONCEPT OF AN OVERALL STRATEGIC APPROACH, BLECH SAID THAT IT WOULD:

--ESTABLISH THE PARALLELISM BETWEEN DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE ALLIANCE'S APPROACH:

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--MAKE VISIBLE THE CONNECTION OF THE NATO TRIAD AND THE UNITY OF ALLIANCE TERRITORY;

--HELP DEAL WITH ONE-SIDED SOVIET CLAIMS ON FBS IN SALT;  
AND

--AVOID REGIONAL (READ EUROSTRATEGIC) OR "LAYERED" (SYSTEM-BY-SYSTEM) FORMS OF PARITY.

17. AFTERNOON SESSION DEALT PRINCIPALLY WITH ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF TNF ISSUE, ALTHOUGH IT FREQUENTLY TURNED BACK TO DISCUSSION OF GERMAN "OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE" CONCEPT. FRG PARTICIPANTS REFUSED TO BE PINNED DOWN ON CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES OR STRATEGIES, ARGUING THAT A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SALT III HAD TO BE DEvised WITHIN ALLIANCE BEFORE HYPOTHETICAL NEGOTIATING TRADE-OFFS COULD BE ASSESSED.

18. US SIDE QUESTIONED NEED FOR NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK -- WHICH COULD, DESPITE FRG INTENTION, LEAD TO NOTION OF EUROSTRATEGIC BALANCE. A NEW CONCEPT IMPLIED A CHANGED REALITY, YET US THOUGHT FRG AGREED STRATEGIC SITUATION WAS NOT FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED. PROBLEM WAS PRIMARILY ONE OF PERCEPTIONS, AND DICTATED A PRAGMATIC APPROACH. QUESTION WAS: HOW TO HANDLE SALT III -- WHICH COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS 6-9 MONTHS FROM NOW AND WHICH WOULD RELATE TO GRAY AREA ISSUES BECAUSE OF PROTOCOL AND US STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS -- GIVEN FACT THAT US TNF PROGRAMS WOULD NOT REACH IOC FOR 3-4 YEARS?

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19. STUTZLE ARGUED REALITY WAS CHANGED, AND THAT PIECES OF DETERRENCE WERE BEING NEGOTIATED IN ISOLATION. THEREFORE, A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK WAS JUSTIFIED. HE ASKED TWO QUESTIONS: WHAT DID THE US WANT THE NUCLEAR BALANCE TO LOOK LIKE AFTER SALT III, GIVEN THE SPECIFIC FACTS WHICH WERE ALREADY IN EXISTENCE (CENTRAL SYSTEMS WERE BEING NEGOTIATED SEPARATELY -- A FACT WHICH SOVIETS MUST PERCEIVE, AND LIKELY HOPE TO MAINTAIN IN SALT III; SOVIET TNF

CAPABILITIES WERE INCREASING; FBS WERE ALREADY PART OF SALT II)? HOW DID THE US WANT THE FRG TO PERCEIVE THE

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THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE? IT WAS THE US, NOT THE FRG, WHICH DETERMINED THAT NUCLEAR BALANCE, AND SO IT WAS ONLY THE US WHICH COULD SPECULATE ON THE LIKELY EVOLUTION OF SALT.

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20. BLECH SAID FRG HARBORED NO DOUBTS ABOUT US CAPABILITIES OR COMMITMENT. NUCLEAR BALANCE AS WHOLE WAS ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT. BUT, FOR FRG, STRUCTURE OF BALANCE WAS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT. IT WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID CREATING UNCERTAINTY IN OTHER SIDE'S MIND ABOUT NATO'S WILL TO ESCALATE. SUCH UNCERTAINTY WOULD MEAN NOT SO MUCH HIGHER PROBABILITY OF WAR, AS HIGHER PROBABILITY OF POLITICAL PRESSURE. THIS PROBLEM WAS ONE FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST THE EUROPEANS, SINCE IT COULD LEAD TO POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION IN EUROPE.

21. GENERAL TANDECKI THEN OFFERED WHAT HE CALLED A MILITARY VIEW OF THE SITUATION. SALT AGENDA HAD PROGRESSIVELY WIDENED SINCE SALT I. WITH AN AMBIGUOUS SYSTEM (THE CRUISE MISSILE) INCLUDED ONLY ON ONE SIDE, IT WAS A MATTER OF LOGIC THAT DISPARITIES NOT COVERED BY SALT II MUST GAIN IN IMPORTANCE. EXCLUSION OF BACKFIRE BY MEANS OF "DEDICATING EUROPE AS ITS TARGET AREA" COULD BE SEEN AS DRIFT AWAY

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FROM NOTION OF ALLIANCE AS SINGLE ENTITY. GOAL FOR SALT III, GIVEN INEVITABILITY THAT AGENDA WOULD WIDEN STILL FURTHER, SHOULD BE OVERALL PARITY, NOT REGIONAL PARITY. THE FRG "OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE" CONCEPT WOULD NOT SINGLE OUT ANY REGION, AND WOULD NOT INCLUDE UK/FRENCH FORCES. AGREEMENT BASED ON IT WOULD PRESERVE COUPLING, DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE IS AN ENTITY IN BOTH SECURITY AND RISK TERMS. FRG WANTED TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL IN GRAY AREA, ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZED UK HAD OPPOSING VIEWS. BUT FRG WANTED UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS EXCLUDED, AND WHOLE MATTER HANDLED BY US.

22. BLECH SAID THE "OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE" CONCEPT WAS NEEDED FOR ARMS CONTROL, NOT FOR NATO STRATEGY. THE ALLIANCE HAD TO DEVISE AN EQUATION WITH WHICH TO COMPARE THE SIDES' FORCES, AND WHICH RECOGNIZED THE CONTRIBUTION OF TNF TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND TO DETERRENCE. RUTH NOTED US-FRG DIFFERENCES WERE OVER DEFINING A MATTER WHICH BOTH SAW IN THE SAME WAY. THE PROBLEM REALLY WAS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO BE IN SALT: IF SYSTEMS NOT PREVIOUSLY DEFINED AS "STRATEGIC" WERE TO BE COVERED, THEN

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"STRATEGIC" HAD TO BE REDEFINED. DEFINING "STRATEGIC" WAS NOT A NEW QUESTION; IT WAS AN INEVITABLE MEANS TO DECIDING WHAT YOU WANTED TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT.

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23. US PARTICIPANTS NOTED PROBLEMS WITH 1000 KM RANGE CUT-OFF. IT COULD PLAY TO SOVIET NOTION OF "EQUAL SECURITY", AND IN TURN PLACE UK AND FRENCH FORCES AT RISK IN A NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO EXPLOIT TERRITORIAL ASYMMETRIES THROUGH INCREASED DEPLOYMENTS OF SHORT-RANGE TNFS, SUCH AS SCALEBOARD, AN AREA WHERE THEIR MODERNIZATION COULD ALREADY BE TERMED "REVOLUTIONARY". STUTZLE REPLIED THAT EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT SCALEBOARD WOULD INCREASE IN STRATEGIC TERMS TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SOVIETS PERCEIVED NATO TO BE NEGLECTING A COUNTER TO THE SS-20.

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24. AFTER NEWHOUSE'S PRESENTATION ON ISSUES INVOLVED IN THEATER ARMS CONTROL, US ATTEMPTED TO ELICIT FRG REACTION TO ILLUSTRATIVE ARMS CONTROL TRADE-OFFS: WHAT WOULD BE FRG VIEW ON AN OFFER TO LIMIT US DEPLOYMENTS OF GLCM AND PERSHING II-XR TO "X" IF SOVIETS CAPPED BACKFIRE AND SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS AT "Y" AND "Z"? RUTH SAID THE EXAMPLE UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A SCHEMA TO COMPARE THE SIDES' CAPABILITIES. ONLY THEN COULD NATO KNOW WHAT TO "CAP" IN RETURN FOR CAP ON SOVIET TNF. US OFFERED HYPOTHETICAL NUMBERS FOR "X" AND "Y". BLECH REPLIED THAT FRG COULD STILL NOT EVALUATE EXAMPLE WITHOUT PARAMETERS WITH WHICH TO EVALUATE BALANCE.

25. RUTH ASKED WHEN THE ILLUSTRATIVE PROPOSAL TO CAP THE SS-20 WOULD BE MADE. US PARTICIPANTS OUTLINED LIKELY SALT III SCENARIO, WITH SOVIETS RAISING FBS AND CRUISE MISSILES, AND US RESPONDING BY RAISING SOVIET TNF. QUESTION WAS WHETHER US SHOULD RAISE ONLY LONG-RANGE TNF'S, OR BROADER SET OF SYSTEMS. SOVIETS WOULD LIKELY COUNTER WITH DEMANDS TO INCLUDE US TNF'S DOWN TO F-4'S, AND NEGOTIATIONS COULD BOG DOWN. STUTZLE SUGGESTED THAT, IN SUCH A CASE, "STRATEGIC" SHOULD BE DEFINED AS INCLUDING ALL SOVIET SYSTEMS WHICH CAN REACH THE US AND FRG. BLECH SAID AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE WAS FOR ALLIANCE TO DECIDE ON SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS BEFOREHAND, AND NOT LET IT BE DONE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ITSELF.

26. RUTH SAID A WESTERN ARMS CONTROL POSITION SHOULD NOT BE DEVELOPED AS A REACTION TO THE OTHER SIDE'S PROPOSALS.

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RATHER, ALLIANCE SHOULD TAKE HLG RECOMMENDATIONS ON TNF  
MODERNIZATION AND THEN DEVELOP ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY WHICH  
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WOULD "COMPLEMENT AND SAFEGUARD" THE NECESSARY MODERNI-  
ZATION. BUT FIRST, THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO DRAW UP A  
BALANCE SHEET OF CAPABILITIES ON BOTH SIDES. RUTH ALSO  
INDICATED ALLIANCE MIGHT WISH TO PROPOSE A LIMITED-SCOPE  
ARRANGEMENT, CONSTRAINING ONLY MODERN LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS.

27. US POSED ANOTHER EXAMPLE. ASSUME ALLIANCE DECIDED  
IN FAVOR OF PERSHING II-XR OVER GLCM. WHAT COULD WE GET  
IN THE WAY OF CONSTRAINTS ON THE SOVIETS IN EXCHANGE FOR A  
RENUNCIATION OF GLCM (WHICH WOULD BE DEVELOPED AS PURE  
BARGAINING CHIP)? RUTH SAID QUESTION COULD NOT BE  
ANSWERED UNTIL ALLIANCE DECIDED ON ROLE OF LONG-RANGE  
SYSTEMS -- WHICH COULD LEAD TO MIX OF DIFFERENT SYSTEMS --  
AND ON CRITERIA FOR NEGOTIATIONS, NOTING FRG PREFERENCE  
FOR 1000 KM CRITERION.

28. ON QUESTION OF FURTHER CONSULTATIONS, US SIDE LAID OUT  
SCENARIO OF A NAC IN NOVEMBER, BILATERALS WITH SMALLER  
ALLIES SOON AFTER, AND FURTHER BILATERALS WITH THE BIG  
THREE, LEADING TO THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN DECEMBER. US  
WOULD ACCORDINGLY GIVE DISCUSSION PAPER TO OTHER ALLIES.  
FRG PARTICIPANTS WERE CHARY OF GIVING PAPER TO OTHER  
ALLIES, SINCE IT WAS TOO DETAILED AND COULD HAVE NEGATIVE  
"SHOCK" EFFECT. US ARGUED THAT FACT OF PAPER'S EXISTENCE  
WOULD BECOME KNOWN AND, IN ANY CASE, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO  
INVOLVE WHOLE ALLIANCE IN TNF ISSUE. DECEMBER MINISTERIAL  
WOULD NOT REACH ANY DECISIONS, BUT MERELY DISCUSS ISSUES  
IN GENERAL TERMS.

29. FRG CONCLUDED BY NOTING PRODUCTIVE CHARACTER OF CON-  
SULTATION, AND THEIR HOPE THAT THERE WOULD BE A CONTINUING  
DIALOGUE RATHER THAN STRUCTURED SERIES OF FORMAL ROUNDS.  
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