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November 19, 1983

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**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Subject: Public Diplomacy Strategy for the Middle East
and Lebanon.**

Attached please find a memorandum from Under Secretary Eagleburger describing and forwarding a public diplomacy strategy paper on the Middle East and Lebanon for consideration by the Special Planning Group.

Corey

**Charles Hill
Executive Secretary**

Attachments:

As stated.

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United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: LMORIN
Date: 10/29/97
Case ID: 9204703

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United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

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
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE,
CHAIRMAN, SPECIAL PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy Strategy
for the Middle East and Lebanon

REFERENCE: Your memorandum of October 26, 1983

A working group of the IPC has prepared a broad, long-term strategy for overall Middle East public diplomacy. The document, which is attached, sets forth a public diplomacy strategy and process for three facets of the Middle East question: Lebanon, the peace process and regional security. Since our public diplomacy strategy must adapt to the ever-changing events of the region, there must be a periodic review of its requirements. Therefore, the paper has been divided into an assessment of the policy aspects of public diplomacy strategy and a number of appendices covering operational programs and information which will be subject to frequent monitoring.

To fulfill the monitoring function, I recommend that the SPG at its next meeting discuss and approve the broad approach described in the attached paper. Thereafter, the Middle East subgroup of the IPC will conduct periodic reviews of our public diplomacy strategy.


Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Chairman
International Political Committee

Attachment: as stated.

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Cleared: P-GBHelman

WMontgomery

NEA:DSchneider

NEA:TNassif

NEA/P:THoman

PA:JMcCarthy

PA/CAP:IPernick

USIA/NEA:DRobins

USIA/P/G:RMcClellan

DCD/PD:RWarren

DCD/PD:ECook

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY
FOR
THE MIDDLE EAST AND LEBANON

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SUMMARY

Setting

U.S. policy in the Middle East faces a period of intense public scrutiny following the Marine massacre in Beirut. The October 23 explosion was a watershed event, damaging the broad consensus among Americans that efforts to seek a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement and to protect American strategic and economic interests were worthy goals of our foreign policy.

The Beirut massacre dramatically focussed public attention on the most controversial aspect of US Middle East policy without the compensating influence of the accepted Arab-Israeli framework. Polls show that the public is still largely divided on President Reagan's justification for maintaining a US military presence in Beirut. New public awareness and scrutiny of our role in Lebanon could result either in increased support for or opposition to our overall Middle East policy, depending on the outcome of events in Lebanon. Successful resolution of the Lebanon crisis is, therefore, essential to sustaining broad support for the Administration in this area.

This paper sets forth a public diplomacy strategy and process for three facets of the Middle East question: Lebanon, the peace process and regional security. Because our public diplomacy must be responsive to the kaleidoscopic events of the Middle East, it is essential to keep its requirements under constant review. Thus, this paper:

- assesses the policy aspects of our public diplomacy strategy;
- attaches appendices which should be the subjects of regular monitoring; and
- recommends the establishment of an interagency subgroup under the International Political Committee (IPC) to conduct that monitoring.

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A. Strategy Goals and Scope

Goals: The initial goal of our public diplomacy strategy must be to shift public attention to broader Middle East issues.

Domestically,

-- it must aim to maintain and enhance the American people's awareness of the region, its importance to US national interests and the continued need for public support for long-standing and historically non-controversial US goals.

Overseas,

-- it must persuade foreign audiences of the merits of U.S. objectives in the area and that by supporting those objectives they can contribute to overall political and economic stability.

B. Summary of Current Public Opinion
(A more complete analysis is contained in Appendix I)

1. Lebanon

Because of the October 23 Marine massacre, recent public attention to Middle East issues has been focussed almost exclusively upon the US role in Lebanon.

Domestic reaction

According to the polls, the three items of public concern are:

--a desire that any US commitment in Lebanon be limited. A clear majority neither wants the US to get involved in a war in Lebanon nor to increase the US Marine presence there;

--doubts about the viability of the Marines' mission.

--the belief that the Administration is relying too heavily on military means instead of diplomacy to resolve international problems.

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Positive effects of the President's October 27 speech may be short-lived, since they seem to be primarily the result of immediate reactions to the Beirut attack on the Marines and the successful action in Grenada. A public diplomacy strategy must be based on a clear exposition of our goals to maintain a reasonable level of support.

Overseas reaction

Overseas the principal concerns are:

--a conviction that the West must not abandon its efforts to obtain a negotiated settlement in Lebanon, which takes into account the interests of all the Lebanese factions, as well as those of the West, Israel and Syria.

--disillusionment over the role of the Peace-keeping force in Lebanon.

--fear that if the force, particularly the US contingent, withdraws now, Syria and the USSR would dominate Lebanon.

--a belief that certain aspects of US Middle East policy are faulty and new European initiatives are necessary.

--a desire the U.S. neither expand the MNF nor retaliate for the Marine Massacre, without full consultations among the MNF participating countries.

--apprehension that U.S.-Israeli ties may hamper relations with the Arabs and the Third World.

2. Middle East Peace Process

Domestic reaction:

-- While most Americans surveyed support our Middle East policy as enunciated in the President's September 1, 1982, speech, some now write off that initiative as dead. King Hussein is seen as having irrevocably forsaken peace negotiations with Israel, while Israel's own immediate rejection of our initiative tends to be forgotten.

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-- Syria, backed by the Soviet Union, is viewed as playing a spoiler role not only in Lebanon, but in the overall peace process.

-- The damage done by the Israeli settlements is recognized only when it is in the spotlight.

Overseas reaction:

-- A prevailing view in much of the world media is that the President's September 1 peace initiative has failed.

-- In some of the moderate Arab countries (e.g., Egypt, Jordan), there is a feeling that the US will either make a new "positive and effective" move or that a new Middle East strategy will be forthcoming.

-- Most Arab commentators believe the U.S. is the sole actor on the Middle East scene with enough influence over Israel to negotiate a peace. But they are increasingly convinced that the U.S. lacks the will to exercise that influence.

-- Even those Arab countries most sympathetic to the US believe that unqualified U.S. support for Israel is contrary to the best interests of the U.S.

3. Regional Security

Domestic reaction :

--There is some public sentiment that U.S. arms programs with Arab nations could jeopardize the security of Israel.

-- Others view many Arab regimes as inherently unstable and challenge our rationale for supporting them. Some also question whether we truly wish to see a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq War, and believe that the U.S. may want instead to see the two countries neutralize each other.

Overseas reaction:

-- Worry over the Iran-Iraq War and its possible consequences for the supply of oil is particularly acute in Japanese media, but is also prominent in Western European media.

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C. Long-range Goals

Long-range public diplomacy strategy goals are to:

--galvanize continued support for a major US role in the region.

-- keep in the forefront of public consciousness that the US alone cannot achieve a Middle East settlement; Israel and the Arabs must negotiate face-to-face.

--make clear that even in an election year, the US commitment to the search for peace remains unchanged.

--keep public attention focussed on the strategic importance of the Middle East. Despite difficulties, we cannot simply walk away from the region's problems.

--generate support both in the US and abroad for the US approach to regional security as an essential element of our push for peace.

--broaden understanding of the need to help all of our friends in the area in meeting their legitimate defense requirements.

--expose Soviet efforts to sabotage the peace process.

--keep the regional security focus sufficiently broad so that there is a greater appreciation of the relationship between what happens in Southwest Asia (e.g. Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq) and what happens in the Persian Gulf and the rest of the region.

--keep the Europeans and other friends abroad publicly supportive of our efforts in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East.

--underscore the Administration's continued commitment to the goals the President outlined in his September 1 initiative, as well as the Camp David Accord and UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.

--emphasize the long-range commitment of the US to a peaceful and stable Lebanon as part of a peaceful and stable Middle East.

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--ensure that there is no misunderstanding about the US commitment to freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf.

--focus public attention on the economic as well as the political realities of the region, so that our friends in Europe and Asia are constantly reminded that they too have a stake in supporting our goals for the region.

D. Themes

Public diplomacy themes must not only address US long-term policy interests in the region, but must be adaptable to tactical needs of near-term policy in a rapidly evolving situation. Themes should be reviewed monthly or more often as events affecting policy occur. A listing of currently applicable themes is provided at Appendix B.

E. Audiences

A public affairs effort should include specific audiences. Domestically, the principal audiences are the Congress, media and segments of the public-at-large (including business, labor, women's organizations, veterans, and special interest groups.) Overseas the primary focus is upon key academic and opinion leaders, as well as the media, including the foreign press represented in the United States.

1. The Congress

The Congress is an important audience in any public diplomacy effort relating to the Middle East. Very few Congressmen and Senators have constituencies which are indifferent to developments in the region. Therefore, we will continue to consult closely with the leadership, appropriate committees and subcommittees to ensure that the Congress fully is briefed on our Middle Eastern policies. A list of committees is included in Appendix D.

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2. The Media

The media are a necessary focus of a public affairs action plan. Speakers, therefore, must be made available for:

- The principal national and regional media centers
- Newspaper and magazine Editorial Boards
- Radio/TV programs and talk shows

3. Domestic Public

--Special Interest Publics: business, labor, women, veterans, special interest groups.

--Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's).

4. Foreign Public: Europe, Middle East, Third World

- Governing elites (in the Middle East individuals as well as institutions.)
- other senior government/political figures
- the academic community
- key business groups
- the media, both press and electronic
- the corps of foreign correspondents

F. COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES

The U.S. Government has an extraordinarily extensive range of communications resources to support public diplomacy strategies. The breadth and depth of our capabilities permit comprehensive, flexible approaches which can be tailored to widely varying audiences and policy needs. The principal communications resources available to support the present strategy are listed in Appendix C.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Public Diplomacy Action Plan.....Page...9
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Appendix C: Communications Resources.....Page..20
Appendix D: Congressional Audiences.....Page..21
Appendix E: List of Speakers.....Page..22
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Appendix G: Major Media Markets.....Page..26
Appendix H: Publications.....Page..30
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Public Opinion

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APPENDIX A

Public Diplomacy Action Plan Middle East and Lebanon

<u>Item/Activity</u>	<u>Responsible Office</u>	<u>Time Frame</u>
1. Review roster of ME Speakers (Domestic)	PA, NEA	Initial review by November 21 thereafter biweekly
" " (Foreign)	PA, NEA, USIA	Initial review by November 21
(See current list at Appendix E)		
2. Review/update Speakers' Book	PA, NEA	Initial Review by November 21 thereafter biweekly
(Sample Speech, map, Background notes available)		
3. Calendar of Speaking Opportunities		
Talk shows, platform engagements (App F)	PA, NEA	On-going; Periodic operational reports will be issued.
		first report by 11/29/83
4. Arrange meetings with Editorial boards in Major media centers.	PA	On-going; Periodic operational reports.
		First due 11/29/83
Assistant Secretary Murphy will:		
--schedule a visit each month to a different major media center		Monthly beginning/Dec 83
--have regular background briefings for State Dept accredited journalists		as required. First operational report due by 11/29/83

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--brief European and other foreign

journalists in London/Paris/Rome or other
suitable transit point enroute to or
from the Middle East as available

(Whenever possible, he should also brief foreign
correspondents at the USIA Foreign Press Center).
Other senior NEA officials will make themselves
available for similar briefings while travelling
overseas.

5. Briefings of US media
by Senior USG officials .PA On-going; monthly
status report beginning
12/01/83
- (Current activities at Appendix G)_
6. Briefings of Foreign Press
in US by Senior USG officials USIA
(either at Foreign Press Center
or in Principal's office) USIA, PA March 1984
7. EURONET audio-visual inter-
view with: Undersecretary Eagleburger USIA November 17
" " Robert C. McFarlane USIA December
8. Presidential interview with
selected European media USIA, WH Early January 84
9. Interview with Secretary
Schultz for placement on
European television through
the European Broadcasting
Union and VISINEWS USIA, PA. Mid December
10. Electronic dialogues between
a Senior State Department official
and a select Middle
Eastern audience USIA, PA February 1984
11. Electronic Dialogues between
Deputy Secretary or U/Secretary
for Political Affairs and a select
European audience on the Middle East P,NEA,USIA .Early 1984
12. Electronic Dialogue with
senior USG officials and
a Japanese audience on ME
oil situation and implica-
tions for the Far East EA, NEA, USIA Early 1984

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- 13. Conduct Public Opinion surveys on US ME policy in
 - (a) Japan USIA Feb/Mar 1984
 - (b) Western Europe USIA Feb/Mar 1984
- 14. Brief Congressional leadership (see appendix D) H,NEA Ongoing; periodic operational report beginning 12/01/83
- 15. Brief appropriate committees of congress (Primarily HFAC, SPFC, HAFIC sub cte on Middle East/Europe, Foreign operations cte of House/Senate appropriations committees/Armed Svcs Ctes) H,NEA " "
- 16. Brief NGO representatives PA,NE December 7
- 17. Prepare new GIST on Lebanon NEA, PA, S/P December 83
- 18. Prepare new GIST on Peace Process in the Middle East NEA, PA, S/P December 83
- 19- Prepare new GIST on Regional Security Issues in NEA NEA, PA, S/P December 83
- 20. Organize Speakers Course NEA, FSI, PA ASAP
- 21. Distribute publications (Appendix H) PA Ongoing Periodic Status report monthly beginning 12/01/83
- 22. Preparation of OP-ED pieces..... PA/NEA/S-P periodic Status report beginning 12/09/83.

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APPENDIX B

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES
Middle East and Lebanon

1. Lebanon

(a) Domestic audiences:

--we will stay the course because it is in America's long-term interest.

--the United States and its moderate friends in the region remain committed to President Reagan's goals: the withdrawal of all foreign forces; the re-establishment of a stable sovereign and truly representative Lebanese Government; and arrangements to ensure the security of Israel's northern border, and a solution to the Palestinian issue.

--the Marines are part of a multinational force which includes the British, French and Italians. Their role is to bolster the Lebanese Government as it re-establishes its authority and, by its pressure to contribute to the safety of the civilian population in areas where the MNF is deployed.

--The loss of our Marines was tragic for the United States. France, too, has paid a price in lives lost. But why withdraw the Marines at the very time that [their effectiveness is being established?] Were we to abandon Lebanon now, the way would be paved for the Syrians, working closely with the Soviets, to work their will. This would invite civil strife and risk renewed open warfare between Syria and Israel. Lebanon would once again become a headquarters for international terrorism, aimed at destabilizing the moderate Arab regimes and attacking Israel.

--We are taking steps to improve the security of our Marines. We do not envisage any change at this time in the size, role or mission of the MNF.

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--It is now up to Syria to begin serious negotiations leading to the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces. This can be done in a way which will take into account Syria's security concerns.

--The abrogation of the May 17 Lebanon-Israel Agreement would be a setback to peace. That agreement governs the removal of Israeli troops. Were it abrogated, the situation would return to what it was when the negotiating process began. We oppose abrogation by either of the signatories.

--The Lebanese national reconciliation talks are a significant and important step to enable the Lebanese to govern themselves. The talks will be difficult but must continue, providing all participating parties are willing to continue and no other emergency disrupts them. We firmly support the Lebanese central government as it works to hammer out compromises.

--It is our hope that the Syrians and Israelis will both recognize that the time has come to promote national reconciliation in Lebanon.

--Despite Lebanon's history of internecine strife, it is also a fact that for some thirty years following its independence Lebanon was a model democratic experiment in the area. To write off Lebanon now would be to condemn a people to a future of strife and warfare, ripe for exploitation by powerful outsiders.

--A successful resolution of the Lebanon problem will enable the United States to pursue with renewed vigor the quest for a broader Middle East peace.

(b)Overseas:

--What happens in one part of the Middle East has vital implications for what happens elsewhere in the region. The failure of the U.S. and its MNF Allies to stand fast in Lebanon could further enbolden Iran in its Middle East aspirations. Conversely, a continuation or intensification of the Iran-Iraq war will have a destabilizing effect elsewhere in the Middle East. None of the Middle East problems can be seen in isolation from each other.

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--the MNF has been a success, not a failure as some contend. It has prepared the stage for the ongoing Lebanese reconciliation talks in Geneva. The alternative to the MNF would be greater chaos in Lebanon, less chance for Lebanon to regain its sovereignty, and a more dominant role for Syria and the USSR in the Middle East. Cowardly, terrorist attempts to force the withdrawal of the MNF will not succeed.

--Political and strategic stability is a vital Western interest. Common efforts are needed to resolve potentially explosive issues, including the Arab-Israeli, Iraq-Iran and Lebanese crises.

--All responsible countries have an interest in seeing a united, peaceful Lebanon. If our efforts in Lebanon fail, where will the process of disintegration lead?

2. Middle East Peace Process

(a) Domestic:

--There is no easy way to foster a process which will provide security for Israel and will enable the Palestinian people to realize their legitimate rights.

--The principal assumption behind all our efforts is that the overwhelming majority of peoples there earnestly desire peace. We will work with them to attain it, and broadened negotiations are the essential next step.

--The President's September 1 Initiative remains on the table for those who seek true peace, real security for Israel and a brighter future for the Palestinian people. It remains the only practicable proposal likely to produce a just and lasting peace.

--The process needs an offer from a credible Arab partner to negotiate peace. The Arabs must decide for themselves how to bring that about. We cannot act alone in the quest for peace.

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--It is wrong to assume that we will be unable to play a vigorous role as a full partner in any negotiations during an election year. The pursuit of peace and the practice of democracy go hand-in-hand.

--There is no question that Syria has taken on the role of mischief-maker with respect to an overall Middle East peace as well as with respect to Lebanon. Syria knows that the Golan Heights remain on our agenda for a comprehensive peace, but that such a peace can only be obtained through the process of negotiations.

--The United States does not seek to deny to the Syrians a role in the peace process. But that role must be a constructive one pointing toward peace rather than disruptive of the constructive steps others might like to make.

--It is clear that the Soviet Union is not yet ready to contribute to the attainment of peace. We are convinced that their current obstructive efforts will fail if Middle Eastern leaders will act boldly in the cause of peace.

--A resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute requires active United States participation because we uniquely have effective working relations with all parties to the dispute. The Soviets do not.

--King Hussein and other moderate Arab leaders have assured the President that they realize the importance of his initiative and they support a negotiated settlement which assures the security of all states in the region and addresses the underlying causes of conflict.

--We are committed to the territorial integrity and security of all the states in the region.

--There has been no change in our PLO policy. When the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist and accepts UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, we are prepared to enter into dialogue with it.

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--We regret the tragic loss of civilian life that has been caused by the PLO fighting in Northern Lebanon.

(b) Overseas:

--The United States is acting as a responsible great power in the interests of international stability. We are in a unique position to do so, because of our effective relations with Israel and the Arab States.

--the President's September 1 peace initiative remains the only practical basis for achieving peace in the Middle East. At this time there is no viable alternative to achieving that objective.

--the Western Powers have a moral commitment in the Middle East to Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinians.

--While the main focus of world attention in recent months has been Lebanon, the U.S. remains prepared to pursue its broader objective of an equitable, comprehensive Middle East peace.

--As President Reagan has made clear, U.S. elections will not interrupt our search for an equitable settlement of the Middle East conflict. His appointment of Donald Rumsfeld as his personal representative to the Middle East is a measure of his determination and commitment.

--the US is recognized as having been constructive, creative and fair in its participation in Middle East negotiations. Our objective is to help end these conflicts in a manner that is equitable to all parties.

--The chief victims of the policies of the rejectionist approach are the Palestinian people themselves, who earnestly seek the peaceful realization of their legitimate rights. We support them in that quest, but cannot do it for them. Face-to-face negotiations between Arabs and Israelis are essential to progress.

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3. Regional Security

(a) Domestic audiences:

--Our policy addresses vital U.S. national interests, including our concern for the security of Israel and security for the Persian Gulf, which is vital to the economies of the industrialized world and to the stability of the region.

--Our security assistance programs have enhanced the ability of our friends in the region to defend themselves against internal and external threats.

--The United States has acted decisively in response to threats to the instability of the region, including Iranian threats to disrupt the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf by blockading the Straits of Hormuz.

--We are neutral with respect to the war. This conflict threatens the stability of the entire region.

--The United States deplores the continuation of hostility between Iran and Iraq and strongly supports a negotiated settlement based on the principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention in the internal affairs of others.

--We reiterate our commitment, first expressed at the outbreak of hostilities, to freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, a matter which is of vital importance to the entire international community.

--The Soviet Union poses a serious threat to the interests of the states of the area as well as to those of the West.

--The United States seeks an early end to the agony of the Afghan people resulting from the brutal Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. We call on the Soviets to withdraw so that the war can end and a free Afghanistan be restored. We strongly support UN efforts to bring about a peaceful negotiated political settlement based on the four United Nations resolutions on Afghanistan, which call for

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the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops; the independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan; self-determination for the Afghan people; and the return of the refugees with safety and honor.

--If we are to advance major United States national interests, we must provide resources commensurate with the need to strengthen the economies and defensive capabilities of key friendly countries in the Middle East.

--In our efforts to advance the Middle East peace process and to promote the resolution of conflicts elsewhere in the region, we must give equal attention to all of our friends in the area and ensure that they are capable of meeting their own legitimate defense needs. The U.S. would never adopt an arms policy which jeopardized Israeli security.

(b) Foreign audiences:

--while U.S. vital interests are at stake in the Middle East, so too are those of Western Europe and Japan, which get about a third and a half of their oil respectively from the Gulf, compared to about five percent for the US.

-- Also at stake are interests of those Arab states threatened by a spillover the Iran-Iraq war and a closure of the Gulf.

--the US and Europe share a common and absolutely vital economic interest in ensuring the supply line from the Persian Gulf and in guaranteeing Western economic interests in the Middle East.

--the Soviets seek to expand their influence through the exploitation of regional instability. The West and the Arab states have a long-term stake in blocking this expansion.

--US policy is aimed at securing the interests of our Allies as well as our own in our search for peace, stability, the just resolution of conflicts and the prevention of Soviet expansionism. The military option is a last resort, but if it is to be a deterrent, force must be viewed as a legitimate possibility.

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--the U.S. has not supplied either of the belligerents with war materiel since the outbreak of hostilities nor have we authorized the transfer of U.S. weapons under our control by third parties.

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APPENDIX C

Communications Resources

1. Domestic

- Speakers Program (list of speakers and platform opportunities attached as Appendices E and F)
- Speaker's Book
- Speaker's course (FSI)
- Briefing Material
 - Speeches
 - GIST
 - Special Reports
 - Press Packages
- Diplomats in Residence
- Retired FSO/FSIO's
- Overcomplement FSO/FSIO's

2. Overseas

- USIA press contacts/placements/wireless file
- VOA editorials
- Broadcasts overseas of President's Saturday talks
- Presidential interviews with select Middle East and Western European Correspondents
- EURONET programs
- Exclusive interviews with Senior USG officials broadcast via European Broadcasting Union or VISINEWS
- Regularly scheduled briefings by senior USG officials at USIA foreign press center
- Electronic Dialogues
- AMPART speakers
- Foreign Audience Analysis surveys

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APPENDIX D :

CONGRESSIONAL AUDIENCES

House of Representatives:

- Leadership of the House.
- Foreign Affairs Committee
Middle East/Europe Subcommittee
- Appropriations Committee: Foreign Operations
Subcommittee
- Armed Services Committee

Senate:

- Leadership of the Senate
- Foreign Relations Committee
Middle East Subcommittee
- Appropriations Committee
Foreign Operations Subcommittee
- Armed Services Committee

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APPENDIX E

List of Speakers

Department of State
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REGIONAL PROGRAMS OFFICE

MIDDLE EAST SPEAKERS

ABINGDON, Edward (NEA/IAI)
ABRAMS, Elliott (HA)
BOVIS, Gene (S/SN)
DIETRICH, David
*DILLON, Robert
DRAPER, Morris (NEA)
EAGLEBURGER, Lawrence (P)
ELLIOTT, Randall (INR)
FAIRBANKS, Richard (S)
GALE, Michael (White House)
GREENE, David (NEA/IAI)
GROSSMAN, Mark (NEA)
HARRIS, George (INR)
HIGGINS, Richard (NEA)
HOMAN, Thomas (NEA)
KIRKPATRICK, Jeanne (USUN)
KRECKO, Alan (NEA)
KULICK, Gilbert (S/P)
*LEWIS, Samuel
LONG, David (S/P)
MACK, David (NEA/ARN)
*Miller, Tom (NEA/IAI)
MONTVILLE, Joseph (INR)
NASSIF, TOM (NEA)
PATRICZIA, Charles (SS/N)
PETERS, Lauralee (NEA/IAI)
PLACKE, James (NEA)
RAPHAEL, Arnold (NEA)
SCHAFFER, Howard (NEA/INS)
SCHNEIDER, David (NEA)
SIMMONS, William (NEA/PAB)
TEICHER, Howard (NSC)
**TWINAM, Joseph (NEA)
*VIETS, Richard
WALKER, David (NEA)

* When in U.S.

**Limited Availability

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Potential Amparts or Conference Speakers on Mideast Issues

U.S. Officials

Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA,
Department of State
Nicholas Veliotos, Ambassador to Egypt
Robert McFarlane, NSC Advisor
Donald Rumsfeld, Special Representative to the
Middle East
Morris Draper, Department of State,
Allen Kreczko, L/NEA
Richard Fairbanks, (S/SN)
Charles Patrizia, (S/SN)
Roger Pajek, National Security Advisor,
Department of the Treasury
Alfred Atherton, Department of State
Robert Pelletreau, DAS, NEA
Thomas Nassif, DAS, NEA
Fred C. Ikle, USPD, DOD
Richard Armitage, AS, ISA, DOD
MG E.L. Tixier, DAS, ISA, DOD
John D. Stempel, DOD
Lt Dan. Fitzgerald, DOD
Lincoln Bloomfield, DOD

Former USG Officials wth Area expertise:

Joseph Sisco
Richard Parker, Editor, Middle East Journal
Hermann Eilts, Boston University, Faculty
Harold Saunders, American Enterprise Institution
Christopher Van Hollen, Islam Centennial Fourteen Committee
Robert Neumann, CSIS
Michael Sterner, Private consultant
William Sullivan, President, American Assembly, Columbia Univ.
Peter Sutherland

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Academics:

William Quandt, Brookings Institution
R.K. Ramazani, University of Virginia (Gulf issues)
Bruce Kuniholm, Duke University
James Bill, University of Texas, Austin (Gulf, Iran issues)
Jerrold Green, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Harvey Sicherman, Washington, D.C.
Mark Tessler, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Seth Tillman, American Enterprise Institution
Fred J. Khouri, Villanova University
Phoebe Marr, University of Tennessee (Iran, Gulf issues)
Malcolm Peck, Middle East Institution (Gulf issues)
Augustus Richard Norton, U.S. Military Academy, Faculty
Theodore Snyder, Wilson Center

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APPENDIX F

Live Platform Opportunities

We are confident that we can develop live platforms in the following media markets--and schedule substantial media--if appropriate senior level speakers are available.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>
<u>November</u>	
5	Boston*
8-9	Columbus
9	East Orange*
29	New Orleans
<u>December</u>	
1	San Diego*
2	San Francisco*
5	New York*
Open	Memphis
Open	Pittsburgh
Open	Kansas City
Open	Los Angeles
<u>January</u>	
13-15	San Francisco
24	Milwaukee
26	Philadelphia
Open	Buffalo
Open	Seattle
Open	Houston
Open	Minneapolis
Open	Dallas
Open	Baltimore
<u>February</u>	
26-29	San Francisco
Open	Hartford
Open	Indianapolis
Open	Chicago
Open	Detroit
Open	Portland
Open	St. Louis

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Open
Open
Open

San Antonio
Palm Beach
San Diego

March

8
Open
Open
Open
Open

Louisville
Providence
Cleveland
Salt Lake City
Des Moines

April

Open
Open
Open

Nashville
Chicago
Cincinnati

May

3
12
Open
Open

Dallas
San Antonio
New York
Louisville

June

30
Open
Open
Open
Open

Kansas City
Boston
Chicago
Houston
Atlanta

*Speaker has been confirmed

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APPENDIX G

Major Media Markets

In connection with visits to the major media markets, we would seek appearances with as many of the listed papers and media outlets as possible:

<u>City</u>	<u>Newspapers</u>	<u>Radio</u>	<u>TV</u>
New York	Times Daily News Post Wall Street Journal	WOR (AM)(Talk)	WCBS-TV "Newsmakers"
Los Angeles	Times Herald Examiner	KABC (AM)(talk) "Michael Jackson Show" KNX (AM)(News)	KABC-TV "AM Los Angeles" "People 7" KNBC-TV "News Conference"
Chicago	Tribune Sune-Times	WGN (AM)(MOR) WBBM (AM)(News) WIND (AM)(news/talk)	WBBM-TV(CBS) "Newsmakers" WLS-TV(ABC) "AM Chicag"
San Francisco	Chronicle Examiner (Oakland Tribune)	KGO (AM)(news/talk) KCBS (AM)(news)	KGO-TV(ABC) "AM San Francisco"
Philadelphia	Inquirer News	KYW (AM)(news) WWDB (FM)(Talk)	KYW-TV(NBC) "Impact" WCAU-TV(CBS) "Update"
Detroit	News Free Press	WJR(AM)(news/talk) WWJ (AM)(news) WXYZ (AM)(news/talk)	WDIV-TV(NBC) news

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Boston	Globe Herald American Christian Science Monitor	WEEI (AM)(news) WBZ (AM)(MOR)	WBZ-TV(NBC) "Live on 4"
Washington	Post	WRC (AM)(news/ talk) NPR	National TV shows) ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN, PBS
Houston- Galveston	Post Chronicle	KPRC(AM)(news/ talk) KRLY (FM)(con- temporary)	(national TV "News Confer- ence 11"
Dallas/ Ft. Worth	Morning News Times	KRLD (AM)(news)	KDFW-TV(CBS) "Point of View"
St. Louis	Globe Democrat Post Dispatch	KMOX (AM)(news/ talk)	KNOX-TV(CBS) "Newsmakers" KSDK-TV(NBC) "Midday AM"
Pittsburgh	Post Gazette Press	KOV (AM)(news/ talk) KDKA (AM)(MOR)	KDKA-TV(CBS) "Pittsburgh Today" WTAE-TV(ABC) Action News Conference
Baltimore	Sun	WBAL (AM)(MOR)	WBAL-TV(NBC) "Edition 11"
Seattle	Post-Intelligencer Times	KIRO (AM)(news/ talk) KING (AM)(con- temporary)	KING-TV(NBC) "King 5 News" KOMO-TV(ABC) "Viewpoint on the News"

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Minneapolis/ St. Paul	Tribune Star	NCCO (AM)(vari- ety) KSTP (FM)(con- temporary)	KSTP-TV(ABC) St. Paul "Dialogue"
Atlanta	Journal Constitution	WKLS (FM)(AOR) WGST (AM)(news)	WSB-TV(CBS) "Eyewitness News" WSB-TV(ABC) "Dialog"
Cleveland	Plain Dealer Press	WMMS (FM)(AOR) WERE (AM)(news/ talk)	WKYC-TV(NBC) "Sunday Mag- azine"
San Diego	Union Tribune	KGB (FM)(AOR) KSDO (AM)(news)	KGTV(ABC) "Newsmakers" KFMB-TV(CBS)
Denver	Post Rocky Mountain News	KOA (AM)(news/ talk)	KBTV(ABC) "Colorado '83"
Milwaukee	Journal Sentinel	WISN (AM)(MOR)	WITI-TV(CBS) "Public Con- ference"
Phoenix	Republic	KTAR (AM)(news/ talk) KOY (FM)(MOR)	KTSP-TV(CBS) "Face the Str"
Cincinnati	Enquirer Post	WLW (AM)(MOR) WEBN (FM)(AOR)	WCPO-TV(CBS) "Impact"
Kansas City	Times Star	WHB (AM)(con- temporary) WCMB (AM)(news/ talk)	WDAF-TV(NBC) "Midday" "Perspective"

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Portland, Oregon	Oregonian	KGW (AM)(con- temporary) KEX (AM)(MOR) KYXI (AM)(news)	KOIN-TV "Impact" "News C fere"
New Orleans	Times-Picayune/ States Item	WSMB (AM)(MOR/ talk)	WDSU-TV "TV 6 I make"
Miami	Herald	WNWS (AM)(news/ talk) WINZ (AM)(news)	WTVJ-TV "Monta- WPLG-TV "Newsm"

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APPENDIX H

PUBLICATIONS

PUBLICATIONS AND DISTRIBUTION

Eleven GISTs on the Middle East are in train, of which the following would be useful for a public diplomacy effort:

- Lebanon (an update of the January 1983 issue)
- Middle East Peace: Problems and Prospects
- Southwest Asian Security Issues
- US-Saudi Relations
- US Policies in North Africa

The others are:

- Western Sahara
- Indian Ocean
- Afghanistan
- US-Indian Relations: New Directions

A Middle East atlas, providing basic facts and illustrating crucial issues, is also in preparation. When completed, it will serve as a basic document on the region.

The following additional materials would be helpful to the effort:

-- a GIST on international peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, including the MNF-Marine presence in Beirut.

-- Background Notes on Israel (last published in April, 1979), Syria (January 1977), Jordan (June 1981), and, should the Geneva meetings produce agreement among the factions, Lebanon (July 1982)

The following materials on the Middle East have been published since August:

<u>Distributed</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Copies</u>
1.	America's Commitment to Peace, President 14,000 Reagan's Nationwide Address, 10/27/83	

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2. The Price of Peace: US Middle East Policy. 12,200
Deputy Secretary Dan to American Jewish
Committee, Phila, 10/27/83
3. The Situation in Lebanon, Secretary Shultz 14,200
to the SFRC and HFAC, 10/20/83
4. Major US Interests in the Middle East, Dep 9,900
Asst Secy Peletreau to HFAC Subcommittee
on Europe & the Middle East, 9/26/83
5. US Objectives in Lebanon, Secretary Shultz 11,500
to the HFAC, 9/20/83
6. A special report, The Libyan Problem, 10/83 10,400
7. August and September Department of State 4,500
Bulletins carried several pieces each on
the Middle East

The audiences receiving these publications were foreign affairs writers, newspapers, magazines, radio/TV stations, political-military and naval science facilities, academic and research institutions, libraries, business, labor, research institutions, libraries, business, labor, professionals, leaders of NGO's, the White House, members of Congress, foreign embassies, overseas US diplomatic missions, Department of State officials, and other government agencies.

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APPENDIX I

Summary of Current Public Opinion

1. Lebanon

Because of the October 23 Marine massacre, public attention to Middle East issues has been focussed almost exclusively upon the US role in Lebanon.

(a) Domestic reaction: The latest poll, taken by ABC/Washington Post one week after the President's October 27 address, shows a small majority of respondents continuing to support retention of U.S. troops in Lebanon (54 percent vs 39 percent favoring removal.) This response was similar to results obtained immediately after the President's speech and also in late September, after the Marines had suffered some casualties. While the President's speech increased public understanding (by 5 to 10 percentage points) of US objectives in Lebanon, a plurality still believes that our goals in Lebanon are not clear.

According to the polls, the three items of public concern are:

--the public wants any US commitment in Lebanon to be limited. A clear majority neither wants the US to get involved in a war in Lebanon nor to increase the US Marine presence there;

--the public is dubious about the viability of the Marines' mission. A two-to-one majority believes that the Marines have not been successful in Lebanon, while a plurality (50 to 37 percent) feels that it is impossible for the Marines to help keep the peace in Lebanon;

--the public believes the Administration is relying too heavily on military means instead of diplomacy to resolve international problems.

Positive effects of the president's speech may be short-lived, since they were related to immediate public reactions to the Beirut attack on the Marines and the successful action in Grenada. A public diplomacy strategy must be supported by a clear exposition of our goals to maintain a reasonable level of support.

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(b) Overseas reaction: A general media theme around the world is that the West must not abandon its efforts to obtain a negotiated settlement in Lebanon which takes into account the interests of the Lebanese factions, of the West and of Israel and Syria. Western European media express disillusionment over the role of the peace-keeping force in Lebanon, but there is also concern that if the force, especially the US component, withdraws now, Syria, and through it the USSR, would dominate Lebanon. At the same time, Western Europeans are very wary about any US attempt either to expand the mission of the Multi-national Force or retaliate for the Marine massacre. A general theme current in Western European media is that aspects of US Middle East policy are faulty and that European initiatives are needed. There is concern that close US ties with Israel may hamper our relations with the Third World. Israeli media reaction has been divided between those who believe the US will opt for increased pressure on Syria, and those who feel US domestic pressures coupled with the imperatives of an election year will force a US-Syrian deal for a face-saving withdrawal of the Marines.

2. Middle East Peace Process

(a) Domestic reaction: While most Americans surveyed support our Middle East policy as enunciated in the President's September 1, 1982, speech, some now write off that initiative as dead. King Hussein is seen as having irrevocably forsaken peace negotiations with Israel, while Israel's own immediate rejection of our initiative tends to be forgotten. Syria, backed by the Soviet Union, is viewed as playing a spoiler role not only in Lebanon, but in the overall peace process. The damage done by the Israeli settlements is recognized only when it is in the spotlight.

(b) Overseas reaction: A prevailing view in much of the world media is that the President's September 1 peace initiative has failed. In some of the moderate Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan etc), there is a feeling that the US will either make a new "positive and effective" move or that a new Middle East strategy will be forthcoming. Most Arab commentators believe the U.S. is the sole actor on the Middle East scene with enough influence over Israel to negotiate a peace. But they are increasingly convinced that the U.S. lacks the will to exercise that influence. Even those Arab countries most sympathetic to the US believe that unqualified U.S. support for Israel is contrary to the best interests of the U.S.

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3. Regional Security

(a) Domestic reaction : There is some public sentiment that U.S. arms programs with Arab nations could jeopardize the security of Israel. Others view many Arab regimes as inherently unstable and challenge our rationale for supporting them. Some also question whether we truly wish to see a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq War.

(b) Overseas reaction: Worry over the Iran-Iraq war and its possible consequences for the supply of oil is particularly acute in Japanese media, but is also prominent in Western European media.

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USIA/P/G-RMcClellan
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