

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Fears of Tehran Merchants Concerning the Tudeh Party	DATE DISTR.	20 July 1953
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Tehran merchants are "extremely worried" by the implications of the powerful showing of the Tudeh Party on 21 July 1953.<sup>1</sup> The general attitude is one of fear that Prime Minister Mousadeq has ventured too far in dealing with leftists and that Iran is slipping behind the Iron Curtain.

EXJ

1. Comment. According to the 22 July 1953 issue of The New York Times, Tudeh Party members and sympathizers numbering at least 100,000 participated in the 21 July 1953 demonstrations, while National Front crowds were estimated at 5,000 demonstrators at most. According to a [REDACTED], the National Front demonstrators numbered approximately 20,000, and the Tudeh demonstrators numbered between thirty and thirty-five thousand.

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DATE 06-08-1999

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY Iran  
SUBJECT Miscellaneous Information Concerning  
The Tudeh Party

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

DATE DISTR. 10 July 1953

NO. OF PAGES 3

REQUIREMENT NO. RD

DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED]

REFERENCES [REDACTED]

PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1. The Tudeh Party has been successful in obtaining the appointment of a Party member [REDACTED] by "influencing" the City Council [REDACTED]. However, by exploiting in its propaganda the reforms to be effected by [REDACTED] the Party will later attempt to obtain additional appointments.

2. [REDACTED] Tudeh members were instructed to begin the immediate collection of signatures demanding that Dr. Mozaffar Baghai's parliamentary immunity be withdrawn and that he be tried in court on charges implicating him in the murder of former Chief of Police Brigadier General Mahmud Afshartus<sup>3</sup>. [REDACTED] Party members were notified that they should not continue to collect signatures nor forward those signatures already collected because the Party had information that the "imperialists" and their "agents" were plotting to murder Baghai after his speech to the Majlis. The "imperialists" were to implicate pro-Government elements in Baghai's assassination by circulating rumors that the Iranian Government feared that in his speech Baghai might disclose information concerning the murder of Afshartus, as well as other official secrets.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of this "imperialistic" plot would be to arouse public opinion against Prime Minister Mossadeq and force him to resign.

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3. [REDACTED] that, in spite of the favorable decision by the Ministry of Justice, the Tudeh Party would continue to act with the utmost discretion in order not to be "deceived." Even if the Party were permitted to function openly and to increase its activities, [REDACTED] that the Party underground organization would continue.

4. [REDACTED]

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. The activities of the Women's Democratic Organization in Resht are being expanded gradually.<sup>9</sup> Conferences are held regularly and committees have been established in each of the city's eleven districts. Membership cards have been printed and dues collected. The organization is also active in nearby towns and villages, especially in Rud-i-Sar and Kasra.

1. [REDACTED] Comment. In spite of its success in this instance, the Tudeh Party exercises little influence in [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] Comment. General Afshartus was abducted and strangled on 20 April 1953. According to a 2 May 1953 Associated Press dispatch, the Government charged that the murder was the first move in a conspiracy by retired Army officers to overthrow Mossadeq and install Baghai in the premiership. Baghai, as a Majlis member, is immune from arrest.

4. [REDACTED] Comment. If the "imperialists" wished to create the impression that the Iranian Government feared Baghai's revelations, it would seem more logical that he would be murdered before, rather than after, his speech.

5. [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED] the Examining Magistrate issued a non-prosecution order in the case of twenty-three Tudeh Party leaders who had been arrested after the attempted assassination of the Shah in February 1949. The Government's opposition and the Tudeh interpreted the order as giving the Party legal status. [REDACTED] the Government suspended the Examining Magistrate who issued the order and the Assistant Prosecutor who confirmed it.

[REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED]

7. [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET  
[REDACTED]  
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Activities of Pro and Anti-Mossadeq Forces	DATE DISTR.	10 June 1953
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	2
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	NO
		REFERENCES	[REDACTED]

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY AND REVERSE)

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]
2. General Zahedi is "coming back very strongly" [REDACTED] rumors are being spread that the United States and the United Kingdom have reached an agreement "to push Zahedi for Prime Minister."
3. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED] Millah Kashani "received lots of money, probably from the bank of Iran from the outside" to help Zahedi.
5. [REDACTED]
6. A group of young Army officers on duty in Tehran has organized an organization called Majahedin-i-Iran (Champions of Iranian Liberty). This organization is being supported by Kashani and claims control of all provincial Army commanders.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

7. The Chief of Staff, General Riahi, and the Chief of Police, General Mubasher, submitted their resignations on 2 June 1953 but Mubasher prevailed on them to reconsider. 1, 2, 3

8. The public "invitation" on 5 June 1953 to Afshar Eshedi, the son of General Eshedi, to appear before the Military Governor, was [REDACTED]

9. The opposition newspapers, Azad, Farzadi-1-Iran, and Mard Asia,<sup>4</sup> have received substantial financial support from [REDACTED] and are to resume publication on 7 June 1953.

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SECRET/ [REDACTED]  
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Measures Taken by Mossadeq to Quell Opposition	DATE DISTR.	2 June 1953
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED], Gholam Reza Nurzad, Grand Master of the Royal Court, and Abol Fath Valatbar,<sup>1</sup> Civilian Adjutant to the Shah, were dismissed (at Mossadeq's request) for alleged anti-Government agitation.
- [REDACTED] Mossadeq's office sent orders to the Police to "watch and arrest" mullahs who were using the mosques as forums for anti-Government agitation.<sup>2</sup>
- Chief of the Iranian National Police, General Nasrollah Modabar, has arrested the last of "ten or twelve mullahs" allegedly active against the Government. Rooms have been prepared at Police Headquarters for their detention.
- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED], Abol Fath Diba Valatbar was one of the Shah's six closest advisors.
- [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] Comment. Siasi, formerly Commander of the Resht Brigade, accepted his appointment as new Chief of Iranian G-2 on 13 May 1953. He is reputedly very pro-Western.
- [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED]

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SECRET/[REDACTED]  
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Anti-Mossadeq Activities	DATE DISTR.	30 April 1953
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	[REDACTED]

BY CABLE  
THESE EVALUATIONS AND APPRAISALS ARE DEFINITIVE.  
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SOURCE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] claimed to know that an opposition coup had been planned which would take place "within the next few days." As leaders of the opposition [REDACTED] named [REDACTED] and a group of retired Army officers, all of whom had the backing of Mullah Kashani. [REDACTED] stated that Chief of Police Mahmud Afshartus had been murdered by [REDACTED] at the "behest" of the retired Army officers and that the murder was connected with the planned coup.

2. [REDACTED], arrived in Tehran several days ago "to assassinate Prime Minister Mossadeq, Foreign Minister Hoseyn Fatemi, and three others" as the opening move of the coup.

1. [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED]

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY Iran  
SUBJECT Shiraz Riots

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]  
DATE DISTR. 25 April 1953

DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED]

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

REQUIREMENT NO. RD

REFERENCES

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THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS TENTATIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1. The attacks against Point IV property and personnel in Shiraz were planned and directed by Prime Minister Mossadeq's followers, probably with the aid of the Qashqai Khans, in an effort to discredit the Army and the Shah.<sup>1</sup>
2. The total strength of the Tudeh Party in Shiraz is, at most, 120 members.<sup>2</sup>
3. The Chief of the Shiraz Police, who was described by Mossadeq followers as an appointee of the Shah, actually was appointed by Iranian National Police Chief General Mahmud Afshartus, a Mossadeq "strong man."
4. The Shiraz disturbances were precipitated by a speech made on 15 April 1953 at the Isfahan gates of Shiraz by Karimpur Shirazi, editor of the Tehran pro-Mossadeq weekly newspaper Shuresh.<sup>4</sup>
5. The Shiraz incident developed when Shirazi used a scheduled speech to voice a bitter attack against Sayyed Nur-i-Din, a Shiraz religious leader, describing him as a "British spy and a traitor." Nur-i-Din sympathizers in the crowd protested "passionately" and fighting broke out. Police and Army units intervened and attempted to restore order at the scene of the speech. Meanwhile, pro-Government and leftist elements moved unopposed against Point IV property in another part of Shiraz.

Comments.

1. [REDACTED], Majlis Deputy Khosrov Qashqai stated that the Iranian Army, at the instigation of the Royal Court, was directly responsible for the Shiraz incidents, and

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that the Tudeh Party had nothing to do with the affair. Khosrov Khan further claimed that the incident was instigated by Seyyed Nur-i-Din and former Majlis Deputy Loft Ali Moadel.

2. [REDACTED] there were approximately 200 members of the Tudeh Party in Shiraz in 1951. Shiraz is also the central location for a new Soviet anti-locust campaign being conducted throughout Fars Province.
3. General Afshartus disappeared on the evening of 20 April 1953, while on duty in Tehran.
4. Karimpur Shirazi was arrested in Tehran in April 1951 on charges of violating the martial law and was subsequently released. During March 1951 he had printed articles in Shuresh attacking the Royal family, [REDACTED] Shuresh, is an organ of Fedayan-i-Islam. The paper,

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY: Iran

SUBJECT: Opposition Test of Strength with Mossadeq

DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED]

PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

DATE DISTR. 16 April 1953

NO. OF PAGES 2

REQUIREMENT NO. RD

REFERENCES

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE'S RELIABILITY IS TENTATIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

[REDACTED SOURCE INFORMATION]

1. The Iranian political crisis has been reopened with Prime Minister Mossadeq taking the initiative in a planned surprise attack in which the Government plans to use all of its assets to try to crush the opposition and to force Majlis acceptance of the report of the "Committee of Eight." Mass demonstrations, Government- and Tudeh-sponsored, are to be staged that day in the Majlis Square.
2. [REDACTED] a Court representative attempted to enlist Mullah Kashani's support of the following plan (to which the Shah "appeared favorably disposed") to oust Prime Minister Mossadeq and replace him by General Fazullah Zahedi:
  - a. Kashani would address a letter to the Shah stating that, in view of the lawless condition in Tehran and threats to the Majlis deputies, the Majlis no longer could function.
  - b. On the same day the above-mentioned Court representative would prevail upon the Shah to issue a firman and proclamations quoting Kashani's letter, relieving Mossadeq, and appointing General Zahedi as "Director of Public Security" to maintain order so that the Majlis could designate an able and capable new prime minister in an atmosphere free from violence.
  - c. In the event that the firman dismissing Mossadeq could not be obtained from the Shah, the opposition would refrain from participation in street conflicts, but opposition deputies would walk out of the Majlis in order to prevent the formation of a quorum.

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3. [REDACTED]
4. Royal Court officials are deeply concerned over the demonstrations scheduled for 16 April and anticipate bloodshed.
5. The following information increases Court fears of possible serious repercussions in the wake of Government-planned demonstrations on 16 April:
- a. Bands of "hoodlums" have been directed by Government supporters to attack the Palace, Majlis buildings, and American installations, but the security forces have not been ordered to stop them.
  - b. The Army guard (including tanks) has been reinforced around Mossadeq's house and Radio Tehran.
  - c. The Government is giving a holiday to all workers on 16 April and the Bazaar is to close on the same day (thus freeing thousands to gather in the streets).
  - d. All schools have been ordered to be closed on 16 April.
1. [REDACTED] Comment. The "Committee of Eight" was formed [REDACTED] to define the powers of the Shah.

(4)

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Statements by Prime Minister Concerning Sale of Oil and Possibility of Military Coup	DATE DIST.	6 April 1953
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF COUNTRY IS TENTATIVE. (FOR REF SEE REFERENCE)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] Prime Minister Mossadeq stated that the Supor Company will continue to haul Iranian oil as long as the Italian Government permits, and hinted that the Company has licenses for two million tons of oil.
2. The Prime Minister further stated that Count Della Zouca<sup>1</sup> will be sold oil only under two conditions:
  - a. That Della Zouca sign a guarantee that the oil will not go to the Eastern bloc; and
  - b. That Della Zouca post \$200,000 which will be forfeited if any of his ships put it at a British port and the oil is impounded.

3. [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Activities of Pro-Mossadeq and Anti-Mossadeq Forces	DATE DISTR.	1 April 1953
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	2
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

**BY CABLE**

THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1. The Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, General Riahi, who is a member of the Iran Party, is promoting a new political party called the "National Socialist Party in the Army." The purpose of the new party is to counter the strong pro-Shah elements among Army officers by organizing the pro-Mossadeq elements. Iran-i-Ma, a pro-Government newspaper edited by Jahangir Tafasolli, is the official organ of the new party.
2. [REDACTED], the Minister of Court, Hoseyn Ala, visited Qum and attempted to persuade the religious leader, Ayatollah Borujerdi, to rally the mullahs for a pro-Shah demonstration when the Shah visits Meshed, probably within the next few days. Ala also requested Borujerdi to persuade the mullahs to oppose Mossadeq's alleged efforts to have Ala dismissed as Minister of Court.
3. Dr. Ali Shayegan, a Mossadeq adviser who left Iran last week for "medical treatment" in Europe, has been authorized by Mossadeq to contact [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], in an effort to gain the active support of Iranian refugee political organizations for Mossadeq in his "feud" with the Shah.
4. General Fazollah Zahedi continues to be active in his efforts to organize a coup d'etat against the Mossadeq Government. [REDACTED]

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5. During a No Ruz (21 March) meeting at Isfahan "several" Bakhtiari khans agreed to join forces and provide military support to Abdul Qasem Bakhtiar. Martial law subsequently was established in the Bakhtiari country with the Army moving new units into the area from the Isfahan garrison.

1. Comment. [Redacted]

2. [Redacted]

3. Comment. [Redacted]

4. [Redacted]

5. Comment. [Redacted]



C O P Y

TOP SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, D. C.

March 20, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: First Progress Report on Paragraph 5-a of  
NSC 136/1, "U.S. Policy Regarding the Present  
Situation in Iran"

NSC 136/1 was approved as governmental policy on  
November 20, 1952. It is requested that this progress report  
as of March 11, 1953, be circulated to the members of the  
Council for their information.

Introduction

1. Paragraph 5-a of NSC 136/1 reads as follows:

"In the event of either an attempted or an actual  
communist seizure of power in one or more of the provinces  
of Iran or in Tehran, the United States should support a  
non-communist Iranian Government, including participation  
in the military support of such a government if necessary  
and useful.\* Preparations for such an eventuality should  
include:

"a. Plans for the specific military, economic,  
diplomatic, and psychological measures which should  
be taken to support a non-communist Iranian Govern-  
ment or to prevent all or part of Iran or adjacent  
areas from falling under communist domination.

\* \* \* \* \*

"\*If it is found necessary for the United States to  
provide military forces in this area, implementation will  
require either a substantial augmentation of over-all  
United States forces or a reduction of present United  
States military commitments elsewhere."

2. In accordance with the foregoing, a Working Group  
consisting of representatives from the Departments of State  
and Defense, CIA and the JCS was formed to develop plans for  
the specific measures indicated.

BY WDP Date 2/29/00	Authority AND 959285
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3. Although many of the specific plans required are still in the process of preparation, the Working Group submits herewith a Progress Report as of March 11, 1953, for the information of the members of the Council.

4. The Working Group desires to point out that in addition to the two conditions envisioned in paragraph 5-a of NSC 136/1, there is also the possibility that a communist seizure of power in Iran may take place imperceptibly over a considerable period of time. Under this contingency, it would be extremely difficult to identify and demonstrate to our allies that specific countermeasures were required to prevent communist infiltration from reaching the point where it would be able to significantly influence the policies of the Iranian Government. In such circumstances, it might be desirable to implement certain of the plans discussed in the attached Report, prior to an identifiable attempted or actual communist seizure of power.

5. Because of the sensitive nature of the information contained in this Progress Report, it is requested that special security precautions be taken in its handling and that access be limited strictly to individuals requiring this information in the performance of their official duties.

Measures Being Taken to Implement Paragraph 5-a of NSC 136/1

CONDITION I

1. Measures to be taken to support a non-communist Iranian Government in the event of an attempted communist seizure of power:

a. Military: Predicated on the assumption that the Iranian Government makes an appeal to the U.S. for direct military assistance, the JCS have recognized three feasible U.S. military courses of action, namely:

(1) To conduct a show of force by periodic flights of carrier aircraft, or aircraft from land bases outside of Iran, over key centers. Recommendations concerning possible employment of U.S. naval and SAC units have been requested from CINCNELM and CGSAC, respectively. To date these recommendations have not been received.

(2) To assist the legal Iranian Army with logistic support by augmenting the present policy of arms aid. Since there is no way of foretelling what assistance might be needed or requested by the Iranians, meaningful plans cannot be prepared in advance. However, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, could draw up the necessary plans very quickly when the necessary specific information became available.

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(3) Furnish additional arms aid to appropriate Middle East countries so as to eventually enable them to possess the strength to secure their frontiers against effective communist infiltration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff keep this matter under continuous review.


b. Economic: It is doubtful that any increase in the present level of MDAP and Point Four programs (\$66.6 and \$20.8 millions, respectively) would be justified if the Iranian situation became more unstable. If economic conditions in Iran continue to deteriorate as a result of the continued instability of the government and its inability to market oil, it is possible that a situation might arise where it would be in the U.S. interest to give the National Front Government direct financial assistance should such a request be received. The Department of State has recommended that a contingency fund of \$45 million be set aside for this purpose, and the matter is currently under consideration by the Bureau of the Budget. This action would be consistent with NSC 136/1, but would have to be justified in the light of the situation existing at the time the request is made.

c. Diplomatic: An attempted communist seizure of power would probably be designed to exploit the increasing economic and political difficulties facing Iran. Thus U.S. diplomatic planning in such a situation requires continued efforts on the part of our Ambassador in Tehran to negotiate a settlement of the oil controversy between Mosadeq and the U.K. and in the event of an attempted coup, to urge positive action, including the prompt use of security forces, upon such Iranian authorities as may be capable of such action with a view to preventing a communist seizure of power.

d. Psychological: The PSB on January 15, 1953, approved a "Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East" (D-22) which includes within this broader framework guidance for psychological operations in Iran. When prepared, plans for specific psychological measures in the event of an attempted communist coup in Iran will be consistent with this program and with the approved PSB policies contained in "A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to 'Cold War' Operations under NSC 10/5" (D-31).

e. Special Political Operations: Current special political operations in Iran, which are directed toward counteracting and reducing Tudeh influence, would be continued and, if circumstances permit, intensified in the event of an attempted communist coup. These operations are designed to:

(1) Influence specific political, military and religious leaders to speak out strongly against the Tudeh threat.



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SECURITY INFORMATION

- (2) Induce certain political and military leaders to institute administrative and security actions to curb Tudeh activities (demonstrations, strikes, etc.).
- (3) Maintain anti-Tudeh propaganda.
- (4) Instigate physical attacks upon Tudeh facilities and demonstrations.
- (5) Obtain the publication of anti-Tudeh material in the press, and in pamphlets, books, posters, etc.
- (6) Influence the choice of a successor to Mosadeq in the event of his resignation or death.
- (7) Maintain liaison with potential resistance groups, in particular elements of certain strong tribal elements in southern Iran.

(It should be noted that: (a) CIA's detailed plan for covert operations in Iran during 1953 was approved by the PSB on January 8, 1953, and (b) certain of the special political operations listed under Condition II, below, could, if circumstances warranted, be implemented under Condition I.)

CONDITION II

2. Measures to be taken to prevent all or a part of Iran or adjacent areas from falling under communist domination in the event of an actual communist seizure of power in one or more of the provinces of Iran or in Tehran:

a. Military: In the event of a Tudeh coup in Iran, the JCS have recognized three feasible U.S. military courses of action, namely:

- (1) Furnish additional arms aid to appropriate Middle East countries so as to eventually enable them to possess the strength to secure their frontiers against effective communist infiltration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff keep this matter under continuous review.
- (2) Deploy appropriate Air Force units, on the order of 1-1/2 wings plus support units, to southern Turkey with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, has been requested to recommend the composition of the Air Force organization to be deployed to southern Turkey under this contingency.

(3) Deploy U.S. ground Division, reinforced, and need f one and

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
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SECURITY INFORMATION

naval forces to the vicinity of Basra with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries. This would be accomplished by the physical presence of U.S. military power, demonstrations of strength and as a last resort, when authorized by proper authority, combat operations. CINCNELM has been requested to make appropriate recommendation with regard to this course of action but his reply has not yet been received. Our present state of preparedness is such that the 82nd Airborne Division, the 2nd Marine Division or an infantry division in Europe could be moved on short notice provided the necessary shipping were made available. The movement of any one of these divisions would take approximately 60 days. The logistic support required to maintain the deployment of these forces could be accomplished only at the expense of critical supplies now destined for Korea. Similarly, any force deployments to the Middle East would necessitate a substantial upward revision of U.S. force ceilings or a reduction of our commitments elsewhere.

b. Economic: The U.S. Government would provide such economic assistance as required to sustain and strengthen whatever non-communist Iranian Government remained after the communist coup. Specific plans for this eventuality cannot be prepared in advance, but it is likely that requirements for such aid would follow the general pattern, though on a reduced scale, of the economic assistance being given the ROK Government. The early appointment of an over-all coordinator for economic aid would, on the basis of Korean experience, greatly increase the effectiveness of any specific economic measures which might be undertaken in such a contingency.

c. Diplomatic: (1) The United States Government will not recognize a communist government of Iran and will publicly support anti-communist Iranian elements in Iran or abroad. Such support might involve the recognition of an Iranian Government in exile. Since the Shah might be a useful rallying point for such a Government, arrangements to facilitate his escape from Tehran in an emergency are under consideration. In addition, there will probably always be some prominent Iranian public figures outside Iran (such as the Iranian Ambassador to the United States) who could participate in such a movement. For political and security reasons, no advance planning in this regard can be attempted with any Iranian leaders, including the Shah.

(2) Any anti-communist Iranian Government will under such circumstances undoubtedly appeal to the United Nations for



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diplomatic and military support. This appeal should be exploited in the United Nations to demonstrate the aggressive character of Soviet communism. However, major policy decisions would be required before active military support could be given by the United Nations.

(3) Unless compelling circumstances prevent it, or other satisfactory arrangements can be made, the Saudi Arabian Government will be asked for permission to use Dhahran as a transit point in connection with contemplated U.S. covert operations.


(4) It is assumed that Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan would each feel threatened by a communist government in Iran and could, therefore, be expected to show sympathy for anti-communist Iranian elements. Diplomatic planning is directed toward insuring the greatest possible measure of cooperation of these countries in support of the non-communist Iranian Government. It should be recognized that the extent of cooperation provided by those countries would, of course, be influenced by their appreciation of Soviet reactions to any measures which they might initiate.

(5) The active cooperation of the British Government is of major importance in any plans which may be developed to meet this contingency. Every effort will be made through diplomatic means to secure this cooperation, but the failure to secure U.K. support will not in itself prevent the U.S. from taking such measures as are possible to achieve our national objectives.

d. Psychological: No specific psychological measures have yet been planned for implementation in Iran in the event of an actual communist seizure of power.

e. Special Political Operations: (1) At the present time CIA has a stockpile of small arms, ammunition and demolition materiel under USAF cover, Wheelus Field, Tripoli. The stockpile is in quantity designed to supply a 10,000-man guerrilla force for six months without re-supply. In other increments there is sufficient materiel to equip basically a 4000-man guerrilla force. (Locales of storage are New Jersey, Ismailia Suez Canal Zone, and Tripoli.) CIA is now considering the feasibility of adding essential food stuffs and clothing to existing or other stockpiles. An estimate of such requirements is in the process of preparation.

(2) These supplies could, within 3 to 4 weeks, be transported by air and sea to certain strong tribal



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elements in southern Iran (in particular the Qashqai tribe) who might, in the event of a Tudeh coup, be prepared to conduct resistance activity against such a Communist government. However, for political and security reasons, no attempt has been made to conduct advanced planning of this sort with Iranian officials.


(3) CIA has an agreement with the Qashqai tribal leaders in southern Iran to establish a clandestine safe haven base from which guerrilla and intelligence operations could be conducted utilizing the manpower of these elements (estimated 20,000). Four members of one group have been given radio communications training by CIA. Conditions in South Iran, attitude of the Iranian Army and neighboring tribes, status of an Iranian rump government or government in exile, the political attitudes of the tribe in question, and degree of our support in time of Tudeh control have a bearing, however, on the tribal will and ability to conduct resistance activity. To date CIA has trained and equipped a total of approximately 10 indigenous clandestine radio operators to be located throughout Iran and who can be called upon to maintain communications with CIA when desired. Others are being trained.

(4) Reception points in the Tehran and Tabriz area and in South Iran where supplies and personnel can be clandestinely introduced into Iran are in the process of being established. A certain quantity of communications equipment, cash and gold has been cached within Iran, and a considerable amount of cash is available in Tehran.

(5) CIA planning includes the creation of eight 3-men teams to assist in supply, training and operation of Iranian resistance elements.

(6) Representatives of CIA and the British Intelligence Service met during the latter part of February to consider joint activities in Iran in the event of a Tudeh coup. The report of this meeting has not yet been received, but the discussions included the following topics:

- (a) Potential resistance groups.
- (b) Conditions under which assistance will be offered.
- (c) Extent and nature of assistance.
- (d) Supply channels to resistance groups.



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- (e) Maintenance and establishment of liaison and communications.
- (f) Establishment of advance supply bases outside of Iran.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE PLANNING

3. In the preparation of the plans for specific military, economic, diplomatic and psychological measures required by paragraph 5-a of NSC 136/1, the working Group has agreed that responsibilities for future action in this regard will be as follows:

a. State: (1) Recommendations as to possible levels of direct financial assistance to Iran under Conditions I and II.

(2) Plans for the Shah's escape from Tehran in an emergency.

(3) Plans for the handling and exploitation in U.N. of an Iranian appeal for diplomatic and military support.

(4) Negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government for the use of Dhahran as a transit point for U.S. supplies to Iran.


(5) Plans for discussions at the appropriate time with Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan re joint action in support of the Iranian Government under Conditions I and II.

(6) In coordination with the JCS, plans for early political-military discussions with the British Government re joint action in support of the Iranian Government under Conditions I and II.

b. Defense (assisted by the JCS): (1) Plans for a show of force by periodic flights of carrier or land-based aircraft over key centers in Iran, under Condition I.

(2) Recommendations as to possible levels of increased logistic support through augmentation of arms aid to Iran under Conditions I and II.

(3) Recommendations as to the possible levels of additional arms aid to appropriate Middle East countries under Conditions I and II.





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(4) Plans for the deployment of 1-1/2 Air Force wings to southern Turkey with the mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries, under Condition II.

(5) Plans for the deployment of one Division (reinforced) with necessary supporting air and naval forces to the vicinity of Basra with the mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries.

(6) In coordination with State, plans for early military discussions with the British military authorities re joint action in support of the Iranian Government under Conditions I and II.

c. CIA: (1) Intensify, and if possible expand, their current special political operations, directed toward counteracting and reducing Tudeh influence in Iran.

(2) Take steps to move appropriate quantities of para-military equipment to bases as close to Iran as possible.

(3) Continue to increase its capability to conduct para-military operations in Iran under Condition II.


(4) Conduct joint planning with the MAAG mission in Iran for para-military operations in Iran under Condition II.

(5) As considered desirable in the light of U.S. national objectives in Iran, continue joint planning with the British clandestine services for coordinated action under Condition II.

(6) Plans for transporting arms and materiel to Iran under Conditions I and II.

d. PSB: PSB will be requested to supervise the preparation of plans for specific psychological measures in Iran and in the Middle East under Conditions I and II.

/s/ Walter B. Smith  
Under Secretary



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECRET [REDACTED]  
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Situation [REDACTED] March 1953	DATE DISTR.	12 March 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	2
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REFERENCES	

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE TENTATIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The following information, now largely outdated, was originally issued as [REDACTED]

1. Government-sponsored pro-Mossadeq demonstrations, designed to dwarf all previous ones of the past three days, are scheduled to begin on 3 March 1953.
2. Mossadeq and his followers in the Majlis are blaming the Americans and specifically the American Ambassador for "encouraging" the Shah to remain and "resist Mossadeq," thus precipitating the present disturbances.
3. Rumors are spreading through Tehran that the American Embassy financed the pro-Shah demonstrations of 28 February and 1 March with ten million rials (approximately \$125,000).
4. The demonstrations which originated at Tehran University on the evening of 1 March and the morning of 2 March were sponsored by the Government to counter the pro-Shah demonstrations in Baharistan Square. Students were recruited for pro-Government demonstrations without any thought of their possible political orientation.
5. Leaders of the pro-Government demonstrations were from the Third Force (not the Tudeh Party) and Tudeh units which tried to join the parade were driven off with tear gas by the security forces.
6. Scores of Tudeh members were injured, many hospitalized, Major Fazollah Moghadam, Chief of the Third Section of the Police, was knifed in the face during a fight with 200 Tudeh "toughs" who tried to join the 2 March pro-Government demonstrations.

SECRET [REDACTED]

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC				
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7. During the 1 March pro-Government demonstration, the Third Force leading the parade began a propaganda attack against the Tudeh, using a mobile loudspeaker, and signaled the security forces to break the parade in half and drive off the Tudeh elements. The Tudeh fled and the Third Force continued on to Babaristan Square for an orderly demonstration.

1. Comment, [REDACTED]

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY Iran REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT Rumored Coup d'Etat DATE DISTR. 12 March 1953

DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED] NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED] REQUIREMENT NO. RD

REFERENCES

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

[REDACTED SOURCE INFORMATION]

- Rumors have been circulating with increasing insistence that a military coup against Prime Minister Mossadeq is impending. Some rumors also have included the Shah as the object of the impending coup.
- [REDACTED] that, unless the coup is launched within the next twenty-four hours (sometime between 6 and 7 March), there is little chance of success. In addition to names mentioned frequently in past speculation, the names of Generals Nadr Batmangelich and Mahmud Amini have been added to the list.
- [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]  
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Planned Coup d'Etat against Mossadeq Government	DATE DISTR.	31 March 1953
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REFERENCE NO.	RD

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
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SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1. Anti-Mossadeq Majlis deputies and retired Army officers are planning a coup d'etat which is tentatively scheduled to take place "two or three weeks hence."
2. Those prominent in planning the coup are: [REDACTED]
3. In the event that the coup were successful, General Zahedi would become Prime Minister and General Garzan would become Chief of Staff.
4. The group which is planning the coup claims that the United States Embassy in Tehran is "fully supporting" the move.<sup>2</sup>
5. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] that the coup would take place in "about twenty days" and that [REDACTED] probably would take part, along with one Army "motorized division."
6. On 18 March 1953 [REDACTED], a supporter of Zahedi, remarked [REDACTED] "We are not finished; we will be in power before summer."

1. [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED]

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Authority NND 959285By WDP NARA Date 2/29/00TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

## THE IRANIAN SITUATION

The Current Crisis

1. The current struggle for power must be differentiated from the oil dispute. They should be considered as two related but distinct matters.
2. Mosadeq appears to be winning the struggle with his opponents which was precipitated by his insistence that the Shah leave Iran for a prolonged trip. The Shah himself has done nothing, except to cancel his trip.
3. Mosadeq is blaming the crisis on the United States, alleging that the American Ambassador improperly interfered by encouraging the Shah and other elements to oppose the Prime Minister.
4. The Communists did not create the crisis nor are they playing a decisive role in its outcome. However, they are actively supporting Mosadeq in order to get rid of the Shah. If Mosadeq eliminates the Shah, the Communist position will be stronger and they may then be expected to turn against Mosadeq.

Our Action in the Crisis

1. Ambassador Henderson, with the Department's approval, has done what he could to persuade the Shah to remain in Iran. By indirect channels, he has also conveyed the suggestion that the Shah should take a more active role and provide leadership for his supporters. At the same time, Henderson has urged moderation on Mosadeq and attempted to dispell his suspicions of the Shah.
2. We have authorized Henderson to do what he can to maintain the Shah's position and to bring about the installation of a new government loyal to the Shah and hostile to the Communists. We have also authorized him, as an alternative, to work for a reconciliation between the Shah and Mosadeq which would force Mosadeq to respect the Shah's position and disavow the Communists.
3. We have made representations to the Iranian Government regarding its responsibility for the protection of American lives and property.

Status of the Oil Problem

1. On February 20, Henderson presented to Mosadeq the latest proposals on behalf of the British, coupled with an American proposal to buy \$133,000,000 worth of oil on the conclusion of an Anglo-Iranian agreement on compensation. We are awaiting Mosadeq's reply. He has indicated that this reply will be negative.

2. If MosadeqTOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Authority NUD 959285  
 By WDP NARA Date 2/29/00

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TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

2. If Mosadeq rejects the proposals, we have no present plans for making new ones. The British consider the present offers as final.
3. The possibilities for future action include:
  - (a) An announcement that we are ceasing our efforts to arrive at an oil solution, coupled with a policy determination to go along with present economic and military aid programs in Iran so long as this assistance is clearly desired by the Iranian Government.
  - (b) A renewed attempt to get the British to consider settlement of the oil problem on a lump-sum basis, which Mosadeq has recently indicated he would be glad to consider.
  - (c) A decision to make arrangements for American purchase of Iranian oil without prior agreement between Great Britain and Iran on the compensation issue.
  - (d) Rapid withdrawal from Iran, both on the oil front and with respect to our aid programs.

Possible Action with Respect to a Communist Takeover in Iran

1. This is covered in NSC report No. 136/1 of November 20, 1952, beginning with Paragraph No. 5 at the bottom of Page 3. (This paper will be in your book.)
2. As called for by Paragraph 5 (a) of NSC 136/1, CIA representatives are in consultation with the British on plans for covert activity to counter a Communist coup. Other plans are under study in the Department of State and Defense. General Bradley will of course speak on military planning.

Alton Jones -- Technicians

The Iranian Government has asked Mr. W. Alton Jones of Cities Service to supply half a dozen technicians to assist it in one of the units of the Abadan refinery. At the request of the British we have been discouraging Mr. Jones for the past several months. The Iranian Government is becoming increasingly insistent and our position has become embarrassing since we have no legal or other right to prevent these technicians from being sent. In the judgment of the Department of State the dispatch of these technicians would have little or no effect on the current oil negotiations although it would irritate the British.

March 3, 1953.

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INFORMATION REPORT

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REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 8 October 1952

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

COUNTRY Iran  
SUBJECT National Socialist Worker's Party.

DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED]

PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

GRADING OF SOURCE						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
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SOURCE

[REDACTED]

1. Jamal Imami, who with his followers is supporting the National Socialist Worker's Party (SUMKA),<sup>1</sup> has solicited the support of others for SUMKA. Imami's followers recently attacked the workers at the Chit Sazi factory who are Tudeh members, and, in general, have encouraged SUMKA to a violent anti-communist stand.
2. Hoseyn Ala, the Minister of Court, recently discussed SUMKA [REDACTED]. Ala indicated that the Court intended to strengthen SUMKA.
3. [REDACTED]
4. Dr. Mozaffar Baghai's Tailors' Party<sup>3</sup> and the newspaper Bakhtar Emruz are strongly opposed to SUMKA and consider it a British-sponsored organization which is attempting to create trouble for the Mossadeq Government.
5. [REDACTED] that the Tudeh Party and the present Government will reduce SUMKA as a political force unless a change of attitude is forthcoming.

1. [REDACTED] Comment, [REDACTED]  
the political program of SUMKA is directed against three enemies: the parliamentary regime, the Communists, and the capitalists. [REDACTED] considers the Iranian Majlis to be an ineffective institution which fails to serve the needs of the people [REDACTED] that there is about SUMKA an air of

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Nazism. However, from the Party program it appears that only the external and superficial aspects of Nazism such as uniforms, salute, and other military gestures have been adopted. The substantive program is not of the same type as Nazism, but SUMKA is nevertheless an extreme rightist group.

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

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# INFORMATION REPORT REFERENCE COPY

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

CD NO.

COUNTRY Iran

DO NOT CIRCULATE

DATE DISTR. 19 August 1952

SUBJECT Repression by Shah of Projected  
Military Coup

NO. OF PAGES 1

DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED]

NO. OF ENCLS.  
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PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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A.	B.	C. X	D.	E.	F.	1.	2.	3. X	4.	5.	6.

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SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. Press stories that a planned military coup involved Major General Hasan Arfa, former Chief of Staff, and Ernest Peron, secretary-companion to the Shah, were largely fabrications inspired by the National Front to purge elements in the Army undesirable to the Front. However, some efforts were made to inspire a coup.

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] Comment. The Imperial Division of Tehran is still under the direct command of the Shah.

Approved For [REDACTED]  
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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

COUNTRY Iran  
SUBJECT Assessment of the Current Situation

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The sequence of events beginning with the resignation of Prime Minister Mossadegh and culminating with the riots of 21 July 1952 resulted in temporarily obscuring the oil question and bringing into sharp focus the major issue in Iran today: whether or not Iran will fall behind the Iron Curtain. Significant features of the internal situation after the 21 July riots indicate the Tudeh Party's emergence as the greatest long-range beneficiary.

1. Growing influence of the Tudeh Party in Iran
  - a. Ahmed Qavam's premiership caught the Tudeh unawares but not unprepared. The Tudeh immediately recognized and seized its opportunity by using the well-known communist tactic of joining in a united front with the Nationalists against Qavam, thus forming a *de facto* alliance in which the Tudeh was a powerful partner. The Communists took the initiative in this and, at least in the early stages, held full control.
  - b. The riots resulted in the following gains for the Tudeh:
    - (1) Lowering of Army officers' morale, consequently weakening the Army itself;
    - (2) Unseating Qavam and thus shattering the hopes that any other old-line political leaders (such as Ibrahim Hakimi, Ali Mansour, and Seyid Zia Tabatabai) may have had of coming back to power;
    - (3) Providing an opportunity to step up the anti-American campaign by making Americans appear to be responsible for bringing Qavam back to power. "Hate America" slogans were added effectively to "Hate British" ones. A dangerous blow was dealt to United States military prestige

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by placing the responsibility for bloodshed on the United States-  
advised and-equipped Iranian Army. Thus the way was paved for  
demanding an early recall of the United States military missions to Iran.

c.

[REDACTED] that the Tudeh  
did not attempt to go beyond these gains and seize power because:

- (1) on account of the element of surprise and Mossadegh's tremendous popularity, the time was hardly propitious. In addition, Mossadegh and Mullah Kashani retained control over the populace (although during the riots their control seemed tenuous and the Nationalists, [REDACTED])

- (2) the Tudeh needed a respite, to consolidate and exploit the gains achieved;
- (3) the populace had apparently expended fully its emotional fervor for the time being.

d. Thus the riots of 21 July accelerated immeasurably the Tudeh program, although it is improbable that the Tudeh actually could have taken over the Government that day. Given one or more similar opportunities in the next few months (particularly if Mossadegh loses his hold over the masses) the Tudeh appears to have an excellent chance to take over the Government, in view of the Tudeh Party's demonstrated organizational strength, the present weakened morale of the security forces, and the apparent ineffectiveness of the Government administration at the working level.

## 2. Soviet tactics

- a. The Soviets continue to rely on the Tudeh and subversion for the most dynamic implementation of their policy toward Iran.
- b. The Tudeh program is backed up by:
  - (1) strong overt pressure against the U.S. Military Mission [REDACTED]
  - (2) the aggressive policy of increasing Irano-Soviet barter trade, which is reminiscent of pre-war German attempts to monopolize Iranian trade. The British blockade and the loss of Western foreign exchange are also playing into Soviet hands.

## 3. Iranian Security Forces

The future usefulness of the security forces to maintain order in Tehran is questionable.

- a. The morale of Army Officers has been greatly lowered for the following reasons:
  - (1) the Army undoubtedly would have been capable and willing to repress the riots but was stopped by the negative attitude of the Shah. The troops, face to face with angry mobs, were ordered by the Shah not to shoot. The result was the worst humiliation experienced by officers since the Part tribal uprisings in 1946;

(2) some top-ranking officers already are under house arrest [REDACTED]. According to apparently well-founded rumors, National Front deputies are drawing up a list of several hundred Army Officers for purging;

(3) the National Front is gaining control over the Army with the inevitable result of nepotism and political patronage. (Mossadegh now is Minister of War.) The new Chief of Staff General Marteza Khan Yazdanpanah, although a "Shah's man", is known to be a National Front sympathizer and is not expected to refuse its demands. Key positions in the Army are likely to be assigned to officers who are sympathetic and subservient to the National Front. However, the National Front was aware of the Tudeh threat and there are now numerous signs that it is attempting to restore the prestige of the Army under its control.

b. The morale of the Police, who were largely responsible for the shooting during the riots, has been very badly damaged. For 24 hours after the riots the Police were conspicuous by their absence on the streets.

c. The loyalty of the Tehran security forces to the Shah is seriously in doubt for the first time.

#### 4. The Prestige of the Shah

The prestige of the Shah is dangerously affected to the point where abdication or even deposition is possible.

a. The Army, which is the mainstay of the Throne, is losing faith in its Commander in Chief; the future power of the Shah over the Army henceforth will probably be nominal; Army officers will be looking to the National Front for promotions and lucrative or desirable assignments; the Shah's Army may shortly become what the National Front likes to describe as a "National Army."

b. For the first time during his reign, the Shah has become, openly and on a large scale, the target for popular abuse. A statue of the Shah in Sengelaj Park, Tehran, was torn down and destroyed in broad daylight by the irate mob. Anti-Shah slogans, such as "Traitor Shah, Abdicate" were splashed over the walls on the main avenues. Bands of hooligans raided shops and other public places, tearing down portraits of the Shah while others dramatically smashed small plaster cast statues of the Shah on the pavement of crowded thoroughfares. Prince Ali Reza, heir-apparent to the throne, was identified and stoned by the mob while personally surveying the situation in town.

c. Members of the royal family, the royal household and court, supporters in the Senate and Majlis were disgruntled, demoralized, and openly critical of the Shah. They went all out for Qavam--many, on the direct request of the Shah. When the Shah failed to follow through with the necessary powers for Qavam, those who had supported the Shah were left in a precarious position to the extent of endangering their lives.

d. [REDACTED] The BBC has broadcast that the "Shah" is a weakling."

#### 5. The Prestige of the National Front

The National Front, having reasserted its popular appeal, is at least temporarily united once more and apparently stronger than ever.

a. Mossadegh, having been brought back to power by the "streets of Tehran" is now ruling with the overwhelming support of the assemblies and the Shah. His newly

acquired control over the Army will provide the National Front with the following advantages:

- (1) They can run elections for the remaining 56 Deputies (82 already have been elected) without fear of Court or Army intrigues.
- (2) The Political power of the Court, which was exercised in the provinces mainly through the Army and which in the past proved detrimental to the National Front, is now greatly curtailed.
- (3) By shifting key personnel in the Army hierarchy, the National Front probably can rely upon the Army to help protect its political power from the Tudeh. Furthermore, the Army will cease being a menace to the National Front, as it had been when the Army was exclusively under the Shah's command.

b. The Hague Court decision unconditionally in favor of Iran vindicates Mossadegh and opens the door to the hope of immediate financial and economic relief.

c. The National Front, however, has within itself the seeds of its own decay.

- (1) Mossadegh's leadership and the continuation of his "arrogant" anti-British line are the mainstays of the National Front. Should Mossadegh disappear, no political figure within the National Front is capable of taking over. In such case the National Front would probably break up with many defection to the Tudeh;
- (2) Dissensions within the National Front leadership have, in the past, threatened its unity (when Mossadegh was in the United States during the elections; and while Mossadegh was at The Hague). While now submerged, these dissident elements will probably reassert themselves in the near future;
- (3) National Front policy to date so closely parallels the Tudeh's that any departure from the present line is bound to be exploited by the Tudeh in an attempt to cause large-scale defection among the masses.

6. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED]

## 7. Serious Damage to American Prestige

- a. The publicity which was given to the prompt visit on 18 July of the United States Ambassador to Qavam led to the widespread belief that the United States condoned Qavam and the tactics associated with him, and that the United States was planning to extend financial aid to his Government.
- b. Tudeh propaganda, associating the United States with the security forces actions against the populace during riots, was highly effective.
- c. The vote against Iran by the United States Judge at The Hague, in contrast to the favorable British vote, had a tremendously adverse impact in Iran.
- d. The United States will bear the brunt of anti-Western feeling because:

(1)



- (2) the size of U.S. installations in Iran makes the U.S. a good target, both on economic and political grounds.
- e. Although a number of National Front leaders recognize the fact that the U.S. is the only hope for Iran today, it is difficult for them to voice such feelings, because of the United States' reputed sympathy for Qavam and the decision of the American Judge at The Hague.
  - f. As a consequence of the above factors, the United States' position in Iran is expected to deteriorate.

## 8. Conclusions

The significance of the events discussed here is primarily that of the upset of the traditional balance of internal political power. The Shah apparently is neutralized as an independent political force. He no longer is able to exercise control over Government policies. In fact, the position is now reversed and it is most likely the Prime Minister who will be exploiting whatever is left of the Shah's prestige to the Government's advantage. The Tudeh, which heretofore was a source of subversion and represented a growing element of pressure on the Government, now emerges as a major opposition force with its organization, teamlike and anonymous leadership, growing momentum, and morale stimulated by the success of the 21 July riots. Mossadegh is stronger personally and is supported by the will of a large mass of the people. Nevertheless he heads a weak, inefficient Government machinery which apparently is seeking with success to attract the Army within the orbit of its influence and control.

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COUNTRY Iran

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DATE DISTR. 20 March 1952

SUBJECT 1. Possible Successor to Prime Minister Mossadegh  
2. Illness of Mullah Kashani

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[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] that, if Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh should be assassinated or resign from office, his most likely successor would be Ibrahim Hakimi (Hakim-ul-Mil).
- Mullah Kashani is gravely ill with cancer.

- [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED], as of [REDACTED] 1951 Hakimi (Senator from Tehran) was one of the Shah's closest advisers.
- [REDACTED] Comment. As of [REDACTED] 1952 Kashani had not left Iran for his intended cure [REDACTED].

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