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SUBJECT: Briefing of the Japanese Government concerning Developments in Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations.

TO: The American Embassy TOKYO

*600,0012/8-361
dgm 125
22 Sep 10 9 '61*

In the course of his talks with the President in Washington, Prime Minister Ikeda indicated that the Japanese Government is prepared to make a vigorous effort to help develop international understanding and support for the United States-United Kingdom concept of a treaty on discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests under adequate international controls. The President expressed gratification and told the Prime Minister that we would arrange for periodic briefings of the Japanese Government on matters related to the nuclear test ban talks.

The Department believes that the assistance of Japan would be especially useful in connection with United Nations General Assembly action on the nuclear weapons test issue this fall. The exercise of Japan's influence, especially among Asian and African countries, might facilitate the adoption of resolutions conducive to the Western objective of early agreement on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective controls. It might help avert the type of resolution we do not desire: one which urges the indefinite continuation of an uncontrolled moratorium on testing, regardless of progress in negotiations, and/or one which calls for the submerging of the nuclear test ban issue in the issue of general disarmament.

It is therefore suggested that you arrange a briefing of a Japanese Government representative, or representatives, as you may consider appropriate, making use of the attached material to extent considered desirable. You might highlight the point that the United States and the United Kingdom have requested the inscription on the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly of the item, "The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control." They have done this in order that the General Assembly may be apprised of the impasse

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7/18/61

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impasse at the Geneva negotiations -- an impasse due to the patent failure of the Soviet Union to heed the General Assembly mandate "to make every effort to reach agreement as soon as possible." (Resolution 1578 of December 20, 1960)

You are also authorized to brief Japanese Government on developments in bilateral discussions with Soviet Union on disarmament.

RUSK

Enclosures:

1. Talking Points
2. United States Note of July 15, 1961
3. Explanatory Memorandum of July 15, 1961
4. USSR Note of July 5, 1961
5. USSR Aide Memoire of June 4, 1961
6. Booklet, "Guide to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests."
7. Department's 137 to Moscow of July 13, 1961.
8. United States Note of June 17, 1961.

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Enclosure 1

TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS1. Desirability of a Test Ban Agreement

- A. Would eliminate concern about radioactive fallout.
- B. Would contribute to halting dangerous proliferation in nuclear weapons capabilities.
- C. Would provide an important agreed first step toward controlled disarmament, improving prospects for other agreements and commencing a process which could build confidence among nations and decrease the danger of war.
- D. Operations of international control organization would constitute valuable pilot project for operations verifying compliance with future agreements.
- E. Communist bloc would cooperate with remainder of world in a major international enterprise under ground rules barring obstruction.

2. Progress toward a Test Ban Agreement, 1958-1960

- A. Scientists of the West and the Soviet bloc agreed as to technical aspects of a control system needed for supervising ban on all tests except underground tests giving a relatively small seismic signal.
- B. Plenary conference of United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union reached agreement on 17 of 25 treaty articles, and two or three technical annexes. Agreement was reached on the framework of an international control organization, including a supreme supervising control commission, and a single administrator carrying out the provisions of the treaty and the instructions of the control commission.
- C. Plenary conference agreed as to the concept of a first step "threshold" treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests except tests underground which cannot now be effectively controlled. (The "threshold" for these underground tests is 4.75 seismic magnitude, which amounts to a 19 kiloton yield for a test conducted in tamped earth, but to a larger explosion if concealed for example in a salt dome.)

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D. Plenary conference also agreed as to the concept of a research program by the three powers, for the purpose of improving the capability of an international control organization in underground detection. Such a research program would be accompanied by a temporary voluntary undertaking by each of the three powers not to conduct tests underground below 4.75 seismic magnitude, even though such tests are not banned by the treaty itself.

3. The Major United States-United Kingdom initiative of 1961

A. In keeping with the General Assembly resolution of December 20, 1960, the United States and the United Kingdom introduced major compromise proposals on March 21 & May 29, and a complete treaty text which they would be prepared to sign immediately on April 18. (Embassy will find treaty text in "disarmament information kit" previously forwarded. Alternative treaty text on the inspection quota issue was introduced at the conference May 31.)

B. Principal proposals were as follows:

(1) Number of on-site inspections in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and their territories to range from 12 to 20, depending on annual incidence of suspicious seismic events.

(2) Number of control posts in Soviet Union reduced to 19, as compared to 14 in United Kingdom and 16 in the United States (including territories).

(3) The supreme supervising Control Commission to be composed of four representatives of the Western powers and their associates, four Soviet bloc representatives, and three representatives of uncommitted States, provided however that rapid, reliable day-by-day control operations are clearly provided for in the treaty.

(4) No underground nuclear tests giving a small seismic signal would be carried out for a period of three years after treaty signature, despite absence of controls. During this period, the three States would cooperate in a research program for the purpose of finding methods of control.

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Soviet Response

- A. The Soviet Union made no constructive response.
- B. The Soviet Union has not introduced a single positive proposal within the past year and a half.
- C. Instead, the Soviet Union has, since March 21 of this year, retreated from agreements also reached. Its most significant backward step was a proposal that day-by-day executive authority over the international control organization be exercised, not by a single administrator able to act rapidly and impartially as the Soviet Union had previously agreed, but by a three-man administrative council (including representatives of each of the nuclear sides, and a neutral) which could take action only with concurrence of all members. Such an arrangement would result in blocking of every control activity unless the Soviet Union concurred in it.
- D. The Soviet Union also adhered to positions calling for a grossly inadequate level of control over a test ban agreement:
- (1) Inspection of suspicious events in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to be limited to a maximum of three annually, regardless of number of suspicious events occurring.
 - (2) No control operations until four years after treaty enters into force.
 - (3) Proposals for staff of control organization which would permit, to large extent, self inspection. For instance, chiefs of control posts must be nationals of the country where the control post is located; chiefs of inspection teams must be nationals of the country being inspected. Also, in many instances, two-thirds of the staff would be composed of nationals of the country being controlled or inspected and of its allies.
 - (4) Criteria for determining that an event eligible for inspection has occurred, so drawn as to eliminate artificially a considerable number of suspicious events.

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(5) Soviet Union demands that uncontrolled moratorium on underground nuclear tests below 4.75 seismic magnitude be of unlimited duration, but refuses to take an active part in the research program which is intended to find means of controlling this type of test.

D. In view of the inability of the United States and United Kingdom to accept such proposals, the Soviet Union has called for merging the nuclear test ban talks with negotiations for "general and complete disarmament." (Soviet Aide Memoire of June 4, 1961). Soviet unwillingness to engage in constructive negotiation was underlined in the polemical Soviet note of July 5, 1961.

5. Current United States position

A. In its note of June 17, 1961, the United States declined to accept a merger of the test ban negotiations into comprehensive disarmament negotiations, because:

(1) Progress already made in three years of negotiation should not be given up; instead, efforts should continue until agreement is reached.

(2) Reasons for desirability of separate test ban agreement, as set out in Paragraph One of these Talking Points, are still applicable.

(3) Merger proposal reverses the Soviet position of 1958 that a test ban agreement should be negotiated separately. US and UK accepted this position, and based their sincere efforts to accomplish agreement on it.

(4) Merger with other complicated issues would undoubtedly result in further period of delay in reaching a test ban agreement. During such a period, the United States would find it more and more dangerous to its security to accept an uncontrolled commitment not to conduct nuclear weapons tests, in the absence of evidence that the Soviet Union has likewise stopped testing. Soviet Union, with its closed society and actions shrouded in secrecy, would continue to be free to conduct nuclear weapons tests without fear of exposure.

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B. In view of the impasse, the United States and the United Kingdom on July 15 requested inscription on the agenda of the Sixteenth General Assembly of an item entitled, "The Urgent Need for a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests under Effective International Control." In a note of the same date, the United States Government urged the Soviet Government to allow the negotiators at Geneva to get on with their work.

(1) Patent Soviet failure to comply with General Assembly resolution of December 20, 1960 was exposed. (Resolution "urges the States concerned to make every effort to reach agreement as soon as possible on the cessation of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, under appropriate international control.")

(2) It was made clear that US-UK proposals for control system organization would in no sense deprive Soviet Union of equal participation.

(a) It has equal membership with Western States on policy-making control commission, and in control organization staff.

(b) Appointment of the administrator requires Soviet concurrence.

(c) Administrator only carries out treaty directives, and directives of control commission, to which he is responsible.

(d) But he can take day-by-day action rapidly, whereas three-man administrative council actions would be subject to delay or blocking.

6. United States Intentions

A. The United States intends to continue negotiating at Geneva, and to continue to give maximum international exposure to the reasonable Western position.

B. The United States will work for General Assembly action having the effect of forcing the Soviet Union to early agreement on an adequately controlled test ban, or of exposing as a fraud Soviet claims of favoring adequately controlled measures of disarmament.

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C. The United States will resist merger of the test ban negotiations into talks on other disarmament measures.

D. The United States will continue its own vigorous research efforts to find ways of improving capabilities for control over nuclear tests carried out underground.

7. Bilateral Discussions with Soviet Union on Disarmament

A. Representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union met in Washington, D.C. in the period June 19 to June 30, and are meeting in Moscow, beginning July 17. No progress has yet been achieved.

B. The United States is seeking agreement with the Soviet Union on (1) a disarmament framework to be recommended to other States which will be invited to participate in multilateral disarmament negotiations, and (2) on composition of a multilateral forum for conduct of such negotiations.

C. The United States is not willing to discuss substantive questions, other than in context of broad agreed framework, since such discussion must be purpose of multilateral negotiating forum.

D. The United States has introduced a draft statement on framework (See 137 to Moscow, attached). With regard to forum, the United States proposed four alternatives (see 137 to Moscow, attached). The United States favors earliest possible resumption of multilateral talks; we believed understanding had been achieved at the United Nations between Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Gromyko on resumption July 31; the Soviet Union now denies this.

E. The Soviet Union showed unwillingness to discuss framework and forum. Instead it sought to involve the United States in discussion on specific disarmament plans. The Soviet Union introduced a written statement on general and complete disarmament ~~and amplifying~~ the Soviet disarmament proposals submitted to the General Assembly September 23, 1960. The Soviet Union made clear that general and complete disarmament must be the exclusive basis for negotiations, and that a single indivisible treaty should be signed.

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