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EXL

CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORY

OVERTHROW OF PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN

November 1952-August 1953

Date written : March 1954
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Written by : Dr. Donald F.
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HISTORIAN'S NOTE

This paper, entitled Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, was written in March 1954 by Dr. Donald N. Wilber who had played an active role in the operation. The study was written because it seemed desirable to have a record of a major operation prepared while documents were readily at hand and while the memories of the personnel involved in the activity were still fresh. In addition, it was felt advisable to stress certain conclusions reached after the operation had been completed and to embody some of these in the form of recommendations applicable to future, parallel operations.

Documents pertaining to the operation described in this paper are in the Project TPAJAX files which are held by the Iran Branch of the Near East and South Asia Division.

All proper names mentioned in this paper have been checked for accuracy and completeness. A serious effort has been made to supply the first name and middle initial of each individual. The omission of any first names and middle initials indicates that such information could not be located.

Dean L. Dodge
NE Division
Historical Officer
March 1969

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SUMMARY

By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in Iran was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries; was reaching a dangerous and advanced stage of illegal, deficit financing; was disregarding the Iranian constitution in prolonging Premier Mohammed Mossadeq's tenure of office; was motivated mainly by Mossadeq's desire for personal power; was governed by irresponsible policies based on emotion; had weakened the Shah and the Iranian Army to a dangerous degree; and had cooperated closely with the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran. In view of these factors, it was estimated that Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain; if that happened it would mean a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for the West in the Middle East. No remedial action other than the covert action plan set forth below could be found to improve the existing state of affairs.

It was the aim of the TPAJAX project to cause the fall of the Mossadeq government; to reestablish the prestige and power of the Shah; and to replace the Mossadeq government with one which would govern Iran according to

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constructive policies. Specifically, the aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party.

Once it had been determined definitely that it was not in American interests for the Mossadeq government to remain in power and CIA had been so informed by the Secretary of State in March 1953, CIA began drafting a plan whereby the aims stated above could be realized through covert action. An estimate entitled "Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq" was completed on 16 April 1953. It was here determined that an overthrow of Mossadeq was possible through covert operations. In April it was determined that CIA should conduct the envisioned operation jointly with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). By the end of April, it was decided that CIA and SIS officers would draw up a plan on Cyprus which would be submitted to CIA and SIS Headquarters, and to the Department of State and the Foreign Office for final approval. On 3 June 1953, US Ambassador Loy Wesley Henderson arrived in the United States where he was fully consulted with regard to the objective and aims, as stated above, as well as CIA's intentions to design covert means of achieving

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the objective and aims.

The plan was completed by 10 June 1953 at which time Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, CIA (who carried with him the views of the Department of State, CIA, and Ambassador Henderson); Mr. Roger Goiran, CIA Chief of Station, Iran; and two CIA planning officers met in Beirut to consider the plan. With minor changes the operational proposal was submitted to the SIS in London on 14 June 1953.

On 19 June 1953, the final operational plan, agreed upon by Mr. Roosevelt for CIA and by British Intelligence in London, was submitted in Washington to the Department of State; to Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA; and to Ambassador Henderson for approval. Simultaneously, it was submitted to the British Foreign Office by SIS for approval. The Department of State wanted to be assured of two things before it would grant approval of the plan:

1. that the United States Government could provide adequate grant aid to a successor Iranian Government so that such a government could be sustained until an oil settlement was reached;
2. that the British Government would signify in writing, to the satisfaction of the Department

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of State, its intention to reach an early oil settlement with a successor Iranian Government in a spirit of good will and equity.

The Department of State satisfied itself on both of these scores.

In mid-July 1953, the Department of State and the British Foreign Office granted authorization for the implementation of the TPAJAX project, and the Director of CIA obtained the approval of the President of the United States. The SIS, with the concurrence of the CIA Director and Ambassador Henderson, proposed that Mr. Roosevelt assume field command in Tehran of the final phases of the operation. It was determined by the Department of State that it would be advisable for Ambassador Henderson to postpone his return to Iran, from Washington consultation, until the operation had been concluded. Arrangements were made jointly with SIS whereby operational liaison would be conducted on Cyprus where a CIA officer would be temporarily stationed, and support liaison would be conducted in Washington. Rapid three-way communications were arranged through CIA facilities between Tehran, Cyprus, and Washington. The time set for the operation was mid-August.

In Iran, CIA and SIS propaganda assets were to conduct

an increasingly intensified propaganda effort through the press, handbills, and the Tehran clergy in a campaign designed to weaken the Mossadeq government in any way possible. In the United States, high-ranking US officials were to make official statements which would shatter any hopes held by Premier Mossadeq that American economic aid would be forthcoming, and disabuse the Iranian public of the Mossadeq myth that the United States supported his regime.

General Fazlollah Zahedi, former member of Mossadeq's cabinet, was chosen as the most suitable successor to the Premier since he stood out as the only person of stature who had consistently been openly in opposition to Mossadeq and who claimed any significant following. Zahedi was to be approached by CIA and be told of our operation and its aim of installing him as the new prime minister. He was to name a military secretariat with which CIA would conclude a detailed staff plan of action.

From the outset, the cooperation of the Shah was considered to be an essential part of the plan. His cooperation was necessary to assure the action required of the Tehran military garrisons, and to legalize the succession of a new prime minister. Since the Shah had shown himself to be a man of indecision, it was determined that pressure

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on him to cooperate would take the following forms:

1. The Shah's dynamic and forceful twin sister, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, was to come from Europe to urge the Shah to dismiss Mossadeq. She would say she had been in contact with US and UK officials who had requested her to do so.

2. Arrangements were made for a visit to Iran by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former head of the US Gendarme Mission, whom the Shah liked and respected. Schwarzkopf was to explain the proposed project and get from the Shah signed firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mossadeq, appointing Zahedi, and calling on the Army to remain loyal to the Crown.

3. The principal indigenous British agent, whose bona fides had been established with the Shah, was to reinforce Schwarzkopf's message and assure the Shah that this was a joint US-UK action.

4. Failing results from the above, Mr. Roosevelt, representing the President of the United States, would urge the Shah to sign the above-mentioned firmans. When received, the firmans would be released by CIA to Zahedi on the day called for

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in the plan. On D-Day, the Shah was to be at some location outside of Tehran so that Zahedi, armed with the royal firmans and with military support, could take over the government without danger of the Shah's reversing his stand, and to avoid any attempt on the Shah's life.

Through agents in the Tehran military, CIA was to ensure, to the degree possible, Tehran Army cooperation in support of the Shah-appointed new prime minister.

The following public statements made in the United States had tremendous impact on Iran and Mossadeq, and contributed greatly to Mossadeq's downfall:

1. The publication, on 9 July 1953, of President Eisenhower's 29 June 1953 letter to Premier Mossadeq made it clear that increased aid would not be forthcoming to Iran.
2. The Secretary of State's press conference of 28 July 1953 stated that ".... The growing activities of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian Government has caused our government concern. These developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran."
3. The President's Seattle speech at the Governors' convention, in which he stated that the United States

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would not sit by and see Asian countries fall behind the Iron Curtain, had definite effect.

In cooperation with the Department of State, CIA had several articles planted in major American newspapers and magazines which, when reproduced in Iran, had the desired psychological effect in Iran and contributed to the war of nerves against Mossadeq.

After considerable pressure from Princess Ashraf and General Schwarzkopf, and after several meetings with Mr. Roosevelt, the Shah finally signed the required firmands on 15 August 1953. Action was set for 16 August. However, owing to a security leak in the Iranian military, the chief of the Shah's bodyguard, assigned to seize Mossadeq with the help of two truckloads of pro-Shah soldiers, was overwhelmed by superior armed forces still loyal to Mossadeq. The balance of the military plan was thus frustrated for that day. Upon hearing that the plan had misfired, the Shah flew to Baghdad. This was an act of prudence and had been at least partially foreseen in the plan. Zahedi remained in hiding in CIA custody. With his key officers, he eluded Mossadeq's security forces which were seeking to apprehend the major opposition elements.

Early in the afternoon of 17 August 1953, Ambassador

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Henderson returned to Tehran. General Zahedi, through a CIA-arranged secret press conference and through CIA covert printing facilities, announced to Iran that he was legally prime minister and that Mossadeq had staged an illegal coup against him. CIA agent assets disseminated a large quantity of photographs of the firmands, appointing Zahedi prime minister and dismissing Mossadeq. This had tremendous impact on the people of Tehran who had already been shocked and angered when they realized that the Shah had been forced to leave Iran because of Mossadeq's actions. US Ambassador Burton Y. Berry, in Baghdad, contacted the Shah and stated that he had confidence that the Shah would return soon to Iran despite the apparent adverse situation at that time. Contact was also established with the Shah in Rome after he had flown there from Baghdad. Mr. Roosevelt and the station consistently reported that Mossadeq's apparent victory was misleading; that there were very concrete signs that the Army was still loyal to the Shah; and that a favorable reversal of the situation was possible. The station further urged both the British Foreign Office and the Department of State to make a maximum effort to persuade the Shah to make public statements encouraging the Army and populace to reject Mossadeq and to accept Zahedi as prime minister.

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On 19 August 1953, a pro-Shah demonstration, originating in the bazaar area, took on overwhelming proportions. The demonstration appeared to start partially spontaneously, revealing the fundamental prestige of the Shah and the public alarm at the undisguised republican move being started by the Communists as well as by certain National Frontists. Station political action assets also contributed to the beginnings of the pro-Shah demonstrations. The Army very soon joined the pro-Shah movement and by noon of that day it was clear that Tehran, as well as certain provincial areas, were controlled by pro-Shah street groups and Army units. The situation was such that the above-mentioned military plan could then be implemented. At the station's signal, Zahedi came out of hiding to lead the movement. He first broadcast over Radio Tehran and announced that the government was his. The General Staff offices were then seized, Mossadeq's home was gutted, and pro-Mossadeq politicians and officers arrested. By the end of 19 August, the country was in the hands of the new Premier, Zahedi, and members of the Mossadeq government were either in hiding or were incarcerated.

The Shah returned shortly to Iran where he was given a rousing popular reception. The Shah was deeply moved by the fact that his people and Army had revolted in the

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face of adversity against a vindictive Mossadeq and a Communist Party riding the crest of temporary victory and clearly planning to declare Iran a republic. The Shah felt for the first time that he had the mandate of his people, and he returned determined to regain firm control of the Army.

In order to give Zahedi badly needed immediate financial assistance so that month-end payrolls could be met before the United States could provide large scale grant aid, CIA covertly made available \$5,000,000 within two days of Zahedi's assumption of power.

[The C.I.A.'s secret history of the 1953 coup in Iran was a nearly 200-page document, comprising the author's own account of the operation and a set of planning documents he attached. The New York Times on the Web is publishing the introduction and many of the planning documents. But the Times decided not to publish the main body of the text after consulting prominent historians who believed there might be serious risk that some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran.

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APPENDIX A

Initial Operational Plan for TPAJAX
as Cabled from Nicosia to Headquarters
on 1 June 1953

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SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY PLAN PREPARED BY
SIS AND CIA REPRESENTATIVES IN CYPRUS

I. Preliminary Action

A. Interim Financing of Opposition

1. CIA will supply \$35,000 to Zahedi.
2. SIS will supply \$25,000 to Zahedi.
3. SIS indigenous channels Iran will be used to supply above funds to Zahedi.
4. CIA will attempt subsidize key military leaders if this necessary.

B. Acquisition Shah Cooperation

1. Stage 1: Convince the Shah that UK and US have joint aim and remove pathological fear of British intrigues against him.
 - a. Ambassador Henderson call on the Shah to assure him of US-UK common aid and British supporting him not Mossadeq.
 - b. Henderson to say to the Shah that special US representative will soon be introduced to him for presentation joint US-UK plan.
2. Stage 2: Special US representative will visit the Shah and present following:

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a. Presentation to the Shah

- (1) Both governments consider oil question secondary.
- (2) Major issue is to maintain independence Iran and keep from the Soviet orbit. To do this Mossadeq must be removed.
- (3) Present dynasty best bulwark national sovereignty.
- (4) While Mossadeq in power no aid for Iran from United States.
- (5) Mossadeq must go.
- (6) US-UK financial aid will be forthcoming to successor government.
- (7) Acceptable oil settlement will be offered but successor government will not be rushed into it.

b. Demands on the Shah

- (1) You must take leadership in overthrow Mossadeq.
- (2) If not, you bear responsibility for collapse of country.

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- (3) If not, Shah's dynasty will fall and US-UK backing of you will cease.
- (4) Who do you want to head successor government? (Try and maneuver Shah into naming Zahedi.)
- (5) Warning not to discuss approach.
- (6) Plan of operation with Zahedi will be discussed with you.

II. Arrangement with Zahedi

- A. After agreement with Shah per above, inform Zahedi he chosen to head successor government with US-UK support.
- B. Agree on specific plan for action and timetable for action. There are two ways to put Zahedi in office.
 1. Quasi-legally, whereby the Shah names Zahedi Prime Minister by royal firman.
 2. Military coup.

Quasi-legal method to be tried first. If successful at least part of machinery for military coup will be brought into action. If it fails, military coup will follow in matter of hours.

III. Relations with Majlis

Important for quasi-legal effort. To prepare for such effort deputies must be purchased.

- A. Basic aim is to secure 41 votes against Mossadeq and assure quorum for quasi-legal move by being able to depend on 53 deputies in Majlis. (SIS considers 20 deputies now not controlled must be purchased.)
- B. Approach to deputies to be done by SIS indigenous agent group. CIA will backstop where necessary by pressures on Majlis deputies and will provide part of the funds.

IV. Relations with Religious Leaders

Religious leaders should:

- A. Spread word of their disapproval Mossadeq.
- B. As required, stage political demonstrations under religious cover.
- C. Reinforce backbone of the Shah.
- D. Make strong assurances over radio and in mosques after coup that new government faithful Moslem principles.

Possibly as quid pro quo prominent cleric Borujerdi would be offered ministry without portfolio or consider implementing neglected article constitution providing body five ✓ mullas (religious leaders) to pass on orthodoxy of legislation.

E.

should be encouraged to threaten direct action against pro-Mossadeq deputies.

V. Relations with Bazaar

Bazaar contacts to be used to spread anti-government rumors and possibly close bazaar as anti-government expression.

VI. Tudeh

Zahedi must expect violent reaction from Tudeh and be prepared to meet with superior violence.

- A. Arrest at least 100 Party and Front Group leaders
- B. Seal off South Tehran to prevent influx Tudeh demonstrations.

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- C. Via black leaflets direct Tudeh members not to take any action.

VII. Press and Propaganda Program

- A. Prior coup intensify anti-Mossadeq propaganda.
- B. Zahedi should quickly appoint effective chief of government press and propaganda who will:
1. Brief all foreign correspondents.
 2. Release advance prepared US and UK official statements.
 3. Make maximum use Radio Tehran.

VIII. Relations with Tribes

- A. Coup will provoke no action from Bakhtiari, Lurs, Kurds, Baluchi, Zolfaghari, Mamassani, Boer Ahmadi, and Khamseh tribal groups.
- B. Major problem is neutralization of Qashqa'i tribal leaders.

IX. Mechanics of Quasi-Legal Overthrow

- A. At this moment the view with most favor is the so-called _____ plan" - whereby mass demonstrators seek religious refuge

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in Majlis grounds. Elements available to religious leaders would be joined by those supplied by bazaar merchants, up to 4,000 supplied by SIS controlled group, and additional elements supplied through CIA.

B. Would be widely publicized that this refuge movement on basis two grounds popular dissatisfaction with Mossadeq government as follows:

1. Ground one that Mossadeq government basically anti-religious as most clearly demonstrated ties between Mossadeq and Tudeh; and Mossadeq and USSR. Just prior to movement CIA would give widest publicity to all fabricated documents proving secret agreement between Mossadeq and Tudeh.
2. Ground two that Mossadeq is leading the country into complete economic collapse through his unsympathetic dictatorship. Just prior to movement CIA would give widest publicity to the evidence of illegally issued paper money. CIA might have capability to print masses excellent imitation currency which would be overprinted by this message.

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C. Religious refuge to take place at the dawn of the coup day. Immediately followed by effort have Majlis pass a motion to censure the government. This is to be followed by the dismissal of Mossadeq and the appointment of Zahedi as successor. If successful, the coup would be completed by early afternoon. Failing success, the coup would be mounted later that evening.

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APPENDIX B

"London" Draft
of the
TPAJAX Operational Plan

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"LONDON" DRAFT OF THE TPAJAX OPERATIONAL PLANI. INTRODUCTION

The policy of both the US and UK governments requires replacement of Mossadeq as the alternative to certain economic collapse in Iran and the eventual loss of the area to the Soviet orbit. Only through a planned and controlled replacement can the integrity and independence of the country be ensured.

General Zahedi is the only figure in Iran currently capable of heading a new government who could be relied upon to repress Soviet-Communist penetration and carry out basic reforms.

The plan which follows is comprised of three successive stages. The first two stages precede action of a military nature. They include the present preliminary support period and the mass propaganda campaign. (See paragraphs below.) These stages will be of real value to the mutual interests of US and UK even if final military action is not carried out in that they will make the position of Mossadeq increasingly vulnerable and unsteady.

The total estimated expenditure required to implement this plan will be the equivalent of \$285,000 of which \$147,500 will be provided by the US Service and \$137,500 by the UK Service.

I. OPERATIONAL PLANA. Preliminary Support of Opposition to Mossadeq Government

For a period of several months both the US field station and the British group (the Rashidian brothers) have been in close touch with Zahedi. The British group has supplied the equivalent of \$50,000 (four to five million rials) for this support.

During this preliminary period beginning 1 June 1953, and for an estimated two months maximum thereafter, the United States will provide \$35,000 and the United Kingdom the equivalent of \$25,000. Initial payments under this allocation have already been made by the US field station.

British funds will continue to be paid through present channels for purposes as directed by the UK or by the US field station on UK behalf.

US funds are to be distributed through direct US field station contacts for the specific purpose of extending and strengthening military and political contacts of Zahedi.

Early in this period Zahedi will be made fully aware of this dual support and of the joint intention that it should lead to even more concrete support.

During this period the impression will continue to be given in the circle of Zahedi's contacts that the Shah

is supporting him by the provision of funds.

The coordination of UK-US field station activity on the developing plan will be achieved through direct contact between US field personnel and the British group with the former acting on behalf of the United Kingdom by relaying instructions and acting as a secure communications link, to augment that already existing.

Appropriate steps will be taken to ensure that overt US policy will conform as closely as possible with the purpose of this plan.

B. Role of the Shah as Focal Point of Opposition

This plan is based on the assumption that the cooperation of the Shah will be obtained. Such cooperation will give a military coup the best chance of success. However, it also envisages the same type of operation through the involuntary involvement of the Shah in this plan.

To play his role the Shah requires special preparation. By nature a creature of indecision, beset by formless doubts and fears, he must be induced to play his role, and this role must require a minimum of affirmative action and cover as brief a period as possible.

We consider Princess Ashraf, his forceful and scheming twin sister, to be the person most likely to be able to

induce the Shah to play his role. We are certain that Ashraf will eagerly cooperate to bring about the fall of Mossadeq. Therefore, Ashraf must be approached at her present location, briefed on the task and sent back to Iran. Contact will have to be maintained between Ashraf and the US field station.

The role of the Shah is to be played in three stages, and Ashraf will be preparing him in advance for each successive stage. The first stage will be to convince the Shah that the United States and the United Kingdom have a joint aim in Iran, and at the same time to remove his pathological fear of the "hidden UK hand"; the second stage will be to inform him in specific terms of what the immediate future holds for him. The third stage will be to obtain specific items from him. These stages are detailed below:

1. First Stage:

With prior advice from Princess Ashraf, the leader of the British group will visit the Shah to assure him that the United States and the United Kingdom have common aims towards Iran, and that both want to support him to the utmost in opposing Mossadeq. The leader of the British group will say that he is in a position to prove that the British are supporting the Shah and

that he, the leader, is authorized to speak for the United Kingdom by stating that any key phrase selected by the Shah out of several proposed will be given on successive dates in the Persian language broadcasts over the BBC.

2. Second Stage:

With advance warning from Princess Ashraf, General Schwarzkopf (former head of the US Military Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie) is introduced as the US special representative. This representative is already well known to and admired by the Shah as a result of his successful tour of duty in Iran some years ago.

His remarks to the Shah will comprise two parts.

The first part covers the following points:

- a. Both governments consider the oil issue of secondary importance at this time, since the major issue is the resolve of both governments to maintain the independence of Iran. Both governments are now determined to help the Iranians to help themselves to keep their country from falling into Soviet hands. If Mossadeq remains in power economic collapse is certain, and since Mossadeq is permitting extensive Communist penetration, the economic collapse would be followed by a Communist takeover of the country.

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b. Both governments feel that the continued existence of the Pahlavi dynasty should be the best bulwark of national sovereignty.

c. As long as Mossadeq is in power the country will get no new financial aid from the United States and indeed present aid may be slashed.

d. Mossadeq must go.

e. His successor will have the strong support of both governments through the same forces that bring him into power.

f. An acceptable oil settlement will be offered, but there is no intention of either rushing this issue or of forcing it on the country.

The second part will cover the following points:

a. The Shah is now, and inevitably will remain, the focal point of all forces opposing Mossadeq.

b. If the Shah fails to go along with these forces he will be solely responsible for the collapse of the country and its loss of independence.

c. If the Shah fails to go along his dynasty is bound to come to an end soon. In spite of the Shah's previous misconceptions, the United States and the United Kingdom have been and are supporting him, but if the Shah fails now, this support will be

withdrawn. The representative will discuss the implications of this.

d. The Shah has stated that Zahedi is acceptable to him as a successor to Mossadeq. Furthermore, the Shah has asked that funds for Zahedi's support given by the United States and United Kingdom governments should be given out in his name.

e. The US and UK governments agree fully that Zahedi is the only effective candidate. Zahedi will be ready to take over in the near future, aided in every way to achieve success by the United States and United Kingdom. The Shah will be kept fully informed of Zahedi's plans and a minimum of action will be required from him. As soon as possible after the visit of the US representative to the Shah, the leader of the British group will make a visit of identical type to reinforce the above statements.

3. Third Stage:

This stage will be the sole responsibility of Princess Ashraf. Immediately following the visits as described above and while the Shah is still under their effects Princess Ashraf will obtain his signature on three documents. The first of these documents will be

dated, the second and the third undated.

They will be:

- a. An open letter calling on all loyal officers to cooperate with the bearer of the letter in any efforts he feels are necessary to reestablish the prestige of the Army, to restore their own self respect and to show their devotion to the Shah and country.
- b. A royal decree naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff.
- c. A royal decree appealing to all ranks of the Army to carry out faithfully the orders of the Chief of Staff whom the Shah has named.

These documents will then be taken out of the palace at once; the first to be delivered to Zahedi and the other two to be held by the US station against time of need.

Following the effort required of him to produce these documents the Shah may be in a period of elation for some time. Sooner or later he will begin to brood and to doubt, and at this time he must be removed from the capital to make some kind of tour. Preferably he would make a religious retreat to the Meshed shrine. He would remain at this shrine until after Zahedi obtains control and would return to the capital only to give his official

approval to the new Prime Minister.

C. Arrangement with Zahedi

Continuing contacts by US personnel and British agents with Zahedi or his representatives have helped to bring into increasingly clear focus the picture of his tentative plans and of those elements from which he expects support. This material and related intelligence reports have been used in the preparation of later paragraphs which follow under the subtitle "Organization to mount coup," with its supporting material in the annexes.

Following the phased contacts with the Shah as given above, both the United States and the United Kingdom will inform Zahedi directly that they have secured a firm commitment from the Shah on his behalf and that the time has come to move to a detailed plan of action.

General Zahedi will be given the letter signed by the Shah calling on all loyal officers to cooperate with the bearer. He will be instructed to recruit, with the aid of this letter, military aides. Zahedi will also be shown the US-UK proposal for action entitled "Organization to overthrow Mossadeq." It will be discussed with Zahedi who will have the opportunity to amend or modify this proposal should this be necessary to meet his desires and

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capabilities. It will be pointed out to Zahedi that the plan provides for full US-UK coordinated covert support prior to the time of the coup. Every element of the potential opposition to Mossadeq will be mustered so that on coup day it may be possible to overthrow the Mossadeq government by legal means. It will be pointed out to Zahedi that the future character and reputation of the successor government would be better if military action could be limited to assuring control of the city coincident with this legal success.

However, should the Shah fail to go along with the US representative or fail to produce the documents for General Zahedi, Zahedi would be informed that the United States and United Kingdom would be ready to go ahead without the Shah's active cooperation if Zahedi agrees. We would continue to make every effort to associate the Shah with the undertaking involuntarily and so hope to achieve the same result as if he had actively participated.

D. Organization to Mount Overthrow

The material which follows under this heading is that which is to be presented to Zahedi by the US field station for the purpose of discussion and modification.

Under the headings which follow, elements of existing

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or potential strength are assigned their specific roles. This approach omits any consideration of the strength of the pro-Mossadeq forces.

1. Organization to Mount Coup

a. Military secretariat. This secretariat, headed by an officer named by Zahedi but acceptable to the United States and United Kingdom will be composed of a very limited number of capable senior officers. This secretariat will be in contact with the US field station which will hand over a preliminary staff plan jointly prepared by the United States and the United Kingdom for securing Tehran. A sum equivalent to \$75,000 will be required for the military secretariat to carry out its functions.

b. Duties of the secretariat. Its most urgent duty will be the selection of key officers in Tehran who can be counted upon or won over for action against the Mossadeq government. For security reasons, such officers will be informed of their own actual role at the latest possible date.

This secretariat will make a detailed examination of the US and the UK staff plan with special attention to every action to be carried out on coup day. Some of these actions will be immediate seizure of general

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staff headquarters, army radio station, Radio Tehran, the houses of Mossadeq and his entourage, police and gendarmerie headquarters, post and telegraph offices, telephone exchange, the Majlis and its printing press, and the National Bank and its printing press. Arrests will include the key figures of the Mossadeq government, key army officers cooperating with Mossadeq, and selected newspaper editors.

Special attention will also be given to preparing measures to be taken against the Tudeh Party. Zahedi must expect a violent reaction from the Tudeh Party, and must be fully prepared to meet it with superior violence. There is no possibility of neutralizing the party until after the Mossadeq government has been replaced. However, there will be a breathing spell of several hours after the change of government before the Tudeh Party will be able to get out on the streets in force. At the time of the coup at least 100 party and front group leaders and journalists must be arrested: these names will come from a list of approximately 80 such leaders recently prepared by the United Kingdom, plus US station additions, plus Zahedi's own additions. Control of the Tehran streets will prevent the massing of Tudeh or other mob elements. Mass distribution of

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black pamphlets, notionally issued by the Central Committee of the Party, will be made with the purpose of confusing Tudeh members and of preventing them from assembling in an effective manner. It may be possible for the United States to supply by air in advance stocks of tear gas, indelible ink, or other materials suitable for the control of mobs. Local air force planes may drop warnings to the public to stay off the streets or take the consequences.

c. Action on coup day. This action will follow basically similar lines although it may be carried out relative to as many as three different situations. These three situations are:

Situation A: The climax of a massive religious protest against the Mossadeq government which is followed immediately by military action.

Situation B: The moment when the Shah is being forced by Mossadeq to leave the country. This action by Mossadeq will have resulted from either the growing strength of the opposition as knowingly led by the Shah or because of its growing strength with the Shah as its involuntary figurehead.

Situation C: The moment when Mossadeq attempts to present his resignation. Such an action might result

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from his real concern over the growing strength of the opposition and might take the form, on past showing, of calling on the Shah for personal support. Failing to win the support of the Shah he might summon the mobs into the streets.

Action to be taken with regard to Situation A will be as follows:

At the climax of Situation A, Zahedi will assume office as Chief of the General Staff by a limited military action against the headquarters of the general staff. He will at once name the selected person as his deputy, and the arrests of Mossadeq and the others will be made at once. The Majlis will be called into session and the opposition will attempt to pass a vote of censure against Mossadeq, and will follow this with a vote of support for Zahedi. However, with or without the possession of a royal decree naming him as prime minister, Zahedi will take over the government and will execute the various requirements of coup day (see above). Once he has firmly established his control, he will have no trouble in obtaining the formal vote of support from the Majlis. Only then will the Shah return to Tehran.

Action to be taken with regard to Situations B and C will be as follows:

The only change in plan will be the necessary advancement of the timetable for coup day to the day of actual crisis and the necessity of putting all the military aspects of the coup machinery into operation at once.

2. Organization to Create a Maximum Public Opposition to Mossadeq Prior to Coup

a. General Program. The purpose will be to create, extend, and enhance public hostility and distrust and fear of Mossadeq and his government. A sum equivalent to \$150,000 will be budgeted for this program. This will be a phased operation, with the phases as follows:

Phase 1. This is the current preliminary support stage wherein the receipt of US and UK funds permits Zahedi to win additional friends and to influence key people.

Phase 2. A massive propaganda campaign against Mossadeq and his government but with Mossadeq himself as the principal target. This will begin only a week or two before the climax of Situation A so as not to offer too much time for a sharp reaction by Mossadeq and so that the impact will not be dispersed by being long drawn out.

Phase 3. This is Situation A which is described in full in a following paragraph.

b. Duties of Specific Elements

(1) Press and publicity. In the preliminary support period the British group will continue to use its numerous smaller papers to push an anti-Mossadeq line. At Headquarters and at the field station US personnel will draft and put into Persian the texts for articles, broadsheets and pamphlets, some pro-Shah and some anti-Mossadeq. The material designed to discredit Mossadeq will hammer the following themes:

(a) Mossadeq favors the Tudeh Party and the USSR. (This will be supported by black documents.)

(b) Mossadeq is an enemy of Islam since he associates with the Tudeh and advances their aims.

(c) Mossadeq is deliberately destroying the morale of the Army and its ability to maintain order.

(d) Mossadeq is deliberately fostering the growth of regional separatist elements through his removal of Army control over

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tribal areas. One of the aims of the removal of control by the Army is to make it easier for the Soviets to take over the Northern Provinces.

(e) Mossadeq is deliberately leading the country into economic collapse.

(f) Mossadeq has been corrupted by power to such an extent that no trace is left of the fine man of earlier years, and he now has all the repressive instincts of the dictator.

(g) Consistent with these themes will be the persistent slant that Mossadeq has been the unwitting victim of his unscrupulous, personally ambitious advisers.

It is considered essential that Zahedi make an early choice of the man who will be his director of press and propaganda and who may be deputy prime minister as well. The US field station will obtain from Zahedi the name of the man he has in mind who must be acceptable to the United States and the United Kingdom. One or two weeks before the date set for Situation A, the intensive propaganda effort will begin. The details relative

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to the execution of this campaign will be the primary responsibility of the US field station.

Immediately after the change of government, Zahedi's director of press and propaganda must be prepared to:

(a) Make maximum use of Radio Tehran.

(b) Through Radio Tehran, posters, special news sheets, etc. spread the program of the new government, including elements of broadcast appeal presented in simplest terms, such as immediate slashes in living costs, increased pay for government officials and Army personnel, etc.

(c) Give maximum local publicity to US and UK statements which will have been prepared in advance.

(d) Brief all foreign correspondents.

(2) The Majlis. If the Majlis is in session at the time of the coup, an effort will be made to have the change of government formalized. If it is not in session it will be called into session by one of its elected officers who will have to be a member of the anti-Mossadeq opposition.

To prepare for the change of government, a

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number of the deputies will be approached and purchased. It is yet to be decided whether the purchases are to be made by the British group or directly by Zahedi himself who, as long as he enjoys the sanctuary of the Majlis building, is in an excellent position to achieve such an aim. Following the receipt from one or both of the above elements of a list of deputies with the amounts required for the purchase of each one, a special funding operation will be established within the framework of the joint authorization for the execution of this plan. The US field station will also employ various agents and contacts to support this operation.

Its basic aim will be to secure a majority plus one vote against Mossadeq as required in Situation A. At the present time it is estimated that at least 30 deputies are prepared to vote against Mossadeq if they think there is a good chance that they will be in a majority. It is to be noted that all Majlis elected members would not normally be present at any one session. However, it will also be necessary to attempt to ensure that a quorum can be

maintained in the Majlis at the moment when the anti-Mossadeq vote is to be taken. The minimum quorum requirement is that two-thirds of the deputies present in Tehran must be in the Chamber before a vote can be taken. Thus an effort will be made to purchase additional deputies solely to have them remain in the Chamber to ensure the quorum and not for the more sensitive role of voting against Mossadeq.

(3) Political elements other than the Tudeh.

Political parties or groups now opposed to Mossadeq will play only a very minor role in this campaign. Such parties as the Toilers Party, the Sumka and sections of the Pan-Iranists could supply only limited and probably ineffectual street gangs. The Toilers Party will, however, play a fairly important role in the publicity described above.

It is to be noted that while these parties command only ineffectual street gangs, the British group can muster up to approximately 3,000 street activists to be committed in Situation A.

(4) Religious leaders. It is our belief that nearly all the important religious leaders with large followings are firmly opposed to Mossadeq.

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Both the US field station and the British group have firm contacts with such leaders. The pro-Zahedi capabilities in this field are very great.

These leaders include such assorted and sometimes inimical elements as the non-political leaders and , as well as and and his terrorist gang,

. During the period of intensive anti-Mossadeq publicity before coup day the leaders and their henchmen will:

(a) Spread word of their disapproval of Mossadeq.

(b) Give open support to the symbol of the throne and give moral backing to the Shah through direct contact with him at the shrine.

(c) As required, stage small pro-religious anti-Mossadeq demonstrations in widely scattered sections of Tehran.

(d) The terrorist group to threaten that they are ready to take direct action against pro-Mossadeq deputies and members of Mossadeq's entourage and government.

(e) Ensure full participation of themselves

and followers in Situation A.

(f) After the change of government, give the strongest assurances over Radio Tehran and in the mosques that the new government is faithful to religious principles.

(5) Bazaar Merchants. These are defined as a relatively small number of long established prominent merchants with a semi-religious outlook and with strong influence over the lower social orders in the bazaar section. Contacts with these merchants exist both through the British group and through the US field station.

These merchants are anti-Mossadeq because the government harms them directly through the stagnation of business, the cutting off of imports, the strenuous collection of taxes, and the general tightness of money.

In the period of intensive publicity preceding Situation A, these merchants will be used to:

(a) Spread anti-Government rumors in the bazaar.

(b) Stage limited protests in the south of Tehran against the economic policies of the

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Mossadeq government. Then, at the time of Situation A, they will:

(c) Close all or part of the bazaar.

c. Final Action Immediately Preceding the Coup.

As noted above, the military action can result from Situations A, B, or C. However, the pre-coup activities of the organization as described above will be primarily for the purpose of creating Situation A which is described below.

(1) On the appointed day, staged attacks will be made against respected religious leaders in Tehran.

(2) Other religious leaders will at once say that these attacks were ordered by Mossadeq as his reaction to the disfavor in which his government is held by the religious leaders of the entire country.

(3) A number of the more important leaders will at once take sanctuary in the Majlis grounds.

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(4) At this time, these religious leaders will release statements through their followers denouncing in the strongest terms the anti-religious attitude and behavior of Mossadeq.

(5) At the same time as 2.b.(4) (d) above, the fullest publicity will be given to the US station fabricated documents which prove and record in detail a secret agreement between Mossadeq and the Tudeh, with the latter promising to use all their force in support of Mossadeq and against the religious leaders, the Army, and the police.

(6) Simultaneously, these leaders will call on their followers to take sanctuary all over Tehran in mosques, telegraph and post offices, banks, etc. The British group and the US station will supply all the demonstrators they can to swell their ranks, and at the same time the merchants will attempt to close the bazaar. (This mass sanctuary is designed to interrupt all normal life and activity in the city and to illustrate dramatically the extent of popular dissatisfaction with the government. It is the local version of passive resistance

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and by long established tradition the military and police are unable to take action against people who take sanctuary.)

(7) In the presence of this increasingly hostile and abnormal atmosphere, Zahedi will take over as chief of staff and make those arrests which are an essential part of the military phase of the coup.

(8) Just after Zahedi moves, the Majlis will be called into session to formalize the change of government and complete the coup.

II. ESTIMATE OF CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF OPERATIONAL PLAN

The preceding material represents a Western-type plan offered for execution by Orientals. However, it was drafted by authors with an intensive knowledge of the country and its people who endeavored to examine and evaluate all the details from the Iranian point of view. Given the recognized incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner, we would never expect such a plan to be re-studied and executed in the local atmosphere like a Western staff operation.

However, we feel that the plan is broad enough and sufficiently comprehensive to offer a reasonable chance of success even if not carried out 100 percent.

Security among all local elements involved is a serious weakness inherent in the Persian character. We must be aware of the fact that security breaches might lead to repressive measures by Mossadeq.

No precedent for this proposed operation exists in Iran in recent years. The Reza Shah coup was of an entirely different nature. Recent coups in other Near Eastern countries were far easier to carry out since they were not complicated by a large pro-Communist opposition or hampered by the presence of a head of government having

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powerful popular following.

Prior to an estimate of the chances of success, the following points in connection with the general concept of the coup are vital:

A. The failure of the coup would result in:

1. A strong tide of Government-directed hostility toward the United States and the possibility of the United States being expelled from Iran.

2. Loss to the United Kingdom only of operational machinery represented by the group which is intended mainly for the overthrow of Mossadeq.

B. Should the coup be attempted and fail, but the United States is not expelled from Iran and should Mossadeq then fall at a subsequent date, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would be in a position to take advantage of that opportunity since the British group and certain US assets may be destroyed by the failure of the coup.

C. If the coup is not undertaken, the United States still stands to be expelled from Iran as the certain economic collapse under the present Mossadeq government would probably be accompanied by internal chaos and a subsequent takeover by the Tudeh under USSR direction.

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D. If the coup plan is rejected at this time, then another plan should be prepared against the time of economic collapse and internal chaos.

Conclusion: Subject to the Shah's support, Zahedi's acceptance of the basic features of this plan, our approval of his modifications, and to our feeling certain that he will act according to an established timetable, the authors of this plan believe that the coup will succeed.

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V. ANNEXES

These proposed annexes are not included in this draft as they must be based upon a great mass of intelligence and information which is still being specifically collected for this purpose.

Annexes would include very detailed listing of all support available or probably available to Zahedi such as names and positions of Army officers backing him, critical examination of the position of the Majlis deputies, appraisal of size and cohesion of religious leaders supporting Zahedi, the proposed cabinet of Zahedi, etc.

[The C.I.A.'s secret history of the 1953 coup in Iran was a nearly 200-page document, comprising the author's own account of the operation and a set of planning documents he attached. The New York Times on the Web is publishing the introduction and many of the planning documents. But the Times decided not to publish the main body of the text after consulting prominent historians who believed there might be serious risk that some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran.]

Because the introductory summary and the main body of the document are inconsistent on a few dates and facts, readers may note discrepancies between accounts. In its reporting, the Times has relied upon details in the C.I.A. document not published here. In addition, certain names and identifying descriptions have been removed from the documents available on the Web.]

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APPENDIX C

Foreign Office Memorandum
of 23 July 1953
from British Ambassador Makins
to
Assistant Under Secretary of State Smith

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

"Her Majesty's Government have noted the State Department's views as got out in a report on the conversation between Mr. Byroade and Mr. Bealey on 7 July, and have much sympathy for them.

"The overriding consideration is that the whole question of compensation must be left to the impartial arbitration of an international tribunal. Furthermore the terms of any future arrangements must be such as not to appear to provide a reward for the tearing up of contractual obligations or to disturb the pattern of world oil prices. Subject to this Her Majesty's Government are prepared to go to the utmost to help...with the problem of presenting an agreement to the public' locally. They are also convinced that the Company, who have not been consulted, will adopt a generous attitude as regards methods and duration of payments as regards any compensation awarded to them.

"The answers therefore to the specific questions raised in the report from Washington Embassy are as follows:

"(a) The United Kingdom can do without this oil, although it would be an advantage to have it flowing into its traditional markets [the UK] once more.

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Her Majesty's Government are, however, anxious to dispose of the dispute which poisons their relations with the country concerned and is a disturbing element in the area as a whole. They would therefore 'be ready to cooperate' with a new government in trying to reach an agreement, provided that the principles referred to in paragraph 2 above are safeguarded.

"(b) Her Majesty's Government take the wording of the plan to mean that the initiative would be left to the future Prime Minister both as to the priority of an oil agreement in relation to his general programme and as to the nature of it. They hope he would agree to look at the February proposals, and they would of course 'help him in regard to the presentation of the agreement.' If he had any alternative proposals, Her Majesty's Government would consider them with equal sympathy, subject always to the principles mentioned above being safeguarded."

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

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APPENDIX E

Military Critique

Lessons Learned from TPAJAX

re Military Planning Aspects of Coup d'Etat

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MILITARY CRITIQUE/TPAJAX

Lessons Learned from TPAJAX

Re: Military Planning Aspects of Coup d'etat

I. The Problem of Personnel Assessment

- A. If CIA desires to overthrow a hostile government by employing armed forces against that government, then CIA must identify friendly forces, make contact with them, and successfully employ them.
- B. The decision to attempt a military coup d'etat should only be made after it has been determined that potentially useful forces do exist. Distinction must be made in making this estimate of the situation between "grouzers" and "activists." When attempting to estimate potential assets, experience has shown that it is vital to have as detailed biographical information as possible on all military personnel whose presence might bear upon the problem, including possible enemies as well as friends.
- C. Biographical information cannot be collected in a short period of time. It must be reported on a basis of continuity and must include everything known about individual officers, no matter how trivial. Military

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attaches are the normal channels for these reports, but Military Advisory Assistance Groups, where present, are the best source of this type of information because they work and take recreation side by side with indigenous officers. It has been our experience that too little emphasis is being placed upon this requirement; too often the files of officers contain only short references to an officer's assignments, promotions, decorations, omitting all personalia which could indicate who an officer really is, what makes him tick, who his friends are, etc.

- D. Biographical files on CIA agents in the armed forces are more complete but often these agents are found in G-2 sections and other staffs, and not among troop commanders.
- E. Assuming that sufficient biographical information exists concerning military personnel and their motivations, our next task is to assess the character of each military person under review. The assessment of officers should be done with a clear appreciation of the traditions of the indigenous service in mind. For instance, the Army in Iran has a modern tradition of defeat. The Iranian officer is usually indecisive and covers his inferiority with bombast and chest beating. Therefore the location

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of leaders who are willing to lead and to die is a hazardous occupation. Perhaps the Shah is a good example of the "typical" Iranian officer; his weaknesses are reflected throughout his Officer Corps.

On the other hand, a true leader in the Army is worth his weight in gold for he truly will count for far more in Iran than in other countries where valor is traditional.

- F. After personal assessment of officers has been completed, CIA will find good and bad officers within all factions or groups. Here political and patriotic motivations must be assessed as well as possible. The political milieu will underlay assessment of officers, and non-military operations (KUGOWN) might have to be prevailed upon to create conditions capable of intensifying or weakening motivations in such a way as to create potential assets which at the time of assessments do not yet exist.
- G. Friendship toward "the free world," "the United States," "the United Nations," "white colonialism," and many other political motivations will be found in all countries. In Iran CIA found that officers were generally "pro-Shah," "pro-Mossadeq," or "fence-sitters." The intensity of individual political motivations was different in each

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case, and was often less important than personal motivations such as ambition, jealousy, young officers' resentments of old officers and vice versa. There is no tradition of military revolutions, but Reza Shah did seize control of the government by using military position as the springboard. Hence, the political motivation of officers and personal motivations within the political milieu have been and are factors to be considered in assessment of military personnel.

- H. Of equal importance in Iran was the assessment of the Commander-in-Chief, the Shah, who also is the head of State. From the military point of view, assessment had to be made of the Shah as Commander-in-Chief, including his depth of influence, command ability, and courage under fire. His use as a focal point or fusing point around which military persons and groups might rally also had to be assessed.

Without stating reasons, our assessment of his usefulness was positive in these fields:

1. Head of State to dismiss hostile government.
2. Commander-in-Chief as rallying symbol.

Our assessment was negative in these fields:

1. Commander-in-Chief as planner and participant in military action.

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I. Turning from our assessment of the Shah, we concluded that the Shah as a symbol could be used to incite action on the part of important military personnel.

J. Our assessments of individual military persons led us to the conclusion that Major General Zahedi was the best suited officer available to lead forces for the Shah against the hostile government for these reasons:

1. He was the only man in Iran openly bidding for the prime ministership.

2. He thus displayed unique courage in that action.

3. He had displayed courage in the past, for as a soldier of 25 years he had been made a Brigadier General in recognition of combat leadership against the Bolsheviks.

4. His life had been saved by an American doctor after four of Zahedi's ribs had been removed.

5. He was known to be pro-American and had permitted his son, Ardeshir, to study in the United States for six years. He was a senior Major General and had won the respect of many senior and junior officers.

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6. His negative qualifications were as follows:
 - a. He had been out of the Army for several years and did not know young junior officers.
 - b. He was identified in some quarters as venal. His capacity for leading a coup d'etat was unknown; he had never distinguished himself as a staff officer, but primarily as a commander.
 - c. Most of his friends were drawn from among the civilian population--few were Army officers.

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L. Specific assessment of line commanders in the Tehran garrison could not go forward in Washington until intelligence directives had been laid upon the field station. For instance, Headquarters did not know the

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names of any of the Brigade Commanders in Tebran, and to our surprise, neither did the G-2 Section, Pentagon: Headquarters did not possess any idea of the order of battle in Iran nor did G-2, Pentagon. Before specific assessment of line commanders could be made, therefore, Tehran Station had to report to Headquarters military information which should have been collected by military attaches on a day-to-day basis.

M. While assessment of individual officers was being made in Headquarters, the actual decision had been taken by the Department of State to do everything possible to turn out Mossadeq. This decision to proceed found us with no clear picture of the military situation in Iran, without even a list of officers and their assignments, and with no operational assets among those officers in command positions. It must be understood, therefore, that swifter movement was required in all phases of our military action to such an extent that assessments were made and decisions taken on a much less secure basis than would otherwise have been the case.

N. Our assessment of Mossadeq's Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Taghi Riahi, was done with care. We studied him in the light of his total personal environment, including a study of the persons with whom he lived,

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the persons he had removed from office, the persons he appointed to office, persons he had gathered in his staff, the political persons with whom he associated. From the political point of view, there was no doubt that Mossadeq had chosen his chief of staff very well. (We felt certain that Riahi would follow Mossadeq in a showdown, and not the Shah.) But from the military point of view, Brigadier General Riahi had several weaknesses. We could not be sure, but we had good ground to hope that Riahi's lack of command and combat experience would prove important if a test of military strength could be brought about. We did not question his personal courage and integrity. We found that he was residing with three of the outstanding members of the pro-Mossadeq Iranian Party and that he actually had led a pro-Mossadeq faction within the Army. He and most of his staff had been French-trained and were very thorough in staff work and very green in the field.

- O. As the field began to report personalia concerning brigadier commanders, brigade deputy commanders, regimental and battalion commanders in Tehran and in other parts of Iran, we were able to assess the situation with much greater clarity. It became evident that it would be necessary to arrest or remove most of the brigade

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commanders and to develop operational assets, for the most part, beneath that echelon of command. This assessment later proved to be correct and saved us much time and kept us from harm--from the security point of view. Because of the all-pervading necessity of drum-tight security, we could see from the beginning the necessity for approaching and developing only those persons with whom we stood a very good chance of success.

P. From all the above it can readily be seen that the possession of all-inclusive biographical information is vital to the success of any operation which includes large-scale use of military personnel. Failure can easily depend upon a mistake in the assessment of one officer and victory hinge upon it.

II. A. Military Intelligence as a Basis for Action Intended to Overthrow Hostile Governments:

1. A war map should be kept by paramilitary officers in each station where revolutionary action may be required. Maps should be assembled of every scale of possible use. The complete order of battle should be posted on a current basis. The supply situation as regards ammunition, gasoline and petrol, clothing and

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equipment, etc., must be watched very carefully. There may be no use sending a brigade into action against a hostile government when that brigade possesses only six rounds of ammunition per man.

2. Defensive measures taken by hostile governments should be watched very carefully. In Iran, Mossadeq's government assembled most of the motor transport into one motor pool; his government permitted only enough petrol for tanks to permit them to operate for one hour; the issuance of ammunition was reduced to an absolute minimum; and ammunition supply dumps were heavily reinforced (guarded). The signal code for the Iranian Army was changed only three weeks prior to the Mossadeq overthrow.

At two critical moments, Chief of Staff General Riahi assembled all officers in the Tehran garrison and made emotional appeals to their patriotism, equated by him with support for Mossadeq. Lists of officers' license plates on vehicles were called for by General Riahi, and in some cases officers were followed. Also, spot telephone checks were made to officers' homes

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in an attempt to learn which officers were spending their evenings away from their homes.

B. It is also necessary to study all military installations which must be seized or protected. For that purpose it is necessary to have detailed drawings of important headquarters, of important communication centers, etc. In the beginning of TPAJAX we possessed none of this information, except for a few excellent sabotage studies made of civilian installations.

C. In an action of this sort it must also be appreciated well in advance that key civilian personnel and civilian installations must be seized. It should be possible to call upon many sources of information for assessment of political figures, but the collection of information concerning physical characteristics of telephone offices, radio stations, airports, etc., is a matter that can greatly be assisted when collected under the guidance of a paramilitary officer who understands what he is looking for; that is not to say that an excellent intelligence officer could not do the same but his intelligence directives should be carefully drawn.

D. Weather conditions may be absolutely vital to success and should be noted at least well in advance. Should fog exist, for instance, time and distance factors in

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staff planning may be thrown off entirely. Rain and storms might do the same. The question of whether or not to begin action by daylight or at night is a vital decision, and it must be made on the ground. In places where curfews exist, conditions may be radically altered by that fact. In other locations the habits of the people may be of extremely important military significance; for instance, the siesta habit, including the closing of most of the shops in business areas, may be important. Also, the day in the week observed as the religious day should be studied for possible usefulness as well as important holidays. Days which neutralize or tend to neutralize opposition groups should be studied with care; for instance, training of military units in some locations is rotated and it might be found that a hostile unit will be sent out of the area of action on a day upon which it may be possible to act.

- E. Military information concerning G-1 sections may prove extremely useful. In some cases it is possible to arrange for the replacement or reassignment of officers who are in the wrong position from our point of view. The placing of the right man in the right spot at the right time is of course the most important factor in all military operations and should under no circumstances

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be overlooked in operations of this kind.

F. Actions which might be taken against you should be studied very carefully and you should receive well in advance notice of measures of this kind before they are actually effected. It will also be understood that G-2 sections may be used in various ways. The feeding by you of diversionary information concerning the existence of military cabals to G-2 sections may possibly be used in places where panic may result in the hostile camp. In Iran we were greatly assisted by the fact that many groups of officers were suspected of planning a coup. As tension increased, reports of this sort also increased. Although they served to alert the hostile government, they also served to smokescreen our activities and the activities of our friends. This whole matter is naturally a matter of study under local conditions, but our experience may be of some assistance in places where similar circumstances exist.

G. It may also be entirely possible that other military groups are being formed to combat the hostile government, and in that case we should know who they are and what they intend to do. It may be necessary to split some of these groups, or it may be necessary to fuse

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them with our forces. In both cases our action must be delicately taken on the basis of very good information. Provocation must be carefully watched for, and remedial steps planned for and taken in the event any of our friends nibbles at the bait.

H. Information concerning our own friends is perhaps the most important field for collection. The appraisal of our own security situation on a continuous basis is a paramount consideration for current decision-making. In Iran we developed and recruited young colonels after very quick assessment, fully understanding the risk we were taking; at the same time, we attempted to probe and to delve in an effort to find out as much about our new recruits as possible.

I. If it is at all possible to develop secretly assets which can check upon the actions of our friends, it will be found extremely useful to have them, for it will be found that the military situation can become extremely fluid and it is absolutely vital to know who has been wounded, arrested, doubled, etc. Early warning of a security break should be provided for and a warning then established capable of reaching and warning other assets. This is particularly true during action phases.

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- J. Security controls may change from day to day and we should have information concerning that entire field. For instance, in the middle of an extremely fluid military situation it was necessary for one of our officers and for one of our principal agents to make hasty trips after curfew hours to cities eight and ten hours away from the capital. We were able to provide them with forged documents which proved absolutely necessary to the success of their missions.
- K. Information concerning the available radio and telegraphic nets is extremely important. In Iran there is an Air Force radio net, gendarmerie radio net, Army radio net, railroad net, and an oil company telegraphic net. The number and extent of telegraphic nets is often surprising in any country and they must be studied very carefully for obvious reasons. At one stage in operation TPAJAX we used the overt governmental telegraphic system, using simple phrases for operational meaning (over-writing). Telephone systems are easy means for both hostile and friendly forces to communicate with each other, and information should be gathered on the extent to which central tapping services exist and, if possible, targets under tap should be identified. In Iran it was known that the Tudeh Party had penetrated the governmental communication

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system and, despite that fact, we relied upon that system because at one point all other means of communication broke down. The insecurity of that practice was realized but had to be accepted under the circumstances. In the signal center in the office of the chief of staff, or the signal center used by the Army Chief of Staff, is the single most important communication base available to a hostile opposition. If this center cannot be penetrated it should be neutralized and alternate means of communications established for friendly forces.

- L. Information gathering can sometimes be of use during occasions in which it is necessary to fabricate "excuses for action." Good penetrations of the hostile government might possibly turn up actions taken by the hostile government which have not been revealed to the public. In attempting to recruit personnel to your cause, it will always be necessary to provoke them to action when their motivation is insufficient to cause them to act under their own steam.

III. Military Planning as a Basis of Coup d'etat

- A. The science of military planning is too deep and well known to be covered in this paper. Needless to say, those officers who are responsible for military planning should have had qualified experience in the armed forces in preparation for this assignment.
- B. In addition to a background in military planning, officers should also be experienced in clandestine operations. The basis of a coup d'etat is security which permits us to exercise operational surprise. The basis of security is good operational tradecraft which can only come from experience.
- C. It may be assumed that a military bureau composed of indigenous officers will be available for specific local planning, either from within the target country or from without. This military bureau can operate only when it possesses current and complete military intelligence.
- D. The military bureau may be designated by the leader-to-be of the new friendly government or may be composed independently of the leader-designee. In either case, clandestine tradecraft is a vital necessity.
- E. Whether or not a CIA officer shall be exposed to this

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military bureau will depend upon the local situation.

In Iran we found it necessary to commit the CIA planner, who later found it necessary to participate in the operation itself on an equal basis with indigenous officers. It is obvious that this practice is an additional security risk which should be avoided if possible.

- F. Political arrest lists should be furnished the CIA military planner, and it is his job to designate forces to execute such lists. Military and civilian targets for neutralizing and seizure by friendly forces should be drawn up by the CIA military officer and the military bureau.
- G. If possible, a CIA radio net should be created specifically for the coup d'etat tying in our CIA field officer with the military bureau which in turn should be tied in to the headquarters and command units for friendly forces. Where this practice is not feasible, other means of communications should primarily be relied upon. But in all situations a primary and alternate means of communication among these elements should be created.
- H. Military planning should be based upon the principle that some elements within our friendly forces will be exposed, and that our operation must not collapse on that account. Therefore, danger signals should be

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included which automatically call for movement from one phase to the other depending upon who or what units have been exposed to the hostile government. In Iran there was good reason to believe that danger signals so noted prior to the change of government were instrumental in keeping alive an operation which, to an outsider, appeared to have failed.

- I. The possibility of civil war must be accepted by our military planners and measures taken within the plan for that eventuality. Such an eventuality might possibly include the necessity for establishing a safebase for the new friendly government. Possibilities and eventualities stemming from civil war can only be seen upon the analysis of each local situation, but they are not difficult to foresee and should certainly be planned for.
- J. The creation of safehouse bases for operational contacts must be planned for and executed well in advance of the commitment of our friendly forces. Several safehouses or safebases should be found in order to maintain contact with friendly elements in the event one or more of our safehouses are blown. In cases where CIA personnel are all stationed within an embassy the operational situation demands that safehouses and safebases be

established. These safehouses should ideally include radio, independent telephone, or other means of communications, depending upon the local situation. In situations in which it is necessary to cache money, ammunition, arms, clothing, food, and documents, safehouses should be found with secure keepers capable of securing those items.

- K. Support items such as automobiles, taxicabs, and other vehicles should be procured and kept sterile well in advance of the operational situation.
- L. Compartmentation of persons and units who compose our friendly forces should be made wherever possible. In the event a part of our operation be exposed, it is vital that interrogation not disclose our entire assets.
- M. Members of the military bureau should under no circumstances actively participate in the operation because under interrogation they would be in a position to disclose too much.
- N. The military board should include both staff officers and line officers, and as many functional specialists as may be necessary under local conditions. A communications staff officer will be found very useful.
- O. Possibilities of blowback against the United States should always be in the back of the minds of all CIA

officers involved in this type of operation. Few, if any, operations are as explosive as this type. This fact makes it imperative that the best trained and experienced officers who can be found be assigned.

- P. Military planning should include the possibilities of complete failure and, therefore, should include an evacuation scheme for CIA and indigenous personnel who might be exposed. Aircraft of American military attaches, evasion and escape nets, and other operational assets might have to be employed. If none of these assets exists then hiding places should be created in advance of the operation which are kept sterile throughout.
- Q. Commitments to friendly persons should be kept well within our ability to make good. In Iran we did not rely upon bribery because we felt that those officers who would accept bribes would probably betray the operation in the event of extreme difficulty, i.e., torture. In Iran we did not spend one cent in the purchase of officers.
- R. Forethought should also be given to the problem of care and keep of wives and families of friendly officers.
- S. The possibility of using weapons of foreign make should be kept well in mind in cases where American arms are not indigenous to the local area.

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way as to neutralize entire cities through the use of road blocks, strong points, traffic control, curfews, new documentation, etc.

X. Needless to say, a complete roster of officer assignments in the new army should be drawn well in advance in order that there be no confusion.

Y. Wherever possible it is much better to use the local army supply system than it is to create a new clandestine one. It also follows that it is much better to conduct the operation from within the country than it is to attempt a cross-border operation. It is also much easier to execute the operation when CIA officers are present than it is when CIA officers are outside the country. Deep cover personnel should be used in

order to prevent severe blowback whenever it is possible to prevent cover to do so.