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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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COUNTRY

ACTION: Amembassy CANBERRA

INFO: USUN New York

STATE

L I M D I S

SUBJECT: Australian Concerns regarding NPT

REF: Canberra 4923; ^{nc} 4938 ^{nc}

1. Summary. We are prepared send qualified team of senior officials to discuss Australian concerns regarding NPT. We consider Australian concerns largely misplaced and due to inadequate knowledge of NPT and negotiating history. END SUMMARY.

2. As explained septel, it will not be possible on such short notice and in present circumstances for Seaborg or comparable official to join team we are prepared send to Canberra. Team we are prepared send comprises senior officials particularly qualified to discuss Australian concerns. (Del. listed Septel).

3. Meanwhile suggest Embassy convey following information to appropriate officials regarding Australian concerns reported

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Drafted by:

ACDA/IR: SDePalma; ems: 4/10/68

Tel. Ext.

2762

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: **ACDA/D - William C. Foster**

Clearance:

AEC - Miss Joseph
SCI - Mr. Zook
G/PM - Mr. Shaw

UNP
IO/ Mr. Higginson

ACDA/DD - Mr. Fisher
ANZ - Mr. Lindquist
ACDA/ST - Dr. Scoville
AEC - Mr. Brown

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para 2, Canberra 4923. We plan make similar approach Australian Ambassador here. Fact that such fears still being expressed in Australia technical circles suggests they have not followed NPT negotiations in Geneva, where most such concerns have already been discussed and dissipated.

4. Thus, for example, it is now generally understood that, far from hindering peaceful atomic energy industry, NPT will facilitate international cooperation in developing peaceful uses. It does this by express undertakings regarding expanded cooperation (Articles III and IV) and by establishing mandatory IAEA safeguards which will remove fear of diversion peaceful uses to weapons purposes, thereby removing what could become serious impediment to international cooperation.

5. Only technological development prohibited by treaty is development nuclear weapons (which understood to mean nuclear bombs and warheads, not delivery systems) and other nuclear explosive devices. Such other devices must be prohibited since technology their development indistinguishable from that for nuclear weapons and such devices could be adapted for military use. However, under Article V such devices will be made available at low cost (far less than it would take for any other country to develop them) and without discrimination on bilateral or international basis. As for so-called peaceful "spin-off" from

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development weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, this was obtained at great cost long ago and is now largely available to countries such as Australia in open technical literature. ~~or on ordinary commercial terms from consulting engineering firms~~ } Difficult believe Australia would choose spend hundreds millions dollars to "rediscover" what is now generally known.

6. STATE 130374 regarding nuclear propulsion, being repeated Canberra, indicates there is no basis for concern about propulsion reactors. Similarly NPT does not prohibit establishment facilities for producing enriched uranium, provided safeguards required by treaty are applied.

7. Visiting team will be prepared explain safeguards provision, interpretation of treaty and proposed assurances resolution in detail. As regards assurances, of course, US/Australian defense arrangements will be unaffected by NPT and will continue assure basic security. Proposed UN Security Council assurance resolution addressed primarily to concerns of non-aligned countries.

8. FOR USUN: Reftels being repeated USUN. Suggest Mission also convey above to Australian DEL.

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END RUSK

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