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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CMC REARCS

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INFO: CFE (01) NRRC (01) SDEL (01) SNP (01)

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END TEXT.

(TOTAL COPIES: 004)

ORIGIN EAP-00

3. PRESS GUIDANCE:

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-13	ADS-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	CFE-00	DODE-00
	EUR-00	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	L-03
	NEA-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-02
	PM-00	PRS-01	P-02	SDEL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	/066R			

Q: IS CHINA SELLING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO ALGERIA? ANY WEAPONS POTENTIAL TO SUCH SALES? WHAT IS THE USG POSITION?

A: WE HAVE INDICATIONS CHINA IS PROVIDING NUCLEAR-RELATED ASSISTANCE TO ALGERIA.

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EAP/P: KWALKIN PA: ASTOCKMAN
NEA/AFN: RALBRIGHT NEA/EX: LWATT

I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT WE HAVE NO REASON TO CONCLUDE THAT CHINA HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO ALGERIA FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.

P 122005Z APR 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5657/58 PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4025/26
USMISSION USVIENNA 4718/19

CHINA HAS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY PLEDGED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT IT DOES NOT ENGAGE IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THAT IT WILL NOT HELP OTHER COUNTRIES DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND HAS ALSO SAID THAT IT WILL REQUIRE SAFEGUARDS ON ITS NUCLEAR EXPORTS.

UNCLAS STATE 119578

WE HAVE STRESSED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TO THE CHINESE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS; WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE EXPECT CHINA TO ABIDE BY ITS PUBLIC COMMITMENTS ON NONPROLIFERATION AS WELL AS ITS PRIVATE ASSURANCES TO US.

FOR UNVIE MISSION

WE WILL CONTINUE TO REVIEW CHINA'S NONPROLIFERATION

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PARM, CH, AG
SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE: CHINA-ALGERIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

PRACTICES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH ITS PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THIS AREA.

(IF PRESSED FOR SPECIFICS ON THE WASHINGTON TIMES ARTICLE)

1. FOLLOWING AT PARA TWO IS THE TEXT OF THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON SINO-ALGERIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION. APPROVED GUIDANCE FOR POSTS TO USE AS NECESSARY FOLLOWS AT PARA THREE.

A: I CANNOT COMMENT ON THE SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS RAISED IN THE WASHINGTON TIMES ARTICLE TODAY.

2. TEXT OF SPOKESMAN'S COMMENTS AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING ON CHINA-ALGERIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION:

Q: IS IT TRUE THAT THE SAUDI ARABIAN CSS-2 MISSILES ARE NUCLEAR-TIPPED, AS ALLEGED BY THE WASHINGTON TIMES?

BBC'S ZIFF ASKED, "DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE PIECE IN THE WASHINGTON TIMES TODAY ON THE ALGERIAN-CHINESE NUCLEAR PROGRAM?" USING GUIDANCE THAT WAS PROVIDED THIS MORNING BOUCHER SAID, "WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT CHINA IS PROVIDING NUCLEAR-RELATED ASSISTANCE TO ALGERIA. I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR HOWEVER, THAT WE HAVE NO REASON TO CONCLUDE THAT CHINA HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO A GER A FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. AS FAR AS NON PRO IER T ON GOES, CHINA HAS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY P EDGED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT IT DOES NOT ENGAGE IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THAT IT WILL NOT HELP OTHER COUNTRIES

A: WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE HAVE PROVIDED NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR CSS-2 BALLISTIC MISSILES; NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE ARE ASSISTING THE SAUDI'S IN DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

Q: ARE THE CHINESE CONTINUING TO SELL BALLISTIC MISSILES TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AS ALLEGED BY THE WASHINGTON TIMES?

DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT HAS ALSO SAID THAT IT WILL REQUIRE SAFEGUARDS ON ITS NUCLEAR EXPORTS. WE HAVE STRESSED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TO THE CHINESE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. WE'VE TOLD THEM THAT WE EXPECT CHINA TO ABIDE BY ITS PUBLIC COMMITMENTS ON NONPROLIFERATION AS WELL AS THE PRIVATE ASSURANCES TO US. AND OF COURSE, THIS IS AN ISSUE THAT WE CONTINUE TO DISCUSS WITH THE CHINESE, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO REVIEW CHINA'S NONPROLIFERATION PRACTICES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH ITS PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THIS AREA."

A: CHINA WAS A MAJOR SUPPLIER OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TO IRAN AND IRAQ DURING THEIR 1981-87 WAR AND SOLD CSS-2 INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA IN 1988.

CHINA HAS SINCE PLEDGED NOT TO SELL MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES TO ANY MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH CHINA HAS NOT ANNOUNCED FORMAL OBSERVANCE OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) GUIDELINES, IT IS AWARE OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PARAMETERS.

WE CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE CHINESE ON THE ISSUE WITH A VIEW TO GAINING EXPLICIT CHINESE OBSERVANCE OF THE MTCR GUIDELINES.

ZIFF INQUIRED, "WHAT SORT OF ASSISTANCE THEN?" BOUCHER SAID "I'M AFRAID I'M NOT ABLE TO GO INTO ANY SPECIFICS NOR THE SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS THAT ARE IN THE ARTICLE."

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE US-PRC NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT?

A: THE US-PRC AGREEMENT FOR NUCLEAR COOPERATION TOOK EFFECT IN 1985 FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE REQUIRED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 09 DEC 2003 200102166

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CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PERIOD AND THE PASSAGE OF A JOINT
RESOLUTION (P.L. 99-183) APPROVING THE AGREEMENT.

HOWEVER BEFORE US NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO CHINA UNDER THE
AGREEMENT MAY BEGIN, THERE ARE TWO LEGISLATIVE
REQUIREMENTS THAT MUST BE SATISFIED.

P.L. 99-183 REQUIRES THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A
CERTIFICATION TO CONGRESS ON THREE MATTERS AND SUBMIT A
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES
AND PRACTICES. (SEE BACKGROUND FOR LISTING OF THE THREE
ISSUES TO BE CERTIFIED.)

IN ADDITION, P.L. 101-246 (THE STATE DEPARTMENT

AUTHORIZATION BILL FOR FY 90-91) REQUIRES SUBMISSION OF A
REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE PRESIDENT THAT EITHER THE PRC
HAS MADE PROGRESS ON POLITICAL REFORM IN CERTAIN WAYS
SPECIFIED BY THE LEGISLATION OR THAT IT IS IN THE US
NATIONAL INTEREST TO PERMIT US NUCLEAR TRANSFERS TO CHINA.

NEITHER OF THESE REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN SATISFIED. THE
US IS STILL AWAITING SATISFACTORY RESPONSES FROM THE PRC
ON MATTERS WE HAVE RAISED SINCE THE US-PRC NUCLEAR
COOPERATION AGREEMENT TOOK EFFECT.

BACKGROUND

THE MATTERS THAT MUST BE CERTIFIED UNDER P.L. 99-183 ARE:

- (1) THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AND
VISITS CALLED FOR BY THE AGREEMENT ARE DESIGNED TO BE
EFFECTIVE IN ENSURING THAT NUCLEAR EXPORTS UNDER THE
AGREEMENT ARE USED SOLELY FOR INTENDED PEACEFUL PURPOSES;
- (2) THAT CHINA IS NOT PRECLUDED UNDER SECTION 129 OF THE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT FROM RECEIVING US NUCLEAR EXPORTS; AND
- (3) THAT THE OBLIGATION TO CONSIDER FAVORABLY A REQUEST TO
CARRY OUT CERTAIN ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 5 (2) OF
THE AGREEMENT, SUCH AS THE REPROCESSING OF MATERIAL
SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT, DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE DECISION
OF THE US TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE SUCH A REQUEST.

END PRESS GUIDANCE.

4. ALGIERS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. KIMMITT

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